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General Introduction 
 
The search for poverty-reducing growth strategies is a perennial question in economics. While 
economic growth is supposed to be one of the most critical determinant of poverty reduction, 
growth-enhancing development strategies differ considerably with respect to its poverty effects. 
Thus growth determinants should be examined by its poverty-reducing quality. The importance 
of a pro-poor growth focus, however, is in stark contrast to its weak integration into 
macroeconomic theory. Most models simply abstract from poverty issues of growth 
determinants, looking only on aggregate effects. Since empirical evidence shows a remarkable 
heterogeneity of poverty effects in the growth process of different countries, omitting poverty 
aspects in the discussion of growth determinants is a rather euphemistic assumption.   
 
Historically, the idea of pro-poor growth is preceded by discussions on broad-based growth at 
the beginning of the nineties (World Development Report 1990), even if the idea of poverty-
focused growth dates back to the seventies (Chenery/Ahluwalia/Bell/Duloy/Jolly 1974). In 
general, the term pro-poor refers to the idea that economic growth should be good for the poor 
in terms of income, disposable resources or capabilities. However, there is considerable 
ongoing discussion on an appropriate definition and measurement of pro-poor growth 
(Kakwani/Pernia 2000, Anderson/White 2001, Bourguignon 2001, Eastwood/Lipton 2001, 
Chen/Ravallion 2001, Kakwani/Son/Khandker 2003, Klasen 2003, Ravallion 2003). While none 
of the proposed measures has so far set an international accepted standard, most pro-poor 
concepts are income-based. As poverty is a complex and multidimensional phenomenon 
(health, education, gender equity), income-based definitions would restrict the focus of poverty. 
However, income-based measures of poverty can be justified due to mutual causality between 
income poverty and most non-income measures of well-being, even if these linkages are not at 
all perfect (Klasen 2003). 
 
Pro-poor growth based on absolute poverty lines could be defined as a high (negative) growth 
elasticity of a specific poverty measure with respect to per capita income or consumption 
expenditure (Chen/Ravallion 1997, Bourguignon 2001, Ravallion 2001, Datt/Ravallion 2002) or 
as a pro-poor growth index greater than one (Kakwani/Pernia 2000, 
Christiaensen/Demery/Paternostro 2002). To compare pro-poor growth across countries, an 
international standard poverty line would be necessary. International comparable poverty lines, 
however, are only limited available and severely criticized by their construction (Pogge/Reddy 
2002). In addition, the estimated poverty reduction would be sensitive to the value of the 
absolute poverty line (Bourguignon 2001, Ravallion 2001, Chen/Ravallion 1997). 
 
Another part of the literature measures poverty as the share of income of the poorest 20 per 
cent. While the incidence of poverty is fixed in this approach, the variation of the share of 
income of the poorest 20 percent has to be explained. Pro-poor growth can be defined here as 
an elasticity greater than one of the mean income of the poor with respect to overall mean 
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income (Timmer 1997, Gallup/Radelet/Warner 1999, Gugerty/Timmer 1999, Dollar/Kraay 2001, 
Eastwood/Lipton 2001, Anderson/White 2001, Ghura/Leite/Tsangarides 2002).1 Restricting pro-
poor growth to a pure distribution effect, however, would hide the impact of an equiproportionate 
growth effect on poverty reduction (Ravallion 2003). Thus in our research we estimate both the 
distribution effect and the total effect, i.e. the distribution and growth effect, on the 20 and 20 to 
40 percent poorest. Choosing this approach, we are additionally able to capture potential trade-
offs between poverty effects through overall economic growth and via distribution effects.  
 
In our research we analyze three possible determinants of pro-poor growth: external 
indebtedness, exchange rate regimes, and  trade policy. At international economic summits, 
NGOs and the anti-globalization movement call for total debt relief initiatives. Unsustainable 
external debt levels are supposed to be responsible for major setbacks in development activities 
and continuing poverty traps. Theoretical models, however, are oddly silent on possible 
transmission mechanisms between high external debt and income poverty. In addition, the 
effect of high external indebtedness on poverty reduction seems not to be well explored 
empirically.  
 
Second, and related, developing and transitional countries are often hit by devastating currency 
crises. While the exchange rate regime is not the only reason for financial crises, there is 
considerable ongoing discussion on the choice of an optimal exchange rate regime. Theoretical 
and empirical literature, however, do not cover the effect of different exchange rate regimes on 
pro-poor growth. This lack of interest may be especially problematic due to the high vulnerability 
of the poor to external shocks and currency crises. However, the issue of an optimal exchange 
rate regime for pro-poor growth is also important if we abstract from the financial crises 
perspective.  
 
Finally, trade liberalization and integration into international goods markets is assumed to be 
one critical determinant to foster economic growth and reduce poverty. While the effect of trade 
policy on absolute poverty is assumed to be mainly driven by the impact of openness on 
economic growth, empirical evidence on the openness-growth nexus is ambiguous and has 
been severely criticized. In addition, recent cross-country studies provide only mixed results on 
the distribution effect of trade liberalization.  
 
To reveal poverty effects of external indebtedness, exchange rate regimes and trade 
liberalization, the thesis is splitted into three parts. The basic structure of the three chapters, 
however, is identical with respect to the econometric methodology and the underlying data set 
                                            
1 One may also require pro-poor growth to be in absolute rather than proportionate terms, i.e. absolute per capita 
income gains to the poor should exceed absolute per capita income gains. A simple example may explain the 
difference. Equiproportionate growth means that a 1 percent increase in growth increases the income of the poorest 20 
percent (and all others) by 1 percent. Given two persons with 100 $ and 100 000 $ income, equiproportionate growth by 
1 percent would be 101 $ and 101 000 $, respectively. If one requires equal growth in absolute terms, incomes of both 
persons should increase by the same amount, e.g. person 1: 100 $ + 100 $ and person 2: 100 000$ + 100 $. Pro-poor 
 3
on poverty measures. Data on the first and second quintile share are drawn from four sources: 
the UNU/WIDER-UNDP World Income Inequality Database, Version 1.0, 12 September 2000, 
the Deininger and Squire (1996, 1998a) database, the Global Poverty Monitoring described in 
Chen and Ravallion (1997, 2000), and the World Development Indicators 2002 Table 2.8. Due 
to limited availability and incomparability problems of income inequality data we select an 
irregular and unbalanced panel of time-series cross-country observations, resulting in a basic 
sample of 371 observations with 81 countries, 231 observations for developing countries, 27 for 
transitional and 113 for industrial countries in the period 1950 to 1999. Since data for indicators 
of external debt, exchange rate regimes and trade openness have to be availabe, the data sets 
vary considerably between the three parts. Concerning the econometric methodology, we apply 
in all chapters a growth equation estimating pooled OLS, random or fixed effects models and a 
system GMM estimator.   
 
In part I we analyze the impact of external debt on the poorest 20 and 20 to 40 percent. We test 
the linear and non-linear distribution and total effects of the external debt to GDP ratio and the 
external debt to exports ratio. In addition, equations are extended by the debt services to 
exports ratio as additional regressor to distinguish budgetary process’ (crowding-out hypothesis) 
and external account effects from the effects of the accumulated debt stock. Finally, we apply 
different robustness checks to confirm our findings, i.e. we estimate results without outliers, with 
mean income and with adjusted and unadjusted inequality income measures in the system 
GMM estimations.   
 
In part II we explore the relationship between exchange rate regimes and pro-poor growth. The 
paper is related to the debate on unsustainable intermediate exchange rate regimes (‘hollowing-
out’ hypothesis) in developing countries. To answer the question of an optimal exchange regime 
for pro-poor growth, we use two recently proposed de facto exchange rate arrangement 
classifications: Levy-Yeyati/Sturzenegger (2002) and Reinhart/Rogoff (2003). We estimate 
poverty effects of different exchange rate regimes for all countries and, separately, for 
developing and industrial countries due to considerable differences in access to international 
capital markets and soundness of domestic financial systems. Again, we execute several 
robustness checks to confirm our results.  
 
In Part III we look at the effect of trade openness on pro-poor growth. To capture this issue, we 
test six adjusted trade sector indicators (agricultural raw materials exports and imports, food 
exports and imports, manufactures exports and imports) and two tariff indicators (export duties 
and import duties). Poverty effects of trade policy are estimated in regressions for all countries, 
and, separately, for developing/transitional countries and industrial countries due to 
considerable differences in economic structure. In addition, poverty effects of trade openness 
                                                                                                                                                 
growth would be reached if the poor person earns more than 100 $. Even if this approach seems justified in terms of 
equality, the obvious strong redistributive aspect lessens its reasonable application in empirical research. 
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are estimated with respect to the level of the countries’ development. Finally, empirical findings 
are examined in several robustness tests.   
 
   
References 
 
 
Anderson, Edward, White, Howard (2001). Growth versus Distribution: Does the pattern of 
growth matter? University of Sussex. 
 
Bourguignon, François (2001). The pace of economic growth and poverty reduction, Paper 
presented at CES-ifo Conference on Inequality and Growth, May 18-20, 2001 Munich: Cesifo. 
 
Chen, Shaohua, Ravallion, Martin (1997). What can new survey data tell us about recent 
changes in distribution and poverty?, in: World Bank Economic Review 11(2): 357 – 382. 
 
Chen, Shaohua, Ravallion, Martin (2000). How did the world’s poorest fare in the 1990s?, 
Working Paper 2409. Washington DC: The World Bank. 
 
Chen, Shaohua, Ravallion, Martin (2001). Measuring Pro-Poor Growth, Washington DC. The 
World Bank. 
 
Chenery, Hollis B., Ahluwahlia, Montek S., Bell, C.L.G., Duloy, John, H., Jolly, Richard (1974). 
Redistribution with growth, Oxford University Press. 
 
Christiaensen, Luc, Demery, Lionel, Paternostro, Stefano (2002). Growth, Distribution and 
Poverty in Africa. Messages form the 1990s. Washington DC: The World Bank. 
 
Datt, Gaurav, Ravallion, Martin (2002). Why has economic growth been more pro-poor in some 
states of India than others? in: Journal of Development Economics 68 (2002), pp. 381 – 400. 
 
Dollar, David, Kraay, Aart (2001). Growth is good for the poor. Working Paper 2587. 
Washington DC: The World Bank.  
 
Eastwood, Robert, Lipton, Michael (2001). Pro-poor growth and pro-growth Poverty: Meaning, 
Evidence, and Policy Implications, in: Asian Development Review 19(1): 1 – 37. 
 
Gallup, John Luke, Radelet, Steven, Warner, Andrew (1999). Economic Growth and the Income 
of the Poor, CAER II Discussion Paper 36, Harvard Institute for International Development. 
 
Ghura, Dhaneshwar, Leite, Carlos A., Tsangarides, Charalambos (2002). Is growth enough? 
Macroeconomic Policy and Poverty Reduction, Working Papers 118/2002. Washington DC: 
International Monetary Fund.  
 
Gugerty, Mary Kay, Timmer, Peter C. (1999). Growth, Inequality, and Poverty Alleviation: 
Implications for Development Assistance, CAER II Discussion Paper 50 December 1999, 
Harvard Institute for International Development, Cambridge, Mass. 
 
Kakwani, Nanak, Pernia, Ernesto M. (2000). What is Pro-poor growth?, in: Asian Development 
Review 18(1): 1 – 16. 
 
Kakwani, Nanak, Son, Hyun H., Khandker, Shahidur (2003). Poverty equivalent growth rate: 
with applications to Korea and Thailand.  
 
Klasen, Stephan (2003). In Search of The Holy Grail: How to Achieve Pro-Poor Growth? in: 
Stern, N., Tuggoden, B. (ed.) Towards pro-poor policies: Proceedings of the Annual Bank 
Conference on Development Economics – Europe. Washington DC: The World Bank. 
 
 5
Pogge, Thomas W., Reddy, Sanjay G. (2002). How not to count the poor. Version 4.5, 26 March 
2003. available at www.socialanalysis.org. 
 
Ravallion, Martin (2001). Growth, Inequality and Poverty: Looking Beyond Averages. World 
Development 29(11): 1803 – 1815. 
 
Ravallion, Martin (2003). Pro – poor Growth: A Primer. Working Paper 3242. Washington DC: 
The World Bank.  
 
Timmer, Peter. (1997). How well do the poor connect to the growth process?, CAER II 
Discussion Paper 17, Harvard Institute for International Development. 
 
 
 
 
 6
Part I 
 
External Debt and Pro-Poor Growth 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 7
Abstract 
 
To reveal effects and consequences of high indebtedness on income poverty, this paper explores 
empirically a linear and non-linear impact of external debt on pro-poor growth in developing and 
transitional countries. To examine this hypothesis, we test the distribution effect of external debt to GDP, 
external debt to exports, and debt services to exports on the poorest 20 and 20 to 40 percent in a cross-
country approach. In addition, we estimate the total effect, i.e. the distribution and growth effect, to analyse 
potential trade-offs between the impact of unsustainable external debt levels on poverty through overall 
economic growth and via distribution. To test the poverty effects, we collect an irregular and unbalanced 
panel of time-series cross-country data on the first and second quintile of 58 developing and transitional 
countries for the period 1970 – 1999. We apply two econometric specifications, a growth equation and a 
system GMM estimation, to cover econometric issues, cross-country variation and dynamic aspects of 
within-country changes of the income of the poor. 
 
Empirical findings of the impact of the debt indicators on pro-poor growth have to be interpreted carefully 
due to inconsistent results of the sensitivity analyses. Thus results do not indicate an optimal external debt 
level with respect to pro–poor growth. On the contrary, higher external debt levels are associated with 
negative effects on the level of the income of the poorest 40 percent without exhibiting any significant 
effects on the growth rates. Thus concise policy recommendations with respect to debt sustainability levels 
and debt relief are difficult. A cautious conclusion would be that debt relief may affect the poor positively, 
but seems not to be a sufficient policy instrument for improved growth rates of the income of the poorest 
40 percent. This policy proposal would be in line with calls for more poverty-targeted capital inflows, as 
even total debt relief would release only insufficient resources for poverty reducing activities. With this 
interpretation, however, we abstract from political economy and bad governance issues which may prevent 
poverty reducing debt relief initiatives.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Two of the major problems the world faces at the moment are poverty and heavily indebted 
countries. Forced by popular pressure from the NGO community and the anti-globalization 
movement, IMF and Word Bank have implemented the HIPC Initiative to link debt relief with 
poverty reduction programs. From an economic point of view, however, the relation between 
external debt and poverty reduction seems not to be well analyzed. Rarely do theoretical 
models explain transmission mechanisms between external debt and income poverty. Effects 
may be implicitely present in models linking external debt to economic growth, but causalities 
still remain elusive.  
 
To uncover effects and consequences of indebtedness on income poverty, we explore 
empirically the impact of external debt on pro-poor growth in developing and transitional 
countries. The underlying hypothesis is that the poor may be especially vulnerable to 
unsustainable external debt levels. To confirm this hypothesis we estimate both the distribution 
and total effect, i.e. the distribution and growth effect, of external debt to GDP, external debt to 
exports, and debt services to exports on the poorest 20 and 20 to 40 percent. If high external 
debt leads to significant ‘anti-poor’ growth, a major impact of debt relief on pro-poor growth may 
be concluded and sustainable debt levels proposed.  
 
To reveal possible effects of external debt on pro-poor growth we first review in section 2 the 
literature on the external debt to growth link and debt sustainability definitions. Even if 
theoretical concepts are only indirectly related to pro – poor growth, we propose four possible 
effects of high external debt on poverty. Section 3 gives detailed description of data coverage, 
data sources and descriptive statistics. While we discuss our concept of pro-poor growth in 
section 4, we explain econometric specifications, econometric issues and estimation results in 
section 5. We conclude in section 6 with the major findings of our research.   
 
2.   External debt and pro-poor growth 
 
2.1  Literature review 
 
There are few models, in which the impact of external debt on poverty is explicitly analyzed 
(Schinke 1994, Loko/Mlachila/Nallari/Kalonji 2003, Agénor/Fofack/Izquierdo 2003). 
Nevertheless, the linkage is implicitly present in the theoretical literature on external debt and 
foreign capital (Eaton 1989, Hjertholm 2000, Pattillo/Poirson/Ricci  2002). Thus we first discuss 
major insights from these models on pro-poor growth and debt sustainability. Subsequently, we 
present approaches which directly analyze the impact of external debt on poverty. 
 
Based on a Harrod-Domar growth model, the two gap model focuses on two binding gaps for 
economic growth, the internal gap between investment and saving and the external gap 
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between imports and exports (Chenery/Strout 1966). The internal gap describes the need for 
additional resources in developing countries to accumulate capital. The external gap assumes 
import commodities to be essential for the production of investment goods. Thus economic 
growth is constrained by the inflow of foreign capital to fill the larger gap. Subsequently, growth-
cum-debt models predict stages of indebtedness in the growth process of developing countries. 
But debt sustainability only holds, if the growth rate of output is equal to or exceeds the rate of 
interest (Czerkawski 1991, Nikbakht 1984). Due to its limitation on the internal gap, however, 
growth-cum-debt models exclude the problem of converting the savings surplus into foreign 
exchange and the external orientation of the country. Thus the ‘debt dynamics’ approach 
requires the growth rate of exports to be equal or exceed the interest rate of the debt.2 To 
summarize these models describe the necessity and positive effect of external debt on the 
development process. Debt sustainability conditions, however, require a sufficient growth of 
internal and external sectors to service the interest payments and accumulated debt.3  
 
Foreign capital can also be seen as growth enhancing in neoclassical growth models, as the 
marginal product of capital is assumed to be above the world interest rate in low capital 
countries. Frameworks with intertemporal optimization respond to the sustainable debt issue 
consequently in the neoclassical tradition. The optimal level of debt will be reached if the 
marginal benefit equals the marginal cost of the external capital (Hjertholm 2000, Eaton 1989). 
But the assumption of perfect capital mobility in these models seems at least to be arguable for 
developing countries. The risk of debt repudiation and moral hazard may hinder the countries’ 
possibility to borrow capital on international capital markets without constraints. Thus loss of 
access to world financial markets may result in reduced investment and economic growth 
(Borensztein 1990, Cohen 1993).4 
 
Another part of the literature analyses the negative economic consequences of high external 
indebtedness. Debt overhang models are motivated by the problem of the creditors needing to 
be their loans repaid from defaulting and insolvent debt countries.5 A debt overhang situation 
occurs when the expected present value of potential future resource transfers is less than its 
debt, i.e. debt overhang is the part of debt without expected future repayment (Krugman 1988).6 
                                            
2 For literature and conceptual shortcomings of the debt dynamics approach, see Hjertholm (2000). 
3 For a related discussion of sustainability of private sector foreign indebtedness, see Pitchford (1995). 
4 In addition, literature on sovereign debt is only concerned with the debt repayment and rescheduling issue of lenders 
facing a repudiation risk, but does not cover human development or poverty considerations. For models of debt 
repudiation, see Cohen 1998; for the problem of sovereign debt restructuring, see Krueger (2002), for the political 
economy of debt crisis in a historical perspective, see Aggarwal (1996). 
5 The point of departure of debt overhang theories is an assumed analogy of national insolvency to private bankruptcy. 
Bankruptcy laws are justified by the costs to postponing the inevitable: a ‘grab race’ between creditors, loans withheld 
from the country, and choice of risky investments by the debtor. As these inefficiencies are assumed to be relieved by 
partial debt forgiveness, both, creditors and debtors, benefit. On critique to the assumed analogy, see Meier (1989). 
6 However, if the perspective is broadened from the sole repayment possibility to the problem of development costs of 
debt repayment, a debt overhang problem exists if a country has exceeded its capacity to repay its debt without a net 
development cost. Despite operational pitfalls, i.e. that one has to deal with the governance issue and the problem of 
measuring development costs of debt repayment, the second definition would bring more into focus the human 
development and pro-poor growth problem. Two minimum levels of debt relief might be derived from debt overhang 
concepts: the level of repayment sustained under the debt overhang and the discount rate on private debt. The 
underlying assumption would be that the discount on the secondary market indicates the proportion of the debt the 
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The basic argument of the effects of debt overhang on growth is usually demonstrated in a two-
period model. If debt exceeds the repayment level of the debtor, it leads to a distortionary tax. 
Any increase in output is taxed at a marginal tax rate to repay the debt. Future domestic and 
foreign investment is discouraged as the returns from investing are diminished by the marginal 
tax. On the other hand, if partial debt is relieved, the debt becomes a lump-sum burden and 
investment is encouraged (Sachs 1989, Krugman 1988, Basu 1997). One disincentive effect of 
debt overhang on growth is thus explained by reduced investment due to a lower after-tax 
return.7 Empirical evidence of this effect, however, remains uncertain (Morriset 1990, 
Desphande 1997, Cohen 1993).8 In addition, as the tax base in low income countries is rather 
narrow, investors might be more concerned about uncertainties created by pressure on the 
external account (Serieux 2001a).  
 
Disincentive effects of the debt overhang on growth have also been discussed in a broader 
perspective. Any productive activity might be discouraged as the gains will be taxed away in the 
future to balance the financing gap. Thus the politicians may have lower incentives to undertake 
difficult structural reforms. In this way, debt overhang impacts on economic growth through 
macroeconomic policy, affecting the level and efficiency of investment (Pattillo/Poison/Ricci 
2002). Furthermore, the disincentive effect of debt overhang on investment cannot only be 
explained by taxation, but by general macroeconomic instability. A large public debt might 
negatively influence key indicators of macroeconomic stability (fiscal deficit, exchange rate, 
inflation rate) increasing their fluctuation and thus the uncertainty of future investments 
(Dornbusch 1989). Empirical evidence supports this hypothesis (Hjertholm 2000). 
Macroeconomic uncertainty, however, will lower the level and efficiency of investment as the 
investor’s behavior is assumed to be risk-adverse, leading to a lower economic growth. Thus 
debt relief may promote growth with price stability (Armendáriz de Aghion/ Armendáriz de 
Hinestrosa 1995). In addition, the psychological burden of debt overhang on inventiveness and 
optimism has been emphasized by Dent/Peters (1998).  
 
Related to the negative effects of debt overhang on economic growth is the capital flight issue. 
Capital flight may increase the need for external debt as the money is lost for domestic 
investment. In addition, high external debt and debt service obligations may lead to economic 
uncertainty (expectation of exchange rate devaluation, fiscal crisis, expropriation risk), resulting 
                                                                                                                                                 
market treats as debt overhang. However, both propositions do not take into account additional development costs of 
the debt overhang (Serieux 2001a). 
7 For a discussion of this effect in different economic circumstances (degree of capital mobility, uncertainty, change of 
real interest rate, capital flight), see Corden (1989), Helpman (1989). However, in a simulation, the effect of credit 
rationing on investment due to foreign debt was found to be more important (Borensztein 1990)  
8 This disincentive effect would be a strong argument for debt relief to restore growth by increased investment. Morisset 
(1990) found a weak direct effect of debt relief on private investment, but a strong indirect effect through a decline of 
domestic interest rate and an increase in domestic credit for Argentina. Deshpande (1997)  found a negative 
relationship between debt stock and domestic investment for 13 severely indebted countries during 1971 – 1991. Cohen 
(1993), however, could only show a negative relationship between actual debt-service and investment, but no negative 
impact of accumulated large debt on investment in a sample of 81 developing countries. 
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in flight of private capital (debt-driven capital flight).9 Negative consequences may be reduced 
economic growth by lost resources, reduced government revenue by erosion of tax base and 
regressive income redistribution due to austerity measures and shifted tax burden. However, in 
regressing different capital flight measures on real growth of GNP and additional variables for 
Kenya in the period 1981 – 91, the coefficients on capital flight have not found to be statistically 
significant (Ajayi 1996).     
 
Recent empirical research has focused on a nonlinear impact of external debt on growth. Using 
a sample of 99 developing countries, Elbadawi/Ndulu/Ndung’u (1997) proposed three channels 
of indebtedness on growth: the indirect effects on public sector expenditures and deficits, 
liquidity constraints related to debt servicing and the debt overhang effect on investment. The 
authors extended a debt Laffer curve approach to indicate the relationship between external 
debt and growth.10 At low levels debt stimulates growth, but beyond a certain threshold, 
accumulated debt impacts negatively on growth.11 The three channels of transmission are 
shown to be empirically evident. Cohen (1997) found that the risk of debt crisis significantly 
lowered growth in Latin American countries.12 The likelihood of debt crisis has the largest 
negative effect on growth beyond a certain threshold (e.g. debt to exports of 200 percent, debt 
to GDP of 50). In addition, Cohen (1998) has explored the effect of debt crisis of the 1980s on 
the economic growth in African countries in the 1990s. Half of the growth slow-down can be 
explained by the debt crisis while a sustainable debt to exports ratio is suggested to be between 
200 to 250 percent.13 Pattillo/Poirson/Ricci (2002) analyzed the impact of external debt 
(measured by debt to exports, debt to GDP, net present values of debt to exports, net present 
values of debt to GDP) and debt reduction on growth in an augmented growth model 
(Mankiw/Romer/Weil 1992) using a sample of 93 developing countries over the period of 1969 - 
1998. Empirical results support the debt Laffer curve hypothesis. A negative growth effect is 
proposed at debt levels above 160 – 170 percent of exports and 35 – 40 percent of GDP. 
Thererfore per capita growth slows between half to a full percentage point, if debt is doubled, as 
the differential in per capita growth seems to be in excess of 2 percent for countries with 
external indebtedness below 100 and above 300 percent of exports.  
 
The theoretical and empirical literature covers the external debt problem mainly with respect to 
economic growth. The link to poverty and human development is implicitly present in the 
assumption that overall growth leads to poverty reduction. The direct impact of external debt on 
poverty, however, is only rarely explicitly modelled and tested. Schinke (1994) analyzes the 
consequences of indebtedness on poverty through the change of relative prices of traded to 
                                            
9 However, the causality between external debt and capital flight can run in both directions. For a distinction in debt-
driven capital flight, debt-fueled capital flight, flight-driven external borrowing and flight-fueled external borrowing, see 
Ajayi (1996). 
10 The usual debt Laffer curve indicates the relationship between the amount of debt repayment and the outstanding 
debt for a given level of liquidity (Claessens, Diwan 1989) 
11 The growth maximizing debt to GDP ratio is calculated at 97 percent (Elbadawi, Ndulu, Ndung’u 1997) 
12 The probability of rescheduling depending positively on the debt-to-GDP ratio is used as a proxy for the risk of debt 
crisis. 
13 Debt crisis is instrumented as debt/GDP ratio and a dummy which counts the number of reschedulings. 
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non-traded goods in a factor endowment framework. The basic concept is that foreign capital 
inflows (external debt) lead to an increase of the relative price of non-traded to traded goods.14 
The relative price change may result in different effects on poverty depending on wage rigidities 
in the labour markets of the trade and non – trade sector. Agénor/ Fofack/ Izquierdo (2003) 
analyze the effect of alternative expenditure allocations caused by debt relief (lump-sum 
transfers to households, investment in infrastructure, education or health) on income distribution 
and poverty in a dynamic general equilibrium model. The underlying assumption is a 
sustainable debt situation before debt relief is granted. A comparison of the alternative 
strategies with respect to poverty reduction simulations suggest the superiority of investment in 
infrastructure. Finally, Loko/Mlachila/Nallari/Kalonji (2003) estimate empirically the impact of 
external debt on three human development indicators (life expectancy, infant mortality, and 
gross primary enrollment rates) for 67 low income countries (of which 41 are HIPCs) for the 
period 1985 to 1999. Once the effect of income is controlled for, the debt indicators are found to 
have limited but not negligible effect on the non-income poverty indicators.15 
 
The debt - poverty issue is closely related to the sustainability problem of external debts. In 
general, debt sustainability conditions state a situation in which the country will have the 
capacity to serve its debt obligations. In the creditors’ view, debt sustainability is fulfilled when 
the country meets its debt-service obligations after imposition of different debt rescheduling 
measures. The NGOs’ community definition of debt sustainability, however, is more concerned 
with the human development needs in general, requiring improved integration of the poverty 
issue in the enhanced HIPC initiative (Befekadu 2001). In a case study for Ethiopia, Befekadu 
(2001) analyzed the burden of debt, in the context of the international development target to 
halve the poverty rate by 2015. Based on a Harrod-Domar model, he estimated the needed 
annual growth and investment rate of GDP as 8.5 % and 44.2 %, respectively. Even total debt 
relief would release resources from servicing the debt to only approximately 2 % of GDP, so 
additional capital inflows are assumed to be essential. Serieux (2001b) critically assessed the 
enhanced HIPC initiative with reference to poverty reduction and sustainable debt. Based on 
data for 22 eligible countries, the analysis states that the budgetary savings of debt relief only 
are small relative to aid flows. In addition, debt relief levels are not derived from country specific 
needs to alleviate poverty, but result from fixed debt indicator ratios. Maintaining sustainable 
debt levels would also require unrealistic economic growth. To achieve the envisaged poverty 
reduction, long-term lending linked to countries’ debt capacity and provision of additional 
poverty-reduction funding is proposed. Critique of the enhanced HIPC initiative is also 
prominent from the NGO community (EURODAD, 2001, 2002) which stresses the 
inappropriateness of the debt sustainability condition to reduce poverty by half until 2015. A 
poverty-focused debt sustainability criterion is promoted, assessing the resources necessary to 
                                            
14 The reason for this is that the amount of traded goods relative to non-traded goods is increased, as external debt is 
assumed to be identical with net imports of goods and non factor services. As non – traded goods are diminished 
relative to traded goods, the relative price of non – traded goods increases (Schinke 1994). 
15 For example a 20 percent increase in the debt-service ratio would lead to a 1 percent decline in life expectancy at birth 
(Loko/Mlachila/Nallari/Kalonji 2003). 
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foster pro-poor growth and human development. In this ‘bottom-up’ approach the resources 
foressential human needs are subtracted from the overall resources available to 
thegovernment’s budget. One-third of the remaining resources should be used to service 
foreign debt.  
 
2.2   Effects of external debt on pro-poor growth 
 
Based on the discussion in the theoretical and empirical literature we propose four major effects 
of high external debt on pro-poor growth and poverty. While the first two effects are more 
related to the size of debt-service obligations, the third and fourth effects are more dependent 
on the amount of the accumulated external debt stock. 
 
Budgetary process’ effects (internal transfer problem) 
 
A large stock of debt may impact on pro-poor growth through the budgetary process. Higher 
debt service obligations affect government expenditures with possible negative effects on the 
income of the poor.16 If further revenue is needed to service the interest payment and principal 
repayment, the government has several possibilities to fill the financing gap resulting from its 
budget constraints. 
 
First, the government may increase revenues. Taking into account the narrow tax base, indirect 
(trade) taxes, and limited institutional infrastructure of developing countries, increased tax 
revenues are both economically and politically unlikely. Second, the government increases the 
budget deficit. Accumulating further domestic or external debt, however, only postpones and 
likely worsens the effects.17 In addition, inflationary finance by seignorage may discourage 
economic growth by the disruptive effect of high inflation rates (Temple 1999, Montiel 2003, 
Epaulard 2003). Furthermore, the poor may be hit disproportionately by the negative effects of 
high inflation rates on their income due to its denomination in nominal terms without access to 
indexation, a decline in real wages due to rigidity of nominal wages, the impossibility of hedging 
inflation with other assets, and the ‘inflation tax’ with effects similar to a regressive tax.18 
Empirical evidence on the negative distribution effect of inflation, however, is mixed. One reason 
may be that economy-wide inflation rates do not correctly reflect the effects of price changes 
relevant for the poor (Romer/Romer 1998, Easterly/Fisher 2001, Dollar/Kraay 2001, 
Anderson/White 2001, Ghura/Leite/Tsangarides 2002, Agénor 2002, Ames/Brown 
/Devarajan/Izquierdo 2002, Epaulard 2003).  
 
                                            
16 The need to mobilize additional domestic resources due to higher debt service payments is also called the internal 
transfer problem (Meier 1995). 
17 In addition, access to international credit markets may be impossible, if high external debt is perceived as an 
insolvency problem by creditors.  
18 In addition, a change in distribution of income and wealth may be explained by high and variable inflation, if the 
middle-class, as holders of nominal liabilites, benefits from its loss of value and the poor holds only nominal assets 
(Agénor 2002).  
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Third, the government may reduce its expenditures concerning social spending (health, 
education, social security etc.) and public investment.19 Lower investment in education leads to 
lower human capital and lower economic growth (Mankiw/Romer/Weil 1992). In addition, social 
spending may be closely related to poverty reduction programs and non-income poverty 
reducing public activities. Whether pro-poor growth is negatively influenced by contraction in 
social expenditures, however, depends also on the previous structure of the social spending 
programs, as social expenditures often disproportionately benerfit upper-income households in 
developing countries (Dollar/Kraay 2001, Baldacci/de Mello/Inchauste 2002, Agénor 2002, 
Davoodi/Tiongson/Asawanuchit 2003).20  
 
The crowding-out hypothesis states that higher current debt service obligations could crowd-out 
current public investment in productive activities due to reduced resources (Cohen 1993, 
Claessens/Detragiache/ Kanbur/Wickham 1996). As public investment is a significant proportion 
of total domestic investment in most developing countries, lower public investment reduces 
long-term growth through macroeconomic multiplier effects (Dornbusch 1989). In addition, 
poverty is increased by reduced investment in infrastructure (Agénor/Fofack/Izquierdo 2003).21 
Furthermore, public and private investment may be complementary and public expenditures 
may crowd-in private investment, resulting in positive externalities, thus fiscal distress hits the 
economic growth even harder (Agénor 2002). Finally, reduced public expenditures may also 
affect investment and growth negatively by import compression, if the economy’s ability to 
substitute between imported and domestic capital goods is limited and government 
expenditures are an important part of imported capital goods (Hjertholm 2000).  
 
External account effects (external transfer problem) 
 
External debt-service obligations have to be repaid usually in foreign currency. Countries with 
limited reserves (most developing countries) may receive the required foreign currency from 
foreign direct investment, private debt flows, nonconditional official development assistance, or 
earnings from exports. At least in severely indebted developing countries, however, the first 
three possibilities are less significant, in part because of their limited access to international 
financial markets, thus debt-service obligations must mainly come from export earnings.22 One 
problem in increasing exports, however, is the fact that the growth rate of exports depends on 
factors (e.g. type of exports, market shares, competitiveness, access to developed countries’ 
markets) not always in control of developing countries. In addition, if all developing countries 
                                            
19 Curtailing government expenditures may also lead to increased poverty via cuts in real wages and layoffs of 
employees in the public sector (Agénor 2002).   
20 So cuts in social spending may nevertheless lead to reduced poverty, if social expenditures are better targeted to the 
poor (Agénor 2002). 
21 Supply side effects of increased infrastructure encompass higher productivity and reduced risk of confiscation, which 
lead to reduced poverty in the rural nontrade sector. For a deeper discussion of the channels proposed in this rather 
comprehensive model, see Agénor/Fofack/Izquierdo (2003). 
22 Mobilizing additional net exports of goods and services to meet the needed foreign currency due to higher debt 
service payments is also called the external transfer problem (Meier 1995). 
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increase exports at the same time, they have to compete with each other and might lose 
possibilities of saving foreign-exchange (Abbott 1993).  
 
The foreign exchange demand imposed by the debt-service obligations may be passed on 
through exchange rate depreciation or import restrictions.23 On the demand side, a depreciation 
of the real exchange rate would benefit consumers of nontradables, while it would harm 
consumers of imported goods. The depreciation could increase domestic food prices due to 
higher prices of imported food. This could lead to negative effects for the poor, if they are net 
consumers of food (Baldacci/de Mello/Inchauste 2002). On the supply-side, improved 
agricultural exports may increase the income of the rural poor, while diminished demand for 
labor in the nontraded sector may decrease the income of the urban poor, i.e. earnings fall for 
those employed in the non-trade sector with respect to the trade sector.24 Thus real exchange 
rate depreciation could positively affect the poor, if they work mainly in the tradable sector, but 
consume nontradables (Ames/Brown/Devarajan/Izquierdo 2002, Agénor 2002). Furthermore, if 
a gain in competitiveness is achieved by a real depreciation, short term unemployment is likely, 
due to decreased spendable income of workers. In addition, a country will gain much less 
foreign currency revenue, when all developing countries are forced to depreciate (Dornbusch 
1989). 
 
Currency depreciation increases the domestic costs of debt-service obligations. The net result 
may be an increase in the price of imported intermediate inputs and capital goods without 
improved capacity to import (import compression) resulting in a contraction in aggregate supply 
and investment (Serieux 2001a). However, increased prices for imported intermediate input and 
capital goods may result in more demand for unskilled workers, if skilled and unskilled labour 
are net substitutes. On the other hand, negative supply shocks are also possible, if the economy 
is a net importer of intermediate inputs (Agénor 2002). If countries defend a fixed exchange 
rate, the increased demand for foreign exchange must be achieved by restrictions on imports. It 
is probable that aggregate supply and investment is decreased by reduced supply of imported 
intermediate inputs and capital goods (import compression). Futhermore, non-price restrictions 
may lead to rent-seeking incentives with negative effects on output and investment (Serieux 
2001a).  
 
Finally, the budget and external account effects are not independent. A currency depreciation 
results in an increased value of debt service in domestic currency. Inflationary financing may be 
caused by the additional budget deficit with disturbing effects on the income of the poor 
(Dornbusch 1989, Meier 1995).  
                                            
23 Effects of nominal devaluations on the income of the poor are ambiguous, depending also on their effect on the real 
exchange rate (Edwards 1989, Ghei/Hinkle 1999). The effects of devaluation on real output and economic growth in 
developing countries are controversially discussed. A devaluation might lead to contraction caused by its effect on both 
aggregate demand and supply (Krugman/Taylor 1978). Empirical evidence appears to confirm the contractionary 
devaluation hypothesis at least in the short run, even if the applied methodology may be criticized (Edwards 1989, 
Agénor 1991, Agénor/Montiel 1996/1999, Kamin/Klau 1998, Rogers/Kamin 2000). 
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Disincentive effects  
 
The debt overhang approach states the disincentive effects of external debt on investment. 
First, debt overhang affects economic growth negatively by a reduced investment due to a lower 
after-tax return. Second, any productive activity might be discouraged, as the gains will be taxed 
away in the future to balance the financing gap. Thus the politicians may have lower incentives 
to undertake difficult structural reforms affecting the level and efficiency of investment. Finally, a 
large public debt may negatively influence key indicators of macroeconomic stability (fiscal 
deficit, exchange rate, inflation rate) increasing the uncertainty of future investments. Increased 
uncertainty may also result from ongoing rescheduling negotiations which are dependent on a 
complex political process (Claessens/Detragiache/Kanbur/Wickham 1996). Macroeconomic 
uncertainty, however, will lower the level and efficiency of investment. While debt overhang 
works mainly through economic growth, the income of the poor may be additionally influenced 
by these disincentive effects. 
 
Macroeconomic uncertainty  
 
The poor may also be affected negatively by increased macroeconomic uncertainty and volatility 
due to high indebtedness (Breen/Garcia-Peñalosa 1999). Increased precautionary savings 
caused by higher uncertainty about future income may increase poverty due to reduced growth. 
In addition, credit market effects, i.e. higher incidence of credit rationing or increased risk 
premium and borrowing rates for private firms may affect negatively the poor via fallen labour 
demand (Agénor 2002).  
 
Higher levels of external debt may also increase the propensitiy of debt crisis (Cohen 1997, 
1998).25 While a financial crisis in itself may impact negatively on the poor (Baldacci/de Mello 
/Inchauste 2002), debt crisis may additionally affect the income of the poor in the longer-run via 
asymmetric effects, i.e. poverty is less reduced in subsequent expansions than increased during 
contractions. First, parents’ decision to take children out of school to work during recessions 
may not be reversed in expansions diminishing the human capital of the poor. Second, 
expectations may be more pessimistic during phases of crisis than optimistic in booming times. 
Third, credits may be rationed to firms due to a higher perceived risk of default in recessions. 
This effect may not completely offset during expansions.26 Fourth, inadequate insurance and 
credit mechanisms for poorer households may prevent the ability to smooth consumption with 
possible negative effects. Finally, unskilled workers may lose their jobs first in recessions if firms 
“hoard” their skilled labor force due to higher turnover costs. During expansions companies may 
                                                                                                                                                 
24 In addition, a higher cost-of-living index in the urban areas may offset the positive supply effect on small farmers in the 
tradable sector (Agénor 2002). 
25 The probability of rescheduling depending positively on the debt-to-GDP ratio is used as a proxy for the risk of debt 
crisis. 
26 A related reason would be a net worth effect, i.e. that a burst of asset price bubbles during crisis would lead to a 
downturn in the value of collaterals leading to a credit crunch. Asset prices, however, may not reach former price levels 
in a subsequent expansion period (Agénor 2002).   
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increase fixed investment if complementarity between skilled labour and physical capital is high, 
leading to persistent unskilled unemployment (Agénor 2002). 
 
To summarize our discussion on poverty effects of external debt, we propose the hypothesis 
that high external debt should impact negatively on the income of the poorest 40 percent in 
developing and transitional countries. Since low levels of external debt may also be growth-
enhancing, we additionally test a debt Laffer curve effect, i.e. external debt promotes the income 
of the poor at low levels and diminishes the income of the poor at high debt levels. We expect 
these hypotheses to be relevant for the distribution effect and the total effect, i.e. for both the 
distribution and the (distribution-neutral) growth effect. 
 
3.   Data sources and descriptive statistics 
 
3.1  Data on income inequality measures 
 
Empirical tests on the impact of external debt on pro-poor growth are limited by data availability. 
In addition, incomparability of inequality data can cause severe problems in cross-section 
analysis (Atkinson/Brandolini 2001). Due to different concepts used in income distribution 
surveys across time and space cross-section analysis of pro-poor growth using first and second 
quintile share of income has to be applied with caution. Data on income inequality may vary in 
various aspects, e.g. in income concept (income, expenditure), tax treatment, reference unit 
(household/family/household equivalent/person) or coverage (age/area/population). Concerning 
the income definition, expenditure should be preferred to income for developing countries based 
on practical measurement reasons especially for rural (poor) households (Atkinson 1993, 
Deaton 1997). In addition, data on income distribution can be based on different sources 
(national household surveys, income tax records, social security/labor market agency 
records).27 Thus comparability of data on first and second quintile share of income has to be 
handled with care. While data on quintile shares of income can not be restricted to completely 
comparable samples due to limited data availability, only samples should be used with 
observations as fully consistent as possible (Atkinson/Brandolini 2001).   
 
Our data on the first and second quintile share of income (and the Gini coefficient) are based on 
three sources: the UNU/WIDER-UNDP World Income Inequality Database, Version 1.0, 12 
September 2000, the Global Poverty Monitoring described in Chen and Ravallion (1997, 2000)28 
and the World Development Indicators 2002 Table 2.8 (see table 1). The observations are 
chosen by a successive selection procedure with restriction criteria motivated by the problems 
outlined above. For the UNU/WIDER database (2000), we first restrict the sample to data based 
                                            
27
see for further details UNU/WIDERUNDP World Income Inequality Database, Version 1.0, 12 September 2000, User 
guide; Atkinson/Brandolini 2001).  
28
The Global Poverty Monitoring is available under www.worldbank.org/research/povmon/index.htm and continually 
updated.  
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on surveys covering all area, all population, all age and fulfilling the 1 OKIN quality rating.29 
Second, as we are interested in pro-poor growth, only countries with at least two spaced 
observations are selected. To cover medium-to-long run growth and measurement errors due to 
fluctuations we draw the first available observation and every following with at least three years 
distance to the preceding. Only in four cases have we allowed for a two year distance within a 
spell for pragmatic reasons.30 In addition, the income concept and income recipients (reference 
unit) have to be identical for each spell.31  
 
The Global Poverty Monitoring data set is based on nationally representative surveys. All 
measures of household living standards are normalized by household size. The distribution and 
empirical Lorenz curves are household-size weighted. The income shares are estimated from 
primary data sources using parameterized Lorenz curves with flexible functional forms 
(Chen/Ravallion 1997). We have selected the sample on data of first and second quintile share 
of income due to the restriction criteria outlined above.32 In addition, actual data are drawn from 
the World Development Indicators 2002 Table 2.8 using the same methodology for low- and 
middle-income countries as used by the Global Poverty Monitoring data set.33 This selection 
procedure has resulted in 371 observations in total, 231 for developing, 27 for transitional and 
113 for industrial countries in the period 1950 - 1999. Finally, data on our three debt indicators, 
i.e. the ratio of total external debt to GDP, ratio of total external debt to exports, and ratio of total 
debt services to exports, have to be available, reducing the total sample further to 209 
observations for 58 countries (186 observations for developing countries and 23 observations 
for transitional countries) in the period 1970 to 1999 (table 1).   
 
In our regressions we use, first,  the same income concept and reference unit for each spell, i.e. 
we do not construct all possible spells between the observations in each country.34 In addition, 
we select in some cases two observations per country per year, exchanging the observations 
between the spells (table 1). Second, in adjusting the income inequality measures to form all 
possible spells in each country we regress the first/second quintile share and Gini coefficient on 
dummy variables for different income definitions and regional dummies.35 The adjusted 
                                            
29 Reliable income or expenditure data referring to the entire (national) population, not affected by apparent 
inconsistencies (UNU/WIDER – UNDP World income inequality database, Version 1.0, 12 September 2000, Users 
guide). 
30 Bulgaria 1991 – 93, Gabon 1975 – 77, Guatemala 1987 – 89, Kenya 1992 – 94. 
31 One can further strengthen the selection criteria by also requiring the same type of survey for each spell to control for 
differences in survey design not captured by the same income definition and reference unit. Due to data availability, 
however, we omitted this idea. 
32 In one case we allowed for a two years distance within a spell for pragmatic reasons (Belarus 1993 – 95).  
33 For description of estimation method see World Development Indicators 2002 Table 2.8 (About the data). 
 As noted in the description of the data set used by Dollar/Kraay (2001), several ‘high-quality’ data from the Deininger 
and Squire (1996, 1998a) database are not incorporated in the UNU/WIDER database (2000). We checked the 
Deininger and Squire (1996, 1998a) database, but no additional observations could be gained due to our restriction 
criteria. 
34 The length of time between two observations with the same income concept within a country ranges from 2 to 14 
years with a median of 4 years in our sample.  
35 We prefer to use regional dummy variables in the adjustment regressions, since we have only 371 observations and 
eight different income definitions in our sample, which are not equally distributed among regions (e.g. income (unknown 
tax treatment) and net income are only present in three out of five regions in developing countries). If we omit regional 
dummy variables, the coefficients of these income definitions may falsely capture also regional differences in inequality. 
Since we only subtract the estimated coefficients of the income definitions from the unadjusted income inequality 
measures, regional differences in inequality are not consumed away by this adjustment procedure. To check this issue 
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first/second  quintile share and Gini coeffcient are then calculated by subtracting the estimated 
coefficients of the alternative income dummies from the unadjusted measures to form a sample 
of inequality measures corresponding to the distribution of household expenditure (table 2).36 In 
general, the number of observations per country varies significantly from 2 (almost all Sub-
Saharan Africa and Eastern Europe countries) to 8 (Indonesia, India).  
 
Mean income of the poorest is measured as the share of income earned by the poorest first and 
second quintile times mean income, divided by 0.2. Data on mean income are based on the 
PPP-adjusted real income per capita (constant 1996 US dollars using the chain index) reported 
in the Penn World Tables Version 6.1 (Heston/Summers/Aten 2002, Heston/Summers 1991). 
Though the mean income from national accounts may differ from mean level of household 
income (expenditure) due to measurement errors, income definition, or underestimation of 
income (consumption) in developing countries caused by nonparticipating rich, we use per 
capita GDP.37  
 
Looking at summary statistics, (adjusted) first/second quintile, (adjusted) mean income of the 
first/second quintile, growth rates of the first/second quintile, and growth rates of the mean 
income of the first/second quintile vary considerably in the different regions (table 5). For 
example, Eastern Europe has on average a highly negative growth rate of the first quintile (-4.70 
percent), while in South Asia the growth rate of the first quintile share is on average only weakly 
negative (-0.62 percent).38   
 
3.2   Debt indicators and additional macroeconomic variables 
 
Total external debt to GDP ratio (EDT/GDP) and, alternatively, total external debt to export ratio 
(EDT/XGS) are used as debt indicators, because they are prominent indicators in the debt 
sustainability discussion and the HIPC debt relief initiative.39 Total external debt comprises long-
term debt (public/ publicly guaranteed, private nonguaranteed), IMF credit and short-term debt 
as defined in the Global development finance 2000 (table 3). One possible expectation would be 
a nonlinear impact of EDT/GDP and EDT/XGS, i.e. for low values of the two debt indicators pro-
                                                                                                                                                 
further, we also run adjustment regressions without regional dummy variables. If we compare correlations of the two 
adjusted first/second quintile shares and Gini coefficients with its unadjusted version, the correlation coefficients for the 
adjustment process with regional dummy variables are always closer to one, confirming our approach. 
36 Subtracting the estimated coefficients of the alternative income dummies from the unadjusted measures means that 
we calculate the adjusted measures by subtracting the alternative income dummies multiplied by its coefficient from the 
unadjusted first and second quintile share. On critic of this adjustment procedure, see Atkinson/Brandolini (1999). 
37 One pragmatic reason is that the UNU/WIDER-UNDP Database does not indicate the mean level of household 
income for each household survey. For a discussion of applying this procedure in pro-poor growth regressions, see 
Eastwood/Lipton (2001), Dollar/Kraay (2001). For a further discussion of discrepancies between national accounts and 
household survey measures of living standards, see Ravallion 2001a). 
38 The high average annual growth rate for the mean (income) of the first quintile in Sub-Saharan Africa stem from three 
spells (Guinea 1991 – 94, Kenya 1992 – 94, Senegal 1991 – 95) with values over 18 percent. If we omit these 
observations in regressions without outliers, the mean of the growth of the first quintile (growth Q20) is 0.59 and the 
mean of the growth of the mean income (growth mean Q20) 1.05. In addition, the mean of the growth of the second 
quintile (growth Q40) is 0.44 and the mean of the growth of the mean income (growth mean Q40) is 1.05 without the 
spell for Kenya 1992 – 94. 
39 Of course, it would be more useful to use data on the net present value of external debt. The reason for this is that 
debt stock indicators based on the net present value are better suited for comparing streams of future debt repayments. 
Information on net present value of external debt, however, is not available.  
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poor growth should be stimulated, while for high values the accumulated debt impacts 
negatively on the 20 percent and 20 to 40 percent poorest. This assumption would be an 
adaptation of a debt Laffer curve effect on the pro-poor growth issue. Higher total debt service 
to exports (TDS/XGS) indicates a liquidity constraint causing external account effects and less 
resources for productive activities. Thus the coefficient of TDS/XGS is expected to be negative, 
caused by budgetary process’ and external accounts effects.40 As this variable measures only 
the scheduled payments, and data for actual payments are not available, empirical results do 
not necessarily reflect the real situation (Patillo/Poirson/Ricci 2002).    
 
The variables overall budget surplus to GDP and government consumption to GDP are 
controlled for.41 Their use is motivated by the impact of indebtedness on the poor via public 
sector financing as explained in the section on budgetary process’ effects. Budget deficit is 
expected at least not to have negative coefficients as better public finances should not decrease 
pro-poor growth. The impact of government consumption, however, is ambiguous as benefits of 
public sector do not necessarily support the poorest part of an economy more than other income 
groups.42 In addition, government size can also negatively impact on the income of the poor due 
to distortions of private decisions and its proxy for bad governance (Barro/Sala-i-Martin 1995). 
Unfortunately, we could not test the impact of health and education expenditures to GDP on 
pro-poor growth due to lacking data availability for our sample.43 Human capital may play a 
crucial role for the income of the poor, thus we use the average years of secondary schooling in 
the total population aged 25 and over as proxy for investment in education with expected 
positive coefficients.44 We also include life expectancy as a proxy for investment in health with 
expected positive effect.  
 
The rate of inflation is used to cover macroeconomic uncertainty effects and to control for 
inflationary financial effects on pro-poor growth. Low levels of inflation are expected to stimulate 
or at least not hinder pro-poor growth, while high or crisis levels of inflation should impact 
negatively on pro-poor growth.45 Furthermore, we use terms-of-trade to capture external 
environment effects with expected positive impact (Barro/Salah-i-Martin 1995, 
                                            
40 TDS/XGS is also included in regressions controlling for EDT/GDP of EDT/XGS to separate debt overhang effects 
from crowding-out effects (Claessens/Detragiache/Wickham/Kanbur 1996, Patillo/Poirson/Ricci 2002).
   
41 We have also controlled for public investment in our regressions. Results, however, are almost always insignificant, 
so we omitted public investment from our approach. This result is in line with similar findings in the literature 
(Ghura/Leite/Tsangarides 2002). 
42 In developing countries social expenditures often benefit more the middle class and the rich (Dollar, Kraay 2001, 
Davoodi, Tiongson, Asawanuchit 2003). 
43 Davoodi/Tiongson/Asawanuchit (2003) collected data on education and health expenditures for 81 countries for the 
period 1960 to 2000. Even if the dataset was accessible (which is not the case), it would be inconvenient for our 
purposes as only less than half of the countries are present in our sample.  
44 We also experimented with three other education indicators (average years of schooling in total population aged 25 
and over, average years of primary schooling in total population aged 25 and over, and percentage of “secondary 
school attained” in total population aged 25 and over). While results remained similar, secondary education turned out to 
be the most relevant indicator.  
45 Because overall inflation may not necessarily reflect the price index of the poor, we also used inflation in food prices 
as price index. The assumption would be that inflation in food prices may hurt especially the poor, as a considerable 
amount of their consumption is paid on food. As data on food inflation are more restricted than data on overall inflation, 
and the correlation between both inflation indicators is rather high (0.99) in our sample, we use only overall inflation to 
cover price changes in goods other than food.   
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Ghura/Leite/Tsangarides 2002).46 We also controll for financial development measured by M2 to 
GDP ratio with expected positive coefficient. A positive impact of financial sector development 
on the poor may be reasoned by better access to credit and improved risk sharing 
(Ghura/Leite/Tsangarides 2002). Furthermore, the initial value of the adjusted Gini coefficient is 
added to cover the impact of initial inequality on the growth of the mean income of the poor with 
expected positive coefficient. Adding the initial inequality in the growth equation can be justified 
by testing the hypothesis of inequality convergence. A positive coefficient for the initial Gini 
coefficient would confirm the convergence of inequality (Ravallion 2000). Finally, civil liberties 
are used to test institutional effects on the poor. The index is measured on a scale from one to 
seven with one indicating the most liberal state. Thus the coefficient should be negative, if less 
civil liberties result in anti - poor growth and policies.47 Data sources and definitions of additional 
macroeconomic variables are presented in table 3. As we confront missing values and outliers 
the number of observations vary for each variable and restrict the size of the sample due to the 
econometric specification (table 4). In addition, not all additional macroeconomic variables are 
used in all specifications, due to insignificant coefficients.  
 
Finally, we take a short look at descriptive statistics for debt indicators and additional 
macroeconomic variables. First, high average values of the different debt indicators are not 
necessarily in the same regions. So we observe high values of the external debt to GDP ratio in 
Middle East and North Africa and Sub – Saharan Africa. On the other side, while EDT/XGS is 
over the average in South Asia and Sub – Saharan Africa, the difference in TDS/XGS between 
the regions is less pronounced (table 4 and 5). Correlation coefficients between the debt 
indicators, however, indicate relative high positive correlation between EDT/GDP and 
EDT/XGS, EDT/XGS and TDS/XGS, but low positive correlation between EDT/GDP and 
TDS/XGS (table 6). Correlation coefficients between the debt indicators and additional 
determinants of pro-poor growth, however, are not necessarily consistent. While EDT/XGS is, 
as expected negatively correlated to a one percent significance level with budget surplus, 
secondary education and life expectancy, the correlation between TDS/XGS and the three 
variables is weakly negative and insignificant. Thus correlation coefficients for TDS/XGS do only 
weakly support the budgetary process’ effects. On the other hand, EDT/GDP is positively 
correlated with government consumption and secondary education (table 6). Finally, inflation is 
on the average high in Central Europe (+191 percent) and in Latin America (+67 percent, table 
5), but amazingly not at all correlated with the debt indicators (table 6).  
 
 
                                            
46 Terms-of-trade growth reflects external shocks from world market orientation. The sign of the coefficient, however, 
may be indifferent as a positive terms-of-trade growth can improve the income of the poor representing for example an 
increase in the relative price of agricultural commodities (benefiting the rural poor) or a fall in the price for imported 
consumption goods (benefiting the urban poor). Otherwise, positive terms-of-trade growth can also decrease the income 
of the poor by adverse supply-side effects due to the shift in relative prices. 
47 To cover the omitted variable issue we also controlled for other additional macroeconomic variables, i.e. we used the 
economy’s dependency on international markets proxied by trade openness (exports plus imports divided by GDP), 
impact of institutions measured by political rights, and macroeconomic uncertainty captured by output volatility. Test 
statistics, however, indicate no significant impact of these covariates in our regressions. 
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4. Pro-poor growth 
 
Analytically, the impact of external debt on the income of the poor can be distinguished in the 
growth and the distribution effect 48:  
 
∂ Yp20/40it
 / ∂  Djit   = ∂ln(Yit)/∂ Djit  + [∂Y
q20/40
it/∂ ln(Yit)*∂ln(Yit)/∂Djit  + ∂ Y
q20/40
it
 / ∂  Djit]   
= ρj       + [(α1- 1) * ρj   + γj] (1)  
 
with  
 
Yp20/40it :  mean income of the 20 percent/20 to 40 percent poorest defined as 
 ln(Q20/40it*Yit/0.2) 
Yq20/40it :  Y
p20/40
it – ln(Yit) = ln(Q
20/40
it *Yit/0.2) – ln(Yit) = ln(Q
20/40
it) + ln(Yit) – ln 0.2 – ln (Yit) 
=   ln(Q20/40it/0.2)  
Q20/40it:  first/second quintile share of income 
Yit:  real per capita income  
Djit:  debt indicator with j = 1, ... , 3 
ρj:  (equiproportionate) growth effect of debt indicator on mean income  
(∂ ln(Yit)/∂ Djit) 
(α1- 1): distribution effect of mean income (∂ Y
q20/40
it/∂ ln(Yit)) 
γj: distribution effect of debt indicator (∂ Y
q20/40
it
 /∂ Djit) 
 
The (equiproportionate) growth effect (first term on the right hand side of the equation) 
measures the effect of the debt indicator on mean income (ρj). The distribution effect (second 
term in brackets) measures the impact of the debt indicator on the first/second quintile share in 
two parts, the difference between α1 and one times the growth effect and the direct effect γj of 
the debt indicator Djit on the first and second quintile share. Thus the income of the poor could 
be affected directly and indirectly through growth by external debt, and trade-offs of the debt 
indicator affecting economic growth and the first/second quintile share in opposite directions 
could be analyzed.49  
 
A natural benchmark for pro-poor growth would be equipropotionate growth with α1 = 1 and γj = 
0, i.e. no distribution effects (equation (1): ∂ Yp20/40it
 / ∂  Djit = ρj). Thus pro-poor growth could be 
defined by a distribution effect: 
 
ρj  + [(α1- 1) * ρj +γj] > ρj  i.e.  γj > 0  for α1 = 1   (2)  
                                            
48 There is considerable ongoing discussion on the appropriate definition and measurement of pro-poor growth. While 
none of the measures proposed has so far set an international accepted standard, both the growth effect and the 
distribution effect have been identified as most critical for reduction in absolute poverty (Kakwani/Pernia 2000, 
Anderson/White 2001, Bourguignon 2001, Eastwood/Lipton 2001, Chen/Ravallion 2001, Kakwani/Son/Khandker 2003, 
Klasen 2003, Ravallion 2003). 
49 In the discussion of our concept of pro-poor growth we abstract from nonlinear effects to simplify the analysis. 
Interpretation of nonlinear effects of external debt on the income of the poor is straightforward. 
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One drawback of defining pro-poor growth only by equation (2) is the fact, that a situation with a 
negative growth effect (ρj < 0)would also be labelled as pro-poor if γj > 0 In this case the debt 
indicator would affect the growth rate negatively(ρj < 0), but this effect would be diminished by a 
positive effect on the first/second quintile share, if γj > - (α1- 1) * ρj (as ρj is assumed to be 
negative, the direct distribution effect of the debt indicator γj must be greater than the 
distribution effect via growth if α1 > 1). To cover this issue, pro-poor growth could be defined by 
a total effect assuming ∂ Yp20/40it
 / ∂  Djit > 0:   
 
ρj+ [(α1 - 1) * ρj + γj] > 0  i.e.  γj > - ρj  for α1 = 1   (3) 
 
This condition would require a positive impact of a total effect, adding the growth and 
distribution effect. A positive impact of the debt indicator on first/second quintile share has to 
more than offset the negative effect of the debt indicator through growth. On the other hand, a 
growth situation would be also labelled pro-poor, if the positive growth effect of a debt indicator 
exceeds its negative distribution effect. 
 
In our approach we choose equation (2) and equation (3) as our pro-poor growth conditions, to 
cover both the distribution effect and the total effect of debt indicators on the lowest 20 and 20 
to 40. We also profit from the fact that the coefficient α1-1, while often different from zero, is 
almost always insignificant in our regressions. Thus, assuming no indirect distribution effect via 
the mean income (α1= 1), pro-poor growth is defined in equation (2) by a positive distribution 
effect (γj > 0). In equation (3) pro-poor growth is achieved if the total effect of the distribution 
effect and growth effect is positive (γj + ρj > 0). By estimating both equations, trade-offs between 
the distribution effect and growth effect can be analyzed. If estimations for the distribution effect 
are positive (γj > 0), but the coefficients for the total effect are zero (γj + ρj = 0), we can conclude 
that the growth effect of the debt indicator on the income of the poor has to be negative (ρj < 0). 
If estimations for the distribution effect are negative (γj < 0) and the total effect is zero (γj + ρj = 
0), the growth effect of the debt indicator on the income of the poor has to be positive (ρj > 0).    
 
5.  Econometric Specifications and Estimation 
  
 
5.1   Econometric specifications 
 
To measure the impact of debt indicators on pro-poor growth we choose two different 
econometric methodologies, a system generalized method of moments estimation for a level 
and first-differenced equation and a growth equation using pooled OLS, random or fixed effects 
estimation.50  
                                            
50 In the discussion on econometric specification we abstract from nonlinear effects to simplify the analysis. 
Interpretation of nonlinear effects of external debt on the income of the poor is straightforward. 
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5.1.1   System GMM Estimation: level and first differenced equation 
 
To estimate the distribution effect we formulate the following ad hoc equation in levels, i.e. we 
regress the mean income of the 20 and 20 to 40 per cent poorest on the mean income, debt 
indicators, and variants of additional variables.   
 
Yp20/40it
 = α0 + α1ln(Yit) + βkXkit + γjDjit  +  μit + εit      (4) 
 
with 
 
Yp20/40it :  mean income of the 20 percent/20 to 40 percent poorest defined as 
 ln(Q20/40it*Yit/0.2) 
Q20/40it:  first/second quintile share of income 
Yit:  real per capita income  
i:  cross-section units (split or not split countries)  
t:  year of observation 
μit + εit:  composite error term including unobserved country effects  
Xkit:  additional variables with k = 1, ... ,n  
D1,2,3it:  total external debt to GDP (EDT), total external debt to exports (EDT/XGS),  
total debt services to exports (TDS/XGS) 
 
To present more clearly the distribution effect we subtract Yit from both sides 
51: 
 
Yq20/40it
 = α0 + (α1-1)ln(Yit) + βkXkit + γjDjit  + μit + εit     (5)  
 
with 
 
Yq20/40it: logarithm of first/second quintile share divided by 0.2 
 
 
However, to include information on within-country variation and to cover econometric issues 
discussed in the next section we apply a system GMM estimator, i.e. we estimate the level 
equation (5) and its first difference (6) as a system with the restriction of having the same 
coefficients α1-1, βk and γj 
 
Yq20/40i,t+z
 - Yq20/40it
 = (α1-1)[ln(Yi,t+z) – ln(Yit)]+ βk[Xki,t+z - Xkit]+ γj[Dji,t+z - Djit] +  [εit+z  - εit] (6)  
 
 
                                            
51 Yq20/40it  = Yp20/40it – ln(Yit) = ln(Q20/40it *Yit/0.2) – ln(Yit) = ln(Q20/40it) + ln(Yit) – ln 0.2 – ln (Ykt) = ln(Q20/40it /0.2) 
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with  
 
z: distance of years between two observations of a spell with identical income definition or 
 distance of years between observations within a country 
 
To handle the incomparability problem of inequality data, we choose two different routes. First, 
we split the countries requiring the same income definition within each subgroup (e.g. Côte 
d’Ivoire 1: 1985/88, Côte d’Ivoire 2: 1988/95, see table 1) and using only the unadjusted income 
definition. While the number of cross-section units is now increased, the number of observations 
for the level equation is decreased as the first observation per cross-section unit is omitted due 
to the first-differenced procedure. The advantage of this procedure is that the first-differenced 
equations are now formed only by observations with the same income definition per country. On 
the other hand the first/second quintile shares in the level equations are not directly comparable. 
Therefore, secondly, we do not split the countries and form first-differenced equations for all 
observations per country using the adjusted first/second quintile share of income. In this case 
we omit one of the two observations for the same year in one country (e.g. Côte d’Ivoire 1988/1, 
see table 1).52 While in this case income definitions in the first-differenced and level equation 
are comparable, the adjustment procedure may influence the estimated coefficients (Atkinson, 
Brandolini 2001). One general drawback of the system GMM estimation in our context, 
however, is the fact that we are confronted with irregular panel data, i.e. z ranges from 2 to 14 in 
both approaches. In the system GMM estimation, however, z is assumed to be identical in the 
first-differenced equation.  
 
The results of the system GMM estimation can be interpreted as a mixture of the level and first-
differenced equation, i.e. pooled cross-section regression of the impact of the debt indicators on 
the level of first/second quintile at certain country-year observations (5) and the impact of the 
change of the debt indicators on the change of the first/second quintile share (6) between the 
observations within a country. Combining (5) and (6) in the system GMM estimation the 
coefficients of the debt indicators (γj) and the additional regressors (βk) capture the distribution 
effect. Thus relying on (2) a significant γj, βk > 0 indicate pro-poor growth (positive distribution 
effect), while γj, βk < 0 could be labelled as anti-poor growth on the average.
53 Interpreting the 
system GMM approach as a level equation, a one percentage point increase in the debt 
indicators would change the first/second quintile share by γj * 100 percent. 
 
                                            
52 We compare the values of the adjusted first and second quintile of both per country-year observations (e.g. 
Venezuela 1987/1, 1987/2) with the values before (e.g. Venezuela 1981) and after (e.g. Venezuela 1993) the country-
year observations to decide whether we omit the first or second observation as ordered in table 1. If one of the adjusted 
observation varies considerably with respect to the other observations, we omit this observation.   
53  This interpretation would apply equivalently to α1 – 1. As α1 – 1, however, is almost ever insignificant, we present only 
results for the system GMM estimation of equations (5) and (6) omitting ln(Yit).  
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Finally, to estimate the total effect we regress the mean income of the poorest 20 and 20 to 40 
percent on debt indicators and variants of additional regressors, taking as level equation in the 
system GMM methodology variants of the following equation: 54  
 
Yp20/40it
 = α0 + (βk+ρk)Xkit + (γj+ ρj)Djit  +  μit + εit      (7) 
 
Taking into account (3) a significant (βk+ρk) > 0, (γj+ ρj) > 0 indicates pro-poor growth (positive 
total effect), while (βk+ρk) < 0, (γj+ ρj) < 0 would indicate anti-poor growth on the average. Trade-
offs between the distribution effect and growth effect are present, if estimations for the 
distribution effect (γj) and the total effect (γj + ρj ) differ in sign.  
 
5.1.2   Growth equation: pooled OLS, fixed effects or random effects estimation 
  
To measure also within country-variation, to cover the problem of an irregular panel in the first-
differenced equation and the incomparability issue of income inequality measures, we also use 
a growth equation forming the dependent variable exclusively from spells with identical 
definitions of inequality income measures and divide the growth rates of each spell by the 
distance of years to calculate (regular) annual averages. Thus we regress the annual average 
growth rate of the mean income of the 20/20 to 40 per cent poorest on the annual average 
growth rate of mean income and initial values for the debt indicators and additional 
macroeconomic variables.  
  
yp20, 40it
  = α0 + α1yit + βkXkit + γjDjit +  uit       (8) 
 
with 
 
yp20/40it: average annual rate of growth of the mean income of the 20/20 to 40 per cent 
poorest defined as 100/z*[ln(Q20/40i,t+z*Yi,t+z/0.2) – ln(Q
20/40
it*Yit/0.2)] 
z: distance of years between two observations of a spell with identical income 
definition 
yit:  average annual rate of growth of the mean income defined as 
  100/z*[ln(Yi,t+z) – ln(Yit)] 
Xkit:  additional variables with k = 1, ... ,n; only initial values (at beginning of spell)  
Djit:  debt indicator with j = 1, ..., 3; only initial values (at beginning of spell) 
uit  error term of unknown form  
 
We subtract yit from both sides in (8) to derive more clearly the distribution effect: 
 
yq20/40it
  = α0 + (α1-1)yit + βkXkit + γjDjit +  εit      (9)  
                                            
54 In this approach we assume that α1-1 equals zero. 
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with 
 
yq20/40it: average annual rate of growth of the first and second quintile share defined as 
100/z* [ln(Q20/40i,t+z) – ln(Q
20/40
it)]
 55 
 
Again γj > 0 or βk > 0 indicate pro-poor growth (positive distribution effect) with respect to (2), 
i.e. a one percentage point increase of the debt indicator or the additional variables would 
increase the average annual growth rate of the first/second quintile share by γj and βk 
percentage points, respectively.56   
 
Finally, we estimate also the total effect in using variants of the following equation57: 
 
yp20, 40it
  = α0  + (βk+ρk)Xkit +(γj+ ρj)Djit +  uit      (10) 
 
With respect to (3) a significant (βk+ρk) > 0, (γj+ ρj) > 0 indicate pro-poor growth (positive total 
effect), while (βk+ρk) < 0, (γj+ρj) < 0 would indicate anti-poor growth on the average. Again, 
trade-offs between the distribution effect and growth effect are indicated, if estimations for the 
distribution effect (γj) and the total effect (γj + ρj ) differ significantly in the sign of the coefficients.  
 
5.2 Econometric issues 
 
In estimating variants of equations (5), (6), and (9) several econometric issues have to be 
mentioned.58  First, if we estimate the level equation (5) alone by pooled OLS, coefficients would 
be biased and inconsistent due to unobserved heterogeneity correlated with regressors 
(Dollar/Kraay 2001, Eastwood/Lipton 2001, Chen/Ravallion 1997). Fixed-effect or first-difference 
estimation in a panel data framework would be standard remedies to the unobserved 
heterogeneity issue. However, within-country variation of income distribution may be too limited 
compared to the greater variability of first and second quintile shares across countries 
(Dollar/Kraay 2001). Thus we apply a system GMM estimator using both information on the 
levels (cross country variation) and first-difference (within country variation) of income 
distribution data (Arellano/Bover 1995, Blundell/Bond 1998). Estimating the growth equation (9) 
by pooled OLS, the estimated coefficients may also be biased and inconsistent due to 
unobserved country-specific effects in εit. We use both a Hausmann test for fixed and random 
effects and a Breusch Pagan Langrange multiplier test for random effects to cover this issue. If 
we can not reject the null hypothesis in both tests, pooled OLS is the appropriate method. 
                                            
55 yq20/40it
 = yp/20/40it – yit  =  100/z* ([ln(Q
20/40
i,t+z*Yi,t+z/0.2) – ln(Q
20/40
it*Yit/0.2)] - [ln(Yi,t+z) – ln(Yit)]) 
=  100/z* ([ln(Q20/40i,t+z) + ln(Yi,t+z) – ln 0.2  
- ln(Q20/40it) - ln (Yit) + ln (0.2) 
- ln(Yi,t+z)  + ln(Yit)]) 
=  100/z* [ln(Q20/40i,t+z)  ln(Q
20/40
i t)] 
56 This interpretation would apply equivalently to α1 – 1. As α1 – 1, however, is almost ever insignificant, we present only 
results for the growth equation (9) omitting yit. 
57 In this approach we assume that α1 equals one. 
58 The discussion in this section is also relevant for regressions on the total effect (equations 7 and 10). 
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Otherwise, we present results for the random effects (the Breusch Pagan test is rejected, but 
not the Hausmann test) or fixed effects model (the Hausmann test is rejected).  
    
Second, even if time-invariant country-specific effects can probably be dismissed, omitted 
variable bias might be an issue due to variables whose values change over time. In addition, as 
the econometric specification is not based on a comprehensive theoretical framework, but more 
found in ad hoc considerations and plausible reasoning, model uncertainty problems might arise 
(Ghura/Leite/Tsangarides 2002).59 Thus excluded variables might be correlated with the 
regressors leading to biased estimates.  
 
Third, measurement error in dependent and independent variables could generate biases in the 
estimated coefficients. While measurement error in the data on first/second quintile might be 
more severe due to flawed inequality data, measurement error in the dependent variable only 
causes biases in case of systematic correlation with regressors (Wooldridge 2000).60 
Measurement error in explanatory variables, however, might lead to inconsistent estimates. 
Varying definitions and accuracy in data collection, for example, cause measurement errors 
especially present in data on developing countries.61 
 
Fourth, in estimating level and first difference equations (5), (6) or the growth equation (9) 
simultaneity might be an issue.62 In case of reverse causation, estimations would be biased and 
inconsistent. The impact of the (growth rate of) first/second quintile income on explanatory 
variables (X, D), however, is controversially discussed. While, on the one hand, endogeneity is 
denied due to pragmatic reasons (Dollar/Kraay 2001), reverse causation may be argued for 
because of major policy and institutional changes in developing countries and political economy 
reasons (Lundberg/Squire 2001). We do not instrument for X and D in the system GMM 
estimations due to limited data availability and plausibility.63 Finally, only initial values for each 
spell are used for the regressors X and D to avoid endogeneity due to explanatory variables in 
the growth equation.64  
 
                                            
59 The problems of omitted variables and model uncertainty are connected by the exclusion of significant explaining 
regressors which might be correlated with the selected regressors. But while the omitted variable issue points to the 
inconsistent estimation of the selected parameters, the problem of model uncertainty focuses on the misspecification of 
the general model and the problem in explaining pro-poor growth by a single ad hoc model. On the problem of model 
uncertainty in cross-country growth regressions, see Temple (1999). On the issue of model uncertainty in pro-poor 
growth regressions with macroeconomic policy variables, see Ghura/ Leite/ Tsangarides (2002). 
60 As yp20/40 is formed by y, i.e. the dependent variable would be systematically related to an explanatory variable in 
regressions with y, a biased coefficient of y might be expected. However, remembering yq20/40 in equation (5), this is 
equal to stating that the growth rate of the first/second quintile must be correlated with the growth rate of mean income. 
As the data on first/second quintile and mean income stem from different sources, this can not be assumed in advance 
(Dollar/Kraay 2001). On the issue of biased estimates in case of identical data sources, see Chen/Ravallion (1997).    
61 On the measurement error problem in cross-section growth regressions and on the flawed data in the Penn World 
Table, see Temple (1999). 
62 On the problem of simultaneous examination of inequality and growth and their joint determinants, see 
Lundberg/Squire (2001). 
63 One could use lagged values of X and D as instruments. However, as our sample is often restricted to only two 
observations per country, we would have to drop all these countries from the regression.  
64 On this solution, see Lundberg/Squire (2001). On the empirical application of this method to deal with the endogeneity 
issue in cross-section growth regressions, see Barro/Sala-i-Martin (1995). But even in this solution endogeneity might 
remain a problem, see Temple (1999). 
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A significant impact of the (growth rate of the) mean income of the poor on the (growth rate of 
the) mean income might be possible.65 Considering equations (5), (6), and (9) reverse causation 
thus would mean impact of the (growth rate of) first/second quintile share on the (growth rate of 
the) mean income.66 Using only a level equation (5), contemporaneous reverse causation would 
cause inconsistent OLS estimation, while lagged reverse causation would justify OLS 
estimation, assuming serial independence. Thus, considering the growth equation (9), pooled 
OLS estimation is unbiased and consistent if lagged reversed causation can be assumed with 
serial independence (Eastwood/Lipton 2001). Concerning the system GMM estimation, reverse 
causation was covered in using instruments for mean income. In the level equation (5), we 
instrument for mean income using accumulated growth in mean income over three years prior to 
time t (e.g. Brazil 1967 to 1970 for 1970). In the first difference equation (6), we instrument for 
growth in mean income using the level of mean income at the beginning of the period, and 
accumulated growth in the three years prior to time t (Dollar/Kraay 2001, 
Ghura/Leite/Tsangarides).67 A Sargan test on overidentifying restrictions was used to test for 
validity of extra instruments (Arrelano/Bond 1991, Bond/Blundell 1998). As the coefficient for 
(the growth rate of the) mean income is one in most of the cases, however, we present only 
results omitting (the growth rate of the) mean income. 
 
Assuming lagged reverse causation of yq20/40 on y in the growth equation (9), serial correlation in 
the error term within countries and over time remains to be discussed. In static models, 
autocorrelation in the error term leads to incorrect standard errors, but not to inconsistent 
estimates in OLS estimation. Serial correlation in models with lagged endogenous variables, 
however, would result in inconsistent estimates. Given a serially correlated error term the 
structure of the variance-covariance matrix for equation (9) would be block diagonal with a 
separate block for each country. Thus off-diagonal elements would only be non-zero within 
these blocks (Chen/Ravallion 1997As different surveys are used within almost each block, the 
error term is assumed to be serially independent. Considering the system GMM estimator, the 
assumption of no serial correlation of the error term εit in the level equation (5) is essential for 
consistency (Bond/Blundell 1998). Thus tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation 
of the first-differenced residuals εit+z  - εit of equation (6) are reported. If disturbances εit are not 
serially correlated, first order serial correlation in first differenced residuals εit+z  - εit have to be 
significant negative (m1) and second order serial correlation in the first differenced residuals 
insignificant (m2) (Arrelano/Bond 1991, Bond/Blundell 1998).  
 
 
 
                                            
65 Biased estimates might also be possible due to joint causation (Timmer 1997, Eastwood/Lipton 2001).  
66 The effect of initial income inequality on subsequent growth has been often empirically examined. The evidence, 
however, is mixed with negative (Perotti 1996, Alesina/Rodrik 1994), positive (Forbes 2000, Li/Zou 1998) and indifferent 
effect of initial income inequality on future growth (Deininger/Squire 1998b). In addition, a negative effect only for 
countries with mean income below $ 2000 (in constant 1985 purchasing power) was found (Barro 2000). 
67 Example: given the first difference equation Brazil 1960 – 1970 we use mean income of 1960 and the accumulated 
growth of mean income between 1957 and 1960 as instruments for the first difference of mean income 1960 - 1970. 
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5.3 Estimation strategy and results 
 
To measure the effect of external debt on pro-poor growth, we apply the following estimation 
strategy. First, we estimate separately the linear and nonlinear effect of EDT/GDP and 
EDT/XGS. In addition, equations for linear and nonlinear effects of EDT/GDP and EDT/XGS are 
extended by TDS/XGS as an additional regressor to distinguish budgetary process’ (crowding-
out hypothesis) and external account effects from the effects of the accumulated debt stock 
(Claessens/Detragiache/Kanbur/Wickham 1996, Patillo/Poirson/Ricci 2002, Loko/Mlachila/ 
Nallari/Kalonji 2003). We test these eight equations for the first and second quintile in the 
growth equation and the system GMM estimation (table 13 to 15).68  
 
Second, we test this set of equations in specifications with regional dummy variables and with 
additional macroeconomic variables. To analyze potential trade-offs between this distribution 
effect and the growth effect we additionally test the total effect of the debt indicators on the 
mean income of the 20 and 20 to 40 percent poorest adding macroeconomic variables. Due to 
our fundamentally empirical approach, we finally apply different robustness checks to confirm 
the results, i.e. we test results without outliers, with mean income, and with both adjusted and 
not adjusted inequality income measures in the system GMM estimations.69  
 
To present a general overview of our results we indicate in table 13 to 15 a matrix of significant 
findings for the debt indicators. In the rows we indicate the different specifications applied. The 
eight columns denote the eight combinations of debt indicators we test in each specification. 
Finally, only significant results for debt indicators are presented in the matrix. In table 13 we 
present results for the distribution and total effect of debt indicators on the growth rate of the first 
quintile share. If we look in the row 4, we see the findings regressing the growth rate of the first 
quintile share on regional dummy variables, macroeconomic variables (secondary education, 
budget deficit, inflation, M2/GDP, and Gini coefficient) and the eight different combinations of 
the debt indicators without outliers. Only the nonlinear effect of EDT/GDP, i.e. EDT/GDP and 
EDT/GDP2, seems to be relevant in combinations with and without TDS/XGS.   
 
5.3.1 Debt indicators and pro-poor growth: distribution effect 
 
Relying on this overview we first emphasize general findings for the distribution effect. In the 
growth equation debt indicators have no distribution effect on the growth rate of the poorest 20 
                                            
68 To fix the eight equations more clearly we regress the growth rate of the first quintile separately on EDT/GDP, 
EDT/GDP and EDT/GDP2, EDT/XGS, EDT/XGS and EDT/XGS2, EDT/GDP and TDS/XGS, EDT/GDP and EDT/GDP2 
and TDS/XGS, EDT/XGS and TDS/XGS, and, finally, on EDT/XGS and EDT/XGS2 and TDS/XGS (see table 13 to 15).  
We also test all specifications only with TDS/XGS as debt indicator. In the growth equation, TDS/XGS is weakly positive 
(+0.06) at a 10 percent significance level only for the growth rate of the first quintile in regressions without outliers and 
with regional dummy variables. In the system GMM estimation, TDS/XGS is only significantly positive (+0.004) for the 
first quintile in the unadjusted approach. Finally, TDS/XGS is significantly positive for the mean of the first quintile 
(+0.006) and the mean of the second quintile (+0.004) in the adjusted and unadjusted approach, if we test the total 
effect. Thus the positive results do not differ much from the coefficients estimated for TDS/XGS in other specifications. 
In addition, distribution effects of TDS/XGS are not very robust. Therefore we do not present findings for TDS/XGS 
separately.     
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to 40 percent.70 The only effect we find for the growth rate of the first quintile is a nonlinear 
effect of EDT/GDP, if we omit outliers (table 14). In the system GMM estimations nonlinear 
effects of EDT/GDP seem to be relevant for the first quintile and, more weakly, the second 
quintile share. While TDS/XGS is relevant only for the first quintile, the few significant findings 
for EDT/XGS indicate no clear relationship (table 14 and 15).   
 
First, we regress the growth rate of the first quintile on eight combinations of debt indicators and 
regional dummy variables to control for cultural, historical and economical differences of income 
inequality in the six regions (Cornia 2002). The Eastern Europe and Central Asia dummy is 
omitted, reflecting the different economies of countries with former planning systems with 
respect to other developing countries.71 In addition, the comparability of data to the other 
regions is problematic due to major structural transformations of these economies and sampling 
biases in surveys (Chen/Ravallion 1997).72  
 
Concerning the growth equation, findings confirm the hypothesis of important difference in the 
growth rates of the first quintile, as coefficients for all five regions differ positively in a highly 
significant way from Eastern Europe and Central Asia (table 7).73 Thus within-country inequality 
has been worsening considerably in transitional countries during the ninties with respect to other 
regions of middle and low–income countries.74 Furthermore, our estimations show that external 
debt to GDP is significant only in the nonlinear specification without outliers (table 7 equations 4 
and 8). Our findings, however, indicate a reverse Laffer curve effect between EDT/GDP and the 
average annual growth rate of the first quintile share. Thus an increase in the external debt to 
GDP ratio would first diminish the growth rate until a threshold around 70 percent for EDT/GDP, 
and then increase the growth rate of the first quintile share after this turning point.75 Around 
three quarters of the observations for EDT/GDP are under 70 percent in our sample without 
outliers indicating a prevalent negative impact of EDT/GDP on the growth rate of the first quintile 
share. The slope of the nonlinear effect, however, is not very steep, e.g. a one percentage point 
change of EDT/GDP at a level of 40 percent for EDT/GDP would decrease the growth rate of 
the first quintile share by only 0.03 percentage points.76 Adding TDS/XGS, the threshold would 
increase to around 79 percent for EDT/GDP (table 7 equation 8).77 Thus the effect of EDT/GDP 
                                                                                                                                                 
69 We indentify outliers from graphical analysis and descriptive statistics without a strict rule (table 4).  
70 Therefore we present only results for the first quintile share in table 13.  
71 In our sample, however, only countries of Eastern Europe are part of the ECA dummy variable (table 1).  
72 As only 13 out of 127 spells are based on data from Eastern Europe and Central Asian countries, we use these data 
for pragmatic reasons. 
73 While this result is also confirmed for regressions for the second quintile, we do not present findings due to 
insignificant debt indicators.  
74 As for the reasons for widening inequality in transitional countries, see Grün/Klasen (2001). 
75 The turning point is calculated by dividing the coefficient of EDT/GDP through twice the coefficient of EDT/GDP2 
taking absolute values of the coefficients: 0.07/2 * 0.0005 = 70 (Wooldridge 2000).  
76 The effect of EDT/GDP on the growth rate of the first quintile share is approximately the coefficient of EDT/GDP plus 
twice the coefficient of EDT/GDP2 multiplied with the chosen value of EDT/GDP: -0.07 + 2 * 0.0005 * 40 = -0.03 
(Wooldridge 2000). 
77 We identified one outlier for TDS/XGS (Algeria 1988: TDS/XGS 76.6) 
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is negative in most of the cases and would only at very high levels impact positively on the 
growth rate of the first quintile share.78  
 
Economically, a reverse Laffer curve effect of EDT/GDP on the growth rate of the first quintile 
share is hard to interpret. One could criticize the robustness of results not taking into account 
outliers. But even the three most extreme values of EDT/GDP, which are omitted as outliers, are 
associated with a positive growth rate of the first quintile (Jordan 1991: EDT/GDP 249.3, yq20 
4.22; Mauretania 1988: EDT/GDP 205.1, yq20 7.77; Zambia 1993: EDT/GPD 214.8 yq20 2.47).79 
So crisis levels of initial debt stock seem not to negatively affect subsequent growth rates of the 
first quintile. However, as the curvature of the nonlinear effect on the growth rate of the first 
quintile share is only small, the difference of the economic impact of a one percentage point rise 
of EDT/GDP at the turning point (70 percent of EDT/GDP) and the highest level of EDT/GDP 
(153.4 percent) would only be around 0.08 percentage points.80 In addition, the explanatory 
power of the regressions is not very high as shown in a low R-squared values (between 0.10 
and 0.23).    
  
Finally, total debt service to exports ratio has a significantly positive effect on the growth rate of 
the first quintile share in regressions without outliers adding EDT/GDP (table 7 equations 6 and 
8). A ten percentage points increase in the initial total service to GDP ratio would increase the 
average annual growth rate of the first quintile share by 0.8 percentage points (table 7 equation 
8). The amazingly positive impact is also present in regressions replacing EDT/GDP by 
EDT/XGS, even if estimated coefficients for TDS/XGS are never significant (table 7 equations 9 
to 16).81 Thus the expected negative effect of TDS/XGS due to budgetary process’ and external 
account effects could not be confirmed with respect to the poorest 20 percent.82    
 
The system GMM estimations confirm the hypothesis of important inequality difference between 
regions, as coefficients for four regional dummy variables differ from Eastern Europe to a one or 
five percent significance level negatively (table 8). The legacy of the communist system is a 
more equal income distribution which is in strong contrast to the unequal income distributions in 
developing countries. While we measure in the growth equation the change in inequality with a 
dramatic increase in the Eastern Europe region, we look here on the differences in the levels of 
the first and second quintile share. And, despite the dramatic fall, the levels in the first and 
                                            
78 In our sample without outliers, less than 25 percent of the observations for EDT/GDP have a value higher than 79 
percent. EDT/GDP varies between 1.4 and 153.4 percent with a mean of 55.6 percent and a standard deviation of 
36.52. 
79 One could additionally conjecture that results are biased due to the problematic high growth rates in SSA (table 5). In 
regressions without outliers, however, we omit the observations with incredible high growth rates in SSA (growth Q20: 
Guinea 1991 – 94 (+25.26), Kenya 1992 – 94 (+19.28), Senegal 1991 – 95 (+18.12); growth Q40: Kenya 1992 – 94 
(+18.50)) resulting in low growth rates for SSA (growth Q20: 0.59, growth Q40: 0.44). In addition, the insignificant results 
for the nonlinear effect of EDT/GDP with outliers on the growth rate of the first quintile are mainly due to the three 
outliers in the dependent variable. 
80 At the turning point we have no impact at all. So the difference is the value at the highest observation for EDT/GDP in 
the sample. As we use the results from regressions without outliers and TDS/XGS (table 7 equation 4), we calculate: -
0.07 + 2*0.005*153.4 = 0.083. 
81 We identified four outliers for EDT/XGS (Ethopia 1995: 1276, Madagascar 1993: 709, Uganda 1989: 716, Uganda 
1992: 1474).  
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second quintile shares are still high in the Eastern Europe region compared to developing 
countries. The mean of the (adjusted) first quintile for Latin America is e.g. 0.037 (0.038) 
compared to 0.091 (0.085) in Eastern Europe in our sample, while the average annual growth 
rate of the first quintile is –0.07 in Latin America compared to –4.70 in Eastern Europe (table 5).  
 
Controlling for regional effects, we find evidence to a high significance level for the Laffer curve 
effect in the first and second quintile share (table 8 equations 1 to 3). Thus an increase of the 
external debt to GDP ratio at low levels would increase the first and second quintile share until a 
threshold is reached, and then worsen the distribution situation of the poorest 20 and 20 to 40 
percent. The turning points are at 129 and 125 percent of external debt to GDP, respectively, for 
the first and second quintile share. As only ten percent of the observations in the sample tested 
are over 125 percent for EDT/GDP, the findings indicate mainly a positive impact of EDT/GDP 
on the first and second quintile share. Again, the curvature of the nonlinear effect is small. 
Interpreting the system GMM approach as a level equation, a one percentage point increase in 
EDT/GDP at a level of 40 percent for EDT/GDP would increase the first quintile share by only 
0.2 percent. One drawback of our results is the fact that, first, the Laffer curve effect is only 
present in estimations using the unadjusted approach, while coefficients are insignificant in 
regressions with adjusted income inequality (table 8 equations 2 and 4). And, second, the Laffer 
curve effect is present but not significant, if we add TDS/XGS (table 8 equations 5 to 8). The 
different nonlinear effects in the growth equation and the system GMM estimation can be mainly 
explained by the fact that we measure two different things in both approaches. In the growth 
equation we test the impact of the debt indicators on the average annual growth rate of the first 
or second quintile share. In the system GMM approach, however, we estimate the effect of the 
level (and first-difference) of debt indicators on the level (and first–difference) of the first or 
second quintile share.83  
 
Similar to the growth equation we find a small positive impact of TDS/XGS on the first quintile 
(table 8 equations 9 to 14), i.e. a one percent increase in total debt service to exports ratio 
would be amazingly associated with a 0.4 percent rise of the first quintile share. Thus again the 
expected negative effect of TDS/XGS due to budgetary process’ effects and external account 
effects could not be confirmed with respect to the poorest 20 percent. Finally, we also present 
significant results for the nonlinear effect of EDT/XGS on the second quintile share, controlling 
additionally for TDS/XGS (table 8 equations 16). This result, however, should not be 
overinterpreted as it can not be confirmed in the unadjusted approach, the first quintile share, in 
                                                                                                                                                 
82 Since we omit observations with incredible high growth rate for SSA in regressions without outliers, the results are not 
biased due to the problematic high growth rate in SSA (table 5).  
83 To reveal the systematic differences of the estimation methodologies, we, first, estimate a sample used in the growth 
equation in a system GMM approach. As we need two observations with growth rates per country (three observations 
for the first and second quintile share) to apply the system GMM estimator, we omitted all countries with only two 
observations. Estimated results for the system GMM estimations are a mixture of the growth equation and the first 
difference of the growth equation. Second, we also tested effects of the level and first differenced equations of a system 
GMM estimation separately in OLS. Estimated coefficients for system GMM estimation are here a mixture of a level 
equation and the first difference of the level equation. Thus the difference between the system GMM estimations and 
the growth estimations stems apparently from the fact that we regress the level of the first/second quintile on the level of 
debt indicators, while in the growth equation we regress the growth rate on the level of the debt indicators.    
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other specifications and test on first order correlation is failed (table 8 equations 13 to 15 and 
table 14, 15).  
 
Finally, we control for additional macroeconomic variables which are suggested in the empirical 
literature with respect to inequality and pro – poor growth (Timmer 1997, Gallup/Radelet/ 
Warner 1998, Gugerty/Timmer 1999, Romer/Romer 1998, Easterly/Fisher 2001, 
Eastwood/Lipton 2001, Ghura/Leite/Tsangarides 2002).84 In the growth equation we control for 
budget deficit to GDP, financial development (money and quasi money to GDP), secondary 
education (average years of secondary schooling in total population aged 25 and over), inflation 
and initial Gini coefficient. In the system GMM estimation, we substitute budget deficit by 
government consumption due to its proven relevance in this estimation methodology 
(Ghura/Leite/Tsangarides 2002).85 While the Gini coefficient was found to be highly significant in 
a similar approach (Ghura/Leite/Tsangarides 2002), regressing the first quintile share on the 
Gini coefficient in a level/first-difference equation seems tautological, as a change in  inequality 
in the first and second quintile share is only explained by change in overall inequality, i.e. no 
new information on the determinants of inequality are added in this specification. Thus we omit 
the Gini coefficient in the system GMM estimations86 
 
In the growth equation all specifications for the debt indicators are irrelevant with respect to the 
second quintile share. In addition, linear and nonlinear effects for EDT/XGS (and extended by  
TDS/XGS) and linear effects for EDT/GDP (and extended by TDS/XGS) are insignificant in 
regressions with and without outliers (table 13). On the other side, the nonlinear effect of 
EDT/GDP on the first quintile can again be confirmed, if we omit outliers (compare table 9 
equations 2 and 4 with table 7 equations 4 and 8).87 Our estimation results indicate again a 
reverse Laffer curve effect between EDT/GDP and the growth rate of the first quintile share with 
a turning point around 63 (table 7 equation 4). Around 70 percent of the observations for 
EDT/GDP are under 63 percent in our sample without outliers, indicating a prevalent negative 
impact on the growth rate of the first quintile share in most cases. The slope of the nonlinear 
effect, however, is not very steep, e.g. a one percentage point change of EDT/GDP at a 
EDT/GDP level of 40 percent would decrease the growth rate of the quintile share by only 0.036 
percentage points. In addition, the nonlinear effect is only weakly significant to a ten percent 
level. Adding TDS/XGS the turning point would slightly increase to 65 percent for EDT/GDP 
(table 9 equation 4).88  
                                            
84 To identify additional key determinants we executed batteries of regressions in both the growth equation and system 
GMM estimation. We used public investment, food inflation, output volatility, terms of trade, trade openness, life 
expectancy, government consumption and indicators for civil liberties and political rights as additional regressors. 
85 We identify one outlier for financial development (Jordan 1991: 132 %), three for inflation (Brazil 1988: 651 %, Brazil 
1993: 1997%, Poland 1990 555 %) and incredible high rates of government consumption for all observations of Jordan 
and Lesotho (above 47 %). 
86 We also omit M2 to GDP ratio due to insignficant results.  
87 Since we omit observations with incredible high growth rate for SSA in regressions without outliers, the results are not 
biased due to the problematic high growth rates in SSA (table 5).  
88 One problem with this result is the fact that the Hausmann test indicates a fixed effects estimation to a significance 
level under 1 percent(table 9 equation 4). Concerning the result of the fixed effects estimation the coefficients would 
change considerably e.g. a constant of -56.50). Explanations of these effects may be based on the sole focus on 
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Concerning the additional explanatory variables, budget deficit, intial inequality, and inflation 
impact significantly positive on the growth rate of the first quintile share (table 9 equations 1 and 
3). So the budgetary process’ effects would be supported, if we assume that higher external 
debt results in increased budget deficit by raised debt service payments. Concerning results 
from the correlation matrix, however, only EDT/XGS is significantly negative correlated with 
budget surplus (table 6). As the budget deficit is negatively defined, a one percentage point 
decrease in the budget surplus to GDP ratio diminishes the growth rate of the first quintile share 
between 0.26 and 0.43 percentage points. In addition, a one percent rise of inflation would 
counterintuitively increase the growth rate of the first quintile share between 1.02 and 1.47 
percentage points. However, the positive impact of inflation becomes insignificant if we drop 
outliers (table 9 equations 2 and 4). Finally, the Gini coefficient is significantly positive indicating 
a positive impact of higher initial inequality on the average annual rate of growth of the first 
quintile. Thus the hypothesis of inequality convergence is confirmed by this result. One 
drawback of our findings is the fact that R-squared is between 0.22 and 0.36, i.e. the covariates 
explain only between 22 and 36 percent of the variance in the growth rate of the first quintile.  
 
Adding secondary education, government consumption, and inflation to debt indicators in the 
system GMM approach, the findings change only slightly change with respect to estimations 
controlling only for regional dummy variables (compare table 10 to table 9). One important 
reason is the fact that the additional variables are almost always statistically insignificant.89 So 
we also find a Laffer curve effect of EDT/GDP to a high significance level for the first and 
second quintile (compare table 10 equations 1 and 3 with table 8 equations 1 and 3). A surge of 
EDT/GDP at low levels would increase the first and second quintile, but this effect is reversed 
and become negative at a certain threshold. The turning points are now lower at 83 and 100 
percent of external debt to GDP, respectively, for the first and second quintile share. Interpreting 
the system GMM approach as a level equation, a one percentage points increase of EDT/GDP 
at a level of 40 percent for EDT/GDP would here raise the first quintile share by only 0.26 
percent. One import difference to specifications with regional dummy variables is the fact that 
the Laffer curve effect is also significant for the first quintile share in the adjusted approach 
(compare table 10 equations 1 to 4 with table 8 equations 1 to 4).90  
 
Controlling for TDS/XGS the Laffer curve effect of EDT/GDP is only confirmed in the unadjusted 
approach for the first quintile with a turning point of 100 percent for EDT/GDP (compare table 10 
equations 5  with equations 6 to 8).91 Finally, we find again small positive impact (0.004) of 
TDS/XGS on the first quintile (compare table 10 equations 9 and 10 to table 8 equations 9 and 
                                                                                                                                                 
within-country variation of the fixed effects estimator, few time series observations in many countries We therefore 
present results for pooled OLS regressions, even if inconsistency may be a problem.  
89 One exception is the significant positive effect of government consumption on the second quintile share (table 10 
equation 2).  
90 The coefficient of EDT/GDP, however, is insignificant for the second quintile share in the adjusted approach (table 10 
equation 4).  
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10). Findings on the Laffer curve effect in the system GMM estimation have to be interpreted 
with care, due to the fact that tests on first-order serial correlation are failed in more than half of 
the cases.  
 
5.3.2 Debt indicators and pro-poor growth: total effect 
 
Taking into account trade-offs between the distribution effect and the growth effect of debt 
indicators on the income of the poor we also test the total effect of the debt indicators on the 
mean income of the 20 and 20 to 40 percent poorest. We choose to measure the total effect 
and derive possible trade-offs between the distribution and growth effect, because our panel is 
highly irregular and unbalanced, and tests on the growth effect of the debt indicators would 
therefore suffer from major data limitations and could better be answered in samples without 
restrictions on income inequality data.   
 
Controlling for budget deficit, financial development, secondary education, inflation, and initial 
inequality in the growth equation, we test our eight equations for the first and second quintile.92 
None of the debt indicators, however, are significant in regressions with or without outliers for 
the first and second quintile share (table 13).93 To compare results with the distribution effect we 
present estimated coefficients for the nonlinear effect of EDT/GDP on the growth rate of the 
mean income of first quintile share (table 11). Even if statistical tests indicate no significant 
impact, the sign and size of the coefficients for EDT/GDP, EDT/GDP2 and TDS/XGS remain 
almost identical in regressions without outliers (compare table 11 equations 2 and 4 with table 9 
equations 2 and 4). Thus the reverse Laffer curve effect of EDT/GDP on the growth rate of the 
income of the poorest 20 percent is primarily driven by the distribution effect. A related 
conclusion is that EDT/GDP does not affect the growth rate nonlinearily in our sample. On the 
contrary, the impact of all control variables is increased in regressions on the total effect. Thus a 
one percentage point increase in budget surplus would now raise the growth rate of the mean 
income of the first quintile share by 0.33 percentage points, compared to 0.28 percentage points 
in regressions for the distribution effect (compare table 11 equations 2 and 4 with table 9 
equations 2 and 4). Thus the distribution and growth effect work in the same direction and 
budget deficit would be especially bad for the poorest 20 percent.     
 
In the system GMM approach we control for secondary education, government consumption, 
inflation, and additionally civil liberties, life expectancy and terms-of-trade.94 Concerning external 
debt to GDP ratio, we find a significant Laffer curve effect only for the mean income of the 
poorest 20 percent in the unadjusted approach (compare table 12 equations 1 to 4 with tabe 10 
                                                                                                                                                 
91 However, coefficients for EDT/GDP2 are significantly negative, suggesting a Laffer curve effect (table 10 equations 6 
to 8). 
92 We also tested initial per capita income as convergence term in total effects regressions of the growth equation. 
However, we omit inital per capita income, since its coefficient was never statistically significant 
93 Since we omit observations with incredible high growth rates for SSA in regressions without outliers, the results are 
not biased due to the problematic high growth rates in SSA (table 5).  
94 In addition to the outliers mentioned above, we identify one outlier for terms-of-trade (Nigeria 1985: 262 %).  
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equations 1 to  4). An increase of EDT/GDP at low level would raise the mean income of the 
first quintile, but this effect becomes negative at a threshold. The turning point would be around 
63 percent of EDT/GDP. Interpreting the system GMM approach as level equation, a one 
percentage point increase of EDT/GDP at a level of 40 percent for EDT/GDP would here raise 
the mean income for the first quintile share 0.18 percent. As the size of the coefficients are very 
similar to the distribution effect, the total effect is mainly driven by the distribution effect in this 
case and there appears to be no trade-off between the growth and distribution effect.95 This 
conclusion is also true adding TDS/XGS, as insignificant coefficients for EDT/GDP and 
EDT/GDP2 are very similar to the distribution effect (compare table 12 equations 5 to 8 with 
table 10 equations 5 to 8).  
 
If we add TDS/XGS to a linear effect of EDT/GDP, total external debt to GDP now affects 
significantly negative the first and second quintile share (compare table 12 equations 9 to 12 
with table 10 equations 9 to 12).96 In addition, we find a highly significant negative effect of 
EDT/XGS on the mean income of first and second quintile if we add TDS/XGS (table 12 
equations 13 to 16). Interpreting the system GMM approach as level equation, a 10 percentage 
points rise in EDT/GDP would diminsh the mean income of the second quintile by 2 percent, 
while a 10 percentage points rise in EDT/XGS decreases the mean income of the first and 
second quintile by 1 percent (Table 12 equations 9 to 16). Furthermore, we find again significant 
positive impact of TDS/XGS on the mean income of the first quintile and second quintile share. 
A 10 percentage point increase in TDS/XGS would amazingly raise the mean income of the first 
and second quintile between 4 and 10 percent (table 12 equations 9 to 16). As the size of the 
coefficients differ considerably from the almost zero distribution effects, the total effect is here 
driven by the growth effect.97 Thus a negative linear effect of EDT/GDP and EDT/XGS on the 
mean income of the first and second quintile share is mainly caused by its effect on overall 
economic growth.    
 
All additional macroeconomic variables affect the income of the poor in the way expected. 
Higher secondary education, life expectancy and terms of trade foster the income of poor, while 
increased government consumption, inflation, and less civil liberties, measured as a high value 
on a scale between one and seven, worsen the income of the poor (table 12).98 Furthermore, 
coefficients for additional macroeconomic variables are now statistically significant, leaving only 
inflation insignificant (compare table 12 with table 10). A one year rise of the average years of 
secondary schooling would increase the mean income of the first and second quintile between 
31 and 37 percent (table 12). As the mean of average years of secondary education is at 1.11 
                                            
95 This conclusion is also true for the mean income of the first quintile (adjusted approach) and the mean income of the 
second quintile (adjusted and unadjusted approach), as coefficients are very similar to the distribution effect (compare 
table 13 equations 2 to 4 with table 11 equations 2 to 4).  
96 The coefficient of EDT/GDP for the mean income of the first quintile in the unadjusted approach, however, is 
insignificant (table 13 equation 9).  
97 One exception is the coefficient of TDS/XGS in combination with EDT/GDP for the mean income of the first quintile 
where the distribution effect is very similar to the total effect (compare table 13 equations 9 and 10 with table 11 
equations 9 and 10).  
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years and the minimum and maximum values in our sample are 0.10 and 3.21 years, 
respectively, a one year change in secondary schooling seems to be a very ambitious policy 
target (table 4). A more realistic interpretation would be that if education policy achieves a 
change of 0.1 in average years of secondary schooling, the mean income of the first and 
second quintile share would rise, roughly speaking, by 3 percent. Apparently, this education 
effect works primarily through the growth effect, as the coefficients for secondary education are 
small and insignificant with respect to the distribution effect (table 10). In addition, a one year 
increase in life expectancy would raise the mean income of the first and second quintile by 3 
percent. As secondary education and life expectancy are almost always negatively correlated 
with the debt indicators, part of a negative effect of higher external debt on the income of the 
poor may be captured by reduced investment in education and health confirming the budgetary 
process’ effect (table 6). Finally, a one unit rise of civil liberties measured in a scale from one to 
seven with one indicating the most favorable state would diminish the mean income for the first 
and second quintile between 5 to 8 percent.   
 
6. Conclusion 
 
The empirical results of the impact of external debt on pro-poor growth have to be interpreted 
carefully due to inconsistent results of the sensitivity analyses. First, EDT/GDP, EDT/XGS and 
TDS/XGS are insignificant in almost all eight combinations in the growth equation (table 13). We 
only have weak evidence for a reverse Laffer curve effect of external debt to GDP ratio with 
respect to the growth rate of the first quintile. While our sample indicates a negative impact of 
EDT/GDP at most observations, the negative slope is not very steep and the result is only 
present in regressions without outliers. In addition, the reverse Laffer curve effect of EDT/GDP 
is also insignificantly present in regressions on the total effect. Thus the nonlinear effect is 
primarily driven by the distribution effect of EDT/GDP.  
 
Second, we find strong evidence of a debt Laffer curve effect of EDT/GDP on the first quintile in 
the system GMM approach (table 14). An increase of the external debt to GDP ratio at low 
levels would raise the first quintile share until a threshold is reached and then worsen the 
situation of the poorest 20. Thus extreme levels of external debt to GDP ratio seem to be 
associated with lower levels of the first quintile, confirming disincentive and macroeconomic 
uncertainty effects. While the turning points vary between 80 and 130 percent of EDT/GDP, the 
curvature is in general rather small. So even at a crisis level of 200 percent of EDT/GDP, a one 
percentage point increase of EDT/GDP would decrease the first quintile only between 0.1 and 
0.9 percent. Another problem for economic interpretation is the fact that the debt Laffer curve 
can never be confirmed controlling for EDT/XGS (table 14). Looking at the second quintile the 
debt Laffer curve for EDT/GDP is only present in the unadjusted approach and even weaker 
than in the first quintile (table 15). While a significant Laffer curve disappears with respect to the 
                                                                                                                                                 
98 The variable government consumption may be seen as a proxy for nonproductive public expenditures (Barro/Sala-i-
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total effect in almost all estimations, no trade-off between the growth and distribution effect can 
be confirmed, as the size of the coefficients remain very similar. 
 
Third, we find highly significant negative impacts of EDT/GDP and EDT/XGS on the mean 
income of the first and second quintile if we control additionally for TDS/XGS. Interpreting the 
system GMM approach as level equation, a 10 percentage points increase in EDT/XGS would 
diminish the mean income of the first quintile and second quintile by 1 percent. A 10 percentage 
points rise in EDT/GDP would decrease the mean income of the first quintile by 3 percent and 
the mean income of the second quintile by 2 percent. These negative total effects are mainly 
driven by a negative growth effect of external debt, as the corresponding distribution effects are 
close to zero. Thus a positive effect of external debt at low levels of economic development 
proposed by growth-cum-debt models or neoclassical growth models would be denied for the 
poorest 40 percent. One problem of this conclusion, however, is the fact that the coefficients of 
EDT/GDP and EDT/XGS are insignificant if we omit TDS/XGS in the system GMM estimation 
and in all specifications of the growth equation (table 13 to 15).  
 
Fourth, total debt service obligations to exports ratio impacts always in the “wrong” positive 
direction on the poor in the growth equation and system GMM estimation. Thus the budgetary 
process’ and external account effects measured by TDS/XGS can not be confirmed. This 
conclusion, however, should be noted with caution as the effect of TDS/XGS is rather small and 
often insignificant. In addition, TDS/XGS measures only the scheduled payments and not the 
actual payments, so empirical results do not necessarily reflect the real effect. 
 
Finally, we look at the indirect effect of high external debt via budget deficit on the poor. In the 
growth equation budget deficit is negative in a highly significant way. A one percentage point 
increase of the budget deficit would diminish the growth rate of the mean income of the first 
quintile between 0.33 and 0.44 percentage points and the growth rate of the first quintile 
between 0.28 and 0.38 percentage points.99 If we compare the findings for the debt indicators in  
regressions with and without budget surplus, however, an indirect effect of high external debt 
via budget deficit on the poor (budgetary process’ effect) can not be confirmed.  
 
It is difficult to draw a concise conclusion from these results with respect to debt sustainability 
levels and debt relief. An optimal external debt level with respect to pro-poor growth can not be 
derived without reserve. Even if results of system GMM estimations on EDT/GDP point to this 
interpretation, the whole picture of the findings do not permit such a conclusion. On the contrary, 
higher external debt levels are associated with negative effects on the level of the income of the 
poorest 40 percent without exhibiting any significant effects on the growth rates. Thus, second, 
a cautious conclusion would be that debt relief may affect the poor positively, but seems not to 
be a sufficient policy instrument for improved growth rates of the income of the poorest 40 
                                                                                                                                                 
Martin 1995). 
99 We find weaker but similar positive coefficients for regressions on the growth rate of the second quintile.  
 40
percent. This policy proposal would be in line with calls for more poverty targeted capital inflows 
as even total debt relief would release only insufficient resources for poverty reducing activities. 
With this interpretation, however, we abstract from political economy and bad governance 
issues which may prevent poverty reducing debt relief initiatives.   
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Table 1: Coverage of the data set 
 
 
Region   Country Observation dates  Source  No. of spells 
 
 
East Asia Pacific  China   1982, 85, 88, 91    UNU  3 
(EAP)     1994, 97    GPM  1 
    
   Indonesia 1976, 80, 84, 87, 90  UNU  4 
     1993, 96, 99   GPM, WDI 2 
 
   Korea  1970, 76, 80, 85, 88  UNU  4 
 
   Malaysia  1970, 76, 79, 84   UNU  3 
     1987, 92, 95   GPM  2 
 
   Philippines 1971, 85, 88, 91   UNU  3 
     1994, 97    UNU  1 
    
Thailand  1975, 81, 86, 90   UNU  3 
1992, 98    UNU  1 
 
    
 
Eastern Europe and  Bulgaria  1991, 93    UNU  1 
Central Asia   
(ECA)   Belarus  1993, 95    GPM  1 
    
   Estonia  1992, 95    UNU  1 
    
   Hungary  1977, 82, 87   UNU  2 
     1989, 93    GPM  1 
    
   Latvia  1995, 98    GPM  1 
 
   Poland  1982, 85, 90, 93   UNU  3 
 
   Romania  1989, 92    UNU  1 
    
   Russia  1994, 98    GPM  1 
    
   Slovakia  1988, 92    UNU  1 
 
 
Latin America and  Brazil  1970, 76, 80, 86   UNU  3  
Caribbean (LAC)    1988, 93, 96   GPM  2 
 
   Chile  1989, 92    UNU  1 
    
   Colombia  1971, 78, 88   UNU  2 
     1988, 91, 95   UNU  2  
 
   Costa Rica 1971, 77    UNU  1 
     1981, 86, 89   UNU  2 
     1993, 96    GPM  1 
    
   Dominican 1989, 96    GPM  1  
   Republic 
 
   Ecuador  1988, 95    GPM  1 
    
   El Salvador 1989, 95, 98   GPM, WDI 2 
    
Guatemala 1987, 89    UNU  1 
    
   Honduras 1989, 92, 96   GPM  2 
    
   Jamaica  1988, 91    UNU  1 
     1991, 96    UNU  1 
    
   Mexico  1984, 89    UNU  1 
     1989, 95, 98   GPM, WDI 2 
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   Table 1: continued 
 
 
Panama  1979, 89    UNU  1 
     1991, 95    GPM  1 
 
   Paraguay  1995, 98    GPM, WDI 1 
    
   Peru  1986, 94    UNU  1 
 
Trinidad & 1971, 76, 81   UNU  2 
   Tobago  1988, 92    GPM  1 
 
   Venezuela 1971, 81, 87   UNU  2 
     1987, 93, 96   GPM  2 
 
 
 
Middle East and   Algeria  1988, 95    GPM  1 
North Africa (MNA) 
   Egypt  1991, 95    UNU  1 
 
   Jordan  1980, 87, 91   UNU  2 
     1991, 97    UNU  1 
 
   Morocco  1984, 91    UNU  1 
     1991, 99    UNU  1 
 
   Tunisia  1985, 90, 95   GPM, WDI 2 
    
   Turkey  1973, 87    UNU  1 
     1987, 94    GPM  1 
 
   Yemen  1992, 98    GPM, WDI 1 
 
 
 
South Asia (SA)  Bangladesh 1973, 77, 81, 86   UNU  3 
     1988, 91, 95   GPM  2 
 
   India  1972, 77, 83, 86, 89, 92  UNU  5 
1994, 97    UNU  1 
 
   Pakistan  1971, 79, 85, 88   UNU   3 
     1991, 96    UNU  1 
 
   Sri Lanka  1973, 79, 87   UNU  2 
     1990, 95    UNU  1 
 
 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) Côte d’Ivoire 1985, 88    UNU  1 
     1988, 95    UNU  1 
 
   Ethiopia  1981, 95    GPM  1 
    
   Gabon  1975, 77    UNU  1 
 
   Ghana  1987, 92    GPM  1 
     1992, 97    UNU  1 
 
   Guinea  1991, 94    UNU  1 
 
   Kenya  1992, 94    UNU  1 
 
   Lesotho  1986, 93    GPM  1 
 
   Madagascar 1980, 93, 99   GPM, WDI 2 
 
Mali  1989, 94    GPM  1 
 
   Mauretania 1988, 95    UNU  1 
 
   Mauritius  1986, 91    UNU  1 
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   Table 1: continued 
 
 
 
Niger  1992, 95    UNU  1 
 
   Nigeria  1985, 97    GPM  1 
 
Senegal  1991, 95    UNU  1 
 
   Uganda  1989, 92, 96   GPM, WDI 2 
 
   Zambia  1993, 96    UNU  1 
 
 
   No. of countries No. of observations     No. of spells 
   
Total   58  209      127 
 
 
 
UNU:  UNU/WIDER-UNDP World Income Inequality Database 
GPM:  Global Poverty Monitoring  
WDI:  World Development Indicators 
 
 
 
 
Note:  
 
Pooled OLS estimation:   
 
As all observations within each line have the same income/reference unit, spells are formed only within each line (e.g. 
Panama 1979, 89, 91, 95 results in two spells: 1979 – 89, 91 - 95). Thus two observations for the same year in one 
country ( e.g. Jordan 1991) indicate different income/reference unit definitions (e.g. Jordan 91: net expenditure, person/ 
expenditure, household per capita).  
 
 
System GMM estimation:  
 
If the countries are split by the same income definition (e.g. Côte d’Ivoire 1: 1985, 88; Côte d’Ivoire 2: 1988, 95; i.e the 
number of cross-section units increases), first-differenced equations are formed only within each line.  
 
If the countries are not split by the same income definition, first-differenced equations are formed by all observations per 
country using the adjusted first and second quintile share. In this case we omit one of the two observations for the same 
year in one country (Côte d’Ivoire 88/1, Colombia 88/1, Ghana 92/1, Jamaica 91/1, Jordan 91/2, Mexico 89/1, Morocco 
91/1, Turkey 87/1, Venezuela 87/2). The number behind the year indicates, whether we omit the first or second 
observation as ordered in the table.  
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Table 2: Adjustment regression for first/second quintile income  
shares and Gini coefficients 
 
Dep. Var.  First quintile  Second quintile Gini 
   share of income  share of income coefficient 
 
(1)   (2)   (3) 
 
      
Income (unknown tax   -0.0149***  -0.0127***  5.71***  
treatment) (0.0043)  (0.0049)  (1.90) 
 
Income, net  0.0046   0.0046   -1.81 
   (0.0036)  (0.0040)  (1.52) 
 
Income, gross  -0.0071**  -0.0008   1.32 
   (0.0046)  (0.0035)  (1.36) 
 
Family   -0.0036   -0.0014   0.60 
   (0.0023)  (0.0031)  (0.82) 
 
Person   0.0119***  0.0185***  -6.62*** 
   (0.0026)  (0.0033)  (1.20) 
 
Household per capita 0.0108***  0.0159***  -5.43*** 
   (0.0032)  (0.0041)  (1.51) 
 
Equivalized  0.0265***  0.008***  -5.61*** 
   (0.0033)  (0.0029)  (0.96) 
 
EAP   -0.0045**  -0.0248***  8.85*** 
   (0.0022)  (0.0029)  (0.97) 
 
ECA   0.0196***  0.001   -1.00  
  (0.005)   (0.0051)  (1.96) 
 
LAC   -0.0272***  -0.0519***  18.86*** 
  (0.0024)  (0.0032)  (1.09) 
 
MNA   -0.0117***  -0.0328***  12.00*** 
  (0.0036)  (0.0043)  (1.67) 
 
SA   0.0081***  -0.0128***  4.65*** 
   (0.0027)  (0.0032)  (1.25) 
 
SSA   -0.0199***  -0.0407***  16.00***  
   (0.0042)  (0.0055)  (2.14) 
 
Constant  0.0662***  0.123***  33.03*** 
   (0.0033)  (0.0036)  (1.34) 
 
N   371   371   371   
R-Squared  0.6647   0.6716   0.6997  
 
 
 
 
Note: This table reports the results of pooled OLS Regression for the indicated inequality measures on the indicated 
variables. * denotes significance at the 90% level, ** at the 95% level, and *** at the 99% level (two-sided alternative). 
Heteroscedasticity adjusted standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 3: Data Sources 
 
 
Variable  Source    Comments    
 
  
Share of Income: UNU/WIDER-UNDP World Income  for selection procedure see 
First/Second Quintile Inequality Database, Version 1.0  section 3 
(12 September 2000), Global Poverty  
Monitoring, World Bank Chen/Ravallion  
(2000), World Development Indicators  
(2002), Deininger/Squire (1996, 98a)      
 
Real GDP Per Capita Penn World Tables, Version 6.1  Constant 1996 US dollars using  
(October 2002)    the Chain index  
 
EDT/GDP  Easterly, Sedaweh (2002): Global Total external debt to GDP (%) 
Development Network Growth  EDT consists of public and  
Database, World Bank publicly guaranteed long-term    
debt, private nonguaranteed 
long-term debt, IMF credit and 
estimated short-term debt.  
 
EDT/XGS  Global Development Finance (2000) Total external debt to exports of 
   (DT.DOD.DECT.EX.ZS)  goods and services (including 
        workers’ remittances) (%) 
 
TDS/XGS  Global Development Finance (2000) Total debt service to exports of  
   (DT.TDS.DECT.EX.ZS)   goods and services (including 
        workers’ remittances) (%)   
TDS shows the debt service  
payments on total long-term 
debt (public and publicly 
guaranteed and private non- 
guaranteed), IMF credit, and 
interest on short-term debt only. 
Debt service payments are the 
sum of principal repayments 
and interest payments.   
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Table 3: continued 
 
 
Gini coefficient  UNU/WIDER-UNDP World Income  for selection procedure see 
   Inequality Database, Version 1.0  section 3 
(12 September 2000), Global Poverty  
Monitoring, World Bank Chen/Ravallion  
(2000), World Development Indicators  
(2002), Deininger/Squire (1996, 98a)      
 
Government   Penn World Tables, Version 6.1  Constant 1996 US dollars 
Consumption  (October 2002)   
 
Secondary Education  Barro and Lee (2000)   Average years of  secondary    
schooling  in total population 
aged 25 and over 
Due to limited data availability 
for secondary education values 
are linearily interpolated 
between the years prior and 
after the observation. 
 
M2 to GDP  Word Development Indicators (2001) Money and quasi money (M2) 
   (FM.LBL.MOMY.GD.ZS)  to GDP 
 
ln(1+inflation/100) World Development Indicators (2001) Inflation, GDP deflator (annual) 
   (NY.GDP.DEFL.KD.ZG)  (%) 
 
(FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG) for missing values: Inflation, 
consumer prices (Laspeyres) 
(annual %) (Belarus 93, 95; 
Ethiopia 81; Poland 90)  
 
Overall Budget   World DeveIopment Indicators (2001) Overall Budget, including grants 
Surplus (+)/  (GB.BAL.OVRL.GD.ZS) 
Deficit (-) to GDP          
        for missing values: 
Easterly, Sewadeh (2002): Global  Data on overall budget/deficit    
Development Network Growth from IMF Government Financial  
Database, World Bank Statistics (Tunisia 1990; Latvia 
1995) 
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Table 3: continued 
 
 
Life expectancy  World development indicators (2001) life expectancy at birth, total (years) 
(SP.DYN.LE00.IN) Values calcutated by linear 
interpolation for Guatemala 
1989, India 1994, Kenya 1994  
 
for missing value: 
   World Population Prospects: The  Jordan 1980 
   2002 Revision Population Database 
 
Terms-of-Trade  Easterly, Sedaweh (2002): Global Terms of Trade (goods and   
   Development Network Growth  services, 1995 = 100)  
   Database, World Bank 
 
Civil Liberties  Freedom House   Measured on a scale for 1 to 7. 
(1 indicates the most liberal 
country) 
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Variable  Observ. Mean  Std. Dev. Min.  Max. 
 
 
Q20   209  0.059  0.024  0.019  0.119 
Adjusted Q20  209  0.055  0.021  0.015  0.115 
 
Q40   209  0.101  0.025  0.041  0.158 
Adjusted Q40  209  0.091  0.024  0.039  0.150 
 
Income Q20  209  1176  1045  161  7182  
Adjusted Income Q20 209  1117  973  102  6197 
 
Income Q40  209  2038  1529  287  9342 
Adjusted Income Q40 209  1834  1385  239  7954 
 
Real GDP per capita 209  4078  2537  528  12000 
 
Growth Q20  127  0.051  5.665  -17.45  25.26 
Growth Q40  127  0.094  3.67  -9.048  18.50 
 
Growth income Q20 127  1.69  6.78  -23.83  26.45   
Growth income Q40 127  1.73  5.06  -15.80  20.94 
 
Growth real GDP  127  1.64  3.37  -9.39  9.42 
per capita 
 
EDT/GDP  207  62.95  47.85  0.30  249.30 
EDT/XGS  191  230.73  181.31  6.60  1473.70 
 
TDS/XGS  194  21.45  12.71  0.28  76.58 
 
Adjusted Gini  209  44.97  9.10  21.32  64.99 
 
Gov. Consumption 209  20.43  10.17  3.40  69.11  
Budget surplus  151  -2.91  3.98  -15.18  8.22 
 
Secondary Education 172  1.11  0.57  0.10  3.21 
Life expectancy  209  63.09  8.44  41.96  76.22 
 
M2 to GDP  201  34.42  21.09  4.91  132.48 
ln(1 + inflation/100) 209  0.22  0.42  -0.05  3.04 
 
Terms of Trade  201  105.39  23.52  50.78  262.37 
Civil liberties  197  4.03  1.41  1  7 
 
 
Note: Descriptive statistics are presented for all available observations, i.e. some observations are counted twice (see table 1). 
Thus summary statistics for debt indicators and additional macroeconomic variables may differ for the growth equation as only 
initial values are used. Q20/40: first, second quintile share. Adjusted Q20/40: adjusted first, second quintile share. Income 
Q20/40: mean income of first, second quintile share (Q20/40 * mean income/0.2). Adjusted Income Q20/40: mean income of 
adjusted first, second quintile share. Growth Q20/40: average annual growth rate of first, second quintile share using only spells 
with identical income inequality measures (table 1). Growth income Q20/40: average annual growth rate of mean income of first, 
second quintile share using only spells with identical income inequality measures.     
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Table 5: Descriptive Statistics - Regions 
 
 
Variable    EAP ECA LAC MNA SA SSA 
 
 
Q20     0.061 0.091 0.037 0.065 0.081 0.057 
Adjusted Q20    0.060 0.085 0.038 0.055 0.077 0.046 
 
Q40     0.103 0.137 0.078 0.106 0.122 0.098 
Adjusted Q40    0.096 0.123 0.071 0.091 0.113 0.082   
 
Income Q20    1082 3379 1005 1273 632 531  
Adjusted Income Q20   1098 3127 1033 1090 591 433 
 
Income Q40    1873 5029 2153 2095 947 918   
Adjusted Income Q40   1767 4493 1953 1802 867 767 
 
Real GDP per capita   3716 7300 5463 4002 1556 2002 
 
Growth Q20    -0.22 -4.70 -0.07 1.20 -0.62 3.64100 
Growth Q40    -0.25 -2.38 0.64 0.77 -0.58 1.35 
 
Growth Income Q20   4.33 -6.41 1.10 1.66 2.29 3.98 
Growth Income Q40   4.29 -4.09 1.81 1.22 2.33 1.69 
 
Growth real GDP    4.54 -1.71 1.17 0.45 2.91 0.34 
per capita 
 
EDT/GDP    46.59 39.83 39.10 87.17 36.36 102.53 
EDT/XGS    125.84 132.04 194.36 212.49 284.79 416.12 
 
TDS/XGS    18.59 11.36 24.22 25.11 20.64 23.57 
 
Adjusted Gini    42.61 32.43 52.19 44.60 36.66 49.03   
  
Government Consumption  18.20 20.54 19.32 27.91 20.65 19.91 
Budget surplus    -1.57 -3.09 -1.99 -4.10 -5.67 -2.13 
 
Secondary Education   1.29 1.33 1.22 1.18 0.88 0.61 
Life expectancy    65.01 69.48 68.72 64.58 57.79 50.89 
 
M2 to GDP    46.10 31.91 26.73 61.07 31.20 22.79 
ln(1+inflation/100)   0.09 0.66 0.28 0.12 0.10 0.14 
 
Terms of Trade    103.13 101.06 104.23 108.17 107.27 108.78 
Civil liberties    4.6 3.76 2.82 4.77 4.17 4.95 
 
    
Note: Descriptive statistics are presented for all available observations, i.e. some observations are counted twice (see table 1). 
Thus summary statistics for debt indicators and additional macroeconomic variables may differ for the growth equation as only 
initial values are used. Q20/40: first, second quintile share. Adjusted Q20/40: adjusted first, second quintile share. Income 
Q20/40: mean income of first, second quintile share (Q20/40 * mean income/0.2). Adjusted Income Q20/40: mean income of 
adjusted first, second quintile share. Growth Q20/40: average annual growth rate of first, second quintile share using only spells 
with identical income inequality measures (table 1). Growth income Q20/40: average annual growth rate of mean income of first, 
second quintile share using only spells with identical income inequality measures. 
                                            
100 The high average annual growth rates for the mean (income) of the first quintile in Sub-Saharan Africa stem from three spells 
(Guinea 1991 – 94, Kenya 1992 – 94, Senegal 1991 – 95) with values over 18 percent. If we omit these observations in 
regressions without outliers,  the mean of the growth of the first quintile (growth Q20) is 0.59 and the mean of the growth of the 
mean income (growth mean Q20) 1.05. In addition, the mean of the growth of the second quintile (growth Q40) is 0.44 and the 
mean of the growth of the mean income (growth mean Q40) is 1.05 without the spell for Kenya 1992 – 94.    
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Table 6: Correlation matrix for debt indicators and additional 
macroeconomic variables 
 
 
 
  EDT EDX TDS Con Bud Edu Life M2 Infl Civ Tot Gini 
  
EDT  1 
 
EDX  0.46*** 1 
 
TDS  0.18** 0.46*** 1 
 
Con  0.17** -0.01 0.13* 1 
 
Bud  -0.06 -0.25*** -0.13 -0.28*** 1 
 
Edu  0.19** -0.36*** -0.18 -0.05 0.15* 1 
 
Life  -0.18** -0.61*** -0.11 0.01 0.12 0.68*** 1 
 
M2  0.21*** -0.27*** -0.14* 0.32*** -0.03 0.36*** 0.35*** 1   
 
Infl  -0.09 0.01 -0.02 0.09 -0.22*** -0.04 0.13* -0.19*** 1 
 
Civ  0.06 0.19*** 0.05 0.04 -0.03 -0.10 -0.42*** 0.13* -0.18** 1  
 
ToT  -0.14* -0.13 0.07 0.10 -0.04 -0.09 -0.16** -0.05 -0.03 0.09 1 
 
Gini  0.20*** 0.06 0.16** 0 0 -0.10 0.04 -0.14** -0.03 -0.18** 0 1 
 
 
 
 
Note: * denotes significance at 90 % level, ** at 95 % level, and *** at the 99 % level. Correlation matrix is presented 
only for all available observations, i.e. some observations are counted twice (see table 1). Thus correlation matrix for 
debt indicators and additional macroeconomic variables may differ for the growth equation as only initial values are 
used. EDT: EDT/GDP. EDX: EDT/XGS. TDS: TDS/XGS. Con: government consumption. Bud: Budget surplus. Edu: 
secondary education. Life: life expectancy. M2: M2/GDP. Infl: ln(1+inflation/100). Civ: civil liberties. ToT: terms-of-trade. 
Gini: adjusted Gini coefficient.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 56
Table 7: Debt indicators and regional dummy variables 
distribution effect (Growth equation) 
 
 
Dep. Var.  yq20 yq20o yq20 yq20o  yq20 yq20o yq20 yq20o  
  ols ols ols ols  ols re ols ols  
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8)  
  
EDT/GDP 0.007 0 -0.01 -0.07*  0.002 -0.009 -0.02 -0.09**  
  (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.05)  
 
EDT/GDP2   0 0.0005*     0 0.0006**   
    (0) (0.0003)    (0) (0.0003) 
 
TDS/XGS      0.03 0.06* 0.04 0.08**   
       (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)  
 
EAP  4.80** 4.83** 4.96** -5.50**  5.85** 5.55*** 5.92*** 6.01***  
  (2.11) (2.06) (2.12) (2.12)  (2.26) (1.69) (2.23) (2.20)  
 
LAC  4.81** 4.99** 5.06** 5.56**  5.93** 5.66*** 6.09** 5.95***  
  (2.29) (2.28) (2.33) (2.27)  (2.39) (1.67) (2.36) (2.27)  
 
MNA  5.90** 6.00*** 6.08*** 6.88***  6.66*** 6.56*** 6.77*** 7.39***  
  (2.30) (2.24) (2.31) (2.29)  (2.43) (2.06) (2.39) (2.40)  
 
SA  4.45** 4.42** 4.54** 4.97**  5.51** 5.10*** 5.47*** 5.33***  
(2.01) (1.95) (1.99) (1.97)  (2.13) (1.77) (2.08) (2.02)  
 
SSA  8.31*** 5.06* 8.55*** 5.63**  10.16*** 6.44*** 10.30*** 6.67***  
  (3.11) (2.64) (3.07) (2.63)  (3.15) (1.92) (3.09) (2.30)  
 
Constant -5.29*** -5.02*** -4.86*** -3.95**  -6.62***  -6.45*** -6.07*** -5.07**  
  (1.89) (1.82) (1.87) (1.90)  (2.14) (1.52) (2.10) (2.13)  
 
Breusch        3.46*    
Pagan - test 
Wald-test       23.53***   
F-test  3.31*** 1.95* 4.94*** 2.55**  3.11***  4.36*** 2.78***  
R-squared 0.15 0.10 0.15 0.13  0.22 0.20 0.22 0.23  
N  125 119 125 119  112 105 112 105  
 
 
* denotes significance at the 90% level, ** at the 95% level, and *** at the 99% level (two-sided alternative). Heteroscedasticity 
adjusted standard errors in parentheses. F-test/Wald-test indicates the F-statistic/Wald-statistic for the test on the overall 
significance of the regression. Ramsey Reset test is used to test for omitted variables. While in equations 1 and 2, the Ramsey 
Reset test for omitted variables is only passed when powers of the right-hand side variables are considered, the Ramsey Reset 
test is passed in equations 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8. Breusch-Pagan is a Lagrange multiplier test for the random effects model, 
distributed as chi-squared under the null of no random effects. yq20: average annual growth rate of the first quintile share. yq20o: 
average annual growth rate of the first quintile share (regressions without outliers). ols: results for pooled OLS estimation, re: 
results for random effects estimation. 
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Table 7: continued. 
 
 
Dep. Var.  yq20 yq20o yq20 yq20o  yq20 yq20o yq20 yq20o  
  ols re ols re  ols re ols re  
 
  (9) (10) (11) (12)  (13) (14) (15) (16)  
 
 
EDT/XGS -0.002 -0.001 0.0003 -0.0004  -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.01 
  (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.01)  (0.003) (0.005) (0.007) (0.01) 
 
EDT/XGS2   0 0    0 0 
    (0) (0)    (0) (0) 
 
TDS/XGS      0.06 0.07 0.06 0.08 
       (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) 
 
EAP  5.51*** 5.51*** 5.50*** 5.50***  4.98*** 4.91*** 4.98*** 4.87*** 
  (1.98) (1.55) (2.00) (1.56)  (1.86) (1.60) (1.86) (1.60) 
 
LAC  5.97*** 5.90*** 5.86*** 5.89***  5.23*** 5.13*** 5.22*** 5.17*** 
  (2.06) (1.49) (2.15) (1.52)  (1.96) (1.57) (2.00) (1.58) 
 
MNA  6.82*** 6.73*** 6.68*** 6.72***  6.08*** 6.29*** 6.08*** 6.46*** 
  (1.99) (1.83) (2.12) (1.88)  (1.93) (1.89) (2.00) (1.92) 
 
SA  5.43*** 5.29*** 5.24** 5.28**  5.27*** 5.24** 5.26** 5.33*** 
  (1.97) (1.74) (2.16) (1.76)  (1.87) (1.74) (2.06) (1.75) 
 
SSA  10.62*** 6.57*** 10.47*** 6.57*** 10.35*** 6.36*** 10.34*** 6.23***  
  (3.05) (1.87) (3.09) (1.89)  (3.00) (1.87) (3.03) (1.89) 
 
Constant -5.39*** -5.51***-5.60*** -5.54*** -5.66*** -5.69*** -5.67*** -5.20*** 
  (1.79) (1.36) (1.80) (1.60)  (1.76) (1.37) (1.73) (1.61) 
 
Breusch  4.47**  4.48**   4.71**  4.69** 
Pagan - test  
Wald - test  20.26*** 20.06***  22.57*** 22.77*** 
F - test  3.45***  3.31***   3.23***  3.67*** 
R-squared 0.21 0.17 0.21 0.17  0.22 0.19 0.22 0.19 
N  114 108 114 108  114 107 114 107 
 
 
 
* denotes significance at the 90% level, ** at the 95% level, and *** at the 99% level (two-sided alternative). Heteroscedasticity 
adjusted standard errors in parentheses. F-test/Wald-test indicates the F-statistic/Wald-statistic for the test on the overall 
significance of the regression. Ramsey Reset test is used to test for omitted variables. While in equations 13 and 15, the 
Ramsey Reset test for omitted variables is only passed when powers of the right-hand side variables are considered, the 
Ramsey Reset test is passed in equations 9 and 11. Breusch-Pagan is a Lagrange multiplier test for the random effects model, 
distributed as chi-squared under the null of no random effects. yq20: average annual growth rate of the first quintile share. yq20o: 
average annual growth rate of the first quintile share (regressions without outliers). ols: results for pooled OLS estimation, re: 
results for random effects estimation. 
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Table 8: Debt indicators and regional dummy variables  
distribution effect (System GMM estimation) 
 
 
 
Dep. Var.  Yq20s  Yq20c  Yq40s  Yq40c  Yq20s  Yq20c 
   
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
          
 
 
EDT/GDP 0.003*** 0.001  0.0015* 0.0005  0.002  0.0006 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.001)  (0.001) 
 
EDT/GDP2 -0.00001*** -0.000007 -0.000006** -0.000003 -0.00001* -0.000005 
  (0.000004) (0.000004) (0.000003) (0.000003) (0.000005) (0.000005) 
              
TDS/XGS         0.003  0.003  
         (0.002)  (0.002) 
  
EAP  -0.39*** -0.30*  -0.29*** -0.26*** -0.38*** -0.30**  
  (0.14)  (0.16)  (0.09)  (0.10)  (0.13)  (0.15) 
 
LAC  -0.92*** -0.80*** -0.58*** -0.58*** -0.92*** -0.82*** 
  (0.13)  (0.15)  (0.07)  (0.09)  (0.12)  (0.15) 
 
MNA  -0.35*** -0.39**  -0.27*** -0.31*** -0.29**  -0.38** 
  (0.13)  (0.16)  (0.07)  (0.09)  (0.13)  (0.16) 
 
SA  -0.06  -0.04  -0.10  -0.09  -0.06  -0.05 
  (0.12)  (0.14)  (0.07)  (0.08)  (0.12)  (0.14)  
   
SSA  -0.52*** -0.65*** -0.38*** -0.44*** -0.47*** -0.62*** 
  (0.14)  (0.18)  (0.09)  (0.11)  (0.13)  (0.18) 
 
Constant -0.94*** -0.95*** -0.44*** -0.50*** -0.98*** -0.99*** 
  (0.11)  (0.14)  (0.06)  (0.08)  (0.11)  (0.14) 
 
m1  -1.03  -1.22  -0.61  -2.21**  -1.00  -1.58 
m2  -1.14  -0.70  -0.12  0.30  0.60  0.88 
N  199  190  199  190  182  175 
1 – RSS/TSS 0.56  0.51  0.49  0.49  0.58  0.53 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* denotes significance at the 90% level, ** at the 95% level, and *** at the 99% level (two-tailed test). Results for one-step estimation are 
obtained using DPD98 for GAUSS. Heteroscedasticity adjusted asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. m1 and m2 are tests for 
first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no 
serial correlation. 1 – RSS/TSS: 1 – residual sum of squares/ total sum of squares. Yq20/40s: ln(Q20,40/0.2) unadjusted approach 
(regressions without outliers). Yq20/40c: ln(Q20,40/0.2) adjusted approach (regressions without outliers).   
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Table 8: continued. 
 
 
 
Dep. Var.  Yq40s  Yq40c  Yq20s  Yq20c  Yq20s  Yq20c 
   
  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
 
 
          
EDT/GDP 0.001  0.00002 0.00003 -0.0004 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.0005) (0.0006) 
 
EDT/GDP2 -0.000005 -0.000002 
  (0.000003) (0.000004) 
 
EDT/XGS         0.0002  0.00004 
          (0.0002) (0.0003  
             
TDS/XGS 0  0.001  0.004**  0.004*  0.004*  0.004 
(0.01) (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003) 
 
EAP  -0.28*** -0.26*** -0.38*** -0.30**  -0.42*** -0.24** 
(0.08) (0.09)  (0.13)  (0.15)  (0.12)  (0.13) 
 
LAC  -0.56*** -0.57*** -0.90*** -0.81*** -0.94*** -0.86*** 
  (0.07)  (0.10)  (0.12)  (0.15)  (0.11)  (0.13) 
 
MNA  -0.24*** -0.31*** -0.28**  -0.37**  -0.32*** -0.43*** 
  (0.07)  (0.09)  (0.12)  (0.16)  (0.11)  (0.15) 
 
SA  -0.09  -0.09  -0.06  -0.06  -0.11  -0.09 
  (0.07)  (0.08)  (0.11)  (0.14)  (0.32)  (0.13) 
 
SSA  -0.32*** -0.40*** -0.45*** -0.62*** -0.54*** -0.74*** 
  (0.08)  (0.11)  (0.13)  (0.17)  (0.13)  (0.18) 
 
m1  -1.61  -2.80*** -1.07  -1.69*  -1.42  -1.99** 
m2  1.15  2.37**  -0.87  1.02  0.70  1.36 
N  182  175  182  175  173  170 
1 – RSS/TSS 0.52  0.50  0.42  0.53  0.60  0.56 
 
 
. 
* denotes significance at the 90% level, ** at the 95% level, and *** at the 99% level (two-tailed test). Results for one-step estimation are 
obtained using DPD98 for GAUSS. Heteroscedasticity adjusted asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. m1 and m2 are tests for 
first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no 
serial correlation. 1 – RSS/TSS: 1 – residual sum of squares/ total sum of squares. Yq20/40s: ln(Q20,40/0.2) unadjusted approach 
(regressions without outliers). Yq20/40c: ln(Q20,40/0.2) adjusted approach (regressions without outliers).   
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Table 8: continued. 
 
Dep. Var.   Yq20s  Yq20c  Yq40s  Yq40c 
 
   (13)  (14)  (15)  (16) 
 
EDT/XGS  -0.0003  -0.001  -0.0006  -0.001** 
   (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
 
EDT/XGS2  0.000001 0.000002 0.000001 0.000002** 
   (0.000001) (0.000002) (0.000001) (0.000001) 
 
TDX/XGS  0.004*  0.005*  0.002  0.003 
   (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
 
EAP   -0.42***  -0.35***  -0.30***  -0.28*** 
(0.11)  (0.13)  (0.07)  (0.08) 
 
LAC   -0.94***  -0.85***  -0.57***  -0.58***  
(0.11)  (0.13)  (0.07)  (0.08) 
 
MNA   -0.31***  -0.40***  -0.24***  -0.30*** 
(0.12)  (0.15)  (0.07)  (0.08) 
 
SA   -0.10  -0.07  -0.10  -0.07 
(0.11)  (0.13)  (0.07)  (0.08) 
 
SSA   -0.54***  -0.75***  -0.34***  -0.45*** 
(0.13)  (0.18)  (0.09)  (0.10) 
 
m1   -1.48  -2.03**  -1.82*  -2.92*** 
m2   0.81  1.87*  1.60  2.90*** 
N   173  167  173  167 
1 – RSS/TSS  0.60  0.56  0.53  0.53 
 
 
 
* denotes significance at the 90% level, ** at the 95% level, and *** at the 99% level (two-tailed test). Results for one-step estimation are 
obtained using DPD98 for GAUSS. Heteroscedasticity adjusted asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. m1 and m2 are tests for 
first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no 
serial correlation. 1 – RSS/TSS: 1 – residual sum of squares/ total sum of squares. Yq20/40s: ln(Q20,40/0.2) unadjusted approach 
(regressions without outliers). Yq20/40c: ln(Q20,40/0.2) adjusted approach (regressions without outliers).   
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Table 9: Debt indicators and macroeconomic variables  
distribution effect (Growth equation) 
 
Dep. Var.   yq20  yq20o   yq20  yq20o   
   ols  re   ols  re  
    
(1)  (2)   (3)  (4)   
 
EDT/GDP  0.03  -0.10*   0.001  -0.14* 
   (0.03)  (0.06)   (0.03)  (0.07) 
 
EDT/GDP2  0  0.0008*    0  0.001** 
   (0)  (0.004)   (0)  (0.0005) 
    
TDS/XGS       0.01  0.05 
        (0.04)  (0.05) 
 
Secondary  -0.24  0.56   -0.05  0.97 
Education  (1.35)  (0.98)   (1.42)  (1.19) 
 
Budget   0.38***  0.28**   0.39***  0.26* 
Surplus   (0.12)  (0.14)   (0.12)  (0.15) 
 
Adjusted Gini  0.34**  0.18*   0.34**  0.23** 
coefficient  (0.14)  (0.10)   (0.15)  (0.11) 
 
ln(1+inflation)  1.41**  3.56   1.36*  1.14 
   (0.68)  (4.10)   (0.73)  (5.00) 
 
M2/GDP  0.02  0.02   0.02  0.02 
   (0.03)  (0.03)   (0.03)  (0.04) 
 
EAP   -3.50  -0.88   -3.62  -2.01 
   (2.95)  (3.96)   (3.13)  (4.30) 
 
LAC   -7.11  -3.54   -7.03  -4.86 
   (4.38)  (4.51)   (4.57)  (4.90) 
  
MNA   -3.20  0.10   -3.18  -0.74 
   (3.35)  (4.22)   (3.42)  (4.57) 
 
SA   -0.42  0.59   -0.12  0.19 
   (1.87)  (3.78)   (1.99)  (4.08) 
    
SSA   0.93  1.77   1.04  0.91 
   (3.22)  (4.33)   (3.33)  (4.64)  
 
Constant  -10.81***  -5.06   -11.25*** -6.48 
   (3.75)  (4.81)   (4.24)  (5.32) 
 
Breusch-Pagan    6.63***     7.78*** 
Wald – test    17.49     16.48 
F-test   22.96***    20.75***   
R – squared  0.39  0.24   0.38  0.24 
N   73  69   69  65 
 
* denotes significance at the 90% level, ** at the 95% level, and *** at the 99% level (two-sided alternative). Heteroscedasticity 
adjusted standard errors in parentheses. F-test/Wald-test indicates the F-statistic/Wald-statistic for the test on the overall 
significance of the regression. In equations 1 and 3 the Ramsey Reset test for omitted variables is only passed when powers of 
the right-hand side variables are considered. Breusch-Pagan is a Lagrange multiplier test for the random effects model, 
distributed as chi-squared under the null of no random effects. yq20: average annual growth rate of the first quintile share. yq20o: 
regressions without outliers. ols: results for pooled OLS estimation, re: results for random effects estimation. 
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Table 10: Debt indicators, regional dummy variables and 
macroeconomic variables - distribution effect  
(System GMM estimation) 
 
 
Dep. Var.  Yq20s  Yq20c  Yq40s  Yq40c  Yq20s  Yq20c 
  
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
 
 
 
EDT/GDP 0.005*** 0.003**  0.002*  0.001  0.004*  0.003 
  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
 
EDT/GDP2 -0.00003*** -0.00003*** -0.00001*** -0.00001** -0.00002** -0.00002***  
  (0)  (0.000007) (0.000004) (0.000005) (0.00001) (0.00001)  
 
TDS/XGS         0.003  0.002 
          (0.002)  (0.002) 
 
Secondary 0.05  0.04  0.05  0.05  0.07  0.06 
Education (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.06) 
 
Government 0.006  0.002  0.005*  0.003  0.005  0.001 
Consumption (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
         
Ln(1+inflation) -0.05  -0.02  -0.07  -0.03  -0.09  -0.02 
  (0.11)  (0.12)  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.12)  (0.12) 
 
EAP  -0.61**** -0.50*** -0.40*** -0.35*** -0.55*** -0.48*** 
  (0.10)  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.06)  (0.09)  (0.07) 
 
LAC  -1.11*** -0.99*** -0.66*** -0.65*** -1.04*** -0.96*** 
  (0.08)  (0.06)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.06)   (0.06) 
   
MNA  -0.56*** -0.60*** -0.34*** -0.37*** -0.42*** -0.56*** 
  (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.06)   (0.06)  (0.13)  (0.14) 
 
SA  -0.28*** -0.24*** -0.21*** -0.17*** -0.20**  -0.20*** 
  (0.09)  (0.06)  (0.06)   (0.05)  (0.09)  (0.06) 
 
SSA  -0.60*** -0.69*** -0.37*** -0.41*** -0.52*** -0.65*** 
  (0.10)  (0.11)  (0.07)   (0.07)  (0.09)  (0.11) 
 
Constant -0.91*** -0.88*** -0.48*** -0.53  -1.01*** 0.95*** 
  (0.12)  (0.11)  (0.08)   (0.07)  (0.12)  (0.12) 
  
m1  -1.13  -1.52  -1.01  -2.77*** -1.11  -1.86* 
m2  -1.34  -0.65  -0.70  -0.06  -1.15  1.12 
N  158  153  158  153  143  140 
1 – RSS/TSS 0.63  0.63  0.56  0.57  0.65  0.64 
 
 
 
* denotes significance at the 90% level, ** at the 95% level, and *** at the 99% level (two-tailed test). Results for one-step estimation are 
obtained using DPD98 for GAUSS. Heteroscedasticity adjusted asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. m1 and m2 are tests for 
first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no 
serial correlation. 1 – RSS/TSS: 1 – residual sum of squares/ total sum of squares. Yq20/40s: ln(Q20,40/0.2) unadjusted approach 
(regressions without outliers). Yq20/40c: ln(Q20,40/0.2) adjusted approach (regressions without outliers).  
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Table 10: continued. 
 
 
Dep. Var.  Yq40s  Yq40c  Yq20s  Yq20c  Yq40s  Yq40c 
   
  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
 
 
EDT/GDP 0.001  0.001  -0.0004  -0.001  -0.0004  -0.0008 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
 
EDT/GDP2 -0.000009* -0.00001*      
  (0.000006) (0.000006) 
           
TDS/XGS 0.001  0.0002  0.005**  0.004*  0.002  0.001 
(0.01) (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
 
Secondary 0.05  0.05  0.08  0.08  0.06  0.06 
Education (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.06)  (0.04)  (0.05) 
 
Government 0.005*  0.002  0.005  0.001  0.005*  0.002 
Consumption (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
 
Ln(1+inflation) -0.09  -0.03  -0.16  -0.08  -0.12  -0.05 
  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.13)  (0.13)  (0.07)  (0.07) 
 
EAP  -0.37*** -0.35*** -0.57*** -0.50*** -0.38*** -0.36*** 
  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.09)  (0.07)  (0.06)  (0.06) 
 
LAC  -0.62*** -0.63*** -1.05*** -0.98*** -0.62*** -0.64*** 
(0.05) (0.05)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.05)  (0.05) 
 
MNA  -0.28*** -0.37*** -0.40*** -0.54*** -0.27*** -0.35*** 
  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.13)  (0.15)  (0.07)  (0.08) 
 
SA  -0.17*** -0.16*** -0.23*** -0.23*** -0.19*** -0.17*** 
  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.08)  (0.06)  (0.05)  (0.05) 
 
SSA  -0.33*** -0.40*** -0.53*** -0.67*** -0.24*** -0.41*** 
  (0.001)  (0.07)  (0.09)  (0.10)  (0.06)  (0.07) 
 
Constant -0.50*** -0.54*** -0.91*** -0.84*** -0.46*** -0.49*** 
  (0.08)  (0.09)  (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.07)  (0.08) 
 
m1  -1.71*  -3.03*** -0.98  -1.74*  -1.65*  -2.99*** 
m2  -0.26  2.63***  -1.07  0.84  -0.04  2.36** 
N  143  140  143  140  143  140 
1 – RSS/TSS 0.57  0.57  0.63  0.63  0.57  0.57 
 
* denotes significance at the 90% level, ** at the 95% level, and *** at the 99% level (two-tailed test). Results for one-step estimation are 
obtained using DPD98 for GAUSS. Heteroscedasticity adjusted asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. m1 and m2 are tests for 
first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no 
serial correlation. 1 – RSS/TSS: 1 – residual sum of squares/ total sum of squares. Yq20/40s: ln(Q20,40/0.2) unadjusted approach 
(regressions without outliers). Yq20/40c: ln(Q20,40/0.2) adjusted approach (regressions without outliers).  
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Table 11: Debt indicators and macroeconomic variables 
total effect (Growth equation) 
 
Dep. Var.   yp20  yp20o   yp20  yp20o   
    
(1)  (2)   (3)  (4)  
 
EDT/GDP  -0.05  -0.12   -0.05  -0.15 
   (0.04)  (0.08)   (0.04)  (0.10) 
 
EDT/GDP2  0.0002  0.0007   0.0002  0.0009 
   (0.0002) (0.0006)  (0.0002) (0.0007)  
 
TDS/XGS       -0.00003 0.04 
        (0.05)  (0.07) 
 
Secondary  1.13  1.76   1.53  2.50  
Education  (1.73)  (1.67)   (1.81)  (1.82)  
 
Budget   0.44***  0.33*   0.46***  0.33* 
Surplus   (0.15)  (0.17)   (0.16)  (0.18) 
 
Adjusted Gini  0.33*  0.21   0.33*  0.21 
Coefficient  (0.17)  (0.20)   (0.17)  (0.20)  
 
ln(1+inflation)  1.75*  0.56   1.80*  -1.49 
   (0.90)  (4.26)   (0.98)  (6.14)   
 
M2/GDP  0.01  0.003   0.02  0.01 
   (0.04)  (0.04)   (0.05)  (0.05) 
 
EAP   4.66  6.45   4.39  6.25 
   (3.64)  (4.27)   (3.85)  (4.36) 
 
LAC   -2.26  0.42   -2.07  0.70 
   (5.33)  (6.37)   (5.55)  (6.48) 
 
MNA   1.82  4.15   1.73  4.29 
   (4.30)  (5.06)   (4.37)  (5.03) 
 
SA   6.56***  6.90**   7.21***  7.53** 
   (2.39)  (2.81)   (2.51)  (2.94) 
 
SSA   6.97*  7.34*   7.24*  7.62*   
   (4.10)  (4.08)   (4.21)  (4.13) 
 
Constant  -13.39*** -8.66*   -14.10*** -9.41* 
   (4.27)  (5.17)   (5.00)  (5.36) 
 
 
F-test   65.98*** 42.06***  56.12*** 37.50*** 
R-squared  0.39  0.33   0.39  0.34 
N   73  69   69  65 
 
* denotes significance at the 90% level, ** at the 95% level, and *** at the 99% level (two-sided alternative). All equations 
estimated with pooled OLS. Heteroscedasticity adjusted standard errors in parentheses. F-test indicates the F-statistic for the 
test on the overall significance of the regression. While in equations 3 and 4, the Ramsey Reset test for omitted variables is only 
passed when powers of the right-hand side variables are considered, the Ramsey Reset test is not passed in any other 
equations. yp20: average annual growth of mean income of first quintile share. yp20o: regressions without outliers.  
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Table 12: Debt indicators, regional dummy variables and 
macroeconomic variables - total effect (System GMM estimation) 
 
Dep. Var.  Yp20s  Yp20c  Yp40s  Yp40s  Yp20s  Yp20c 
  
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  
EDT/GDP 0.005**  0.004  0.002  0.002  0.004  0.002 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
 
EDT/GDP2 -0.00004*** -0.00003*** -0.00002** -0.00002* -0.00003*** -0.00003** 
  (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) 
   
TDS/XGS         0.004  0.004  
          (0.003)  (0.003) 
 
Secondary 0.34***  0.32***  0.31***  0.31***  0.37***  0.34*** 
Education (0.09)  (0.11)  (0.10)  (0.10)  (0.09)  (0.10) 
  
Government -0.01*  -0.01**  -0.01*  -0.01**  -0.01**  -0.02*** 
Consumption (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
 
Ln(1+inflation) -0.02  -0.04  -0.01  0.01  -0.08  -0.04 
(0.19)    (0.20)  (0.14)  (0.14)  (0.19)  (0.18) 
 
Civil liberties -0.05*  -0.07**  -0.07**  -0.08*** -0.07**  -0.07** 
  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03) 
 
Life   0.03**  0.03**  0.03**  0.03**  0.03**  0.03** 
expectancy (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
 
Terms of  0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
Trade  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
 
EAP  -1.46*** -1.33*** -1.23*** -1.18*** -1.42*** -1.29*** 
(0.15)  (0.13)  (0.14)  (0.14)  (0.16)  (0.13) 
 
LAC  -1.69*** -1.60*** -1.27*** -1.26*** -1.63*** -1.56*** 
(0.13)    (0.10)  (0.11)  (0.08)  (0.12)  (0.09) 
 
MNA  -0.98*** -1.05*** -0.79*** -0.83*** -0.94*** -1.06*** 
(0.11)  (0.09)  (0.11)  (0.08)  (0.11)  (0.07) 
 
SA  -1.61*** -1.56*** -1.52*** -1.49*** -1.51*** -1.49*** 
(0.21)   (0.17)  (0.18)  (0.16)  (0.24)  (0.18) 
 
SSA  -1.76*** -1.82*** -1.49*** -1.52*** -1.61*** -1.73*** 
(0.35)   (0.31)  (0.33)  (0.30)  (0.34)  (0.31) 
  
Constant 5.91***  5.96***  6.29***  6.23***  5.46***  5.77***  
(0.73)  (0.72)  (0.67)  (0.68)  (0.73)  (0.75) 
 
m1  -0.85  -1.05  -1.16  -1.64  -0.83  -1.00 
m2  0.91  -0.91  1.06  -0.27  0.31  -0.29 
N  141  140  141  140  135  134 
1 – RSS/TSS 0.78  0.81  0.83  0.83  0.79  0.81 
 
* denotes significance at the 90% level, ** at the 95% level, and *** at the 99% level (two-tailed test). Results for one-step estimation are 
obtained using DPD98 for GAUSS. Heteroscedasticity adjusted asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. m1 and m2 are tests for 
first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no 
serial correlation. 1 – RSS/TSS: 1 – residual sum of squares/ total sum of squares. Yp20/40s: ln(Q20,40 * Y/0.2) unadjusted approach 
(regressions without outliers). Yp20/40c: ln(Q20,40 * Y/0.2) adjusted approach (regressions without outliers). 
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Table 12: continued.  
 
Dep. Var.  Yp40s  Yp40c  Yp20s  Yp20c  Yp40s  Yp40c  
 
  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
 
EDT/GDP 0.001  0.001  -0.0017  -0.003** -0.002*  -0.002** 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
 
EDT/GDP2 -0.00002 -0.00002 
  (0.00001) (0.00001)  
      
TDS/XGS 0.003  0.003  0.006**  0.006**  0.005**  0.004* 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
 
Secondary 0.32***  0.32***  0.35***  0.33***  0.31***  0.32 
Education (0.09)  (0.10)  (0.09)  (0.10)  (0.09)  (0.10) 
 
Government -0.01**  -0.01**  -0.01**  -0.02**  -0.01**  -0.01** 
Consumption (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.007) 
 
Ln(1+inflation) -0.08  -0.06  -0.15  -0.09  -0.13  -0.09 
  (0.13)  (0.12)  (0.20)  (0.21)  (0.15)  (0.14) 
 
Civil  -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.06*  -0.07**  -0.07*** -0.08*** 
Liberties (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03) 
 
Life   0.03**  0.03**  0.03***  0.03***  0.03***  0.03*** 
Expectancy (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
 
Terms of  0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
Trade  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002) 
 
EAP  -1.17*** -1.14*** -1.41*** -1.30*** -1.18*** -1.15*** 
  (0.15)  (0.14)  (0.14)  (0.13)  (0.14)  (0.14) 
 
LAC  -1.22*** -1.23*** -1.63*** -1.57*** -1.22*** -1.24*** 
  (0.11)  (0.08)  (0.11)  (0.09)  (0.11)  (0.08) 
 
MNA  -0.77*** -0.85*** -0.90*** -1.03*** -0.75*** -0.83*** 
  (0.10)  (0.05)  (0.10)  (0.07)  (0.09)  (0.05) 
 
SA  -1.43*** -1.42*** -1.47*** -1.48*** -1.42*** -1.42*** 
  (0.18)  (0.17)  (0.20)  (0.17)  (0.18)  (0.16) 
 
SSA  -1.39*** -1.45*** -1.58*** -1.70*** -1.37*** -1.43*** 
  (0.33)  (0.30)  (0.33)  (0.30)  (0.31)  (0.29) 
 
Constant 6.12***  6.12***  5.48***  5.67***  6.04***  6.05*** 
  (0.68)  (0.71)  (0.75)  (0.74)  (0.67)  (0.69) 
 
m1  -0.96  -1.44  -0.57  -0.73  -0.82  -1.25 
m2  0.87  0.60  0.63  -0.45  0.86  0.41 
N  135  134  135  134  135  134 
1 – RSS/TSS 0.83  0.83  0.78  0.81  0.83  0.83 
 
* denotes significance at the 90% level, ** at the 95% level, and *** at the 99% level (two – tailed test). Results for one-step estimation 
are obtained using DPD98 for GAUSS. Heteroscedasticity adjusted asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. m1 and m2 are tests for 
first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no 
serial correlation. 1 – RSS/TSS: 1 – residual sum of squares/ total sum of squares. Yp20/40s: ln(Q20,40 * Y/0.2) unadjusted approach 
(regressions without outliers). Yp20/40c: ln(Q20,40 * Y/0.2) adjusted approach (regressions without outliers). 
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Table 12: continued.  
 
 
Dep. Var.   Yp20s  Yp20c  Yp40s  Yp40c  
 
   (13)  (14)  (15)  (16) 
 
EDT/XGS  -0.001*  -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
   (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)  
 
TDS/XGS  0.01***  0.01***  0.01***  0.01*** 
   (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
 
Secondary  0.34***  0.30***  0.31***  0.31*** 
Education  (0.10)  (0.11)  (0.10)  (0.10) 
 
Government  -0.01*  -0.02**  -0.01*  -0.02** 
Consumption  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.007) 
 
Ln(1+inflation)  -0.07  -0.03  -0.11  -0.07 
   (0.15)  (0.17)  (0.11)  (0.12) 
 
Civil Liberties  -0.03  -0.04  -0.05*  -0.06** 
   (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03) 
 
Life    0.03**  0.03**  0.03**  0.03 
Expectancy  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
 
Terms of  0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
Trade   (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
 
EAP   -1.18***  -1.04***  -1.00***  0.93***  
   (0.19)  (0.21)  (0.17)  (0.21) 
 
LAC   -1.33***  -1.24***  -0.97***  -0.95*** 
   (0.18)  (0.20)  (0.14)  (0.17) 
 
MNA   -0.67***  -0.79***  -0.57***  -0.62*** 
   (0.16)  (0.19)  (0.13)  (0.16) 
 
SA   -1.14***  -1.09***  -1.14***  -1.09*** 
   (0.26)  (0.27)  (0.22)  (0.24)  
 
SSA   -1.32***  -1.45***  -1.17***  -1.22*** 
   (0.38)  (0.38)  (0.35)  (0.36) 
 
Constant  5.36***  5.53***  6.15***  6.15*** 
   (0.79)  (0.84)  (0.72)  (0.75) 
 
m1   -0.98  -1.14  -1.25  -1.60 
m2   0.22  -0.79  1.47  0.99 
N   134  133  134  133 
1 – RSS/TSS  0.76  0.78  0.81  0.81 
 
 
* denotes significance at the 90% level, ** at the 95% level, and *** at the 99% level (two – tailed test). Results for one-step estimation 
are obtained using DPD98 for GAUSS. Heteroscedasticity adjusted asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. m1 and m2 are tests for 
first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no 
serial correlation. 1 – RSS/TSS: 1 – residual sum of squares/ total sum of squares. Yp20/40s: ln(Q20,40 * Y/0.2) unadjusted approach 
(regressions without outliers). Yp20/40c: ln(Q20,40 * Y/0.2) adjusted approach (regressions without outliers). 
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Table 13: First Quintile and Debt Indicators  
(Growth equation) 
 
 
 
Combinations:  EDT EDT EDX EDX  EDT EDT EDX EDX 
     EDT2  EDX2  TDS EDT2 TDS EDX2 
          TDS  TDS 
 
 
1) Distribution effect 
 
 
Specifications:  
 
yq20 = regional    - - - -  - - - -  
dummies  
 
 
yq20o = regional  - EDT* - -  TDS* EDT** - -  
dummies     EDT2*     EDT2* 
          TDS** 
 
yq20 = regional   - - - -  - - - -  
dummies + macro- 
economic variables  
 
 
yq20o = regional  - EDT* - -  - EDT* - -  
dummies + macro-   EDT2*     EDT2*   
economic variables 
 
 
 
2) Total effect 
 
 
Specifications: 
 
yp20 = regional   - - - -  - - - -  
dummies + macro- 
economic variables  
 
 
yp20o = regional  - - - -  - - - -  
dummies + macro-          
economic variables 
 
 
 
Note: Under the rubric “specifications” we denote the different basic equations which are tested with eight different combinations of the 
debt indicators. E.g. yq20 = regional dummies means that the growth rate of the first quintile share is regressed on regional dummy 
variables and eight different combinations (e.g. EDT/GDP alone or plus EDT/GDP and EDT/GDP2 etc.). In the matrix we indicate 
significant debt indicators. * denotes signficance at 90 % level, ** at the 95 % level, and *** at the 99 % level (two-sided alternative).  
yq20: average annual growth rate of first quintile share. yq20o: regressions without outliers for growth rate of first quintile. yp20: average 
annual growth rate of mean income of first quintile. yp20o: regressions without outliers for growth rate of mean income of first quintile. 
EDT: EDT/GDP. EDX: EDT/XGS. TDS: TDS/XGS.  
 
 
 
 69
Table 14: First Quintile and Debt Indicators  
(System GMM estimation)  
 
 
           
Combinations:  EDT EDT EDX EDX  EDT EDT EDX EDX 
     EDT2  EDX2  TDS EDT2 TDS EDX2 
         TDS  TDS 
 
 
1) Distribution effect 
 
 
Specifications:  
 
Yq20s = regional   - EDT*** - -  TDS* EDT2* TDS* TDS*  
dummies    EDT2***    
 
 
Yq20c = regional  - - - -  TDS* - - TDS* 
dummies           
           
          
Yq20s = regional  - EDT*** EDX* EDX*  TDS** EDT* - - 
dummies + macro-   EDT2***     EDT2** 
economic variables  
 
           
Yq20c = regional  - EDT** - -  TDS* EDT2***- -  
dummies + macro-   EDT2***       
economic variables 
    
 
 
2) Total effect 
 
 
Specifications:  
 
Yp20s = regional  - EDT** - -  TDS** EDT2*** EDX* TDS*** 
dummies + macro-   EDT2***     TDS***   
economic variables  
 
     
Yp20c = regional  EDT* EDT2*** - -  EDT** EDT2** EDX*** EDX* 
dummies + macro-        TDS**  TDS*** TDS***  
economic variables         
    
          
 
Note: Under the rubric specifications we denote the different basic equations which are tested with eight different combinations of the 
debt indicators. E.g. Yq20 = regional dummies means that the first quintile share is regressed on regional dummy variables and eight 
different combinations (e.g. EDT/GDP alone or plus EDT/GDP and EDT/GDP2 etc.). In the matrix we indicate significant debt indicators. 
* denotes signficance at 90 % level, ** at the 95 % level, and *** at the 99 % level (two-sided alternative). Yq20s: logarithm of first quintile 
share divided by 0.2 (unadjusted approach, regressions without outliers). Yq20c: logarithm of first quintile divided by 0.2 (adjusted 
approach, regressions without outliers). Yp20s: logarithm of mean income of 20 percent poorest (unadjusted approach, regressions 
without outliers). Yp20s: logarithm of mean income of 20 percent poorest (adjusted approach, regressions without outliers). EDT: 
EDT/GDP. EDX: EDT/XGS. TDS: TDS/XGS.  
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Table 15: Second Quintile and Debt Indicators  
(System GMM estimation)  
 
 
           
Combinations:  EDT EDT EDX EDX  EDT EDT EDX EDX 
     EDT2  EDX2  TDS EDT2 TDS EDX2 
          TDS  TDS 
 
1) Distribution effect 
 
 
Specifications: 
       
Yq40s = regional   - EDT* - -  - - - -  
dummies    EDT2**    
 
 
Yq40c = regional  - - - -  - - - EDX** 
dummies           EDX2** 
            
          
Yq40s = regional  - EDT* - -  - EDT2* - - 
dummies + macro-   EDT2***      
economic variables  
 
    
Yq40c = regional  - EDT2** - -  - EDT2* - EDX*  
dummies + macro-          
economic variables  
 
 
 
2) Total effect 
 
 
Specifications:  
 
Yp40s = regional  - EDT2** - -  EDT* - EDX*** EDX*  
dummies + macro-       TDS**  TDS*** TDS*** 
economic variables            
    
         
Yp40c = regional  EDT* EDT2* - -  EDT** - EDX*** EDX*** 
dummies + macro-       TDS*  TDS*** TDS***  
economic variables          
         
 
 
Note: Under the rubric specifications we denote the different basic equations which are tested with nine different combinations of the 
debt indicators. E.g. Yq20 = regional dummies means that the first quintile share is regressed on regional dummy variables and eight 
different combinations (e.g. EDT/GDP alone or plus EDT/GDP and EDT/GDP2 etc.). In the matrix we indicate significant debt indicators. 
* denotes signficance at 90 % level, ** at the 95 % level, and *** at the 99 % level (two-sided alternative). Yq40s: logarithm of second 
quintile share divided by 0.2 (unadjusted approach, regressions without outliers). Yq40c: logarithm of second quintile divided by 0.2 
(adjusted approach, regressions without outliers). Yp40s: logarithm of mean income of 20 to 40 percent poorest (unadjusted approach, 
regressions without outliers). Yp40s: logarithm of mean income of 20 to 40 percent poorest (adjusted approach, regressions without 
outliers). EDT: EDT/GDP. EDX: EDT/XGS. TDS: TDS/XGS.  
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Exchange Rate Regimes and Pro-Poor Growth 
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Abstract 
 
This paper extends the ongoing discussion on optimal exchange rate regimes to the issue of pro-poor 
growth. To analyze empirically the poverty effects of exchange rate regimes, we estimate the distribution 
effects of different exchange rate arrangements on the poorest 20 and 20 to 40 percent. In addition, we 
test the total effect, i.e. the distribution and growth effect, to capture potential trade-offs between poverty 
effects through overall economic growth and distribution.   
 
To analyze this question, we collect an irregular and unbalanced panel of time-series cross-country data 
on the first and second quintile share from 76 countries and use two recently proposed de facto exchange 
rate regime classifications, Levy-Yeyati/Sturzenegger (2002) and Reinhart/Rogoff (2003). To cover 
econometric issues, cross-country variation and dynamic aspects of within-country changes of the income 
of the poor, we apply two econometric specifications, a growth equation and a system GMM estimation. 
We estimate the poverty effects of different exchange rate regimes for all countries and, separately, 
developing and industrial countries due to considerable differences in economic structure, access to 
international capital markets and soundness of domestic financial systems.  
 
Empirical findings vary considerably with respect to three aspects. First, findings for the Levy-
Yeyati/Sturzenegger (2002) and Reinhart/Rogoff (2003) classification differ significantly with respect to 
similar exchange rate categories. Thus the classification process of exchange rate regimes affects critically 
the policy conclusions. Second, statistically significant exchange rate regimes in the Reinhart/Rogoff 
(2003) classification impact positively on the poor in developing countries, but negatively on the poor in 
industrial countries. Thus exchange rate regimes affect very differently the poor in developing and 
industrial countries in the Reinhart/Rogoff (2003) classification. Third, statistical significance of exchange 
rate regimes in the system GMM approach differs considerably for adjusted and unadjusted income 
inequality measures.    
 
Due to these varying and only weakly robust empirical findings, a concise policy recommendation with 
respect to poverty-reducing exchange rate regimes is difficult. Nevertheless, positive effects of 
intermediate regimes of the Reinhart/Rogoff (2003) classification in developing countries should be 
emphasized, showing at least a tendency to not negative and possible positive effects of intermediate 
regimes on the poorest 40 percent in developing countries.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
In the 1990s developing and transitional countries were hit by devastating financial crises and 
speculative attacks resulting in an ongoing debate on the optimal exchange rate regime. In 
recent discussions, the ‘hollowing out’ hypothesis, i.e. intermediate regimes between hard pegs 
and free floating are unsustainable, gained prominent proponents (Fisher 2001). Critics, 
however, emphasized the dependence of optimal exchange rate regimes on country-specific 
circumstances justifying also intermediate regimes (Frankel 1999, Mussa/Masson/Swoboda 
/Jadresic/Mauro/Berg 2000). In addition, empirical evidence seems not to confirm the bipolar 
view for all developing countries (Calvo/Reinhart 2000, Husain/Mody/Rogoff 2004). Thus 
different exchange rate arrangements may be appropriate in countries with different structural 
characteristics (Isard 1995).  
 
While the debate on optimal exchange rate regimes has often changed its focus since the early 
60s, the theoretical and empirical literature is peculiarly silent on the impact of exchange rate 
arrangements on pro-poor growth or poverty reduction (Isard 1995). This lack of integration of 
poverty effects in macroeconomic modelling on exchange rate regimes is especially  
problematic due to the high vulnerability of the poor to external shocks and currency crises. 
Even without a financial crisis perspective, the question of an optimal exchange rate regime for 
pro-poor growth would be an important one (Lustig 2000). Thus, to analyze empirically poverty 
effects of different exchange rate arrangements, we estimate both the distribution and the total 
effect, i.e. the distribution and growth effect, of different exchange rate regimes on the poorest 
20 and 20 to 40 percent in a growth equation and a system GMM estimation.   
 
To uncover the effects of different exchange rate regimes on the income of the poor we have a 
short look at the literature in section 2. As the poverty issue is not very well integrated in 
macroeconomic models, the possible effects are given more implicitly in economic theory. In 
section 3 we present the data coverage and data sources used in the estimations, which 
encompasses a discussion of the discrepancies between the official statement of exchange rate 
regimes and its factual application, the de jure/de facto issue. In addition, descriptive statistics 
and some stylized facts of exchange rate regimes are presented. While in section 4 we discuss 
our concept of pro-poor growth, we explain our econometric approach in section 5 to estimate 
the possible impact of different exchange rate arrangements on pro-poor growth followed by an 
interpretation of the results. Finally, we conclude in section 6 with major findings.  
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2.   Exchange rate regimes and pro-poor growth 
 
2.1 Literature Review  
 
The relationship between exchange rate regimes and pro-poor growth is only rarely discussed 
in the literature (Lustig 2000).101 Thus we look at the impact of exchange rate regimes on overall 
economic growth, the discussion of real exchange rate misalignment and contractionary 
devaluation for possible different effects of exchange rate arrangements on the income of the 
poor.  
 
Historically, discussions on optimal exchange rate arrangements evolved from debates on the 
stabilizing effect of flexible exchange rates under international capital mobility, types of 
structural characteristics (e.g. exposure to shocks, financial development) decisive for the 
choice of an appropriate exchange rate regime to issues of credibility of monetary policy and 
nominal anchors to cover inflation bias, optimal currency area hypothesis, endogeneity of 
structural characteristics and speculative attacks. Resulting from these discussions, different 
exchange rate regimes may be optimal for countries with different structural characteristics, 
types of exogenous shocks, and different macroeconomic and political environments which may 
change over time (Isard 1995, Frankel 1999).102 This view is emphasized especially for 
developing and transitional countries caused by their heterogeneous economical situation 
(Mussa/Masson/Swoboda/Jadresic/Mauro/Berg 2000). While the two corner solution is recently 
proposed for developing countries (Krueger 1999, Fisher 2001), critics opt for adjustable pegs to 
balance the conflict of macroeconomic stability and economic growth (Hausknecht 2001).  
 
In line with the debate on the optimal exchange rate system, the impact of different exchange 
rate arrangements on economic growth is ambiguously discussed in economic theory. Refering 
to the growth accounting approach, exchange rate regimes could impact on economic growth 
through the rate of factor accumulation (investment, labor) or total factor productivity. Fixed 
exchange rate arrangements may promote investment and trade by reduced price uncertainties 
and relative price volatility, lowered real interest rates and decreased real exchange rate 
volatility which in turn may increase growth.103 In addition, fixed exchange rate regimes may 
foster growth by lower inflation and less vulnerability to speculative exchange rate fluctuations if 
the peg is credible (Levy-Yeyati/Sturzenegger 2001, Levy-Yeyati/Sturzenegger 2002a, 
Bailliu/Lafrance/Perrault 2002).  
 
On the other side, fixed exchange rate regimes could also diminish the efficiency of a given 
stock of capital since external trade may be reduced due to higher protectionist pressure in the 
                                            
101 On a dynamic macro-micro modelling of the impact of macroeconomic policy and variables on poverty in a CGE 
framework, see the IMMPA program of the Worldbank (Agénor/Fofack/Izquierdo 2003). 
102 For a detailed survey of advantages and disadvantages of nine alternative exchange rate regimes, see 
Edwards/Savastano (1999). 
103 This reasoning assumes a positive effect of higher trade on economic growth.  
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absence of exchange rate adjustments (Gosh/Gulde/Ostry/Wolf 1997).104 Furthermore, 
investment can be impeded by increased real interest rates and uncertainty which may result 
from expectations of a regime switch due to negative external shocks or weak macroeconomic 
fundamentals (Montiel 2003). While the lack of adjustment and the possibility of frequent 
external shocks under a fixed exchange rate regime may imply increased output volatility, the 
impact on long-run growth is less obvious (Levy-Yeyati/Sturzenegger 2001). 
 
Empirical evidence on the impact of different exchange rate regimes on economic growth is 
ambiguous.105 In the World Economic Outlook (1997) no clear relationship between exchange 
rate regimes and economic growth is found for developing countries, while inflation is typically 
lower and less volatile in countries with pegged rates than in countries with flexible rates. 
Gosh/Gulde/Ostry/Wolf (1997) estimate the different impact of fixed, intermediate and flexible 
exchange rate regimes on growth, inflation and output volatility using de jure exchange rate 
regimes (official IMF classification) for 136 countries in the period 1960 - 1980. While growth 
varies only slightly across different exchange rate arrangements, fixed exchange rate regimes 
compared with flexible regimes tend to increase output volatility, but are associated with lower 
inflation. Levy-Yeyati/Sturzenegger (2002a) measure the impact of fixed, intermediate and 
flexible exchange rate regimes on growth and output volatility using de facto exchange rate 
regimes for 183 countries in the period 1974 – 1999. Fixed exchange rate arrangements are 
connected with slower growth rates and higher output volatility for non-industrial countries. 
However, Levy-Yeyati/Sturzenegger (2001) found an inflation-growth tradeoff for ‘long’ pegs  in 
non-industrial countries, i.e. fixed exchange rate regimes with a duration of at least 5 years are 
associated with lower inflation in addition to slower growth. Furthermore, there is evidence for 
negative announcement value of short pegs with respect to economic growth, i.e. countries 
running a de facto peg often avoid a formal commitment to a fixed regime due to potential 
speculative attacks in introducing a legal peg. However, no different impact of hard pegs 
(currency boards or countries without separate legal tender) compared with conventional pegs 
on economic growth could be confirmed. On the other side, in Gosh/Gulde/Wolf (2003) currency 
boards are associated with higher output growth and lower inflation in developing countries. 
Edwards (2001) and Edwards/Magendzo (2001) find lower growth rates for dollarized countries 
compared with non-dollarized countries, while Edwards/Magendzo (2003), using a treatment 
regression analysis, could not confirm different growth rates. Accounting for different monetary 
policy frameworks, Bailliu/Lafrance/Perrault (2002) estimate a panel-data set of 60 countries 
over the period from 1973 to 1998 using a dynamic GMM estimator and find that intermediate 
and flexible exchange rate regimes without an anchor hinder economic growth. Finally, 
Husain/Mody/Rogoff (2004) test the growth and inflation impact of exchange rate regimes drawn 
from a new de facto exchange rate regime classification for the period 1970 to 1999. While fixed 
regimes are more sustainable and less inflationary in developing countries without liberal capital 
                                            
104 This line of argument would assume positive productivity effects of increased trade.  
105 Connected to this issue Baxter/Stockmann (1989) found that the cyclical behavior of real macroeconomic aggregates 
(output, consumption, etc.) does not depend systematically on exchange rate regimes. 
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markets, pegged regimes are more crisis prone in emerging markets. In addition, flexible 
regimes are more sustainable in advanced economies combined with slightly higher growth 
rates.    
 
Another point of departure for possible differences of exchange rate systems on poverty are the 
effects of real exchange rate misalignment, i.e. difference between actual and equilibrium real 
exchange rate (RER) 106, and nominal devaluations on real output. While the construction of an 
appropriate measure assessing RER misalignment is controversially discussed in the literature 
(Hinkle/Montiel 1999, Razin/Collins 1999) 107, persistent RER misalignment may be associated 
with fixed exchange rate regimes assuming nominal rigidities (Gosh/Gulde/Ostry/Wolf 1997, 
World Bank 2001a, Bailliu/Lafrance/Perraul 2002, Montiel 2003).108 Alberola/López/Servén 
(2004) find a considerable impact of the hard peg (curreny board) on the overvaluation of the 
RER in Argentina.  
 
RER misalignment is important in our context for at least three reasons. First, RER 
misalignment can cause inefficient allocation of resources across sectors and price distortions 
(Gosh/Gulde/Ostry/Wolf 1997). Second, severe or persistent RER misalignment (e.g. 
overvaluation) may lead to adjustment expectations resulting in capital flight and increased 
likelihood of currency crisis (Bailliu/Lafrance/Perrault 2002, Montiel 2003). Third, RER 
misalignment may be associated with lower medium to long-run growth by influencing 
investment and the competitiveness of the tradable sector. While these costs of RER 
misalignment are assumed to be positive related to the extent of financial integration (Montiel 
2003), misalignment volatility may also harm economic growth (Edwards/Savastano 1999, 
Razin/Collins 1999). Empirical evidence seems to confirm the negative impact of average RER 
misalignment and its volatility on overall economic growth (Edwards 1989, Cottani/Cavallo/Khan 
1990, Ghura/Grennes 1993, Razin/Collins 1999). However, this effect might be driven by 
important nonlinearities, i.e. while only very high overvaluations appear to be associated with 
slower growth, moderate to high undervaluations seem to foster growth (Razin/Collins 1999).  
 
Nominal devaluations are associated with different kind of pegs using the exchange rate as 
important policy instrument. Devaluations are usually a result of inconsistent macroeconomic 
policies with severe overvaluation of the real exchange rate. A nominal devaluation, however, 
must not necessarily translate into a real devaluation due to inflationary pressure (Edwards 
1989, Ghei/Hinkle 1999). The effects of devaluations on real output and economic growth in 
                                            
106 Equilibrium real exchange rate can be defined as the real exchange rate that would prevail if the economy is 
simultaneously in internal and external balance. While internal balance describes an economy operating at its potential 
output, external balance  means that the courrent account deficit equals the expected sustainable capital inflows 
(Razin/Collins 1999, Montiel 2003).  
107 for an overview of empirical studies of real exchange rate misaligment in developing countries, see 
Edwards/Savastano (1999). 
108 RER overvaluation may be caused by fixed exchange rate regimes due to difficulties to exit the peg or the failure to 
accommodate secular deterioration in terms-of-trade (World Bank 2001a). Generally, however, the real exchange rate is 
an endogenous variable, which cannot be changed directly by policy makers. Thus the exchange rate regime is only 
one of several fundamental macroeconomic variables in determining indirectly the level of the real exchange rate and its 
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developing countries are controversially discussed. A devaluation may lead to contraction 
caused by its effect on both aggregate demand and supply (Krugman/Taylor 1978, 
Agénor/Montiel 1999). Empirical evidence appears to confirm the contractionary devaluation 
hypothesis at least in the short run, even if the applied methodology is critisized (Edwards 1989, 
Agénor 1991, Kamin/Klau 1998, Agénor/Montiel 1999, Rogers/Kamin 2000). 
 
2.2  Effects of exchange rate regimes and pro-poor growth 
 
Relying on the literature review, the choice of the exchange rate regime may affect the income 
of the poor via its effect on macroeconomic volatility (shock absorption), its relation to real 
exchange rate misalignment, its proneness to currency crises, via devaluation and inflation.      
 
Output volatility (shock absorption) 
 
Macroeconomic volatility and high output fluctuation, resulting from exogenous shocks and 
instable policy regimes, may impact on poverty (Breen/Garcia-Peñalosa 1999). The income of 
the poor may be affected by a negative impact of macroeconomic volatility on investment and 
growth due to distorted price signals and expected rate of return. Increased precautionary 
savings caused by higher uncertainty about future income may also lead to either decreased or 
increased economic growth. In addition, credit market effects, i.e. higher incidence of credit 
rationing or increased risk premium and borrowing rates for private firms may negatively affect 
the income of the poor (Agénor 2002).  
 
Identifying the predominant economic shocks and the structural features of a specific country 
and choosing the exchange rate regime which best insulates the economy against shocks could 
be seen as one reason for different impact of exchange rate arrangements on pro-poor growth. 
This reasoning would be based on the assumption that exchange rate regimes dampen or 
amplify the negative effects of exogenous shocks and adjustment processes 
(Ames/Brown/Devarajan/Izquierdo 2002, Bailliu/Lafrance/Perrault 2002, Edwards/Levy-Yeyati 
2003).109 Refering to a Mundell-Flemming framework, fixed exchange rate regimes are 
assumed to stabilize output in case of nominal shocks to domestic asset markets, while real 
shocks are more easily absorbed by flexible exchange rate regimes.110 Structural features of an 
economy may determine the optimality of a regime with respect to external financial shocks 
(Montiel 2003).111 Traditional analysis of exchange rate regimes, however, is confined to 
extreme arrangements (hard pegs or pure floats) in comparison to a broad scale of 
intermediated regimes used in developing countries (Montiel 2003).  
                                                                                                                                                 
misalignment. For an useful distinction in short-run and long-run RER misalignments and their relation to exchange rate 
regimes, see Montiel (2003). 
109 Even if the long-run equlibrium effect may be the same for fixed and flexible regimes, the short- to medium run 
adjustment process may differ considerably due to different exchange rate arrangements (Lustig 2000).  
110 Gosh/Gulde/Ostry/Wolf (1997) and Levy-Yeyati/Sturzenegger (2002) find that fixed exchange rate are associated 
with higher output volatility. 
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RER misalignment and currency crises 
 
Exchange rate regimes may impact on pro-poor growth via RER misalignment. First, inefficient 
allocation of resources between foreign and domestic goods and price distortions due to RER 
misalignment may lead to distributional effects. Second, reduced investment and 
competitiveness of the tradable sector due to RER misalignment may also result in additional 
effects for the poorest. The costs for the poor may be increased by the extent of financial 
integration in international capital markets (at least in the short run).112 In addition, misalignment 
volatility may harm pro-poor growth even if the direction of these effects may be ambiguous and 
dependent on the amount of RER misalignment (Edwards/Savastano 1999, Razin/Collins 
1999). Fourth, severe or persistent RER misalignment may be especially costly for the poor as 
they usually can not hedge against the adjustment risks and considerable RER misalignment 
may increase significantly the probability of a currency crisis (Bailliu/Lafrance/Perrault 2002, 
Montiel 2003).  
 
Currency crises may be associated with certain types of exchange rate regimes. Relying on the 
‘hollowing-out’ hypothesis, fixed but adjustable pegs and narrow-band systems are supposed to 
be unsustainable for countries highly integrated in global financial markets (Fisher 2001). 
Bubula/Ötker-Robe (2003) find that pegged exchange rate regimes are more prone to crises 
than floatings and intermediate exchange rate arrangements more than hard pegs or floating 
regimes for the period 1990 to 2001.113 Looking at the two de facto exchange rate regime 
classifications used in our sample, currency crises are relatively prevalent in dirty floats in the 
Levy-Yeyati/Sturzenegger (2002b) classification. Even if relative frequency is much lower, 
currency crises are also present in all other classifications (table 4). While currency crises are 
not present for the category freely floating in the coarse Reinhart/Rogoff classification (2003), 
currency crises are relativey dominant in freely falling and associated with pegged regimes, 
limited flexbility and managed floating to a lower relative frequency (table 4).114 If we replace 
freely falling by one of the four other regimes in a 4-way classification, currency crises of freely 
falling are mainly attributed to freely floating and managed floating.115  
 
A currency crisis may impact negatively on the income of the poor by unemployment effects on 
low skilled labour in both the formal and informal sector. In addition, wealth effects and changes 
in the value of assets induced by changes in interest rates or asset prices may affect the income 
distribution. Furthermore, a financial crisis could lead to spending cuts in social expenditures 
                                                                                                                                                 
111 Structural characteristics of economies, however, may not be exogenous to the choice of exchange rate regimes 
(Isard 1995).  
112 While procyclical access to world capital markets of developing countries may increase macroeconomic instability, 
greater penetration of foreign banks may result in reduced access to loans by small and medium-size firms. In addition, 
financial openness may hurt the poor by credit rationing caused by increased volatility and lower growth rates due to 
capital flight and international risk sharing (Agénor 2003). 
113 For a detailed discussion on the feasability conditions using intermediate exchange rate regimes in developing 
countries in the context of capital mobility and a broad discussion on causes of currency crisis, see Montiel (2003).  
114 One reason for the prevalence of freely falling is the fact, that category freely falling is attributed to the six months 
immediatly following a currency crisis (Reinhart/Rogoff 2003).  
115 For reasoning and construction of the reduced 4-way RR classification, see section 3.2.  
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(health, education, social security) which may adversely affect the poor.116 Baldacci/de 
Mello/Inchauste (2002) find evidence for this hypothesis applying a difference-in-difference 
methodology in a cross-country analysis. The size of the poverty effect, however, may depend 
critically on the initial structure and the composition of the social spending programs since social 
expenditures often benefit disproportionately upper-income households in developing countries 
(Dollar/Kraay 2001, McCulloch/Winters/Cirera 2001, Baldacci/de Mello/Inchauste 2002, Agénor 
2002, Davoodi/Tiongson/Asawanuchit 2003).117 Finally, the poor may be additionally affected by 
a currency crisis in the longer-run via asymmetric effects, i.e. the decrease of the income of the 
poor in recessions is not offset by the positive effects of expansions (Agénor 2002).118 
 
Devaluation 
 
Fixed exchange rate arrangements may entail nominal devaluations of the official exchange rate 
in case of overvalued RER. However, the effects of nominal devaluations on the income of the 
poor are ambiguous depending also on its effect on the RER (Edwards 1989, Ghei/Hinkle 
1999). On the demand side, a depreciation of the RER would benefit consumers of 
nontradables, while it would harm consumers of imported goods. Thus the depreciation could 
increase domestic food prices due to higher prices of imported food. This could lead to negative 
effects on the poor, if they are net consumers of food (Baldacci/de Mello/Inchauste 2002). On 
the supply-side, improved agricultural exports may increase the income of the rural poor, while 
diminished demand for labor in the nontraded sector may decrease the income of the urban 
poor, i.e. earnings fall for those employed in the non-trade sector with respect to the trade 
sector.119 Thus RER depreciation would positively affect the poor, if they work mainly in the 
tradable sector, but consume nontradables (Ames/Brown/Devarajan/Izquierdo 2002, Agénor 
2002). In addition, increased prices for imported intermediate input and capital goods may result 
in more demand for unskilled workers. Negative supply shocks are also possible, if the economy 
is a net importer of intermediate inputs (Agénor 2002). Empirically, RER depreciation is found to 
decrease real wages in the agricultural sector, while labor’s share of GDP does not significantly 
change in the event of nominal devaluations (Edwards 1989). 
 
Inflation  
 
High inflation may discourage the income of the poor via disruptive effects on economic growth 
(Temple 1999, Montiel 2003, Epaulard 2003). In addition, the poor may be hit disproportionately 
by negative effects of high and variable inflation rates on their income due to its denomination in 
                                            
116 Curtailing government expenditures may also lead to increased poverty via cuts in real wages and layoffs of 
employees in the public sector (Agénor 2002).  
117 Cuts in social spending may nevertheless lead to reduced poverty if social expenditures are better targeted to the 
poor (Agénor 2002).  
118 Parents’ decision with respect to their children attending school, asymmetric changes in expectations, credit rationing 
to firms due to adverse selection problems or net worth effects, borrowing constraints on household consumption 
behavior and “labor hoarding” of skilled labor force are proposed as explanations for the asymmetric effect of 
contractions and expansions on the income of the poor (Agénor 2002).   
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nominal terms without access to indexation, a decline in real wages due to rigidity of nominal 
wages, impossibility of hedging inflation with other assets and the ‘inflation tax’ with effects 
similar to a regressive tax.120 Empirical evidence on a negative distribution effect of inflation, 
however, is mixed. One reason may be that economy-wide inflation rates do not correctly reflect 
the effects of price changes relevant for the poor (Romer/Romer 1998, Easterly/Fisher 2001, 
Dollar/Kraay 2001, Anderson/White 2001, Ghura/Leite/Tsangarides 2002, Agénor 2002, 
Ames/Brown /Devarajan/Izquierdo 2002, Epaulard 2003). 
 
Exchange rate regimes (together with monetary policy) may have different impact on inflation. 
Fixing the exchange rate to the currency of a country with anti-inflation reputation could increase 
credibility since announcing a future path of the exchange rate may serve as a commitment 
mechanism.121 Thus inflation rate or inflation bias may be reduced due to the use of the 
exchange rate as nominal anchor. On the other hand, fixed exchange rate regimes face the risk 
of devaluation bias and loss of credibility which may result in higher inflation if the structural 
features of the economy are inappropriate to the choice of the fixed exchange rate regime and 
exiting the fixed exchange rate regime is difficult (Isard 1995, Ames/Brown /Devarajan/Izquierdo 
2002, Montiel 2003). Empirical evidence supports the view that fixed exchange rate regimes are 
associated with lower and more stable inflation (World Economic Outlook 1997, 
Gosh/Gulde/Ostry/Wolf 1997, Levy-Yeyati/ Sturzenegger 2001).  
 
To summarize, our discussion of the theoretical channels and empirical literature does not show 
a clear superiority or inferiority of one category of exchange rate regime with respect to pro-poor 
growth. Exchange rate arrangements may impact on pro-poor growth through various and 
possibly contradictory effects. However, there seems to be a tendency to attribute negative 
poverty effects to intermediate exchange rate regimes in developing countries with liberal capital 
markets due to an assumed higher likelihood of currency crises.  
 
3.   Data sources and descriptive statistics 
 
3.1   Data on income inequality measures 
 
Empirical tests on the impact of exchange rate arrangements on pro-poor growth are limited by 
data availability. In addition, incomparability of inequality data can cause severe problems in 
cross-section analysis (Atkinson/Brandolini 2001). Due to different concepts used in income 
distribution surveys across time and space cross-section analysis of pro-poor growth using first 
and second quintile share of income has to be applied with caution. Data on income inequality 
                                                                                                                                                 
119 In addition, a higher cost-of-living index in the urban areas may offset the positive supply effect on small farmers in 
the tradable sector (Agénor 2002). 
120 In addition, a change in distribution of income and wealth may be explained by high and variable inflation, if the 
middle-class as holders of nominal liabilites benefits from its loss of value and the poor holds only nominal assets 
(Agénor 2002).  
121 On a detailed discussion of the advantages and disadvantages announcing a predetermined exchange rate path as 
commitment mechanism, see Montiel (2003).  
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may vary in various aspects, e.g. in income concept (income, expenditure), tax treatment, 
reference unit (household/family/household equivalent/person) or coverage (age/area 
/population). Concerning the income definition, expenditure should be preferred to income for 
developing countries for reasons of practical measurement, especially for rural (poor) 
households (Atkinson 1993, Deaton 1997). In addition, data on income distribution can be 
based on different sources (national household surveys, income tax records, social 
security/labor market agency records).122 Thus comparability of data on first and second quintile 
share of income has to be handled with care. While data on quintile shares of income can not 
be restricted to completely comparable samples due to limited data availability, only samples 
should be used with observations as fully consistent as possible (Atkinson/Brandolini 2001).   
 
Our data on the first and second quintile share of income (and the Gini coefficient) are based on 
four sources: the UNU/WIDER-UNDP World Income Inequality Database, Version 1.0, 12 
September 2000, the Deininger and Squire (1996, 1998a) database, the Global Poverty 
Monitoring described in Chen/Ravallion (1997, 2000)123 and the World Development Indicators 
(2002a) Table 2.8 (table 1). The observations are chosen by an successive selection procedure 
with restriction criteria motivated by the problems outlined above. For the UNU/WIDER 
database (2000), we first restrict the sample to data based on surveys covering all area, all 
population, all age and fulfilling the 1 OKIN quality rating.124 Second, as we are interested in 
pro-poor growth, only countries with at least two spaced observations are selected. To cover 
medium-to-long run growth and measurement errors due to fluctuations we draw the first 
available observation and every following with at least three years distance to the preceding. 
Only in five cases have we allowed for a two year distance within a spell for pragmatic 
reasons.125 In addition, the income concept and income recipients (reference unit) have to be 
identical for each spell.126 As noted in the description of the data set used by Dollar/Kraay 
(2001), several ‘high-quality’ data from the Deininger and Squire (1996, 1998a) database are 
not incorporated in the UNU/WIDER database (2000). We checked the Deininger and Squire 
(1996, 1998a) database and three extra observations could be gained due to our restriction 
criteria.127 The Global Poverty Monitoring data set is based on nationally representative surveys. 
All measures of household living standards are normalized by household size. The distribution 
and empirical Lorenz curves are household-size weighted. The income shares are estimated 
from primary data sources using parameterized Lorenz curves with flexible functional forms 
(Chen/Ravallion 1997). We have selected the sample on data of first and second quintile share 
of income due to the restriction criteria outlined above. In addition, actual data are drawn from 
                                            
122
see for further details UNU/WIDERUNDP World Income Inequality Database, Version 1.0, 12 September 2000, 
User guide; see also Atkinson/Brandolini 2001).  
123
The Global Poverty Monitoring is available under www.worldbank.org/research/povmon/index.htm and continually 
updated.  
124 Reliable income or expenditure data referring to the entire (national) population, not affected by apparent 
inconsistencies (UNU/WIDER – UNDP World income inequality database, Version 1.0, 12 September 2000, Users 
guide). 
125 Bulgaria 1991 – 93, Belarus 1993 – 95, Gabon 1975 – 77, Guatemala 1987 – 89, Kenya 1992 – 94 
126 One can further strengthen the selection criteria by also requiring the same type of survey for each spell to control for 
differences in survey design not captured by the same income definition and reference unit. Due to data availability, 
however, we omitted this idea.  
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the World Development Indicators 2002 Table 2.8 using the same methodology for low- and 
middle- income countries as used by the Global Poverty Monitoring data set.128 This selection 
procedure has resulted in 371 observations in total, 231 for developing, 27 for transitional and 
113 for industrial countries. Finally, data on exchange rate regimes have to be available for the 
selected country-year observations reducing the total sample further to 343 observations for 76 
countries (212, 18 and 113 for developing, transitional and industrial countries, respectively).  
 
In our regressions we use, first,  the same income concept and reference unit for each spell, i.e. 
we do not construct all possible spells between the observations in each country.129 In addition, 
we select in some cases two observations per country per year, exchanging the observations 
between the spells (table 1). Second, in adjusting the income inequality measures to form all 
possible spells in each country, we regress the first/second quintile share and the Gini 
coefficient on dummy variables for different income definitions and regional dummies.130 The 
adjusted first/second quintile share and Gini coefficient are then calculated by subtracting the 
estimated coefficients of the alternative income dummies from the unadjusted measures to form 
a sample of inequality measures corresponding to the distribution of household expenditure 
(table 2).131 In general, the number of observations per country varies significantly from 2 
(almost all Sub-Saharan Africa and Eastern Europe countries) to 15 (India). 
 
Mean income of the poorest is measured as the share of income earned by the poorest first and 
second quintile times mean income, divided by 0.2. Data on mean income are based on the 
PPP-adjusted real income per capita (constant 1996 US dollars using the chain index) reported 
in the Penn World Tables Version 6.1 (Heston/Summers/Aten 2002, Heston/Summers 1991). 
Though the mean income from national accounts may differ from mean level of household 
income (expenditure) due to measurement errors, income definition, or underestimation of 
income (consumption) in developing countries caused by nonparticipating rich, we use per 
capita GDP.132  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
127 Canada 1951, 57, 61 
128 For description of estimation method, see World Development Indicators (2002a) Table 2.8 (About the data).  
129 The length of time between two observations with the same income concept within a country ranges from 2 to 14 
years with a median of 4 years in our sample. 
130 We prefer to use regional dummy variables in the adjustment regressions since we have only 371 observations and 
eight different income definitions which are not equally distributed among regions. While category family and equivalized 
are only relevant for industrial countries, category income (unknown tax treatment) and net income are only present in 
three out of five regions in developing countries. If we omit regional dummy variables, the coefficients of these income 
definitions may falsely capture also regional differences in inequality. Since we only subtract the estimated coefficients 
of the income definitions from the unadjusted income inequality measures, regional differences in inequality are not 
consumed away by this adjustment procedure. To check this issue further, we also run adjustment regressions without 
regional dummy variables. If we compare correlations of the two adjusted first/second quintile shares and Gini 
coefficients with its unadjusted version, the correlation coefficients for the adjustment process with regional dummy 
variables are always closer to one confirming our approach.  
131 Subtracting the estimated coefficients of the alternative income dummies from the unadjusted measures means that 
we calculate the adjusted measures by subtracting the alternative income dummies multiplied by its coefficient from the 
unadjusted first/second quintile and Gini coefficients. On critic of this adjustment procedure, see Atkinson/Brandolini 
(2001). 
132 One pragmatic reason is that the UNU/WIDER-UNDP Database does not indicate the mean level of household 
income for each household survey. For a discussion of applying this procedure in pro-poor growth regressions, see 
Eastwood/Lipton (2001), Dollar/Kraay (2001). For a further discussion of discrepancies between national accounts and 
household survey measures of living standards, see Ravallion 2001a). 
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3.2  Classifications of exchange rate regimes and descriptive statistics 
 
The analysis of the impact of different exchange rate regimes on pro-poor growth needs to take 
into account some important issues. First, even if exchange rate regimes in developing 
countries might have evolved towards more flexibility since the decline of the Bretton Woods 
system in 1973, de facto a wide variety of managed rates is predominant in developing and 
transitional countries in contrast to more flexible exchange rate regimes or monetary unions in 
industrial countries (World Economic Outlook 1997, Agénor/Montiel 1999, Johnston et al. 1999, 
Mussa/Masson/Swoboda/Jadresic/Mauro/Berg 2000, Reinhart/Rogoff 2003, Husain/Mody 
/Rogoff 2004). Thus the empirical analysis of the optimal arrangement can be impeded by the 
lack of experience with flexible regimes and its ‘appropriate’ operational meaning in developing 
countries (Edwards/Savastano 1999). In addition, distinguishing the different forms of managed 
rates due to its different macroeconomic consequences on pro-poor growth may be important 
for our purposes. Second and related, quantitative restrictions on foreign exchange availability 
are common in developing and transitional countries leading to parallel free (il)legal exchange 
markets. Integrating the aspect of informal, dual or multiple exchange-rate regimes in our 
classification of exchange rate regimes is important due to its macroeconomic implications for 
both the growth and pro-poor effect as foreign exchange rationing can impact on private 
decision rules (e.g. private consumption, investment) (Reinhart/Rogoff 2003). Additional costs 
for the government (e.g. enforcement, loss of tariff revenue), loss of seignorage, distorted 
domestic prices, implicit tax on exports and changed transmission mechanisms of short-term 
macroeconomic policies caused by parallel exchange markets may affect growth and the 
income of the poor. Third, the assumption of perfect capital mobility is inappropriate for 
macroeconomic modelling in developing countries due to capital controls and immature 
domestic financial system (Agénor/Montiel 1999).  
 
To cover these issues, data on exchange rate arrangements are based on two sources: Levy-
Yeyati/Sturzenegger (2002b) and Reinhart/Rogoff (2003). The use of these alternative 
classifications is justified by the well-documented pitfalls of the old IMF classification (1975 – 
1998), which only indicates the official or de jure exchange rate regime based on the public 
commitment of the central banks and ignores the inofficial or de facto regime and parallel 
exchange rates (Gosh/Gulde/Ostry/Wolf 1997, Edwards/Savastano 1999, Johnston et al. 1999, 
Bubula/Ötker-Robe 2002, Reinhart/Rogoff 2003, Husain/Mody/Rogoff 2004).133 Ignoring 
completely the old official IMF classification, Levy-Yeyati/Sturzenegger (2002b) use the volatility 
of the nominal exchange rate, the volatility of its rate of change and the volatility of international 
reserves (indicator for the extent of foreign exchange intervention) to group annual exchange 
rate regimes of all 183 IMF reporting countries for the period 1974 – 2000 by cluster analysis 
                                            
133 The difference in official statement and actual management of exchange rate regimes can be caused for example by 
the political costs of announcing devaluations (Bubula/Ötker-Robe 2002). Reinhart and Rogoff (2003) state that the old 
IMF classification is almost random with respect to their reclassification.  
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methodology.134 Combinations of high and low volatility of the three indicators result in a 5-way-
classification (flexible, dirty float, crawling peg, fixed, inconclusives).135  
 
Reinhart/Rogoff (2003) classify exchange rate regimes of 153 countries for the period 1946-
2001 by incorporating monthly data on market-determined (dual, multiple or parallel) exchange 
rates and chronologies of the history of exchange rate arrangements and related factors, i.e. 
exchange controls and currency reforms.136 Using a similar nomenclatura as the new IMF 
classification (January 1999), the resulting fine classification now comprises fifteen 
categories.137 Due to limited availability of data in our sample, however, we use a more coarse 
classification which condenses the fifteen categories to six by merging the categories.138 In their 
approach, Reinhart/Rogoff (2003) construct a new category freely falling by two criteria. First, 
the 12-month inflation rate exceeds 40 percent unless some form of pre-announced peg or 
narrow band have been identified. Second, the six months immediatly following a currency crisis 
are classified as freely falling only if the crisis has taken place by a sudden change from pegs to 
managed or independently floating regimes.139 Classifying this new category, freely falling is 
justified by the reason that macroeconomic instability could be incorrectly attributed to pegged, 
intermediate or floating exchange rate regimes, i.e. exchange rate regimes would have no 
indepedent influence on macroeconomic outcome due to severe economic disturbances 
(Husain/Mody/Rogoff 2004). However, since category freely falling is not an exchange rate 
regime of voluntary choice and thus currency crises are not correctly attributed to the chosen de 
facto exchange rate arrangement, estimation results for the exchange rate categories may be 
misleading. To cover this issue, we also test a reduced 4-way classification replacing freely 
falling by one of the four categories as indicated in the chronologies (Reinhart/Rogoff 2003).140 
Critic on both the LYS and RR classifications can be based on its reliance on quantitative 
analysis of exchange rates and foreign exchange reserves, which may lead to false inferences 
about the exchange rate regime (Bubula/Ötker-Robe 2002).141  
 
                                            
134 Using a calendar year as unit of account, the exchange rate regime classified is a combination of different official 
arrangements in case of changes during the year.  
135 Flexible: high volatility of the nominal exchange rate, high volatility of its rate of change, low volatility of international 
reserves. Dirty float: high volatility of the nominal exchange rate, high volatility of its rate of change, high volatility of 
international reserves. Crawling peg: high volatility of the nominal exchange rate, low volatility of its rate of change, 
high volatility of international reserves. Fixed: low volatility of the nominal exchange rate, low volatility of its rate of 
change, high volatility of international reserves. Inconclusives: low volatility of all three indicators. 
136 The chronologies are used to sort out countries with dual, multiple or parallel exchange rates. While the exchange 
rate regime of countries with unified exchange rates is classified by the volatility of the official exchange rate, the 
volatility of the market-determined (dual, multiple, parallel) exchange rate classifies the exchange rate regime if the 
parallel market premium is consistently 10 percent or higher.  
137 On the correspondance between the IMF de jure classification and the Reinhart/Rogoff 2003 classification, see 
Husain/Mody/Rogoff (2004). 
138 Pegged: no separate legal tender, pre announced peg, currency board or horizontal band (between +/-2 %), de facto 
peg. Limited flexibility: Pre announced crawling peg or band (between -/+ 2 %), de facto crawling peg or band 
(between -/+ 2 %). Managed floating: Pre announced crawling band (more than or equal to -/+ 2 %), de facto crawling 
band (between -/+ 5 %), Moving band (between -/+ 2%), Managed floating. Freely floating. Freely falling. Category 6: 
Dual market with missing data on parallel markets. 
139 Currency crises are defined by a monthly depreciation above twelve and one-half percent and if the preceding 
month’s depreciation is exceeded by at least 10 percent.  
140 Reinhart/Rogoff (2003) provide also the underlying arrangement for freely falling in the chronologies, assuming that 
there would be no knowledge of the inflation rate. In addition, since category freely falling is only present in transitional 
and developing countries in our sample, estimations for industrial countries have not to be retested.  
141 For example the behavior of the exchange rate is not only affected by exchange rate policy.  
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In table 4 we present a two-way table of the frequency of the exchange rate regimes between 
the LYS  and RR classification, to analyze the comparability of both exchange rate regime 
classifications. While pegged regimes (hard pegs) and freely floating in RR coincide mainly with 
fixed and flexible regimes in LYS, respectively, fixed and flexible regimes in LYS are not 
exclusively associated with pegs and freely floating in RR, respectively, but are also frequently 
present in limited flexibility and managed floating.142 In addition, freely falling is not confined to 
one exchange rate regime in the LYS classification, but almost equally distributed among the 
different arrangements. Thus the frequency table emphasizes the significant difference in 
classifying exchange rate arrangements between both approaches.  
 
Finally, we have a look at descriptive statistics to reveal some important prior results. In table 5 
we present the mean of the average annual growth for the unadjusted first and second quintile 
share for each initial exchange rate arrangement, comparing the LYS and both RR 
classifications. First, observations for inconclusives and category 6 (dual market with missing 
data on parallel market) are very limited and often misleading, thus we omit both categories in 
the regressions. Second, while in the LYS classification we have 22 observations with flexible 
exchange rate regimes in the developing countries, there is no observation for category freely 
floating for developing countries in the coarse RR classification. On the other hand, we have 18 
observations for freely falling, a category only present in developing and transitional countries. 
Observations for transitional countries, however, are very limited and the mean of the average 
annual growth for both quintile shares is almost always highly negative compared to other 
regions.143 Concerning the 4-way RR classification, freely falling is attributed mainly to managed 
floating and freely floating in both developing and transitional countries. Third, regarding the 
sign and size of the means in the LYS classification, the regime dirty float is considerably 
positive for all countries compared to other arrangements if we omit the highly negative 
observation for transitional countries (Poland 1990/93). This result is mainly driven by nine 
observations in developing countries. In addition, fixed regimes are negatively correlated with 
the mean of the growth rate of both the first and second quintile in all and developing 
countries.144 Furthermore, the growth rates of flexible regimes (LYS) or freely floating (RR) are 
negatively correlated for both quintile shares in industrial countries, which also indicate negative 
means for all countries in the RR classification (-0.58, -0.85). Finally, we emphasize the 
difference between the coarse and 4-way RR classification. While category freely falling is 
highly positively correlated with the means for first and second quintile in developing countries, 
                                            
142 These results hold even if we use the 4-way classification replacing freely falling by other exchange rate arrangments 
(Reinhart/Rogoff 2003) (table 4). 
143 The exception managed floating (pre-announced crawling peg, moving band and managed floating) is only 
dependent on observations from Hungary mostly during the communist era (1972/77, 77/82, 82/87, 89/93) and thus do 
only marginally reflect the effect of the transitional process on the first and second quintile share. For reasons of 
widening inequality in transitional countries, see Grün/Klasen (2001).   
144 The positive effect of the fixed regime for the growth rate of the first quintile becomes negative in all countries (-0.34) 
and the negative effect in developing countries diminishes (-0.73) if we omit an incredible high growth rate for the first 
quintile in Senegal 1991 – 95 (18.12 %). 
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this positive effect is attributed to managed floating and freely floating in the reduced 
classification.145       
 
In table 6 we present the means of the adjusted first and second quintile share of income for 
each exchange rate regime comparing the LYS and RR classifications. We now have more 
observations since we look at the correlation between the levels of adjusted first/second quintile 
share and exchange rate arrangements. Again, we omit observations for inconclusives and 
category 6 in our regressions due to limited availability and often misleading size. Furthermore, 
we now have two observations in category freely floating for developing countries in the coarse  
RR classification with high values (Indonesia 1999, Madagascar 1999). In general, the means in 
the transitional countries are high in both classifications compared with developing and 
industrial countries, illustrating the influence and legacy of the communist era. While there 
seems to be no important difference of the means in the LYS classification, freely falling is 
considerably lower for developing countries in the coarse RR classification, a result lessened for 
all countries due to the high means of freely falling in transitional countries. Looking a the 4-way 
RR classification, freely falling is again attributed mainly to managed floating and freely floating 
in both developing and transitional countries. While this change is not relevant for the means in 
all countries, the values for freely floating are considerable diminished for developing countries 
in the reduced RR classification.  
 
To look additionally on the total effect, we finally present the means of the average annual 
growth of mean income of the first/second quintile and the means of the mean income of the 
adjusted first/second quintile for the different exchange rate arrangements (table 7 and 8).146 In 
industrial and developing countries the growth rate of the mean income of first/second quintile is 
almost always higher than the growth rate of the first/second quintile (compare table 7 to 5). 
Even if dirty float remains considerably positive for all countries with respect to other regimes in 
the LYS classification, crawling pegs and flexibles become also important for developing 
countries (table 7). And again, fixed regimes exhibit the lowest growth rates for the poorest 40 
percent in developing countries.147 We find a similar result for pegged regimes in the coarse RR 
classification for developing countries. While the growth rates of limited flexibility and managed 
floating here are not lower with respect to freely falling in developing countries, freely falling is 
again positively correlated with the means for growth rate of the mean income of the first and 
second quintile in developing countries (compare table 7 to 5). This positive effect is again 
attributed to freely floating and managed floating in the 4-way classification, resulting in low 
positive growth rates for freely floating in developing countries. Looking at table 8, the means of 
dirty float are considerably higher than in other regimes for developing countries in the LYS 
                                            
145 In all countries the small positive effect of freely falling is mainly attributed to managed floating since freely floating 
becomes more negative in the 4-way RR classification, i.e. the highly negative values of transitional countries are 
labelled as freely floating in the reduced RR classification.. 
146 For the difference between distribution effect and total effect, see section 4.  
147 The positive effect of the fixed regime for the growth rate of the mean income of the first quintile diminishes to +1.27 
in all countries and to +0.70 in developing countries if we omit the incredible high growth rate of the mean income of the 
first quintile for Senegal 1991 – 95 (+17.69 %). 
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classification. In addition, freely falling is the category with the lowest means for all countries in 
the coarse RR classification, a result not comfirmed in developing countries. While limited 
flexibility remains the exchange rate regime with the highest means for developing countries in 
the 4-way RR classification, the values for freely floating in all countries are diminished by the 
highly negative values for freely floating in transitional countries in the reduced RR 
classification.        
 
3.3   Data on additional macroeconomic variables 
 
Data sources and definitions of additional macroeconomic variables are presented in table 3. As 
we confront missing values and outliers, the number of observations vary for each variable and 
restrict the size of the sample due to the econometric specification. In addition, not all additional 
macroeconomic variables are used in all specifications due to insignificant coefficients.  
 
The variables overall budget surplus to GDP and government consumption to GDP are 
controlled for. Budget deficit is expected at least to not have negative coefficients, as better 
public finances should not decrease pro-poor growth. The impact of government consumption, 
however, is ambiguous, as benefits of public sector not necessarily support the poorest part of 
an economy more than other income groups.148 In addition, government size can also 
negatively impact on the income of the poor due to distortions of private decisions and its proxy 
for bad governance (Barro/Sala-i-Martin 1995). Unfortunately, we could not test the impact of 
health and education expenditures to GDP on pro-poor growth due to lacking data availability 
for our sample.149 Human capital may play a crucial role for the income of the poor, thus we use 
the average years of secondary schooling in the total population aged 25 and over as proxy for 
investment in education with expected positive coefficients.150 We also include life expectancy 
as a proxy for investment in health with expected positive effect.  
 
The rate of inflation is used to cover macroeconomic uncertainty effects and to control for 
inflationary financial effects on pro-poor growth. Low levels of inflation are expected to stimulate 
or at least not hinder pro-poor growth, while high or crisis levels of inflation should impact 
negatively on pro-poor growth. Furthermore, we use terms-of-trade to capture external 
environmental effects with expected positive impact (Barro/Sala-i-Martin 1995, 
Ghura/Leite/Tsangarides 2002).151 We also controll for financial development measured by M2 
                                            
148 In developing countries social expenditures often benefit more the middle class and the rich (Dollar/Kraay 2001, 
Davoodi/Tiongson/Asawanuchit 2003). 
149 Davoodi/Tiongson/Asawanuchit (2003) collect data on education and health expenditures for 81 countries for the 
period 1960 to 2000. Even if the dataset is accessible (which is not the case), it would be inconvenient for our purposes 
as only less than half of the countries are present in our sample.  
150 We also experimented with three other education indicators (average years of schooling in total population aged 25 
and over, average years of primary schooling in total population aged 25 and over and percentage of “secondary school 
attained” in total population aged 25 and over). While results remained similar, secondary education turned out to be the 
most relevant indicator.  
151 Terms-of-trade growth reflects external shocks from world market orientation. The sign of the coefficient, however, 
may be indifferent as a positive terms-of-trade growth can improve the income of the poor representing for example an 
increase in the relative price of agricultural commodities (benefiting the rural poor) or a fall in the price for imported 
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to GDP ratio with expected positive coefficient. A positive impact of financial sector development 
on the poor may be reasoned by better access to credit and improved risk sharing 
(Ghura/Leite/Tsangarides 2002).  
 
Furthermore, the initial value of the adjusted Gini coefficient is added to cover the impact of 
initial inequality on the growth of the mean income of the poor with expected positive coefficient. 
Adding the initial inequality in the growth equation can be motivated by testing the hypothesis of 
inequality convergence. A positive coefficient for the initial Gini coefficient would confirm the 
convergence of inequality (Ravallion 2000). Finally, civil liberties are used to test institutional 
effects on the poor. The index is measured on a scale from one to seven with one indicating the 
most liberal state. Thus the coefficient should be negative, if less civil liberties result in anti-poor 
growth and policies.  
 
4. Pro-poor growth 
 
Analytically, the impact of the exchange rate regime on the income of the poor can be 
distinguished in the growth and the distribution effect 152: 
 
∂ Yp20/40it
 / ∂  Exjit   = ∂ln(Yit)/∂ Exjit + [∂Y
q20/40
it/∂ ln(Yit)*∂ln(Yit)/∂Exjit  + ∂ Y
q20/40
it
 / ∂  Exjit]   
= ρj       + [(α1- 1) * ρj   + γj] (1)  
 
with 
Yp20/40it :  mean income of the 20 percent/20 to 40 percent poorest defined as 
 ln(Q20/40it*Yit/0.2) 
Yq20/40it :  Y
p20/40
it – ln(Yit) = ln(Q
20/40
it*Yit/0.2) – ln(Yit) = ln(Q
20/40
it) + ln(Yit) – ln 0.2 – ln (Yit) 
=   ln(Q20/40it /0.2)  
Q20/40it:  first/second quintile share of income 
Yit:  real per capita income  
Exjit:  dummy variable for exchange rate regimes  
  with  j = 1, ... , 4 (LYS) 
   j = 1, ... , 5 (coarse RR) 
   j = 1, ... , 4 (4-way RR) 
ρj: (equiproportionate) growth effect of exchange rate regime on mean income  
(∂ ln(Yit)/∂ Exjit) 
(α1- 1): distribution effect of mean income (∂ Y
q20/40
it/∂ ln(Yit)) 
γj: distribution effect of exchange rate regime (∂ Y
q20/40
it
 /∂ Exjit) 
                                                                                                                                                 
consumption goods (benefiting the urban poor). Otherwise, positive terms-of-trade growth can also decrease the income 
of the poor by adverse supply-side effects due to the shift in relative prices. 
152 There is considerable ongoing discussion on the appropriate definition and measurement of pro-poor growth. While 
none of the measures proposed has so far set an international accepted standard, both the growth effect and the 
distribution effect have been identified as most critical for reduction in absolute poverty (Kakwani/Pernia 2000, 
Anderson/White 2001, Bourguignon 2001, Eastwood/Lipton 2001, Chen/Ravallion 2001, Kakwani/Son/Khandker 2003, 
Klasen 2003, Ravallion 2003). 
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The (equiproportionate) growth effect (the first term on the right hand side of the equation) 
measures the effect of the exchange rate regime on mean income (ρj) with respect to a base 
group.153 The distribution effect (second term in brackets) measures the impact of the exchange 
rate regime on the first/second quintile share in two parts, the difference between α1 and one 
times the growth effect and the direct effect γj of the exchange rate regime EXjit on the first and 
second quintile share. Thus the income of the poor could be affected directly and indirectly 
through growth by exchange rate regimes and possible trade-offs of exchange rate regimes 
affecting economic growth and the first/second quintile share in opposite directions can be 
analyzed.  
 
A natural benchmark for pro-poor growth would be equipropotionate growth with α1 = 1 and γj = 
0, i.e. no distribution effects (equation (1): ∂ Yp20/40it
 / ∂  Exjit = ρj). Thus pro-poor growth could be 
defined by a distribution effect: 
 
ρj  + [(α1- 1) * ρj +γj] > ρj  i.e. γj > 0  for α1 = 1   (2)  
 
One drawback of defining pro-poor growth only by equation (2) is the fact, that a situation with a 
negative growth effect (ρj < 0)would also be labelled as pro-poor if γj > 0In this case the 
exchange rate regime would affect the growth rate negatively(ρj < 0), but this effect is 
diminished by an positive effect on the first/second quintile share, if γj > - (α1- 1) * ρj (as ρj is 
assumed to be negative the direct distribution effect of the exchange rate regimes γj must be 
greater than the distribution effect via growth if α1 > 1). To cover this issue, pro-poor growth 
could be defined by a total effect assuming ∂ Yp20/40it
 / ∂  Exjit > 0:  
 
ρj+ [(α1 - 1) * ρj + γj] > 0  i.e.  γj > - ρj  for α1 = 1   (3) 
 
This condition would require a positive impact adding the growth and distribution effect, i.e. the 
positive impact of the exchange rate regime on first/second quintile share has to more than 
offset the negative effect of the exchange rate regime through growth. On the other hand, a 
growth situation would be also labelled pro-poor, if the positive growth effect of an exchange 
rate regime exceeds its negative distribution effect. 
 
In our approach we choose equation (2) and equation (3) as our pro-poor growth conditions, to 
cover both the distribution effect and the total effect of exchange rate regimes on the poorest 20 
and 20 to 40. We also profit from the fact that the coefficient α1-1, while often different from 
zero, is almost always insignificant in our regressions. Thus, assuming no indirect distribution 
effect via the mean income (α1= 1), pro-poor growth is defined in equation (2) by a positive 
distribution effect (γj > 0). In equation (3) pro-poor growth is achieved if the total effect of the 
                                            
153 As we outline in the next section we estimate the difference between a fixed exchange rate regime (our base group) 
and all other arrangements. Thus the growth and distribution effects of, for example, a flexible exchange rate regime 
have to be interpreted as positive or negative difference with respect to the fixed exchange rate regime.  
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distribution effect and growth effect is positive (γj + ρj > 0). Estimating both equations, possible 
trade-offs between the distribution effect and growth effect can be analyzed. If estimations for 
the distribution effect are positive (γj > 0), but the coefficients for the total effect are zero (γj + ρj = 
0), we can conclude that the growth effect of exchange rate regimes on the income of the poor 
has to be negative (ρj < 0). If estimations for the distribution effect are negative (γj < 0) and the 
total effect is zero (γj + ρj = 0), the growth effect of the openness indicator on the income of the 
poor has to be positive (ρj > 0). 
 
5.   Econometric specifications and estimation 
  
 
5.1   Econometric specifications 
 
To measure the impact of exchange rate regimes on pro-poor growth we choose two different 
econometric methodologies, a system generalized method of moments estimation for a level 
and first-differenced equation and a growth equation using pooled OLS, random or fixed effects 
estimation.  
 
5.1.1   System GMM estimation: level and first differenced equation 
 
To estimate the distribution effect we formulate the following ad hoc equation in levels, i.e. we 
regress the mean income of the 20/20 to 40 per cent poorest on the mean income, exchange 
rate regime dummies, and variants of additional variables.   
 
Yp20/40it
 = α0 + α1ln(Yit) + βkXkit + γjExjit +  μit + εit      (4) 
 
with 
 
Yp20/40it :  mean income of the 20 percent/20 to 40 percent poorest defined as 
 ln(Q20/40it*Yit/0.2) 
Q20/40it:  first/second quintile share of income 
Yit:  real per capita income  
i:  cross-section units (split or not split countries)  
t:  year of observation 
μit + εit:  composite error term including unobserved country effects  
Xkit:  additional variables with k = 1, ... ,n  
Exjit:  dummy variables for exchange rate regimes (base group omitted) 
with  j = 1, ..., 4 (LYS)  
   j = 1, ..., 5 (coarse RR)  
   j = 1, ..., 4 (4-way RR) 
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To present more clearly the distribution effect we subtract Yit from both sides:
 154 
 
Yq20/40it
 = α0 + (α1-1)ln(Yit) + βkXkit + γjEXjit + μit + εit     (5)  
 
with  
 
Yq20/40it
  = logarithm of first/second quintile share divided by 0.2 
 
However, to include information on within-country variation and to cover econometric issues 
discussed in the next section we apply a system GMM estimator, i.e. we estimate the level 
equation (5) and its first difference (6) as a system with the restriction of having the same 
coefficients α1-1, βk and γj 
 
Yq20/40i,t+z
 - Yq20/40it
 = (α1-1)[ln(Yi,t+z) – ln(Yit)]+ βk[Xki,t+z - Xkit]+ γj[EXji,t+z - EXjit] +  [εit+z  - εit] (6)  
 
with  
 
z: distance of years between two observations of a spell with identical income definition or 
 distance of years between observations within a country 
 
To handle the incomparability problem of inequality data we choose two different routes. First, 
we split the countries requiring the same income definition within each subgroup (e.g. Côte 
d’Ivoire 1: 1985/88, Côte d’Ivoire 2: 1988/95) and using only the unadjusted income definition. 
While the number of cross-section units is now increased, the number of observations for the 
level equation is decreased as the first observation per cross-section unit is omitted due to the 
first-differenced procedure. The advantage of this procedure is that the first-differenced 
equations are now formed only by observations with the same income definition per country. On 
the other hand, the first/second quintile shares in the level equations are not directly 
comparable. Therefore, second, we do not split the countries and form first-differenced 
equations for all observations per country using the adjusted first/second quintile share of 
income. In this case we omit one of the two observations for the same year in one country (e.g. 
Côte d’Ivoire 1988/1) and an observation with only one year difference within a country 
(Netherlands 1983) (see table 1).155 While in this case income definitions in the first-differenced 
and level equation are comparable, the adjustment procedure may influence the estimated 
coefficients (Atkinson, Brandolini 2001). One general drawback of the system GMM estimation 
in our context, however, is the fact that we are confronted with irregular panel data, i.e. z ranges 
                                            
154 Yq20/40it
 = Yp20/40it – ln(Yit) = ln(Q
20/40
it*Yit/0.2) – ln(Yit) = ln(Q
20/40
it) + ln(Yit) – ln 0.2 – ln (Ykt) = ln(Q
20/40
it/0.2) 
 
155 We compare the values of the adjusted first and second quintile of both per country year observations (e.g. 
Venezuela 1987/1, 1987/2) with the values before (Venezuela 1981) and after (Venezuela 1993) the country year 
observations to decide whether we omit the first or second observation as ordered in table 1.  If one of the adjusted 
observation varies considerably with respect to the other observations, we omit this observation.   
 92
form 2 to 14 in both approaches. In the system GMM estimation, however, z is assumed to be 
identical in the first-differenced equation.  
 
The results of the system GMM estimation can be interpreted as a mixture of the level and first-
differenced equation, i.e. pooled cross-section regression of the impact of the exchange rate 
regimes on the level of first/second quintile at certain country-year observations (5) and the 
impact of the change of the exchange rate regime on the change of the first/second quintile 
share (6) between the observations within a country.156 Combining (5) and (6) in the system 
GMM estimation, the coefficients of the exchange rate regimes (γj) and the additional regressors 
(βk) capture the distribution effect. Thus relying on (2) a significant γj > 0 or γj < 0 indicates a 
pro- or anti-poor shift on average of the first/second quintile share associated with the chosen 
exchange rate regime j compared to the omitted exchange rate regime. Similar, βk different from 
zero indicate pro- (βk > 0) or anti- (βk < 0) poor growth on average.
157 Interpreting the system 
GMM approach as a level equation the chosen exchange rate arrangement j would shift the 
first/second quintile share on average by γj*100 percent with respect to the base group. 
 
Finally, to estimate the total effect we regress the mean income of the poorest 20 and 20 to 40 
percent on exchange rate regimes and variants of additional regressors taking as level equation 
in the system GMM methodology variants of the following equation: 158  
 
Yp20/40it
 = α0 + (βk+ρk)Xkit + (γj+ ρj)Exjit  +  μit + εit      (7) 
 
Taking into account (3) a significant (γj+ ρj) > 0 indicate a pro-poor shift on average of the mean 
income of the first/second quintile share associated with the chosen exchange rate regime j 
compared to the omitted exchange rate regime (positive total effect), while (γj+ ρj) < 0 would 
indicate anti-poor shift on average. Similar, βk+ρk different from zero indicate pro- (βk+ρk > 0) or 
anti- (βk+ρk < 0) poor growth (total effect). Trade-offs between the distribution effect and growth 
effect are present, if estimations for the distribution effect (γj) and the total effect (γj + ρj ) differ in 
sign.  
 
5.1.2   Growth equation: pooled OLS, fixed effects or random effects estimation 
  
To measure also within-country variation, to cover the problem of an irregular panel in the first-
differenced equation and the incomparability issue of income inequality measures, we also use 
a growth equation forming the dependent variable exclusively from spells with identical 
definitions of inequality income measures and divide the growth rates of each spell by the 
distance of years to calculate (regular) annual averages. Thus we regress the annual average 
                                            
156 In the first-differenced equation the exchange rate variables have three values (1, 0 –1), which desribe the change 
into a regime (1), no change of a regime (0), and the change out of a regime (-1) between time t + z and t. 
157  This interpretation would apply equivalently to α1 – 1. As α1 – 1, however, is almost ever insignificant, we present 
only results for the system GMM estimation of equations (5) and (6) omitting ln(Yit).  
158 In this approach we assume that α1-1 equals zero. 
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growth rate of the mean income of the 20 and 20 to 40 per cent poorest on the annual average 
growth rate of mean income and initial values for dummy variabels of exchange rate regimes 
and additional macroeconomic variables.  
  
yp20/40it
 = α0 + α1yit + βkXkit + γjExjit +  uit       (8) 
 
with 
 
yp20/40it: average annual rate of growth of the mean income of the 20/20 to 40 per cent 
poorest defined as 100/z*[ln(Q20/40i,t+z*Yi,t+z/0.2) – ln(Q
20/40
i,t+z t*Yit/0.2)] 
z: distance of years between two observations of a spell with identical income 
definition 
yit:  average annual rate of growth of the mean income defined as 
  100/z*[ln(Yi,t+z) – ln(Yit)] 
Xkit:  additional variables with k = 1, ... ,n; only initial values (at beginning of spell)  
Exjit:  dummy variables for exchange rate regimes (base group omitted) 
with  j = 1, ..., 4 (LYS)  
   j = 1, ..., 5 (coarse RR)  
   j = 1, ..., 4 (4-way RR) 
  only initial values (at beginning of spell) 
uit  error term of unknown form  
 
We subtract yit from both sides in (8) to derive the distribution effect more clearly: 
 
yq20/40it
 = α0 + (α1-1)yit + βkXkit + γjEXjit +  εit      (9)  
 
with  
 
yq20/40it: average annual rate of growth of the first and second quintile share defined as 
100/z* [ln(Q20/40i,t+z) – ln(Q
20/40
it)]
 159 
 
Again γj > 0, βk > 0  indicate pro-poor growth (positive distribution effect) with respect to (2), i.e., 
first, the average annual growth rate of the first and second quintile share with exchange rate 
regime j is on average γj percentage points higher than the base group and, second, a one 
                                            
159 yq20/40it
 = yp/20/40it – yit  =  100/z* ([ln(Q
20/40
i,t+z*Yi,t+z/0.2) – ln(Q
20/40
it *Yit/0.2)] - [ln(Yi,t+z) – ln(Yit)]) 
=  100/z* ([ln(Q20/40i,t+z) + ln(Yi,t+z) – ln 0.2  
- ln(Q20/40it) - ln (Yit) + ln (0.2) 
- ln(Yi,t+z)  + ln(Yit)]) 
=  100/z* [ln(Q20/40i,t+z) – ln(Q
20/40
it)] 
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percentage point increase of the additional variables would increase the average annual growth 
rate of the first/second quintile share by βk percentage points.
160   
 
Finally, we estimate also the total effect in using variants of the following equation:161 
 
yp20/40it
  = α0  + (βk+ρk)Xkit +(γj+ ρj)EXjit +  uit      (10) 
 
With respect to (3) a significant (γj+ ρj) > 0 indicates that the average annual growth rate of the 
mean income of the first/second quintile with exchange rate regime j is on average γj+ρj 
percentage points higher than the omitted exchange rate regime (positive total effect), while (γj+ 
ρj) < 0 would indicate an anti-poor shift on average. Similar, βk+ρk different from zero indicate 
pro- (βk+ρk > 0) or anti- (βk+ρk < 0) poor growth (total effect). Again, trade-offs between the 
distribution effect and growth effect are present, if estimations for the distribution effect (γj) and 
the total effect (γj + ρj ) differ in sign. 
 
5.2 Econometric issues 
 
In estimating variants of equations (5), (6), and (9) several econometric issues have to be 
mentioned. 162 First, if we estimate the level equation (5) alone by pooled OLS, coefficients 
would be biased and inconsistent due to unobserved heterogeneity correlated with regressors 
(Dollar/Kraay 2001, Eastwood/Lipton 2001, Chen/Ravallion 1997). Fixed-effect or first-difference 
estimation in a panel data framework would be standard remedies to the unobserved 
heterogeneity issue. However, within-country variation of income distribution may be too limited 
compared to the greater variability of first and second quintile shares across countries 
(Dollar/Kraay 2001). Thus we apply a system GMM estimator using both information on the 
levels (cross-country variation) and first-difference (within-country variation) of income 
distribution data (Arellano/Bover 1995, Blundell/Bond 1998). Estimating the growth equation (9) 
by pooled OLS, the estimated coefficients might also be biased and inconsistent due to 
unobserved country-specific effects in εit. We use both a Hausmann test for fixed and random 
effects and a Breusch Pagan Langrange multiplier test for random effects to cover this issue. If 
we can not reject the null hypothesis in both tests pooled OLS is the appropriate method. 
Otherwise, we present results for random effects (the Breusch Pagan test is rejected, but not 
the Hausmann test) or fixed effects model (the Hausmann test is rejected).     
 
Second, even if time-invariant country-specific effects can probably be dismissed, omitted 
variable bias might be an issue due to variables whose values change over time. In addition, as 
the econometric specification is not based on a comprehensive theoretical framework, but more 
found in ad hoc considerations and plausible reasoning, model uncertainty problems might arise 
                                            
160 This interpretation would apply equivalently to α1 – 1. As α1 – 1, however, is almost ever insignificant, we present only 
results for the growth equation (9) omitting yit. 
161 In this approach we assume that α1 equals one. 
162 The discussion in this section is also relevant for regressions on the total effect (equations 7 and 10). 
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(Ghura/Leite/Tsangarides 2002).163 Thus excluded variables might be correlated with the 
regressors leading to biased estimates.  
 
Third, measurement error in dependent and independent variables could generate biases in the 
estimated coefficients. While measurement error in the data on first/second quintile might be 
more severe due to flawed inequality data, measurement error in the dependent variable only  
causes biases in case of systematic correlation with regressors (Wooldridge 2000).164 
Measurement error in explanatory variables, however, might lead to inconsistent estimates. 
Varying definitions and accuracy in data collection, for example, cause measurement errors 
especially present in data on developing countries.165 
 
Fourth, in estimating level and first difference equations (5), (6) or the growth equation (9) 
simultaneity might be an issue.166 In case of reverse causation, estimations would be biased 
and inconsistent. While the choice of exchange rate regimes may depend on a broad set of 
variables, the (growth rate of the) first and second quintile income, however, is not proposed in 
the literature (Gosh/Gulde/Ostry/Wolf 1997 Levy-Yeyati/Sturzenegger 2001, 2002a). In 
addition, the impact of the (growth rate of) first/second quintile income on additional 
macroeconomic variables (X) is controversially discussed. While, on the one hand, endogeneity 
is denied due to pragmatic reasons (Dollar/Kraay 2001), reverse causation may be argued for 
because of major policy and institutional changes in developing countries and political economy 
reasons (Lundberg/Squire 2001). We do not instrument for EX and X in the system GMM 
estimations due to limited data availability and plausibility.167 In addition, we use only initial 
values for the regressors X and EX in each spell to avoid endogeneity due to explanatory 
variables in the growth equation.168  
 
A significant impact of the (growth rate of the) mean income of the poor on the (growth rate of 
the) mean income might also be possible.169 Considering equations (5), (6), and (9), reverse 
causation thus means impact of the (growth rate of) first/second quintile share on the (growth 
                                            
163 The problems of omitted variables and model uncertainty are connected by the exclusion of significant explaining 
regressors which might be correlated with the selected regressors. But while the omitted variable issue points to the 
inconsistent estimation of the selected parameters, the problem of model uncertainty focuses on the misspecification of 
the general model and the problem in explaining pro-poor growth by a single ad hoc model. On the problem of model 
uncertainty in cross-country growth regressions, see Temple (1999). On the issue of model uncertainty in pro-poor 
growth regressions with macroeconomic policy variables, see Ghura/ Leite/ Tsangarides (2002). 
164 As yp20/40 is formed by y, i.e. the dependent variable is systematically related to an explanatory variable, a biased 
coefficient of y may be expected. However, remembering yq20/40 in equation (5) this is equal to state that the growth rate 
of the first/second quintile must be correlated with the growth rate of mean income. As the data on first/second quintile 
and mean income stem from different sources, this can not be assumed in advance (Dollar/Kraay 2001). On the issue of 
biased estimates in case of identical data sources, see Chen/Ravallion (1997).  
165 On the measurement error problem in cross-section growth regressions and on the flawed data in the Penn World 
Table, see Temple (1999). 
166 On the problem of simultaneous examination of inequality and growth and their joint determinants, see 
Lundberg/Squire (2001). 
167 One could use lagged values of X and EX as instruments. However, as our sample is often restricted to only two 
observations per country, we would have to omit all these countries from the regression. The problem of endogeneity is 
reduced in the RR classification since longer-term regimes are indentified by a rolling five-year horizon. This approach 
leads to a relatively long durability of the classified exchange rate regimes (Husain/Mody/Rogoff 2004).  
168 On this solution, see Lundberg/Squire (2001). On the empirical application of this method to deal with the 
endogeneity issue in cross-section growth regressions, see Barro/Sala-i-Martin (1995). But even in this solution 
endogeneity might remain a problem, see Temple (1999). 
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rate of the) mean income.170 Using only a level equation (5), contemporaneous reverse 
causation will cause inconsistent OLS estimation, while lagged reverse causation would justify 
OLS estimation assuming serial independence. Thus considering the growth equation (9), 
pooled OLS estimation is unbiased and consistent if lagged reversed causation can be 
assumed with serial independence (Eastwood/Lipton 2001). Concerning the system GMM 
estimation, reverse causation is covered in using instruments for mean income. In the level 
equation (5), we instrument for mean income using accumulated growth in mean income over 
three years prior to time t (e.g. Brazil 1967 to 1970 for 1970). In the first difference equation (7), 
we instrument for growth in mean income using the level of mean income at the beginning of the 
period, and accumulated growth in the three years prior to time t (Dollar/Kraay 2001, 
Ghura/Leite/Tsangarides 2002).171 A Sargan test on overidentifying restrictions is used to test 
for validity of extra instruments (Arrelano/Bond 1991, Bond/Blundell 1998). As the coefficient for 
(the growth rate of the) mean income is one in most of the cases, however, we present only 
results omitting (the growth rate of the) mean income. 
 
Assuming lagged reverse causation of yq20/40 on y in the growth equation (9), serial correlation in 
the error term within countries and over time remains to be discussed. In static models, 
autocorrelation in the error term leads to incorrect standard errors and t-ratios but not to 
inconsistent estimates in OLS estimation. Serial correlation in models with lagged endogenous 
variables, however, would result in inconsistent estimates. Given a serially correlated error term 
the structure of the variance-covariance matrix for equation (9) would be block diagonal with a 
separate block for each country. Thus off-diagonal elements would only be non-zero within 
these blocks (Chen/Ravallion 1997). As different surveys are used within almost each block, the 
error term is assumed to be serially independent. Considering the system GMM estimator, the 
assumption of no serial correlation of the error term εit in the level equation (5) is essential for 
consistency (Bond/Blundell 1998). Thus tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation 
of the first-differenced residuals εit+z  - εit of equation (6) are reported. If disturbances εit are not 
serially correlated, first order serial correlation in first differenced residuals εit+z  - εit have to be 
significant negative (m1) and second order serial correlation in the first differenced residuals 
insignificant (m2) (Arrelano/Bond 1991, Bond/Blundell 1998).  
 
5.3 Estimation strategy and results 
 
To measure the impact of exchange rate regimes on pro-poor growth and to cover the issues 
mentioned above with respect to correct classifications of exchange rate regimes and 
econometric specifications, we test two classifications (5-way classification: Levy-
                                                                                                                                                 
169 Biased estimates might also be possible due to joint causation (Timmer 1997, Eastwood/Lipton 2001).  
170 The effect of initial income inequality on subsequent growth has been often empirically examined. The evidence, 
however, is mixed with negative (Perotti 1996, Alesina/Rodrik 1994), positive (Forbes 2000, Li/Zou 1998) and indifferent 
effect of initial income inequality on future growth (Deininger/Squire 1998b). In addition, a negative effect only for 
countries with mean income below $ 2000 (in constant 1985 purchasing power) was found (Barro 2000). 
171 Example: given the first difference equation Brazil 1960 – 1970 we use mean income of 1960 and the accumulated 
growth of mean income between 1957 and 1960 as instruments for the first difference of mean income 1960 - 1970. 
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Yeyati/Sturzenegger 2002b (LYS), coarse classification: Reinhart/Rogoff 2003 (RR)) in both 
econometric approaches using fixed (LYS) and pegged (RR) regimes (no separate legal tender, 
pre-announced peg, currency board or horizontal band between +/-2%) as base group. We omit 
inconclusives (LYS) and category 6 (RR) due to limited observations in these categories and 
their biasing effect in our sample (table 5 to 8). Econometric specifications are tested for all, 
developing and industrial countries separately.172 
 
We estimate the different effects of exchange rate regimes in specifications without additional 
regressors, with regional dummy variables and with sets of additional macroeconomic variables. 
To analyze potential trade-offs between the distribution effect and the growth effect we 
additionally test the total effect of exchange rate regimes on the mean income of the 20 and 20 -
40 percent poorest adding macroeconomic variables. Due to our fundamentally empirical 
approach, we execute different robustness checks to confirm the results, i.e. we test results 
without outliers, with mean income and with both adjusted and unadjusted inequality income 
measures in the system GMM estimations.173 Finally, we also use a reduced 4-way RR 
classification in which category freely falling is assigned to one of the other four categories as 
denoted in the chronologies (Reinhart/Rogoff 2003).    
 
5.3.1 Exchange rate regimes and pro-poor growth: distribution effect 
 
First, we estimate the effect of exchange rate regimes on the first and second quintile share 
without additional regressors. In table 9 we compare the results for the growth equation 
denoting the exchange rate regimes in an ascending order from more fixed (crawling peg, 
limited flexibility) to flexible regimes. In the LYS classification only dirty floats have a significant 
impact (equations 2, 10, 19, 20).174 This effect is significantly positive for developing and all 
countries if we omit outliers (equations 2, 10), i.e. countries with a dirty float regime have a 2.40 
percentage points higher annual average growth rate of the first quintile share with respect to 
the base group fixed regime (equation 10).175 The positive impact of the dirty float regime on the 
second quintile in industrial countries (equations 19, 20), while robust to outliers, is not 
significant for all countries. However, as only 2 out of 11 observations (Italy 1987, Norway 1976) 
for dirty float regimes are from industrial countries (table 5), the effect on industrial countries is 
not very well supported.  
 
                                            
172 We did not test transitional countries separately due to limited data availability.  
173 We indentify outliers from graphical analysis and descriptive statistics without a strict rule. We analyze outliers for our 
dependent variables with respect to the whole sample of each exchange rate regime classification and within each 
exchange rate regime (i.e. we also omit the incredible high growth rates of Guinea 1991 - 94, Kenya 1992 - 94, and 
Senegal 1991 – 95 for the growth rate of the (mean of the) first quintile and Kenya 1992 - 94 for the growth rate of the 
(mean of the) second quintile in regressions of the growth equation). Due to a varying number of observations of the 
samples used in regressions for all, developing and industrial countries, the number of outliers differ for dependent and 
independent variables. 
174 The F-test for all and developing countries (equation 2, 10), however, indicates no overall significance of the 
regressions. 
175 The low and insignificant coefficient of 0.12 in equation 1 is suspected to depend mainly on Poland 1990, as table 5 
indicates (mean of average annual growth of first quintile share of income for transitional countries: -13.87).  
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Concerning the RR classification, freely floating and freely falling are statistically significant 
exchange rate regimes. While category freely floating is only present in industrial countries, 
freely falling is only found in developing (18 observations) and transitional countries (3 
observations, table 5). Significant results for all countries (table 9 equations 6, 7, 8) are 
therefore driven by effects in these subgroups of countries. For the first quintile share, the 
coefficient of freely falling is significantly positive only without outliers. We estimate a 2.88 
percentage points positive difference of the annual average growth rate of the first quintile share 
with respect to the base group (pegged regimes) for developing countries (table 9 equation 14). 
On the other hand, freely floating is significantly negative for industrial countries for the first 
quintile share (equations 21, 22), a result contrary to the belief of a positive impact of flexible 
exchange rate regimes. In addition, freely floating is also highly significantly negative for the 
second quintile share for industrial and all countries,  -0.88 and –0.66 percentage points 
respectively (equations 7, 8, 23, 24). Finally, all categories are negative in equation (22) omitting 
only two outliers.176 If we replace freely falling in a reduced 4-way RR classification, however, no 
significant effect of freely floating or other exchange rate regimes could be confirmed in 
regressions for all and developing countries (table 9 equations 25 to 32).      
 
In table 10 we present our estimates for the system GMM methodology.177 We only indicate 
results for the RR classification due to insignificant results for the LYS classification. As 
mentioned above, we estimate both an adjusted and unadjusted approach to cover the income 
incomparability issue. Estimations for the first and second quintile shares for all countries (table 
10 equations 1 to 4) indicate that coefficients change in both approaches.178 Category freely 
falling now has a negative coefficient between -0.12 and -0.16 on the first quintile share and 
second quintile share. Interpreting the system GMM approach as a level equation, the first 
quintile share in countries with freely falling exchange rate regimes is on average between 15 
and 16 percents lower than in countries with pegged regimes. While freely floating and limited 
flexibility are significantly positive with respect to pegged regimes, this result is not confirmed for 
the first quintile share in the unadjusted approach. Specification-tests for the system GMM 
estimator, however, require significant negative first-oder serial correlation in the differenced 
residuals (m1) and no evidence for second-order correlation (m2), which is only fulfilled in the 
adjusted approach (table 10, equations 2 and 4). 
 
Considering developing countries, the coefficient for freely floating is now highly positive on a 
one percent significance level (table 10 equations 5 to 8). Conclusions based on these results, 
however, should be drawn cautiously, as there are only two observations (Indonesia 1999, 
Madagascar 1999) in the category freely floating in developing countries (table 5). In addition, 
                                            
176 Initial values for spells: Norway 1979 - 84, Denmark 1992 – 95. 
177 Coefficients, heteroscedasticity adjusted asymptotic standard errors and tests on first-order and second-order serial 
correlation are based on the one-step estimator. While the one-step estimator is asymptotically inefficient relative to the 
two-step estimator, asymptotic inference based on the one-step estimator is supposed to be more reliable indicated by 
simulations. However, a Sargan-test would be only based on the two-step estimator (Blundell/Bond 1998, see also 
Bond/Hoeffler/Temple 2001). 
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limited flexibility is again significantly positive for the second quintile in the adjusted approach 
(table 10 equation 8). Furthermore, the coefficient of category freely falling is negative, but 
insignificant in developing countries. Finally, only managed floating is significantly negative in 
industrial countries in the adjusted approach (table 10 equation 12). Again specification-tests on 
first-oder serial correlation are only passed in the adjusted approach (table 10, equations 6, 8, 
12). If we test the reduced 4-way RR classification, the significant coefficients for freely floating 
and freely falling disappear in all and developing countries, but findings for limited flexibility 
remain significant and change only slightly in size (table 10 equations 13 to 20).   
 
In comparing results for the growth equation and level/first-differenced equation, four facts have 
to be emphasized. First, the positive effect of the dirty float regime (LYS) in the growth equation 
can not be confirmed in the system GMM estimation. Second, coefficients of limited flexibility 
(RR) are positive, but insignificant for all and developing countries in the growth equation. Third, 
the sign of the coefficients for category freely falling and freely floating differ in both econometric 
approaches for all countries (coarse RR). Finally, the coefficient of freely falling is negative, but 
insignificant for developing countries in the system GMM estimation (table 9 and 10).  
 
Explanation of these different findings should be based on the estimation methodology.179 To 
reveal systematic differences of the estimation methodologies, we also estimate a sample used 
in the growth equation in a system GMM approach. As we need two observations with growth 
rates per country, i.e. three observations for the first and second quintile share, to apply the 
system GMM estimator, we dropped all countries with only two observations. Estimated results 
for the system GMM estimations are a mixture of the growth equation and the first difference of 
the growth equation. Second, we also tested effects of the level and first differenced equations 
of a system GMM estimation separately in OLS. Estimated coefficients for system GMM 
estimation are here a mixture of a level equation and the first difference of the level equation. 
Thus the difference between the system GMM estimations and the growth estimations stems 
apparently from the fact that we regress the level of the first/second quintile on exchange rate 
regimes, while in the growth equation we regress the growth rate on initial exchange rate 
regimes.    
 
                                                                                                                                                 
178 The maximum difference of 0.054 between equation 3 and 4 is equivalent to a 5.4 percent difference for the second 
quintile share, for example from 0.080 to 0.084.  
179 The result of the system GMM estimation is a mixture of a level and first-differenced equation, i.e. pooled cross-
section regression of the impact of exchange rate regimes on the level of first/second quintile and the impact of the 
change of the exchange rate regime on the change of the first/second quintile share. Concerning the level equation, a 
negative impact of freely falling on the first/second quintile share can be expected by its lower value with respect to 
other categories in all countries (table 6). In the first-differenced equation the dummy varibales for exchange rate 
regimes have three values (1, 0, -1), which describe the change into a regime (1), no change of a regime (0), and the 
change out of a regime (-1) between time t and t+z. Thus a fall of first quintile between t and t+z with a change into 
category freely falling would indicate a negative coefficient. In the growth equation, on the contrary, we look at the 
impact of the exchange rate regime at time t on the growth of the first/second quintile between t and t+z . A positive 
effect of freely falling can then be interpreted as a higher growth of first quintile after a freely falling regime at time t. 
Thus the reversed signs of the freely falling coefficients may reflect a u-turn shape of a freely falling situation, i.e. a 
downwards and upwards movement for first quintile share between time t-z, t and t+z with freely falling category at time 
t (the bottom of a possible crisis). This hypothesis, however, would indicate that category freely falling is changed at the 
end of a spell, which could not confirmed in our sample. 
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Next, we add regional dummy variables in our specifications to control for cultural, historical and 
economical differences of income inequality in the six regions (Cornia 2002). In general, 
regional dummy variables are not important in the growth equation (table 11 equations 1 to 8). 
Exceptions are significant negative coefficients for Latin America/Carribean and Eastern 
Europe/Central Asia in regressions for all countries (RR), increasing the positive impact of freely 
falling on the growth rate of the first quintile share (compare table 11 equation 5 with table 9 
equation 6). Even if limited flexibility now affects significantly positive the growth rate of the first 
quintile in developing countries, regional dummy variables remain insignificant (compare table 
11 equation 7 with table 9 equation 14). This result is also true, if we test the reduced 4-way RR 
classification (table 11 equation 11). However, exchange rate regimes remain insignificant in all 
other specifications in the 4-way RR classification (table 11 equations 9 to 12).  
 
In the system GMM approach, however, estimations confirm the hypothesis of important 
inequality difference between regions, since most coefficients for regional dummy variables 
differ significantly from the base-group region, i.e. industrial countries for all countries and Sub-
Saharan Africa for developing countries (table 12).180 Adding regional dummies results in 
insignificant and low coefficients for freely falling and freely floating in all countries (compare 
table 12 equations 1 to 4 with table 10 equations 1 to 4). Thus the high values for both 
categories in regressions without regional dummy variables stem apparently from regional 
determinants different from exchange rate regimes. On the other hand, coefficients for freely 
floating remain highly significant and almost identical for developing countries (compare table 12 
equations 5 to 8 with table 10 equations 5 to 8). Concerning limited flexibility, coefficients for the 
second quintile for all and developing countries remain significantly positive in the adjusted 
approach, but the coefficients are significantly lower (table 12 equations 4 and 8 compared with 
table 10 equations 4 and 8). Finally, category managed floating is now significantly positive to a 
10 percent level in first and second quintile regressions for all countries (table 12 equations 1 
and 3), a result not confirmed using adjusted income inequality measures. In addition, managed 
floating is also significantly positive in the first and second quinitle share for developing 
countries, a result not present in regressions without regional dummy variables (compare table 
12 equations 5, 7, 8 with table 10 equations 5 to 8).181 Again specification-tests on first-oder 
serial correlation are only passed in the adjusted approach (table 12, equations 2, 4, 6, 8). If we 
test the reduced 4-way RR classification, significant coefficients of freely floating for developing 
countries disappear. On the other hand, results for category managed floating do only slightly 
change (table 12 equations 9 to 16). Thus, while freely falling is often replaced by managed 
floating in the 4-way RR classification, the reclassification does no affect the coefficients of 
managed floating.182 Finally, limited flexibility is now only significantly positive for the second 
quintile in developing countries using the unadjusted approach (table 12 equation 7). 
                                            
180 Since we define developing countries without transitional countries, the dummy variable for Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia region is also omitted in regressions for developing countries.  
181 One exeception is the coefficient of managed floating for the first quintile share using the adjusted approach (table 12 
equation 6).  
182 This result is in line with descriptive statistics since the means of adjusted first/second quintile in developing countries 
do not differ considerably for managed floating in both the coarse and the 4-way classification (table 6).  
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5.3.2  Exchange rate regimes, pro-poor growth,  currency crises and capital controls: 
distribution effect  
   
Restrictions on capital mobility are seen to be a critical variable in studying the association 
between exchange rate regimes and economic growth (Gosh/Gulde/Ostry/Wolf 1997).183 In 
addition, the choice of a reasonable exchange rate arrangement may differ for countries open to 
international capital mobility and countries without access to international capital markets 
(Fisher 2001, Husain/Mody/Rogoff 2004). To test this hypothesis with respect to pro-poor 
growth, we additionally control for capital account liberalization in using a dummy variable for 
capital control based on various issues of the IMF Yearbook on Exchange Arrangement and 
Exchange Restrictions (table 3).184 Batteries of regressions, however, could not reject the null 
hypothesis of no impact of capital restrictions on the first and second quintile shares.185  
 
Certain exchange rate regimes may be more prone to currency crisis than others (Bubula/Ötker-
Robe 2003).186 But currency crises may also dependent on factors different from the type of 
exchange rate regimes (Husain/Mody/Rogoff 2004, Razin/Rubinstein 2004). Without controlling 
for currency crises we so far assigned these effects to the corresponding exchange rate 
arrangement. To control the shock effects of currency crises on pro-poor growth, we use a 
dummy variable indicating a currency crisis if an index of currency pressure, i.e. a weighted 
average of monthly real exchange rate changes and monthly (percent) reserve losses, exceeds 
the mean plus 2 times the country-specific standard deviation (Glick/Hutchinson 1999). 
Concerning the growth equation, the additional currency crisis variable has never significant 
effect on pro-poor growth in the LYS classification, except for the negative coefficient of the 
second quintile share in industrial countries, an effect driven by two spells (table 13 equation 
1).187 While this effect is also debatable due to the small sample size (N = 30), the positive effect 
of the dirty float regime is only slightly reduced from 1.32 to 1.19 (compare table 13 equation 1 
with table 9 equation 20). Looking at the coarse RR classification, the coefficient of the currency 
crisis dummy variable is also negative for second quintile shares in industrial countries, while 
the high statistical significance of the negative coefficient of freely floating disappears (compare 
table 13 equation 2 and table 9 equation 24).188 Currency crises have an amazingly positive 
impact on the growth rate of the second quintile share for developing countries (table 13 
equation 4). Exchange rate regimes, however, are unimportant and the F-test on overall 
significance is not passed. Using the coarse classification the shock variable is insignificant in all 
other specifications. If we test the 4-way RR classification, currency crises affect again positively 
                                            
183 For an overview of empirical cross-country studies on the effect of capital account liberalization on economic 
performance, see Edison/Klein/Ricci/Sloek (2002).  
184 In the literature, several qualitative and quantitative indicators are proposed to measure capital account liberalization. 
For an overview and critic on each measure, see Edison/Klein/Ricci/Sloek (2002). 
185 We test both the growth equation and system GMM equation for all, developing and industrial countries with 
exchange rate regimes, without outliers, with and without regional dummies for the LYS classification and the coarse 
and 4-way RR classification. 
186 For a detailed discussion on the feasability conditions using intermediate exchange rate regimes in developing 
countries in the context of capital mobility and a broad discussion on causes of currency crisis, see Montiel (2003).  
187 New Zealand 1986/89, Sweden 1981/87. 
188 The Wald-test, however, indicates no overall significance of the regression. 
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the growth rate of second quintile share in developing countries (compare table 13 equations 6 
and 4). Finally, curreny crises impact now significantly positive on the growth rate of the first 
quintile share, while findings for limited flexibility remain similar and significant (compare table 
13 equations 5 and 3). Since the coefficient of currency crisis using the 4-way RR classiciation 
is rather similar to the coefficient of freely falling using the coarse RR classification (+2.63, 
+2.79 respectively), the currency crisis variable seems to capture the effect so far attributed to 
freely falling.    
  
Looking at the estimates of the system GMM estimation, currency crises impact amazingly 
significantly positive on the second quintile share for all and industrial countries in the RR 
classification (table 14 equations 1, 5 and 6).189 Interpreting the system GMM equation as level 
equation, a currency crisis would increase the level of the second quintile between 2.3 and 3.2 
percent in industrial countries. Controlling for currency crises, however, the limited flexibility and 
managed floating regimes now are significantly negative for the second quintile in industrial 
countries using the unadjusted approach (compare table 14 equation 5 with table 10 equation 
11). In addition, managed floating becomes insignificant in the unadjusted approach for the 
second quintile in all countries (compare table 14 equation 1 with table 12 equation 3). While 
currency crises are insignificant in developing countries, categories limited flexibility and 
managed floating now are also insignificant for the second quintile (table 14 equations 3 and 4 
compared with table 12 equations 7 and 8). Finally, if we test the reduced 4-way RR 
classification in the system GMM estimation, currency crises and exchange rate regimes are 
never significant for all and developing countries. 
 
5.3.3  Exchange rate regimes, pro-poor growth, inflation and output volatility: 
distribution effect 
 
High inflation rates may negatively affect the first and second quintile share of income 
(Romer/Romer 1998, Easterly/Fisher 2001, Dollar/Kraay 2001, Ghura/Leite/Tsangarides 2002). 
To test this hypothesis with respect to exchange rate regimes, we first add the inflation rate 
(logarithm of 1 plus the inflation rate) with exchange rate arrangements and regional dummy 
variables in all specifications. While inflation is not relevant with respect to the LYS 
classification, the coefficient of the inflation rate is amazingly positive at a ten percent 
significance level in regressions of  the growth rate of the first quintile share on exchange rate 
regimes, inflation and regional dummy variables in developing countries (coarse RR 
classification, table 15 equation 1). If we test 4-way RR classification, inflation is again positive 
for the growth rate of the first and second quintile in developing countries (table 15 equations 3 
and 4).190 The high coefficients for the inflation rate should not be misinterpreted, since only a 
                                            
189 The only exception is the regression for all countries using the adjusted approach (table 14, equation 2). We do not 
present results for regressions on the first quintile since the coefficient of currency crises is never significant.  
190 Wald-test on overall significance of the regression, however, is not passed for the growth rate of the second quintile 
(table 15 equation 4). We also find significant effect of inflation on the growth rate of the first quintile in all countries 
using the 4-way RR classification. Since Wald-test on overall significance is also not passed in this specification and 
other regressions indicate no significant impact of inflation for all countries, we do not present this result.  
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one unit increase of ln(1+inflation/100) would raise the growth rate of the first quintile share for 
example by 9.93 percentage points (table 15 equation 3). In our sample without outliers, 
however, the values for ln(1+inflation/100) range only between -0.01 (-1.22 % inflation rate) and 
0.89 (143.61 % inflation rate). In addition, inflation is never significant in the system GMM 
estimation, if we omit four outliers with extreme values (Belarus 1993: 1190 %, Belarus 1995: 
709 %, Brazil 1988: 651 %, Brazil 1993: 1997 % p.a.).  
 
We also test the direct impact of the inflation rate without exchange rate regimes. In the growth 
equation the coefficient of the inflation rate is amazingly positive for the growth rate of the first 
and second quintile in developing countries (table 15 equations 5 and 6).191 In all other 
regressions, however, inflation rate is never significant for both econometric approaches and all 
specifications omitting outliers.192 Thus, indirect negative effects of the exchange rate 
arrangements through direct effects of the inflation rate on the first and second quintile share 
seem unlikely. In addition, a significant effect of inflation on the first quintile share could not be 
confirmed in the system GMM estimations omitting values of very high inflation, even if the 
coefficient of inflation rate is in general negative (Dollar/Kraay 2001, Ghura/Leite/Tsangarides 
2002).193   
 
In addition, macroeconomic volatility may impact negatively on the first and second quintile 
share. We add output volatility formed as three year moving standard deviation of annual real 
GDP per capita growth (for example Australia 1976: standard deviation of growth rates for 
Australia 1974, 75, 76, table 3) with exchange rate regimes and regional dummies in our basic 
equations. Output fluctuation, however, is almost never significant omitting outliers.194 We also 
test the direct effect of output fluctuation on the first and second quintile share omitting 
exchange rate arrangments. The coefficient of output volatility, however, is never significant. To 
summarize, the effect of exchange rate regimes on the first and second quintile share seem not 
to work indirectly through output volatility. 
 
5.3.4  Exchange rate regimes, pro-poor growth and additional macroeconomic 
variables: distribution effect 
 
Considering the empirical literature (Romer/Romer 1998, Easterly/Fisher 2001, Eastwood/Lipton 
2001, Ghura/Leite/Tsangarides 2002), macroeconomic variables are found to be relevant with 
respect to pro-poor growth. In the growth equation we control for budget deficit to GDP, financial 
development (money and quasi money to GDP), secondary education (average years of 
                                            
191 Again, the Wald-test on overall significance of the regression is not passed for the growth rate of the second quintile 
(table 15 equation 6). 
192 These results are in contrast to empirical evidence in the literature, which find significant negative impact of high 
inflation on the poor (Romer/Romer 1998, Easterly/Fisher 2001). Romer/Romer (1998), however, do not adjust data on 
income inequality due to incomparability issues.   
193 While in Ghura/Leite/Tsangarides (2002), inflation is found to be significantly negative, results in Dollar/Kraay (2001) 
are similar to our estimates as the coefficients of inflation are insignificant.   
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secondary schooling in total population aged 25 and over), inflation and initial Gini coefficient.195 
In the system GMM estimation we substitute budget deficit by government consumption due to 
its proven relevance in this estimation methodology (Ghura/Leite/Tsangarides 2002). While the 
Gini coefficient is found to be highly significant in a similar approach (Ghura/Leite/Tsangarides 
2002), regressing the first quintile share on the Gini coefficient in a level/first-difference equation 
seems to us tautological as a change in inequality in the first and second quintile share is only 
explained by a change in overall inequality, i.e. no new information on the determinants of 
inequality are added in this specification. Thus we omit the Gini coefficient in the system GMM 
estimations.196  
 
Looking at the LYS classification in the growth equation, the dirty float regime is now 
insignificant due to positive effects of budget surplus (compare table 16 equations 1 to 3 with 
table 9 equations 2 and 10), but the F-test of overall significance could not be rejected.197 
Coefficients for all other exchange rate regimes remain insignificant. Controlling for additional 
macroeconomic variables in the RR classification, the effects of exchange rate regimes are 
changed considerably. While freely falling becomes insignificant in all and developing countries, 
now limited flexibility impacts significantly positive on the growth rate of the first quintile share 
(compare table 16 equations 5 and 7 with table 11 equations 5 and 7).198 Coefficients for all 
other exchange rate regimes remain insignificant. Concerning the macroeconomic variables, the 
adjusted Gini coefficient impacts significantly positive on the growth rate of the second quintile 
in all and developing countries (table 16 equations 2, 4, 6, 8). Thus the hypothesis of inequality 
convergence would be confirmed by these results.199 In addition, a one percentage point 
increase in budget surplus would raise the growth rate of the first quintile share in all and 
developing countries between 0.22 and 0.30 percentage points (table 16 equations 1, 3, 7).200 
Finally, financial development affects significantly positive the growth rate of the first quintile in 
the coarse RR classification (table 16 equations 5 and 7). If we test the reduced 4-way RR 
classification, the significant coefficients for limited flexibility disappear (compare table 16 
equations 9 and 11 with equations 5 and 7). Coefficients for all other exchange rate regimes 
remain insignificant. While the impact of broad money to GDP becomes insignificant, initial 
inequality affects now also positively the growth rate of the first quintile share (table 16 
equations 9 to 12).   
                                                                                                                                                 
194 One exception is a small positive coefficient (+0.007) for the second quintile in industrial countries using the 
unadjusted approach in a system GMM estimation (coarse RR classication). However, this effect could not be confirmed 
in the adjusted approach and the test on first-order serial correlation indicates misspecifications. 
195 Adding initial inequality in the growth equation can be justified by testing the hypothesis of inequality convergence 
even if usually the same inequality measure, i.e. Gini coefficient or first quintile share, is used on both sides of the 
equation (Ravallion 2000). A positive coefficient for the initial Gini coefficient would confirm the convergence of 
inequality. 
196 We also omit M2 to GDP ratio due to insignificant results. 
197 Tests for industrial countries fail due to limited observations (N = 19) and are not presented.  
198 The coefficient of limited flexibility remained significantly positive in regressions on the first quintile for developing 
countries (compare table 15 equation 7 with table 11 equation 7). In addition, tests for industrial countries fail due to 
limited observations (N = 28) and are not presented.  
199 One problem with these results are the high coefficients for the adjusted initial Gini coefficients, which are present 
only in fixed effects estimations (table 16 equations 2 and 4). However, one should be cautious interpreting these 
findings,  since the coefficients of the constants are incredible highly negative.  
200 One exception is the insignificant coefficient of budget surplus for the growth rate of the first quintile in the coarse RR 
classification for all countries (table 15 equation 5).  
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Adding government consumption, inflation, and secondary education to the exchange rate 
regimes and regional dummies in a system GMM estimation, results for the coefficients of the 
exchange rate regimes on the first quintile are very similar to the regressions without 
macroeconomic variables  (compare table 17 equations 1, 2, 5, 6, 9, 10 with table 12 equations 
1,2, 5, 6, and table 10 equations 9, 10). Thus managed floating is significantly positive for the 
first quintile in all and developing countries using the unadjusted approach. However, none of 
the coefficients of the macroeconomic variables are significant in these regressions. Looking at 
the findings for the second quintile, managed floating remains only significantly positive in 
developing countries using the unadjusted approach (compare table 17 equations 3, 4, 7, 8, 11, 
12 with table 12 equations 3, 4, 7, 8 and table 10 equations 11 and 12). While the coefficients of 
limited flexibility become insignificant (compare table 17 equations 4, 8 with table 12 equations 
4, 8), freely floating remain highly significantly positive in developing countries (compare table 
16 equations 5 to 8 with table 12 equations 5 to 8). Finally, freely floating now affects negatively 
the second quintile in industrial countries using the adjusted approach (compare table 17 
equation 12 with table 10 equation 12). Coefficients of the macroceonomic variables, however, 
are insignificant in most of the cases.201 While the size of the significant exchange rate regimes 
are lower, the general effect of exchange rate regimes on pro-poor growth remain unchanged, if 
we test the reduced 4-way classification (compare table 17 equations 13 to 20 with table 16 
equations 1 to 8). Finally, tests on first-order serial correlation are again passed only in the 
adjusted approach for all and developing countries, while specification tests fail completely for 
industrial countries. 
 
5.3.5  Exchange rate regimes, pro-poor growth and additional macroeconomic 
variables: total effect 
 
Taking into account trade-offs between the distribution effect and the growth effect of exchange 
rate regimes on the income of the poor, we also test for the impact of both the LYS and RR  
classification on the mean income of the 20 and 20-40 percent poorest, i.e. the total effect. We 
choose to measure the total effect and derive possible trade–offs between the distribution and 
growth effect, because our panel is highly irregular and unbalanced and tests on the growth 
effect of exchange rate regimes are limited by data availability and may better be answered in 
samples without restrictions on income inequality data.   
 
Controlling for budget deficit, financial development, secondary education, inflation, and initial 
inequality in the growth equation, we test the LYS and both the coarse and 4-way RR 
classification.202 In the LYS classification, however, only crawling peg is negative at a one 
                                            
201 Exceptions are the weakly positive coefficient of government consumption in  all and developing countríes for the 
second quintile using the unadjusted approach (table 16 equations 3 and 7), and the positive effect of secondary 
education on the second quintile in industrial countries using the adjusted approach (table 16 equation 12).  
202 We also tested initial per capita income as convergence term in total effects regressions of the growth equation. 
However, we omit inital per capita income, since its coefficient was never statistically significant. 
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percent significance level for the growth rate of the mean income of the second quintile in all 
countries (table 18 equation 2). Thus this negative effect works only through the growth effect, 
as we do not find any significant distribution effect (compare table 18 equation 2 with table 16 
equation 2). Considering the additional macroeconomic variables, the adjusted Gini coefficient 
is again significantly positive for the growth rate of the mean income of the second quintile 
(compare table 18 equations 2 and 4 with table 16 equations 2 and 4).203 In addition, the 
significantly positive effect of budget surplus on the first quintile is reinforced by the growth 
effect (compare table 18 equations 1 and 3 with table 16 equations 1 and 3). A one percentage 
points increase in budget surplus would raise the growth rate of the mean income of the first 
quintile share between 0.36 and 0.39 percentage points compared to 0.22 percentage points in 
regressions for the distribution effect.  
 
Concerning estimations for the coarse RR classification, none of the exchange rate regimes 
exhibits significant impact on the growth rate of the mean income of the poor (table 18 
equations 5 to 8). Thus the significant positive distribution effect of limited flexibility on the first 
quintile is not supported by the growth effect, even if the coefficients for limited flexibility remain 
similar positive (compare table 18 equations 5 and 7 with table 16 equations 5 and 7). In 
addition, budget surplus affects positively the growth rate of the mean income of the first quintile 
in developing countries, a result primarily driven by the distribution effect (compare table 18 
equation 7 with table 16 equation 7). While the size of the coefficients for M2 to GDP ratio 
remains broadly the same, higher financial development is now significantly positive for the 
growth rate of the mean income of the second quintile in all countries (compare table 18 
equations 5 to 8 with table 16 equations 5 to 8). If we test the reduced 4-way RR classification, 
findings for exchange rate regimes and macroeconomic variables remain identical with respect 
to statistical significance (table 18 equations 9 to 12).  
 
In the system GMM approach we control for secondary education, government consumption, 
inflation, and, additionally, civil liberties, life expectancy, and terms-of-trade. Estimations for all 
countries do not indicate any significant impact of exchange rate regimes on the mean income 
of the first and second quintile (table 19 equations 1 to 4). Thus the positive distribution effect of 
managed floating in the unadjusted approach is apparently offset by the growth effect (compare 
table 19 equation 1 with table 17 equation 1). Results for developing countries, however, need a 
closer look. First, the highly significant positive distribution effect of category freely floating could 
only be confirmed for the mean income of the first quintile using the unadjusted approach 
(compare table 19 equations 5 to 8 with table 17 equations 5 to 8). These findings, however, are 
not amazing if we compare descriptive statistics for the mean of the adjusted first/second 
                                            
203 In regressions for the growth rate of the mean of the second quintile, more than 85 percent of the positive effect of 
the initial Gini coefficient stem from a positive distribution effect on the growth rate of the second quintile, confirming the 
hypothesis of inequality convergence (Ravallion 2000). However, one should be cautious interpreting these findings,  
since the coefficients of the constants are incredible highly negative in the fixed effects estimations. In addition, the 
positive total effects of initial inequality are not directly comparable to Forbes (2001), since we do not apply a first-
difference methodology (GMM) to estimate our growth equation, we use a different set of additional regressors, and our 
Gini coefficient is adjusted in a more accurate way.   
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quintile and the mean of the mean income of the adjusted first/second quintile. While the mean 
of the first/second quintile for freely floating is highly positive with respect to other regimes (table 
6), the mean of the mean income of the first/second quintiles is rather low (table 8). Second, 
freely falling is amazingly significantly positive for both quintiles using the unadjusted approach 
(compare table 19 equations 5 and 7 with table 17 equations 5 and 7). Thus category freely 
falling may be associated with a positive growth effect in developing countries. This result, 
however, could not be confirmed in the adjusted approach (table 19 equations 6 and 8). While 
managed floating is insignificant for the total effect, the coefficients remain positive at a lower 
level compared to the distribution effect (compare table 19 equations 5 to 8 with table 17 
equations 5 to 8). Finally, limited flexibility is significantly positive for the mean income of the 
second quintile, a result primarily driven by the growth effect (compare table 19 equations 7 and 
8 with table 17 equations 7 and 8). Interpreting the system GMM approach as a level equation, 
the mean income of the second quintile share in countries with limited flexibility (narrow crawling 
peg or band) is, on average, between 12.2 and 14.5 percents higher than in countries using 
pegged regimes. Findings for industrial countries do not change for the total effect with respect 
to significant exchange rate regimes. While only category freely floating is negative for the mean 
income of the second quintile using the adjusted approach, the size of the coefficient is almost 
doubled by the growth effect (compare table 19 equation 12 to table 17 equation 12). If we test 
the 4-way RR classification, results remain unchanged in regressions for all countries (compare 
table 19 equations 13 to 16 with equations 1 to 4). While the significant coefficient of category 
freely floating for the first quintile disappears in developing countries using the unadjusted 
approach (compare table 19 equation 17 with equation 5), findings for  the second quintile in 
developing countries confirm the significantly positive impact of limited flexibility with almost 
unchanged size (compare table 19 equations 19 and 20 with equations 7 and 8). 
 
Most additional macroeconomic variables impact on the income of the poor in the way 
expected. In all and developing countries higher life expectancy and terms-of-trade increase the 
income of the poor, while raised government consumption diminishes the income of the poor 
(table 19 equations 1 to 8, 13 to 20).204 Thus a one percentage point rise in the ratio of 
government consumption to GDP would diminish the mean income of the first and second 
quintile around 2 percent in developing countries. In addition, improved secondary education 
fosters the income of the poor only in all and industrial countries (table 19 equations 1 to 4 and 
9 to 12).205 A one year rise of average years of secondary schooling would increase the mean 
income of the second quintile between 13 and 15 percent in all countries. While life expectancy 
is similar positive in industrial countries, terms-of-trade exhibit no significant effect in industrial 
countries (table 19 equations 9 to 12). Furthermore, the coefficient of inflation is negative in all 
estimations of the coarse RR classification, but only significant for the mean income of the first 
                                            
204 The variable government consumption may be seen as a proxy for nonproductive public expenditures, political 
corruption or bad governance (Barro/Sala-i-Martin 1995). 
205 One exception is the insignificant coefficient for secondary education in the unadjusted approach (table 18 equation 
9). Another exception is the significantly positive coefficient for secondary education on the first quintile in developing 
countries in the unadjusted approach testing the 4-way RR classification (table 18 equation 17).  
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quintile in industrial countries (table 19 equations 9 and 10). Finally, the coefficient of civil 
liberties is negative in all estimations, indicating a positive impact of civil liberties on the income 
of the poor since civil liberties is measured on a scale from one to seven with one indicating the 
most favorable state. This result, however, is weakened by the fact that the coefficient of civil 
liberties is weakly significant only in few estimations (table 19 equations 4, 8, 10, 16, 19, 20). 
Results on the total effect, however, have the shortcoming that tests on first-order serial 
correlation are almost never passed.206  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In this paper we estimated the poverty effect of different exchange rate arrangements on the 
poorest 20 and 20 to 40 percent. To answer this question we regressed the first and second 
quintile and the mean of the first and second quintile on two de facto exchange rate regime 
classifications, Levy-Yeyati/Sturzenegger (2002) and Reinhart/Rogoff (2003), in a growth 
equation and an adjusted and unadjusted system GMM approach. Empirical results, however, 
vary considerably due to exchange rate regime classifications and econometric specifications.   
 
First, the classification process, i.e. the elements used to classify the de facto exchange rate 
regimes, affect the findings by attributing the exchange rate arrangements to different 
categories in the LYS and RR classification (table 4). Thus coefficients for similar categories 
have very different results in both the growth and system GMM equation, even if this effect may 
also be caused by the different number of observations and time periods covered in both 
classifications. While none of the exchange rate regimes in the LYS classification are significant 
using the system GMM approach, arrangements in both the coarse and 4-way RR classification 
are relevant. Thus the problem of classifying exchange rate regimes correctly is still an open 
question, influencing the conclusions drawn from the estimations. 
 
Second, coefficients of exchange rate regimes differ considerably for developing and industrial 
countries in the RR classification.207 In industrial countries statistically significant exchange rate 
regimes affect negatively the poor (table 9, 10, 14, 17, 19). On the other hand, all statistically 
significant regimes in developing countries exhibit positive effects on the poor with respect to 
the base group pegged regimes (table 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 16, 17, 19). Thus exchange rate 
arrangements impact very differently on pro-poor growth in developing and industrial countries 
in the RR classification.208  
 
                                            
206 Two exceptions are the estimations for the mean income of the second quintile in industrial countries (table 18 
equations 11 and 12).  
207 While descriptive statistics indicate remarkable differences for transitional countries, results of regression analysis 
would be misleading due to limited observations. In addition, effects of exchange rate regimes are strongly 
superimposed by other macroeconomic shock effects in the transition period.  
208 Results for the LYS classification, however, are not so clear since category dirty float is significantly positive in 
developing countries for the growth rate of the first quintile and in industrial countries for the growth rate of the second 
quintile in regressions without outliers (table 9, 11, 13).   
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Considering the impact on the first and second quintile, only the poorest 20 percent are affected 
by exchange rate regimes in all and developing countries estimating the growth equation (table 
9, 11, 13, 16). In addition, we find only significant effects for dirty float (LYS) and freely floating 
(RR) on the poorest 20 to 40 percent in industrial countries, if we omit any additional regressors 
in the growth equation (table 9).209 Using the system GMM approach with the RR classification, 
again, only the second quintile in industrial countries is affected significantly by exchange rate 
regimes (table 10, 14, 17, 19). However, estimations do not confirm a different effect on the 20 
and 20 to 40 percent poorest in all and developing countries, since estimations for both the first 
and second quintile share differ only modestly, and without discernable patterns (table 10, 12, 
17, 19).    
 
Fourth, empirical findings differ considerably for the growth equation and system GMM 
approach.210 We assign these differences in estimation results mainly to the fact that we regress 
the level of the first and second quintile on exchange rate regimes in the system GMM 
approach, while we regress the growth rate of the first and second quintile on initial exchange 
rate regimes in the growth equation. Moreover, empirical findings differ often for the adjusted 
and unadjusted system GMM approach (table 10, 12, 14, 17, 19). Thus the statistical 
significance of exchange rate regimes depends critically on the solution of the incomparability 
problems of income inequality measures, i.e. whether we use unadjusted or adjusted first and 
second quintiles.    
 
Finally, we compare results for the coarse and 4-way RR classification. If we support the view 
that soft pegs are unsustainable, incredible, and prone to currency crisis, we would replace 
category freely falling by the chosen exchange rate arrangement. In this case, significantly 
positive coefficients of freely floating would disappear in allmost all regressions (table 10, 12, 
19).211 In addition, statistical significance and size for coefficients of limited flexibility and 
managed floating change only slightly in most specifications (table 10, 11, 12, 13, 16, 17, 19).212 
Thus even if incredible soft pegs break down, this would not change the often positive effect of 
intermediate exchange rate regimes in developing countries. While the significantly positive 
effects of limited flexibility and managed floating are not robust to specifications, we do not find 
any significant negative poverty effects of intermediate arrangements. Thus we would cautiously 
conclude that the hollowing-out hypothesis could not be confirmed with respect to pro-poor 
growth in developing countries. If we sort out freely falling as separate arrangement, we would 
argue that the poverty effects of exchange rate regimes are not independently discernable in 
                                            
209 We also find a significantly positive effect of dirty float on the growth rate of the second quintile if we add currency 
crises (table 13).  
210 To compare the estimations of the growth equations with system GMM estimations, coefficients have to be divided 
by 100 due to multiplication by 100 in calculating the annual average rate of growth of the first and second quintile share 
(yq20/40it
 = 100/z*[ln(Q20/40i,t+z) – ln(Q
20/40
it)]). 
211 Regressions with additional macroeconomic variables on the distribution effect in table 17 are one exception. The 
significant coefficients for freely floating in the reduced 4-way RR classification (in comparison to the insignificant 
coefficients in table 12) stem mainly from the different sample size, since we have to omit several observations due to 
missing values and outliers for the inflation rate and government consumption.  
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situations of severe macroeconomic instabilities. In this case we find amazingly significant 
positive coefficients of freely falling on the growth rate of the first quintile (table 9, 11, 13). On 
the other side, freely falling is significantly negative for all countries in the system GMM 
approach (table 10), a result not robust to other specifications. In addition, freely floating is now 
significantly positive in developing countries using the system GMM approach (table 10, 12, 17, 
19). The positive results for freely floating, however, should be interpreted with caution since 
these effects are only driven by two observations.  
 
Due to these varying and only weakly robust empirical results, it is difficult to derive a concise 
policy recommendation with respect to a poverty-reducing exchange rate regime choice. 
Notwithstanding these difficulties, the positive effects of limited flexibility and managed floating 
for the RR classification in developing countries should be emphasized. First, category limited 
flexibility is positively associated with average annual growth rate of the first quintile in 
developing countries (table 11, 13, 16).213 These positive distribution effects, however, are not 
present for the total effect. On the other hand, limited flexibility is positively associated with the 
mean income of the second quintile in the system GMM estimation in both the unadjusted and 
adjusted approach (table 19). This total effect is only driven by the growth effect. Second, 
managed floating affects positively the first and second quintile share in the system GMM 
estimation using the unadjusted approach in developing countries (table 12, 17). These positive 
distribution effects, however, are almost never confirmed in the adjusted approach.214 In 
addition, no significant total effect of managed floating could be estimated in the system GMM 
approach. In combination with the positive coefficient of dirty float on the growth rate of the first 
quintile in the LYS classification for developing countries (table 9, 11), these results show at 
least a tendency to not negative and possible positive effects of intermediate regimes on the 
poorest 40 percent in developing countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
212 Exceptions are regressions on the second quintile in all and developing countries in the system GMM approach 
(table 12 equations 4, 7, 8, 12, 15, 16) and regressions on the first quintile in all and developing countries in the growth 
equation (table 16 equations 5, 7, 9, 11).  
213 This result can not be confirmed in regressions with additional macroeconomic variables using the 4-way 
classification (table 16).  
214 Two exceptions are regressions on the second quintile with regional dummy variables for the coarse and 4-way RR 
classification (table 12).  
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Table 1: Coverage of the data set 
 
 
Region   Country Observations dates  Source  No. of spells 
 
East Asia Pacific  China   1982, 85, 88, 91    UNU  3 
(EAP)     1994, 97    GPM  1 
 
   Hongkong 1971, 76, 81, 86, 91  UNU  4 
    
   Indonesia 1976, 80, 84, 87, 90  UNU  4 
     1993, 96, 99   GPM, WDI 2 
 
   Korea  1965, 70, 76, 80, 85, 88  UNU  5 
 
   Malaysia  1970, 76, 79, 84   UNU  3 
     1987, 92, 95   GPM  2 
 
   Philippines 1957, 61, 65   UNU  2  
     1965, 71, 85, 88, 91  UNU  4 
     1994, 97    UNU  1 
    
   Singapore 1978, 88    UNU  1 
 
Thailand  1962, 69, 75, 81, 86, 90  UNU  5 
1992, 98    UNU  1 
    
Eastern Europe and  Bulgaria  1991, 93    UNU  1 
Central Asia   
(ECA)   Belarus  1993, 95    GPM  1 
       
   Hungary  1972, 77, 82, 87   UNU  3 
     1989, 93    GPM  1 
    
   Latvia  1995, 98    GPM  1 
 
   Poland  1990, 93    UNU  1 
 
   Romania  1989, 92    UNU  1 
    
   Russia  1994, 98    GPM  1 
 
Latin America and  Brazil  1960, 70, 76, 80, 86  UNU  4  
Caribbean (LAC)    1988, 93, 96   GPM  2 
 
   Chile  1968, 71    UNU  1 
     1989, 92    UNU  1 
    
   Colombia  1971, 78, 88   UNU  2 
     1988, 91, 95   UNU  2  
 
   Costa Rica 1961, 71, 77   UNU  2 
     1981, 86, 89   UNU  2 
     1993, 96    GPM  1 
    
   Dominican 1989, 96    GPM  1  
   Republic 
 
   Ecuador  1988, 95    GPM  1 
    
   El Salvador 1989, 95, 98   GPM, WDI 2 
    
Guatemala 1987, 89    UNU  1 
    
   Honduras 1989, 92, 96   GPM  2 
    
   Jamaica  1988, 91    UNU  1 
     1991, 96    UNU  1 
    
   Mexico  1950, 57, 63, 68, 75  UNU  4  
  1984, 89    UNU  1 
     1989, 95, 98   GPM, WDI 2 
 
   Panama  1979, 89    UNU  1 
     1991, 95    GPM  1 
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Table 1: continued 
 
   Paraguay  95, 98    GPM, WDI 1 
 
Peru  1986, 94    UNU  1 
    
   Trinidad & 1976, 81    UNU  1 
   Tobago  1988, 92    GPM  1 
 
   Venezuela 1962, 71, 81, 87   UNU  3 
     1987, 93, 96   GPM  2 
 
Middle East and   Algeria  1988, 95    GPM  1 
North Africa (MNA) 
   Egypt  1991, 95    UNU  1 
 
   Jordan  1980, 87, 91   UNU  2 
     1991, 97    UNU  1 
 
   Morocco  1984, 91    UNU  1 
     1991, 99    UNU  1 
 
   Tunisia  1985, 90, 95   GPM, WDI 2 
    
   Turkey  1968, 73, 87   UNU  2 
     1987, 94    GPM  1 
 
   Yemen  1992, 98    GPM, WDI 1 
 
South Asia (SA)  India  1951, 54, 57, 60, 63, 66, 69,  
72, 77, 83, 86, 89, 92  UNU  12 
1994, 97    UNU  1 
 
   Pakistan  1971, 79, 85, 88   UNU   3 
     1991, 96    UNU  1 
 
   Sri Lanka  1953, 63, 73, 79, 87  UNU  4 
     1990, 95    UNU  1 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) Côte d’Ivoire 1985, 88    UNU  1 
     1988, 95    UNU  1 
 
   Ethiopia  1981, 95    GPM  1 
    
   Gabon  1975, 77    UNU  1 
 
   Ghana  1987, 92    GPM  1 
     1992, 97    UNU  1 
 
   Guinea  1991, 94    UNU  1 
 
   Kenya  1992, 94    UNU  1 
 
   Lesotho  1986, 93    GPM  1 
 
   Madagascar 1980, 93, 99   GPM, WDI 2 
 
Mali  1989, 94    GPM  1 
 
   Mauretania 1988, 95    UNU  1 
 
   Mauritius  1986, 91    UNU  1 
 
   Niger  1992, 95    UNU  1 
 
   Nigeria  1985, 97    GPM  1 
 
Senegal  1991, 95    UNU  1 
 
   Uganda  1989, 92, 96   GPM, WDI 2 
 
   Zambia  1993, 96    UNU  1 
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Table 1: continued 
 
Industrial Countries (IND) Australia  1969, 76, 79   UNU  2 
     1981, 85, 89   UNU  2 
     1995, 98    UNU  1 
 
   Belgium  1979, 85, 88, 92   UNU  3 
    
   Canada  1951, 57, 61, 65, 69,   
73, 77, 81, 84, 87   DS/UNU  9 
     1987, 91    UNU  1 
 
   Denmark  1981, 87, 92   UNU  2 
     1992, 95    UNU  1 
    
Finland  1978, 81, 84, 87, 91  UNU  4 
     1991, 94, 97   UNU  2 
    
   France  1979, 84    UNU  1 
 
   Germany  1973, 78, 81, 84   UNU  3 
    
   Greece  1974, 81, 88   UNU  2  
  
   Ireland  1973, 80, 87   UNU  2 
 
Italia  1978, 81, 84, 87, 91  UNU  4 
 
Japan  1962, 65, 68, 71, 74, 77, 80  UNU  6 
 
Netherlands 1975, 79, 82   UNU  2 
  1983, 87, 91   UNU  2 
 
Norway  1967, 73, 76, 79, 84, 91  UNU  5 
 
New Zealand 1973, 77, 80, 83, 86, 89  UNU  5 
 
Portugal  1980, 90    UNU  1 
 
Spain  1974, 81, 91   UNU  2 
 
   Sweden  1967, 75, 81, 87, 92  UNU  4 
    
   United Kingdom 1961, 64, 67, 71, 74, 77,  
80, 84, 88, 91   UNU  9 
       
   USA  1950, 53, 56, 59, 62, 65, 68,  
71, 74, 77, 80, 83, 86, 89  UNU  13 
 
   No. of countries No. of observations     No. of spells 
   
Total   76  343      234 
 
UNU:  UNU/WIDER-UNDP World Income Inequality Database 
GPM:  Global Poverty Monitoring  
WDI:  World Development Indicators 
DS:  Deininger and Squire   
 
Note:  
 
Pooled OLS estimation:  As all observations within each line have the same income/reference unit, spells are formed only within 
each line (e.g. Panama 1979, 89, 91, 95 results in two spells: 1979 – 89, 91 - 95). Thus two observations for the same year in 
one country (e.g. Jordan 1991) indicate different income/reference unit definitions (e.g. Jordan 91: net expenditure, person/ 
expenditure, household per capita).  
 
System GMM estimation:  
 
If the countries are split by the same income definition (e.g. Côte d’Ivoire 1: 1985, 88; Côte d’Ivoire 2: 1988, 95; i.e the number 
of cross-section units increases), first-differenced equations are formed only within each line.  
 
If the countries are not split by the same income definition, first-differenced equations are formed by all observations per country 
using the adjusted first/second quintile share. In this case we omit one of the two observations for the same year in one country 
(Canada 1987/1, Côte d’Ivoire 88/1, Colombia 88/1, Denmark 92/2, Finland 91/2, Ghana 92/1, Jordan 91/2, Jamaica 91/1, 
Mexico 89/1, Morocco 91/1, Philippines 65/1, Turkey 87/1, Venezuela 87/2) and if the time length between observations in one 
country is only one year (Netherlands 1983). The number behind the year indicates, whether we omit the first or second 
observation as ordered in the table. 
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Table 2: Adjustment regressions for first/second quintile income 
shares and Gini coefficients 
 
   (1)   (2)   (3) 
 
Dep. Var.  First quintile  Second quintile Gini  
   share of income  share of income coefficient 
      
 
Income (unknown tax   -0.0149***  -0.0127***  5.71***  
treatment) (0.0043)  (0.0049)  (1.90) 
 
Income, net  0.0046   0.0046   -1.81 
   (0.0036)  (0.0040)  (1.52) 
 
Income, gross  -0.0071**  -0.0008   1.32 
   (0.0046)  (0.0035)  (1.36) 
 
Family   -0.0036   -0.0014   0.60 
   (0.0023)  (0.0031)  (0.82) 
 
Person   0.0119***  0.0185***  -6.62*** 
   (0.0026)  (0.0033)  (1.20) 
 
Household per capita 0.0108***  0.0159***  -5.43*** 
   (0.0032)  (0.0041)  (1.51) 
 
Equivalized  0.0265***  0.008***  -5.61*** 
   (0.0033)  (0.0029)  (0.96) 
 
EAP   -0.0045**  -0.0248***  8.85*** 
   (0.0022)  (0.0029)  (0.97) 
 
ECA   0.0196***  0.001   -1.00  
  (0.005)   (0.0051)  (1.96) 
 
LAC   -0.0272***  -0.0519***  18.86*** 
  (0.0024)  (0.0032)  (1.09) 
 
MNA   -0.0117***  -0.0328***  12.00*** 
  (0.0036)  (0.0043)  (1.67) 
 
SA   0.0081***  -0.0128***  4.65*** 
   (0.0027)  (0.0032)  (1.25) 
 
SSA   -0.0199***  -0.0407***  16.00***  
   (0.0042)  (0.0055)  (2.14) 
 
Constant  0.0662***  0.123***  33.03*** 
   (0.0033)  (0.0036)  (1.34) 
 
N   371   371   371   
R-Squared  0.6647   0.6716   0.6997  
 
 
 
 
Note: This table reports the results of pooled OLS Regression for the indicated inequality measures on the indicated variables.  
* denotes significance at the 90% level, ** at the 95% level, and *** at the 99% level (two-sided alternative). Heteroscedasticity 
adjusted standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 3: Data Sources 
 
Variable  Source    Comments     
 
Share of Income: UNU/WIDER-UNDP World Income  for selection procedure see section 3 
First/Second Quintile Inequality Database, Version 1.0  
(12 September 2000), Global Poverty  
Monitoring, World Bank Chen/Ravallion  
(2000), World Development Indicators  
(2002), Deininger/Squire (1996, 98a)      
 
Real GDP Per Capita Penn World Tables, Version 6.1  Constant 1996 US dollars using the  
(October 2002)    Chain index  
    
Exchange rate  Levy-Yeyati/Sturzenegger (2002) 5-way-classification 
regimes  (www.utdt.edu/~ely/papers.html)  
 
   Reinhart/Rogoff (March 3, 2003) coarse classification 
   www.puaf.umd.edu/faculty/papers/ 
   reinhart/papers.htm 
          
Gini coefficient  UNU/WIDER-UNDP World Income  for selection procedure see share of  
 Inequality Database, Version 1.0  income quintile 
(12 September 2000), Global Poverty  
Monitoring, World Bank Chen/Ravallion  
(2000), World Development Indicators  
(2002), Deininger/Squire (1996, 98a)      
    
Currency Crisis  Glick/Hutchison (1999)   dummy variable (1 = currency crisis) 
currency crisis, if index of currency 
pressure (weighted average of 
monthly real exchange rate changes 
and monthly (percent) reserve losses) 
exceeds the mean plus 2 times the 
country-specific standard deviation 
 
Capital Control  IMF - Annual report on exchange dummy variable  
arrangements and exchange   ( 1 = restricted, 0 = not restricted) 
   restrictions (1968 – 2000)     
 
Government   Penn World Tables, Version 6.1  Constant 1996 US dollars 
Consumption  (October 2002)   
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Table 3: continued 
 
ln(1+inflation/100) World Development Indicators (2001) Inflation, GDP deflator (annual %) 
(NY.GDP.DEFL.KD.ZG) 
for missing values:  
(FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG) Inflation, consumer prices (Laspeyres) 
(annual %) (Belarus 1993, 95; 
Canada 65; Germany 1973, 78, 81, 
84; Ethiopia 1981; Poland 1990; 
Turkey 1968)  
          
Secondary Education  Barro and Lee (2000)   Average years of secondary schooling   
        in total population aged 25 and over 
Due to limited data availability for 
secondary education values are 
linearily interpolated between the 
years prior and after the observation. 
 
M2 to GDP  Word Development Indicators (2001) Money and quasi money (M2) to GDP 
   (FM.LBL.MOMY.GD.ZS) 
 
Overall Budget   World DeveIopment Indicators (2001) Overall Budget, including grants 
Surplus (+)/  (GB.BAL.OVRL.GD.ZS) 
Deficit (-) to GDP          
        for missing values: 
Easterly, Sewadeh (2002): Global  Data on overall budget/deficit    
Development Network Growth from IMF Government Financial  
Database, World Bank Statistics (Germany 1973, 78, 81, 84; 
Tunisia 1990; Latvia 1995) 
 
Life expectancy  World development indicators (2001) life expectancy at birth, total (years) 
(SP.DYN.LE00.IN) Values calcutated by linear 
interpolation for Guatemala 1989, 
India 1994, Kenya 1994  
 
for missing value: 
   World Population Prospects: The  Jordan 1980 
   2002 Revision Population Database 
 
Terms  of  Trade Easterly, Sedaweh (2002): Global Terms of Trade (goods and   
   Development Network Growth  services, 1995 = 100)  
   Database, World Bank 
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Table 3: continued 
 
Civil Liberties  Freedom House   Measured on a scale of 1 to 7. 
(1 indicates the most liberal country) 
  
Output volatility  Penn World Tables, Version 6.1  Constant 1996 US dollars using the  
(October 2002) Chain index, three year moving 
standard deviation of annual real GDP 
per capita growth (e.g. Australia 1976: 
standard deviation of growth rates for 
Australia 1974, 75, 76) 
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Table 4: Two-way tables of frequency 
 
 
 
Exchange rate regimes and currency crises 
 
 
 
Levy-Yeyati/Sturzenegger (2002) Reinhart/Rogoff (2003) Coarse   4-way  
5-way classification      classification  classification 
         
Currency crisis    Currency crisis Currency crisis 
    
1 0     1 0  1 0  
        
Fixed  5 50  Pegged  4 34  4 35 
Crawling peg 3 33  Limited flexibility 9 76  11 76 
Dirty float 7 12  Managed floating 4 41  8 50 
Flexible 7 43  Freely floating  0 4  3 7 
    Freely falling  9 16   
Inconclusives 0 4  Category 6  1 1  1 4 
   
 
 
Exchange rate regimes Levy-Yeyati/Sturzenegger and Reinhart/Rogoff 
 
 
Levy-Yeyati/  Fixed  Crawling Dirty  Flexible Incon-   
Sturzenegger (2002):   peg  float    clusives 
 
Reinhart/Rogoff (2003)   
coarse classification 
     
Pegged  32  4  2  3  5  
Limited flexibility 17  26  10  25  0  
Managed floating 10  6  2  16  0  
Freely floating  0  1  0  13  0  
Freely falling   5  4  5  7  0  
Category 6  0  0  1  1  0  
 
 
Reinhart/Rogoff (2003) 
4-way classification 
 
Pegged  33  4  2  3  5 
Limited flexibility 17  27  10  26  0 
Managed floating 12  7  5  21  0 
Freely floating  1  3  2  14  0 
Category 6  1  0  1  1  0 
 
 
  
Note: For description of exchange rate classifications, see section 3.2.  
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Table 5: Exchange rate regimes and mean of average annual growth 
of first and second quintile share of income 
 
 
Levy-Yeyati/Sturzenegger (2002),  Reinhart/Rogoff 2003,   Reinhart/Rogoff 2003, 
5 – way classification   coarse classification   4-way classification 
 
 
yq20 yq40 N   yq20 yq40 N  yq20 yq40 N 
 
 
All countries215   All countries 
 
 
Fixed  0.11 -0.14 41 Pegged  -0.34 -0.20 75 -0.34 -0.20 75 
Crawling peg 0.34 -0.34 24 Lim. flexibility 0.33 -0.08 74 0.38 -0.04 75 
Dirty Float 1.50 0.45 11 Man. floating -0.45 -0.15 50 0.08 0.30 61 
Flexible 0.12 0.003 43 Freely floating -0.58 -0.85 8 -2.16 -1.37 15 
     Freely falling 0.23 0.60 21 
Inconclusives -3.52 -3.20 3 Category 6 -1.50 -0.83 2 -0.37 -0.94 4 
 
 
Developing countries   Developing countries 
 
 
Fixed   -0.12 -0.04 31 Pegged  -0.52 -0.23 47 -0.52 -0.23 47 
Crawling peg 0.42 -0.06 17 Lim. flexibility 0.96 0.29 35 1.04 0.35 36 
Dirty float 1.67 0.36 9 Man. floating -0.63 -0.17 32 0.16 0.48 43 
Flexible 0.31 0.27 22 Freely floating . . 0 0.62 0.35 5 
     Freely falling 2.04 1.72 18  
Inconclusives -3.52 -3.20 3 Category 6 -0.51 -0.23 1 0.98 0.30 1 
 
 
Transitional countries216  Transitional countries   
 
       
Pegged -8.53 -2.44 2 -8.53 -2.44 2 
    Lim. flexibility . . 0  
Dirty float -13.87 -2.78 1 Man. floating -0.40 -0.53 4 -0.40 -0.53 4 
       Freely floating . . 0 -15.41 -7.73 2 
Freely falling -10.59 -6.13 3  
    Category 6 -2.50 -1.44 1 -1.72 -2.18 2 
 
 
Industrial countries  Industrial countries 
       
 
Fixed  0.8 -0.46 10 Pegged  0.61 0.03 26 
Crawling peg 0.14 -1.01 7 Lim. flexibility -0.23 -0.41 39 
Dirty float 0.74 0.86 2 Man. floating -0.03 -0.01 14 
Flexible -0.09 -0.27 21 Freely floating -0.58 -0.85 8 
    Freely falling . . 0 
Inconclusives  . 0 Category 6 . . 0 
 
 
                                            
215 In the dirty float category we omit Poland 1990 because of its biasing effect (see transitional countries). 
216 As there is only one initial exchange rate regime for transitional countries, the values are given by the spell Poland 1990 – 93.   
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Table 6: Exchange rate regimes and mean of adjusted first and 
second quintile share of income 
   
     
Levy-Yeyati/Sturzenegger 2002   Reinhart/Rogoff 2003,    Reinhart/Rogoff 2003, 
5 – way classification   coarse classification   4-way classification 
 
 
 Q20ad  Q40ad N   Q20ad  Q40ad N Q20ad  Q40ad N 
 
 
All countries    
 
 
Fixed  0.053 0.094 68 Pegged  0.057 0.098 97 0.057 0.098 98 
Crawling peg 0.056 0.097 41 Lim. flexibility 0.063 0.108 108 0.062 0.108 110 
Dirty Float 0.054 0.093 20 Man. floating 0.056 0.096 67 0.054 0.092 81 
Flexible 0.057 0.100 69 Freely floating 0.063 0.117 15 0.064 0.110 25  
     Freely falling 0.048 0.082 30 
Inconclusives 0.073 0.106 5 Category 6 0.069 0.113 4 0.053 0.095 7 
 
 
Developing countries    
 
 
Fixed   0.048 0.083 49 Pegged  0.052 0.085 65 0.052 0.084 66 
Crawling peg 0.050 0.084 29 Lim. flexibility 0.059 0.094 57 0.058 0.093 59 
Dirty float 0.052 0.090 16 Man. floating 0.049 0.084 45 0.047 0.082 59 
Flexible 0.051 0.085 40 Freely floating 0.066 0.10 2 0.048 0.078 7 
     Freely falling 0.039 0.072 24 
Inconclusives 0.073 0.106 5 Category 6 0.089 0.127 1 0.050 0.086 3 
 
 
Transitional countries     
 
 
Fixed  0.080 0.126 1 Pegged  0.086 0.128 3 0.086 0.128 3 
Crawling peg . . 0 Lim. flexibility . . 0 . . 0  
Dirty float 0.062 0.096 2 Man. floating 0.096 0.132 6 0.096 0.132 6 
Flexible 0.074 0.121 2 Freely floating . . 0 0.091 0.130 5 
     Freely falling 0.082 0.122 6 
Inconclusive . . 0 Category 6 0.062 0.109 3 0.055 0.102 4 
 
 
Industrial countries    
       
 
Fixed  0.066 0.122 18 Pegged  0.067 0.126 29  
Crawling peg 0.073 0.130 12 Lim. flexibility 0.068 0.124 51  
Dirty float 0.058 0.112 2 Man. floating 0.061 0.115 16  
Flexible 0.064 0.121 27 Freely floating 0.063 0.119 13  
     Freely falling . . 0 
Inconclusives  . 0 Category 6 . . 0 
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Table 7: Exchange rate regimes and mean of average annual growth 
of mean income of first and second quintile share 
 
Levy-Yeyati/Sturzenegger 2002,  Reinhart/Rogoff 2003,   Reinhart/Rogoff 2003, 
5 – way classification   coarse classification   4-way classification 
 
 yp20  yp40 N   yp20  yp40 N  yp20  yp40 N 
 
All countries217     
 
 
Fixed  1.67 1.43 41 Pegged  1.81 1.96 75 1.81 1.96 75 
Crawling peg 1.92 1.25 24 Lim. flexibility 2.96 2.55 74 2.96 2.54 75 
Dirty Float 4.17 3.12 11 Man. floating 2.06 2.36 50 2.24 2.46 61 
Flexible 2.31 2.19 43 Freely floating 1.71 1.45 8 -1.64 -0.85 15 
     Freely falling -0.29 0.08 21  
Inconclusives -0.15 -0.16 3 Category 6 -5.29 -4.62 2 -3.67 -4.24 4 
 
 
Developing countries    
 
 
Fixed   1.24 1.32 31 Pegged  1.49 1.78 47 1.49 1.78 47 
Crawling peg 2.27 4.66 17 Lim. flexibility 4.01 3.33 35 3.98 3.29 36 
Dirty float 4.28 2.96 9 Man. floating 2.25 2.72 32 2.45 2.77 43 
Flexible 2.60 2.55 22 Freely floating . . 0 1.64 1.38 5 
     Freely falling 2.45 2.13 18  
Inconclusives -0.15 0.16 3 Category 6 1.26 1.55 1 0.34 -0.34 2 
 
 
Transitional countries218     
 
       
Pegged -6.45 -0.36 2 -6.45 -.36 2 
    Lim. flexibility . . 0 . . 0  
Dirty float -14.28 -3.19 1 Man. floating 0.91 0.79 4 0.91 0.79 4  
       Freely floating . . 0 -23.30 -15.61 2 
Freely falling -16.70 -12.24 3 
    Category 6 -11.84 -10.79 1 -7.67 -8.13 2 
 
 
Industrial countries   
       
 
Fixed  3.00 1.75 10 Pegged  3.05 2.47 26 
Crawling peg 1.08 -0.07 7 Lim. flexibility 2.02 1.85 39 
Dirty float 3.69 3.81 2 Man. floating 1.96 1.97 14 
Flexible 2.01 1.82 21 Freely floating 1.71 1.45 8 
    Freely falling . . 0 
Inconclusives . . 0 Category 6 . . 0 
 
 
 
 
                                            
217 In the dirty float category we omit Poland 1990 because of its biasing effect (see transitional countries). 
218 As there is only one initial exchange rate regime for transitional countries, the values are given by the spell Poland 1990 – 93.   
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Table 8: Exchange rate regimes and mean of mean income of 
adjusted first and second quintile share 
   
     
Levy-Yeyati/Sturzenegger 2002,  Reinhart/Rogoff 2003,    Reinhart/Rogoff 2003, 
5 – way classification   coarse classification   4-way classification 
 
 
 P20ad  P40ad N   P20ad  P40ad N P20ad  P40ad N 
All countries     
 
 
Fixed  2277 4078 68 Pegged  2093 3756 97 2084 3738 98  
Crawling peg 2388 4238 41 Lim. flexibility 3204 5743 108 3157 5661 110 
Dirty Float 1936 3340 20 Man. floating 1989 3480 67 1830 3211 81 
Flexible 2844 5295 69 Freely floating 5317 10116 15 3924 7172 25 
     Freely falling 1244 2087 30 
Inconclusives 966 1430 5 Category 6 1499 2628 4 1085 2028 7 
 
 
Developing countries    
 
 
Fixed   964 1670 49 Pegged  894 1489 65 899 1497 66 
Crawling peg 952 1653 29 Lim. flexibility 1210 1991 57 1190 1964 59 
Dirty float 1567 2640 16 Man. floating 786 1369 45 853 1501 59 
Flexible 926 1608 40 Freely floating 810 1153 2 889 1486 7 
     Freely falling 928 1668 24  
Inconclusives 966 1430 5 Category 6 416 593 1 225 388 3 
 
 
Transitional countries     
 
 
Fixed  2736 4319 1 Pegged  2778 4126 3 2778 4126 3 
Crawling peg . . 0 Lim. flexibility . . 0 . . 0 
Dirty float 2066 3240 2 Man. floating 4071 5564 6 4071 5564 6 
Flexible 2178 3628 2 Freely floating . . 0 2746 3892 5 
     Freely falling 2511 3762 6  
Inconclusive . . 0 Category 6 1860 3306 3 1729 3892 4 
 
 
Industrial countries   
       
 
Fixed  5826 10621 18 Pegged  4709 8798 29  
Crawling peg 5859 10483 12 Lim. flexibility 5433 9937 51  
Dirty float 4756 9045 2 Man. floating 4592 8635 16  
Flexible 5736 10881 27 Freely floating 6011 11495 13    
     Freely falling . . 0 
Inconclusives  . 0 Category 6 . . 0 
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Table 9: Exchange rate regimes and pro-poor growth 
 distribution effect (Growth equation) 
 
 
Levy-Yeyati/Sturzenegger 2002   Reinhart/Rogoff 2003, coarse classification 
 
 
All countries    All countries 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)    (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Dep. Var. yq20 yq20o yq40 yq40o    yq20 yq20o yq40 yq40o 
             
   
Crawling peg 0.23 0.69 -0.19 -0.61 Limited flexibility 0.67 0.58 0.12 0.12 
  (1.04) (0.95) (0.73) (0.68)    (0.69) (0.55) (0.40) (0.36) 
Dirty Float 0.12 1.85* 0.33 -0.09 Managed floating -0.10 0.15 0.04 -0.12 
  (1.62) (0.98) (0.75) (0.70)    (0.82) (0.79) (0.43) (0.37) 
Flexible 0.01 0.80 0.15 -0.27 Freely floating  -0.24 0.01 -0.66** -0.66** 
  (0.99) (0.84) (0.58) (0.52)    (0.73) (0.69) (0.32) (0.29) 
Freely falling  0.57 2.37** 0.80 0.36 
         (1.80) (0.93) (1.20) (0.74) 
 
Constant 0.11 -0.34 -0.14 0.27 Constant  -0.34 -0.59 -0.20 -0.19 
  (0.86) (0.74) (0.48) (0.40)    (0.49) (0.43) (0.28) (0.23) 
 
F-test  0.04 1.29 0.16 0.29 F-test   0.51 1.91 2.40* 2.36* 
R2  0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 R2   0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 
N  120 117 120 118 N   228 222 228 223 
  
 
Developing countries    Developing countries 
 
(9) (10) (11) (12)    (13) (14) (15) (16) 
 
Dep. Var. yq20 yq20o yq40 yq40o    yq20 yq20o yq40 yq40o 
 
 
Crawling peg 0.54 1.15 -0.02 -0.58 Limited flexibility 1.48 1.17 0.52 0.51 
  (1.35) (1.23) (0.91) (0.84)    (1.12) (0.78) (0.62) (0.57) 
Dirty float 1.79 2.40** 0.40 -0.16 Managed floating -0.11 0.29 0.06 -0.20 
  (1.33) (1.20) (0.93) (0.86)    (1.14) (1.07) (0.64) (0.54) 
Flexible 0.43 1.71 0.31 -0.25 Freely floating  . . . . 
  (1.43) (1.15) (0.88) (0.80) 
      Freely falling  2.55 2.88*** 1.95 0.96 
         (1.67) (1.03) (1.22) (0.72) 
 
Constant -0.12 -0.73 -0.04 0.52 Constant  -0.52 -0.92 -0.23 -0.22 
  (1.09) (0.93) (0.62) (0.51)    (0.69) (0.57) (0.41) (0.33) 
 
F-test  0.83 1.43 0.11 0.16 F-test   1.33 2.84* 1.02 1.03 
R2  0.01 0.05 0.00 0.01 R2   0.04 0.05 0.04 0.03 
N  79 77 79 77 N   132 128 132 128 
 
 
* denotes significance at the 90% level, ** at the 95% level, and *** at the 99% level (two-sided alternative). Pooled – OLS 
estimation for all equations. Heteroscedasticity adjusted standard errors in parentheses. F-test indicates the F-statistic for the 
test on the overall significance of the regression. yq20: average annual growth rate of the first quintile share. yq40: average annual 
growth rate of the second quintile share. yq20o: average annual growth rate of the first quintile share (regressions without 
outliers). yq40o: average annual growth rate of the second quintile share (regressions without outliers).    
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Table 9: continued 
 
 
Levy-Yeyati/Sturzenegger 2002    Reinhart/Rogoff 2003, coarse classification 
 
 
Industrial countries    Industrial countries 
 
 
(17) (18) (19) (20)    (21) (22) (23) (24) 
 
Dep. Var. yq20 yq20o yq40 yq40o    yq20 yq20o yq40 yq40o 
 
 
Crawling peg -0.66 0.21 -0.55 0.46 Limited flexibility -0.84 -1.07* -0.44 -0.07 
  (1.20) (0.88) (1.09) (0.50)    (0.59) (0.54) (0.43) (0.36) 
Dirty float -0.06 0.81 1.32** 1.32** Managed floating -0.64 -1.55** -0.05 -0.05 
(1.26) (0.97) (0.55) (0.55)    (1.16) (0.77) (0.45) (0.45) 
Flexible -0.89 -0.02 0.19 0.19 Freely floating  -1.19* -1.19* -0.88*** -0.88*** 
  (1.08) (0.79) (0.43) (0.43)    (0.67) (0.67) (0.32) (0.32) 
Freely falling  . . . . 
 
 
Constant 0.80 -0.07 -0.46 -0.46 Constant  0.61 0.61 0.03 0.03 
  (1.08) (0.71) (0.38) (0.38)    (0.39) (0.39) (0.26) (0.26) 
 
F-test  0.54 0.43 2.78* 2.55* F-test   1.29 2.18* 3.35** 4.29** 
R2  0.03 0.01 0.07 0.09 R2   0.02 0.07 0.03 0.03 
N  40 39 40 39 N   87 85 87 85 
 
 
 
* denotes significance at the 90% level, ** at the 95% level, and *** at the 99% level (two-sided alternative). Pooled – OLS 
estimation for all equations. Heteroscedasticity adjusted standard errors in parentheses. F-test indicates the F-statistic for the 
test on the overall significance of the regression. yq20: average annual growth rate of the first quintile share. yq40: average annual 
growth rate of the second quintile share. yq20o: average annual growth rate of the first quintile share (regressions without 
outliers). yq40o: average annual growth rate of the second quintile share (regressions without outliers).    
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Table 9: continued 
 
 
Reinhart/Rogoff 2003, 4-way classification 
 
All countries       
 
 
(25) (26) (27) (28)    
 
Dep. Var.  yq20 yq20o yq40 yq40o    
 
Limited flexibility 0.72 0.63 0.15 0.05     
   (0.68) (0.55) (0.39) (0.35)    
Managed floating 0.43 0.35 0.50 0.09    
   (0.86) (0.77) (0.52) (0.39)    
Freely floating  -1.82 0.47 -1.17 -0.30    
   (1.54) (0.71) (0.75) (0.31)    
  
Constant  -0.34 -0.59 -0.20 -0.09     
   (0.49) (0.43) (0.27) (0.21)  
    
F-test   1.10 0.45 1.43 0.49    
R2   0.02 0.005 0.02 0.002    
N   226 221 226 220       
         
   
 
Developing countries 
 
(29) (30) (31) (32) 
 
yq20 yq20o yq40 yq40o 
 
Limited flexibility 1.56 1.27 0.58 0.41 
   (1.10) (0.78) (0.61) (0.54) 
Managed floating 0.68 0.63 0.71 0.11 
(1.17) (1.02) (0.74) (0.54) 
Freely floating  1.13 1.54 0.58 0.41 
(1.34) (1.28) (0.54) (0.45) 
 
Constant  -0.52 -0.92 -0.23 -0.06 
   (0.69) (0.57) (0.41) (0.29) 
 
F-test   0.72 1.07 0.53 0.36 
R2   0.01 0.02 0.01 0.005 
N   131 128 131 127 
 
 
 
* denotes significance at the 90% level, ** at the 95% level, and *** at the 99% level (two-sided alternative). Pooled – OLS 
estimation for all equations. Heteroscedasticity adjusted standard errors in parentheses. F-test indicates the F-statistic for the 
test on the overall significance of the regression. yq20: average annual growth rate of the first quintile share. yq40: average annual 
growth rate of the second quintile share. yq20o: average annual growth rate of the first quintile share (regressions without 
outliers). yq40o: average annual growth rate of the second quintile share (regressions without outliers).    
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Table 10: Exchange rate regimes and pro-poor growth 
distribution effect (System GMM estimation) 
      
Reinhart/Rogoff 2003, coarse classification  
 
All Countries      Developing Countries  
 
(1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Dep. Var.  Yq20s Yq20c Yq40s Yq40c  Yq20s Yq20c Yq40s Yq40c 
           
Limited flexibility 0.072 0.101** 0.061* 0.083**  0.083 0.103 0.058 0.075* 
   (0.054) (0.050) (0.036) (0.038)  (0.068) (0.064) (0.041) (0.040) 
 
Managed floating 0.020 -0.004 0.002 -0.012  -0.003 -0.010 0.015 0.001 
   (0.061) (0.061) (0.041) (0.046)  (0.075) (0.069) (0.048) (0.047) 
 
Freely floating  0.048 0.148* 0.128** 0.182*** 0.281***0.238***0.185***0.173*** 
(0.090) (0.080) (0.058) (0.061)  (0.102) (0.114) (0.056) (0.064) 
 
Freely falling  -0.152* -0.161* -0.120**-0.136*  -0.131 -0.142 -0.073 -0.086 
   (0.088) (0.090) (0.060) (0.070)  (0.091) (0.090) (0.060) (0.066) 
 
Constant  -1.28*** -1.32*** -0.67*** -0.75*** -1.38*** -1.43*** -0.79*** -0.89***  
   (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05)  (0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05)  
 
m1   -1.60 -2.65*** -1.78* -2.81*** -1.60 -2.56** -1.68* -2.59*** 
m2   -1.75* -1.15  -1.95* 0.88  -1.23 -0.87 -1.91* 0.84  
N   321 307 321 307  201 191 201 191 
1 – RSS/TSS  0.05 0.09 0.07 0.13  0.07 0.10 0.07 0.10 
 
 
Industrial Countries 
 
(9) (10) (11) (12)   
 
Yq20s Yq20c  Yq40s Yq40c   
 
 
Limited flexibility -0.004 0.032 -0.022 -0.009 
   (0.075) (0.049) (0.020) (0.021) 
 
Managed floating 0.036 -0.042 -0.039 -0.054* 
   (0.086) (0.072) (0.033) (0.032) 
 
Freely floating  -0.157 -0.033 -0.069 -0.041 
   (0.102) (0.082) (0.049) (0.048) 
 
Constant  -1.11*** -1.13*** -0.45*** -0.47*** 
   (0.09) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) 
 
m1   -0.77 -0.72 -1.30 -1.75* 
m2   -1.19 -1.81* -0.99 -1.35 
N   111 107 111 107 
1 – RSS/TSS  0.07 0.05 0.07 0.09 
 
 
* denotes significance at the 90% level, ** at the 95% level, and *** at the 99% level (two-tailed test). Results for one-step 
estimation are obtained using DPD98 for GAUSS. Heteroscedasticity adjusted asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. M1 
and m2 are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as 
N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. 1 – RSS/TSS: 1 – residual sum of squares/total sum of squares. Yq20s/Yq40s: 
ln(Q20/40/0.2) unadjusted approach. Yq20c/Yq40c: ln(Q20/40/0.2) adjusted approach.  
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Table 10: continued 
      
Reinhart/Rogoff 2003, 4-way classification  
 
All Countries      Developing Countries  
 
(13) (14)  (15) (16)  (17) (18) (19) (20) 
 
Dep. Var.  Yq20s Yq20c Yq40s Yq40c  Yq20s Yq20c Yq40s Yq40c 
           
Limited flexibility 0.072 0.092* 0.063* 0.078**  0.080 0.087 0.059 0.066* 
   (0.053) (0.050) (0.036) (0.037)  (0.067) (0.063) (0.041) (0.040) 
 
Managed floating -0.005 -0.029 -0.013 -0.029  -0.021 -0.033 0.003 -0.012 
   (0.058) (0.057) (0.040) (0.042)  (0.070) (0.064) (0.045) (0.042) 
 
Freely floating  0.017 0.074 0.063 0.081  -0.002 -0.021 0.0002 -0.024  
(0.101) (0.096) (0.071) (0.075)  (0.160) (0.139) (0.100) (0.098) 
 
Constant  -1.30*** -1.32*** -0.68*** -0.75*** -1.39*** -1.43*** -0.79*** -0.89***  
   (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)  (0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05)  
 
m1   -1.64 -2.18**  -1.81* -2.77*** -1.56 -2.02** -1.76* -2.53** 
m2   -1.61* -1.76*  -1.94* 0.97  -1.08 -1.17 -1.75* 0.15  
N   319 305 319 305  199 189 199 189 
1 – RSS/TSS  0.02 0.04 0.04 0.06  0.03 0.04 0.03 0.05 
 
* denotes significance at the 90% level, ** at the 95% level, and *** at the 99% level (two-tailed test). Results for one-step 
estimation are obtained using DPD98 for GAUSS. Heteroscedasticity adjusted asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. M1 
and m2 are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as 
N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. 1 – RSS/TSS: 1 – residual sum of squares/total sum of squares. Yq20s/Yq40s: 
ln(Q20/40/0.2) unadjusted approach. Yq20c/Yq40c: ln(Q20/40/0.2) adjusted approach.  
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Table 11: Exchange rate regimes and regional dummies  
distribution effect (Growth equation) 
 
 
Levy-Yeyati/Sturzenegger 2002   Reinhart/Rogoff 2003, coarse classification 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)    (5)  (6) (7) (8) 
  
Dep. Var. yq20o yq40o yq20o yq40o    yq20o yq40o yq20o yq40o 
  all all dev dev    all all dev dev 
ols re ols re    ols re ols re 
 
Crawling peg 0.37 -0.48 0.79 -0.43 Limited flexibility 0.44 0.08 1.29* 0.52 
  (0.95) (0.63) (1.26) (0.88)    (0.49) (0.37) (0.73) (0.57) 
  
Dirty float 1.62 0.16 2.13* -0.12 Managed floating 0.46 -0.09 0.47 -0.32 
  (0.99) (0.82) (1.21) (1.07)    (0.83) (0.42) (1.10) (0.61) 
 
Flexible 0.60 -0.08 1.46 -0.22 Freely floating  -0.36 -0.64  
  (0.85) (0.55) (1.18) (0.82)    (0.69) (0.85) 
 
Freely falling  3.13*** 0.53 3.31*** 1.01 
         (1.11) (0.63) (1.20) (0.77) 
    
EAP  -0.26 0.12 1.02 -0.97    -0.82 0.05 -1.37 -0.83 
  (0.86) (0.66) (1.72) (1.10)    (0.73) (0.44) (1.60) (0.77) 
    
ECA   -2.66      -3.29* -1.92**   
   (2.51)      (1.93) (0.85) 
    
LAC  0.65 0.93 1.87 -0.13    -1.44* -0.18 -1.76 -1.05 
  (0.92) (0.58) (1.84) (1.04)    (0.84) (0.48) (1.47) (0.73) 
     
MNA  1.01 1.05 2.27 -0.03    0.82 1.00 0.36 0.18 
  (0.95) (0.93) (1.82) (1.34)    (0.79) (0.69) (1.57) (0.96) 
    
SA  0.03 0.30 1.06 -0.77    0.12 -0.03 -0.37 -0.93 
  (0.63) 0.98) (1.67) (1.43)    (0.60) (0.55) (1.66) (0.86) 
     
SSA  -1.43 1.08      0.20 0.78   
  (1.61) (0.87)      (1.50) (0.63)  
     
Constant -0.25 -0.28 -1.88 0.86    -0.22 -0.22 -0.06 0.52 
  (0.78) (0.53) (1.68) (0.90)    (0.42) (0.34) (1.62) (0.68) 
 
Breusch-Pagan  6.49**  6.65***     5.51**  5.68** 
F- test  0.87  1.05     1.84*  2.91***  
Wald – test  6.94  2.10     12.24  7.14 
R2  0.06 0.06 0.08 0.03    0.08 0.05 0.09 0.06 
N  117 118 77 77    222 223 128 128 
 
 
* denotes significance at the 90% level, ** at the 95% level, and *** at the 99% level (two-sided alternative). Heteroscedasticity 
adjusted standard errors in parentheses. F-test/Wald-test indicate the F-statistic/Wald-statistic for the test on the overall 
significance of the regression. Ramsey Reset test for omitted variables is passed in all OLS estimations (equations 1, 3, 5, 7). 
Breusch-Pagan is a Lagrange-multiplier test for the random effects model, distributed as chi-squared under the null of no 
random effects. yq20o: average annual growth rate of the first quintile share (regressions without outliers). yq40o: average annual 
growth rate of the second quintile share (regressions without outliers). ols: results for pooled OLS estimation, re: results for 
random effects estimation. all: all countries. dev: developing countries. 
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Table 11: continued 
 
 
Reinhart/Rogoff 2003, 4-way classification 
 
 (9) (10) (11) (12)    
  
Dep. Var.  yq20o yq40o yq20o yq40o    
   all all dev dev    
ols re ols re    
 
Limited flexibility 0.60 0.12 1.49** 0.53 
   (0.49) (0.37) (0.73) (0.58) 
 
Managed floating 0.62 -0.23 0.83 -0.08 
   (0.80) (0.41) (1.04) (0.58) 
 
Freely floating  0.50 -0.31 1.93 0.19 
   (0.73) (0.67) (1.36) (1.22) 
 
EAP   -0.76 0.07 -1.73 -1.56* 
   (0.72) (0.43) (1.64) (0.81) 
 
ECA   -3.13 -0.88 
   (2.17) (0.95) 
   
LAC   -0.91 0.25 -1.80 -1.29*  
   (0.81) (0.43) (1.57) (0.77) 
 
MNA   1.09 1.06 0.16 -0.50 
   (0.73) (0.68) (1.57) (1.00) 
 
SA   0.24 0.01 -0.63 -1.61* 
   (0.60) (0.54) (1.71) (0.90) 
 
SSA   0.71 1.50**   
   (1.51) (0.64) 
 
Constant  -0.40 -0.27 0.13 1.19 
   (0.42) (0.33) (1.68) (0.73) 
 
Breusch-Pagan   6.13**  5.62** 
F-test   1.45  2.40** 
Wald-test   9.45  0.56 
R2   0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 
N   221 220 128 127 
 
 
 
* denotes significance at the 90% level, ** at the 95% level, and *** at the 99% level (two-sided alternative). Heteroscedasticity 
adjusted standard errors in parentheses. F-test/Wald-test indicate the F-statistic/Wald-statistic for the test on the overall 
significance of the regression. Ramsey Reset test for omitted variables is passed in equation 11, but not passed in equation 9. 
Breusch-Pagan is a Lagrange-multiplier test for the random effects model, distributed as chi-squared under the null of no 
random effects. yq20o: average annual growth rate of the first quintile share (regressions without outliers). yq40o: average annual 
growth rate of the second quintile share (regressions without outliers). ols: results for pooled OLS estimation, re: results for 
random effects estimation. all: all countries. dev: developing countries. 
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Table 12: Exchange rate regimes and regional dummies 
distribution effect (System GMM estimation) 
 
 
Reinhart/Rogoff (2003), coarse classification 
 
All Countries      Developing Countries 
 
Dep. Var.  Yq20s Yq20c Yq40s Yq40c  Yq20s Yq20c Yq40s Yq40c 
 
   (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
      
Limited flexibility 0.044 0.052 0.026 0.030*  0.063 0.052 0.045 0.046* 
   (0.043) (0.036) (0.019) (0.017)  (0.051) (0.049) (0.028) (0.025) 
 
Managed floating 0.083* 0.041 0.045* 0.026  0.099* 0.069 0.076** 0.056* 
   (0.043) (0.039) (0.025) (0.023)  (0.053) (0.048) (0.032) (0.029) 
 
Free floating  -0.037 0.044 0.014 0.029  0.280***0.247***0.186***0.172*** 
   (0.090) (0.073) (0.051) (0.048)  (0.061) (0.044) (0.032) (0.029) 
 
Freely falling  0.030 -0.013 0.011 -0.005  0.043 -0.004 0.031 0.010 
   (0.056) (0.064) (0.039) (0.046)  (0.062) (0.069) (0.043) (0.049) 
 
 
Eap   -0.13 -0.07 -0.22*** -0.25*** 0.08 0.38*** 0.06 0.20** 
   (0.08) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)  (0.09) (0.10) (0.07) (0.08) 
 
Eca   0.39*** 0.40*** 0.14*** 0.10***   
   (0.08) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03)   
 
Lac   -0.61*** -0.55*** -0.51*** -0.58*** -0.40*** -0.10 -0.23*** -0.13* 
   (0.08) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05)  (0.08) (0.10) (0.06) (0.08) 
 
Mna   -0.08 -0.20** -0.20*** -0.32*** 0.13 0.26** 0.08 0.13* 
   (0.10) (0.08) (0.05) (0.04)  (0.11) (0.12) (0.07) (0.07) 
 
Sa   0.19** 0.11** -0.03 -0.12*** 0.41*** 0.58*** 0.25*** 0.33*** 
   (0.10) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03)  (0.11) (0.10) (0.07) (0.07) 
 
Ssa   -0.21** -0.45*** -0.28*** -0.44***  
   (0.09) (0.10) (0.06) (0.06) 
 
Constant  -1.16*** -1.16*** -0.40*** -0.51*** -1.38*** -1.63*** -0.79*** -0.98*** 
   (0.07) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.07) (0.10) (0.06) (0.07) 
 
m1   -1.61 -2.20** -1.75* -2.68*** -1.49 -2.09** -1.63 -2.47** 
m2   -1.47 -1.05 -2.14** -0.39  -1.01 -0.39 -2.05** -0.26 
N   321 307 321 307  201 191 201 191 
1 – RSS/TSS  0.50 0.55 0.60 0.68  0.49 0.52 0.44 0.47 
 
 
 
* denotes significance at the 90% level, ** at the 95% level, and *** at the 99% level (two-tailed test). Results for one-step 
estimation are obtained using DPD98 for GAUSS. Heteroscedasticity adjusted asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. M1 
and m2 are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as 
N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. 1 – RSS/TSS: 1 – residual sum of squares/total sum of squares. Yq20s/Yq40s: 
ln(Q20/40/0.2) unadjusted approach. Yq20c/Yq40c: ln(Q20/40/0.2) adjusted approach.  
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Table 12: continued 
 
 
Reinhart/Rogoff (2003), 4-way classification 
 
 
All Countries      Developing Countries 
 
Dep. Var.  Yq20s Yq20c Yq40s Yq40c  Yq20s Yq20c Yq40s Yq40c 
 
   (9) (10) (11) (12)  (13) (14) (15) (16) 
      
Limited flexibility 0.047 0.042 0.029 0.026  0.067 0.037 0.050* 0.038 
   (0.043) (0.036) (0.020) (0.018)  (0.052) (0.050) (0.029) (0.026) 
 
Managed floating 0.075* 0.034 0.042* 0.023  0.090* 0.054 0.070** 0.048* 
   (0.040) (0.038) (0.024) (0.021)  (0.049) (0.046) (0.031) (0.026) 
 
Freely floating  -0.006 0.030 0.014 0.012  0.122   0.073 0.074 0.040 
   (0.075) (0.069) (0.044) (0.046)  (0.116) (0.117) (0.072) (0.079) 
 
Eap   -0.13 -0.08 -0.22*** -0.25*** 0.06 0.37*** 0.05 0.19** 
   (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)  (0.09) (0.11) (0.07) (0.08) 
 
Eca   0.40*** 0.38*** 0.14*** 0.09***   
   (0.08) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02)   
 
Lac   -0.61*** -0.57*** -0.51*** -0.59*** -0.43*** -0.13 -0.25*** -0.15* 
   (0.08) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)  (0.08) (0.10) (0.07) (0.08) 
 
Mna   -0.08 -0.20** -0.20*** -0.32*** 0.11 0.24** 0.06 0.12 
   (0.10) (0.08) (0.05) (0.04)  (0.11) (0.12) (0.07) (0.07) 
 
Sa   0.20** 0.11** -0.03 -0.12*** 0.39*** 0.56*** 0.24*** 0.32*** 
   (0.10) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03)  (0.11) (0.10) (0.07) (0.07) 
 
Ssa   -0.19** -0.44*** -0.27*** -0.44***  
   (0.09) (0.10) (0.06) (0.07) 
 
Constant  -1.16*** -1.15*** -0.50*** -0.51*** -1.36*** -1.60*** -0.78*** -0.96*** 
   (0.07) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.07) (0.10) (0.06) (0.07) 
 
m1   -1.63 -2.10** -1.77* -2.77*** -1.50 -1.94* -1.66* -2.60*** 
m2   -1.56 -1.01 -2.20** -0.58  -1.14 -0.56 -2.10** 0.02 
N   319 305 319 305  199 189 199 189 
1 – RSS/TSS  0.50 0.55 0.60 0.68  0.49 0.53 0.44 0.46 
 
 
 
* denotes significance at the 90% level, ** at the 95% level, and *** at the 99% level (two-tailed test). Results for one-step 
estimation are obtained using DPD98 for GAUSS. Heteroscedasticity adjusted asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. M1 
and m2 are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as 
N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. 1 – RSS/TSS: 1 – residual sum of squares/total sum of squares. Yq20s/Yq40s: 
ln(Q20/40/0.2) unadjusted approach. Yq20c/Yq40c: ln(Q20/40/0.2) adjusted approach.  
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Table 13: Exchange rate regimesand currency crises 
distribution effect (Growth Equation) 
 
 
Levy-Yeyati/    Reinhart/ 
Sturzenegger 2002  Rogoff 2003: coarse classification  4-way classification 
  
  (1)    (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
 
Dep. Var. yq40o    yq40o yq20o yq40o  yq20o  yq40o 
indu    indu dev dev  dev dev 
ols    re ols re  re re 
     
    
Crawling Peg 0.33  Limited  -0.25 2.04* 1.22  2.15* 0.83 
(0.49)  flexibility (0.56) (1.08) (0.82)  (1.21) (0.85) 
  
Dirty Float 1.19**  Managed -0.37 1.68 0.72  1.84 0.90 
(0.54)  floating  (0.60) (1.47) (0.97)  (1.26) (0.88) 
 
Flexible 0.55  Freely floating -1.06    0.69 -0.05 
(0.45)    (0.94)    (2.12) (1.47) 
      
Freely falling  2.79* 1.16     
   (1.42) (0.95)  
     
Currency -1.27*  Currency -1.05** 1.77 1.65*  2.63** 1.67* 
Crisis  (0.65)  Crisis  (0.55) (1.31) (0.86)  (1.34) (0.89) 
 
    
Constant -0.33  Constant 0.29 -1.50 -1.01  -1.65* -0.61 
  (0.35)    (0.50) (0.94) (0.68)  (1.00) (0.71) 
  
 
F-test  2.70*  F-test   2.45*    
Wald-test 5.01  6.59  6.65 4.47 
Breusch-   Breusch- 
Pagan     Pagan  4.13**  10.28*** 3.64* 9.29***  
R2  0.22  R2  0.11 0.10 0.08  0.08 0.06  
N  30  N  44 80 81  80 80 
      
 
 
 
* denotes significance at the 90% level, ** at the 95% level, and *** at the 99% level (two-sided alternative). Heteroscedasticity 
adjusted standard errors in parentheses. F-test/Wald-test indicate the F-statistic/Wald-statistic for the test on the overall 
significance of the regression. Ramsey Reset test for omitted variables is passed in all OLS estimations (equations 1 and 3). 
Breusch-Pagan is a Lagrange multiplier test for the random effects model, distributed as chi-squared under the null of no 
random effects. yq20o: average annual growth rate of the first quintile share (regressions without outliers). yq40o: average annual 
growth rate of the second quintile share (regressions without outliers). ols: results for pooled OLS estimation. re: results for 
random effects estimation. dev: developing countries. indu: industrial countries. 
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Table 14: Exchange rate regimes and currency crises 
distribution effect (System GMM estimation) 
 
Reinhart/Rogoff (2003), coarse classification  
 
 
All Countries Developing  Industrial  
Countries  Countries 
 
Dep. Var.  Yq40s Yq40c  Yq40s Yq40c  Yq40s Yq40c 
    
   (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
      
Limited flexibility 0.008 0.029  0.023 0.043  -0.063**-0.030 
   (0.026) (0.025)  (0.032) (0.031)  (0.030) (0.034) 
 
Managed floating 0.021 0.010  0.054 0.037  -0.083**-0.078** 
   (0.027) (0.028)  (0.034) (0.035)  (0.043) (0.039) 
 
Freely floating  0.045 0.082***    -0.024 0.023  
   (0.029) (0.030)     (0.025) (0.032) 
 
Freely falling  -0.045 -0.054  -0.028 -0.038 
   (0.044) (0.053)  (0.062) (0.055)  
 
Currency Crisis  0.040* 0.029  0.047 0.028   0.032** 0.023*** 
   (0.023) (0.028)  (0.034) (0.040)  (0.013) (0.008) 
 
EAP   -0.23*** -0.26*** 0.03 -0.14**  
   (0.05) (0.05)  (0.06) (0.07) 
 
ECA   0.12*** 0.08*** 
   (0.04) (0.02) 
 
LAC   -0.49*** -0.58*** -0.24*** -0.18** 
   (0.05) (0.06)  (0.06) (0.07) 
 
MNA   -0.18*** -0.31*** 0.08 -0.10 
   (0.04) (0.05)  (0.05) (0.06) 
 
SA   0.002 -0.09**  0.26*** 0.32*** 
   (0.02) (0.04)  (0.04) (0.07) 
 
SSA   -0.25*** -0.40***   
   (0.05) (0.06) 
 
Constant  -0.47*** -0.51*** -0.74*** -0.92***  -0.40*** -0.45*** 
   (0.03) (0.03)  (0.04) (0.06)  (0.02) (0.03) 
 
 
m1   -2.22** -2.58*** -2.11** -2.50**  -1.70* -1.32 
m2   1.51 1.97**  1.38 1.82*  -1.71* -0.41 
N   201 194  127 124  67 63 
1 – RSS/TSS  0.67 0.73  0.51 0.51  0.14 0.19 
 
* denotes significance at the 90% level, ** at the 95% level, and *** at the 99% level (two-tailed test). Results for one-step 
estimation are obtained using DPD98 for GAUSS. Heteroscedasticity adjusted asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. M1 
and m2 are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as 
N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. 1 – RSS/TSS: 1 – residual sum of squares/total sum of squares. Yq20s/Yq40s: 
ln(Q20/40/0.2) unadjusted approach. Yq20c/Yq40c: ln(Q20/40/0.2) adjusted approach.  
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Table 14: continued 
 
Reinhart/Rogoff (2003), 4-way classification  
 
 
All Countries Developing Countries   
 
Dep. Var.  Yq40s Yq40c  Yq40s Yq40c   
    
   (7) (8)  (9) (10)   
      
Limited flexibility 0.011 0.019  0.028 0.031   
   (0.026) (0.027)  (0.034) (0.035)   
 
Managed floating 0.014 -0.005  0.036 0.012   
   (0.024) (0.025)  (0.029) (0.031)   
 
Free floating  -0.012 -0.006  -0.028 -0.030  
   (0.064) (0.073)  (0.092) (0.100)   
 
Currency Crisis  0.027 0.011  0.031 0.006    
   (0.021) (0.027)  (0.031) (0.040)   
 
EAP   -0.23*** -0.27*** 0.01 0.12*  
   (0.05) (0.05)  (0.06) (0.07) 
 
ECA   0.12*** 0.07*** 
   (0.04) (0.02) 
 
LAC   -0.51*** -0.60*** -0.27*** -0.21*** 
   (0.05) (0.06)  (0.06) (0.07) 
 
MNA   -0.19*** -0.32*** 0.05 0.07 
   (0.04) (0.05)  (0.05) (0.07) 
 
SA   -0.004 -0.10**  0.24*** 0.29*** 
   (0.02) (0.04)  (0.05) (0.07) 
 
SSA   -0.24*** -0.39***   
   (0.05) (0.06) 
 
Constant  -0.47*** -0.49*** -0.72*** -0.89***   
   (0.03) (0.03)  (0.05) (0.06)   
 
 
m1   -2.07* -2.20**  -1.94* -2.30**   
m2   1.11 1.84*  1.31 1.87*   
N   199 192  125 122   
1 – RSS/TSS  0.67 0.73  0.51 0.51   
 
* denotes significance at the 90% level, ** at the 95% level, and *** at the 99% level (two-tailed test). Results for one-step 
estimation are obtained using DPD98 for GAUSS. Heteroscedasticity adjusted asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. M1 
and m2 are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as 
N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. 1 – RSS/TSS: 1 – residual sum of squares/total sum of squares. Yq20s/Yq40s: 
ln(Q20/40/0.2) unadjusted approach. Yq20c/Yq40c: ln(Q20/40/0.2) adjusted approach.  
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Table 15: Exchange rate regimes and inflation  
distribution effect (Growth equation) 
 
 
Reinhart/Rogoff 2003:  coarse classification 4-way classification 
 
(1) (2)  (3) (4)   (5) (6) 
  
Dep. Var.  yq20o yq40o  yq20o yq40o  yq20o yq40o 
   dev dev  dev dev  dev dev 
ols re  re re  re re 
 
Limited flexibility 1.11 0.43  1.15 0.37 
   (0.75) (0.61)  (1.01) (0.61) 
  
Managed floating 0.48 -0.61  0.24 -0.58 
   (1.12) (0.65)  (1.04) (0.64) 
 
Freely floating     -2.13 -1.65 
      (2.71) (1.65) 
 
Freely falling  0.82 -0.41   
   (1.80) (1.11)  
    
ln(1+inflation)  7.31* 3.60  9.93*** 3.91*  7.06*** 3.28*  
   (4.00) (2.28)  (3.42) (2.09)  (2.68) (1.70) 
 
EAP   -0.73 -0.72  -1.12 -1.46*  -0.38 0.57 
   (1.52) (0.80)  (1.35) (0.83)  (1.23) (0.78) 
    
ECA         
      
    
LAC   -1.49 -0.76  -2.23* -1.24  -1.26 0.60 
   (1.45) (0.77)  (1.29) (0.80)  (1.19) (0.76) 
    
MNA   0.93 0.49  0.64 -0.25  1.38 1.64* 
   (1.54) (1.00)  (1.66) (1.02)  (1.53) (0.97) 
 
SA   -0.51 -1.15  -0.96 -1.89  -0.23 0.30 
   (1.61) (0.95)  (1.57) (0.97)  (1.43) (0.91) 
     
SSA     
   
     
Constant  -0.99 0.16  -0.80 0.90  -0.70 -1.03 
   (1.62) (0.76)  (1.20) (0.78)  (1.11) (0.70) 
 
Breusch-Pagan   8.69***  4.59** 8.86***  4.19** 6.13** 
F- test   2.38**        
Wald – test   9.27  14.26* 10.10  10.04* 6.66  
R2   0.11 0.08  0.12 0.09  0.08 0.05  
N   117 117  117 116  123 123   
  
* denotes significance at the 90% level, ** at the 95% level, and *** at the 99% level (two-sided alternative). Heteroscedasticity 
adjusted standard errors in parentheses. F-test/Wald-test indicate the F-statistic/Wald-statistic for the test on the overall 
significance of the regression. Ramsey Reset test for omitted variables is passed in OLS estimation (equation 1). Breusch-
Pagan is a Lagrange-multiplier test for the random effects model, distributed as chi-squared under the null of no random effects. 
yq20o: average annual growth rate of the first quintile share (regressions without outliers). yq40o: average annual growth rate of the 
second quintile share (regressions without outliers). ols: results for pooled OLS estimation, re: results for random effects 
estimation. dev: developing countries. 
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Table 16: Exchange rate regimes and macroeconomic variables 
distribution effect (Growth equation) 
 
Levy-Yeyati/Sturzenegger 2002   Reinhart/Rogoff 2003, coarse classification  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6) (7) (8) 
       
Dep. Var. yq20o yq40o yq20o yq40o   yq20o yq40o yq20o yq40o 
all/ols all/fe dev/ols dev/fe   all/ols all/re dev/ols dev/re 
   
Crawling peg -0.38 -0.88 0.09 -0.69 Limited flexibility 1.34* 0.81 1.53** 0.82  
(1.15)  (1.34) (1.31) (1.80)   (0.80) (0.82) (0.79) (0.90)  
 
Dirty float  0.69 2.47 1.22 1.84 Managed floating 0.64 0.25 -0.69 -0.51 
(1.23) (1.54) (1.53) (2.04)   (1.54) (1.02) (1.16) (1.25) 
 
Flexible  -0.03 1.60 0.64 1.59 Freely floating 0.16 0.59    
  (1.10) (1.13)  (1.25) (1.24)   (1.49) (1.54)    
 
Freely falling 1.35 0.71 -0.38 -0.71  
        (2.50) (1.58) (2.44) (1.80) 
 
M2/GDP 0.02 -0.02 0.03 -0.02    0.03** 0.03 0.04* 0.03  
(0.02) (0.06) (0.02) (0.08)   (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)  
 
Budget   0.22** -0.18 0.22** 0.07   0.17 0.04 0.30** 0.12  
Surplus  (0.10) (0.16)  (0.11) (0.32)   (0.13) (0.09) (0.13) (0.11)  
 
Secondary -0.24 -1.26 -0.53 -1.01   -0.15 -0.57 -0.41 -0.89  
Education (0.34) (1.27) (1.01) (3.00)   (0.47) (0.43) (0.92) (0.73)  
 
Adjusted Gini -0.002 1.01***  -0.02 1.07***   0.13 0.16** 0.09 0.15*  
Coefficient (0.055) (0.16)  (0.08) (0.24)   (0.09) (0.07) (0.09) (0.08)  
 
Ln(1+inflation) 1.27 0.22  2.72 2.85   1.91 1.98 6.74 6.53  
(3.58) (7.90)  (4.61) (12.12)   (5.59) (4.20) (5.55) (5.05)  
 
EAP        -1.08 -1.64 -3.65*** -1.56  
        (1.67) (1.21) (1.30) (1.87) 
 
ECA        -1.29 0.05 
        (2.07) (2.74) 
 
LAC        -2.00 -3.07* -3.72** -2.72 
        (2.05) (1.69) (1.46) (1.86) 
 
MNA        -0.71 -1.80 2.30* -1.21 
        (1.88) 1.54 (1.32) (2.01) 
 
SA        -0.20 -1.22 -2.35 -0.81 
        (1.38) (1.27) (1.54) (2.09) 
 
SSA        1.29 -0.78    
        (1.83) (1.83)   
 
Constant  0.66 -41.18*** 0.97  -47.73***   -6.32* -6.13** 2.38 -5.89  
  (2.88) (6.77)  (3.49) (10.25)   (3.72) (3.05) (4.09) (4.04)  
 
Breusch-Pagan  6.54**  3.32*    10.22***  11.91*** 
Hausmann  52.81***  44.43***  
F-test  1.32 7.16*** 1.04 5.98***   25.16***  2.71***   
Wald-test         15.00  10.79  
R2  0.10 0.07 0.12 0.06   0.13 0.16 0.21 0.18  
N  72 73 52 53   94 94 63 63 
 
* denotes significance at the 90% level, ** at the 95% level, and *** at the 99% level (two-sided alternative). Heteroscedasticity 
adjusted standard errors in parentheses. F-test/Wald-test indicate the F-statistic/Wald-statistic for the test on the overall 
significance of the regression. Ramsey Reset test for omitted variables is passed in all OLS estimations (equations 1, 3, 5, 7). 
Breusch-Pagan is a Lagrange multiplier test for the random effects model, distributed as chi-squared under the null of no 
random effects. Hausmann is a test on fixed or random effects estimation, distributed as chi-squared under the null of no 
difference. yq20o: average annual growth rate of the first quintile share (regressions without outliers). yq40o: average annual growth 
rate of the second quintile share (regressions without outliers). ols: results for pooled OLS estimation, re: results for random 
effects estimation, fe: results for fixed effects estimation. all: all countries. dev: developing countries. 
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Table 16: continued 
 
 
Reinhart/Rogoff 2003, 4-way classification  
 
(9) (10) (11) (12) 
       
Dep. Var. yq20o yq40o yq20o yq40o 
all/re all/re dev/re dev/re 
 
Limited flexibility 1.12 0.94 1.32 0.85 
  (1.19) (0.85) (1.18) (0.96) 
 
Managed floating 0.15 0.76 -1.53 0.18 
  (1.39) (1.00) (1.57) (1.28) 
 
Freely floating -0.91 0.47 -3.91 -0.59 
  (1.92) (1.38) (2.95) (2.40) 
 
M2/GDP  0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 
  (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
 
Budget Surplus 0.20 0.07 0.36** 0.16 
  (0.13) (0.09) (0.15) (0.12) 
 
Adjusted Gini 0.25** 0.19*** 0.22** 0.20** 
Coefficient (0.10) (0.07) (0.10) (0.08) 
 
Ln(1+inflation) 4.18 1.48 9.74* 4.25 
  (4.54) (3.25) (5.31) (4.32) 
 
EAP  -2.06 1.57 -5.02** -1.37 
  (1.75) (1.25) (2.54) (2.07) 
 
ECA  0.12 0.37   
  (3.95) (2.83) 
 
LAC  -4.51* -2.83* -6.65*** -2.68 
  (2.40) (1.72) (2.54) (2.07) 
 
MNA  -1.63 -1.80 -3.43 -1.16 
  (2.21) (1.58) (2.70) (2.20) 
 
SA  -0.29 -0.75 -2.61 0.02 
  (1.83) (1.31) (2.77) (2.26) 
 
SSA  1.08 -0.73   
  (2.64) (1.89) 
  
Constant  -10.41 -7.88 -6.59 -8.41 
(4.29) (3.07) (5.16) (4.20) 
 
Breusch-Pagan 4.63** 8.41*** 2.98* 8.30*** 
Hausmann . . . . 
Wald-test  14.70 16.73 16.72 10.87 
R2  0.16 0.17 0.25 0.18 
N  95 95 64 64 
 
 
 
* denotes significance at the 90% level, ** at the 95% level, and *** at the 99% level (two-sided alternative). Heteroscedasticity 
adjusted standard errors in parentheses. Wald-test indicate the Wald-statistic for the test on the overall significance of the 
regression. Breusch-Pagan is a Lagrange multiplier test for the random effects model, distributed as chi-squared under the null 
of no random effects. Hausmann is a test on fixed or random effects estimation, distributed as chi-squared under the null of no 
difference. yq20o: average annual growth rate of the first quintile share (regressions without outliers). yq40o: average annual growth 
rate of the second quintile share (regressions without outliers). re: results for random effects estimation. all: all countries. dev: 
developing countries. 
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Table 17: Exchange rate regimes and macroeconomic variables 
distribution effect (System GMM estimation) 
 
Reinhart/Rogoff 2003, coarse classification 
 
All Countries     Developing Countries 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Dep. Var. Yq20s Yq20c Yq40s Yq40c  Yq20s Yq20c Yq40s Yq40c 
        
Limited flexibility 0.043 0.034 0.011 0.008  0.050 0.035 0.019 0.016 
  (0.046) (0.040) (0.020) (0.019)  (0.061) (0.058) (0.029) (0.028) 
 
Managed floating 0.089* 0.038 0.041 0.017  0.105* 0.072 0.066** 0.041 
  (0.046) (0.040) (0.026) (0.023)  (0.056) (0.050) (0.032) (0.030) 
 
Freely floating -0.032 0.001 -0.024 -0.023  0.348*** 0.247*** 0.190*** 0.145*** 
  (0.206) (0.009) (0.057) (0.051)  (0.049) (0.051) (0.025) (0.031) 
 
Freely falling 0.054 -0.010 0.006 -0.022  0.071 0.008 0.026 -0.003 
  (0.068) (0.079) (0.042) (0.055)  (0.069) (0.082) (0.042) (0.055) 
 
Ln(1+inflation) -0.05 -0.02 0 0.04  -0.09 -0.03 -0.02 0.02  
  (0.13) (0.16) (0.086) (0.10)  (0.13) (0.17) (0.09) (0.10) 
 
Secondary -0.03 0.01 0.016 0.02  0.03 0.01 0.05 0.04 
Education (0.03) (0.03) (0.017) (0.02)  (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) 
 
Government  -0.002 -0.003 0.004* 0.003  0.007 0.002 0.006** 0.004 
Consumption (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) 
        
EAP  -0.19** -0.07 -0.21*** -0.22***  -0.01 0.26** -0.01 0.12*  
  (0.09) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06)  (0.11) (0.12) (0.06) (0.07) 
 
ECA  0.38*** 0.41*** 0.17*** 0.11***   
  (0.09) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) 
 
LAC  -0.66*** -0.55*** -0.49***-0.55***  -0.48*** -0.21* -0.29*** -0.21*** 
  (0.10) (0.08) (0.05) (0.05)  (0.09) (0.12) (0.06) (0.07) 
 
MNA  -0.21 -0.21* -0.19** -0.28***  0.01 0.13 0.02 0.07 
  (0.17) (0.12) (0.08) (0.07)  (0.15) (0.15) (0.08) (0.08) 
 
SA  0.12 -0.12 -0.04 -0.10**  0.30*** 0.48*** 0.16** 0.25** 
  (0.12) (0.08) (0.06) (0.05)  (0.12) (0.12) (0.07) (0.07) 
 
SSA  -0.21* -0.34*** -0.21*** -0.35*** .     
  (0.12) (0.12) (0.06) (0.07) 
 
Constant  -1.08*** -1.21*** -0.59*** -0.61***  -1.43*** -1.54*** -0.88*** -0.99*** 
  (0.13) (0.07) (0.05) (0.04)  (0.13) (0.14) (0.09) (0.09) 
 
m1  -1.78* -2.23** -2.06** -2.64***  -1.51 -1.88* -1.84* -2.31** 
m2  -1.78* -1.46 -1.74* -0.81  -1.13 -0.81 -1.62 -0.47  
N  277 267 277 267  165 159 165 159 
1 – RSS/TSS 0.51 0.57 0.64 0.72  0.53 0.53 0.52 0.53 
 
 
 
 
* denotes significance at the 90% level, ** at the 95% level, and *** at the 99% level (two-tailed test). Results for one-step 
estimation are obtained using DPD98 for GAUSS. Heteroscedasticity adjusted asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. M1 
and m2 are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as 
N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. 1 – RSS/TSS: 1 – residual sum of squares/total sum of squares. Yq20s/Yq40s: 
ln(Q20/40/0.2) unadjusted approach (regressions without outliers). Yq20c/Yq40c: ln(Q20/40/0.2) adjusted approach (regressions 
without outliers).  
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Table 17: continued 
 
Reinhart/Rogoff 2003, coarse classification 
 
 
Industrial Countries      
 
(9) (10) (11) (12) 
 
Dep. Var. Yq20s Yq20c Yq40s Yq40c        
  
Limited flexibility -0.004 0.015 -0.033 -0.026   
  (0.065) (0.048) (0.024) (0.025)   
 
Managed floating 0.006 -0.050 -0.051 -0.064   
  (0.075) (0.072) (0.041) (0.041)   
 
Free floating -0.103 -0.066 -0.081 -0.073*   
  (0.120) (0.083) (0.054) (0.041)   
 
Ln(1+inflation) -0.03 0.15 0.20 0.27    
  (0.36) (0.27) (0.21) (0.21)   
 
Secondary -0.06 0.02 0.01 0.02*   
Education (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)   
 
Government  -0.004 0.002 0.001 0.002   
Consumption (0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)   
        
 
Constant  -0.90*** -1.22*** -0.49*** -0.58***   
  (0.15) (0.06) (0.05) (0.03)   
 
m1  -0.46 -0.82 -0.28 -1.12   
m2  -1.45 -1.82* -1.06 -1.50    
N  107 103 107 103   
1 – RSS/TSS 0.14 0.08 0.08 0.17   
 
 
* denotes significance at the 90% level, ** at the 95% level, and *** at the 99% level (two-tailed test). Results for one-step 
estimation are obtained using DPD98 for GAUSS. Heteroscedasticity adjusted asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. M1 
and m2 are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as 
N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. 1 – RSS/TSS: 1 – residual sum of squares/total sum of squares. Yq20s/Yq40s: 
ln(Q20/40/0.2) unadjusted approach (regressions without outliers). Yq20c/Yq40c: ln(Q20/40/0.2) adjusted approach (regressions 
without outliers).  
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Table 17: continued 
 
Reinhart/Rogoff 2003, 4-way classification 
 
 
All Countries     Developing Countries 
 
(13) (14) (15) (16)  (17) (18) (19) (20) 
 
Dep. Var. Yq20s Yq20c Yq40s Yq40c  Yq20s Yq20c Yq40s Yq40c 
        
Limited flexibility 0.051 0.029 0.018 0.008  0.057 0.022 0.027 0.011 
  (0.046) (0.041) (0.020) (0.019)  (0.062) (0.060) (0.029) (0.030) 
 
Managed floating 0.073* 0.026 0.034 0.011  0.093* 0.055 0.058** 0.034 
  (0.043) (0.039) (0.024) (0.020)  (0.051) (0.047) (0.029) (0.026) 
 
Freely floating 0.042 0.044 0.012 0.002  0.247*** 0.185*** 0.125*** 0.093*** 
  (0.085) (0.075) (0.043) (0.041)  (0.087) (0.068) (0.046) (0.032) 
 
Ln(1+inflation) 0.01 0.004 0.02 0.04  -0.08 -0.05 -0.03 0.003  
  (0.13) (0.14) (0.09) (0.08)  (0.12) (0.15) (0.09) (0.08) 
 
Secondary -0.04 0.01 0.01 0.02  0.03 0.01 0.05 0.04 
Education (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) 
 
Government  0.002 0.003 0.004* 0.003  0.007 0.002 0.006** 0.004 
Consumption (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) 
        
EAP  -0.19** -0.07 -0.21*** -0.22***  -0.04 0.23* -0.03 0.10  
  (0.09) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06)  (0.10) (0.12) (0.06) (0.07) 
 
ECA  0.39*** 0.42*** 0.18*** 0.11***   
  (0.09) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) 
 
LAC  -0.67*** -0.56*** -0.49*** -0.56***  -0.51*** -0.26** -0.31*** -0.24*** 
  (0.10) (0.08) (0.05) (0.05)  (0.08) (0.11) (0.06) (0.07) 
 
MNA  -0.22 -0.21* -0.20** -0.28***  -0.02 -0.09 -0.002 0.04 
  (0.17) (0.13) (0.08) (0.07)  (0.15) (0.15) (0.08) (0.08) 
 
SA  0.12 -0.12 -0.04 -0.10**  0.26** 0.44*** 0.14** 0.23*** 
  (0.12) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05)  (0.11) (0.11) (0.06) (0.06) 
 
SSA  -0.17 -0.30** -0.19*** -0.33*** .     
  (0.13) (0.12) (0.06) (0.07) 
 
Constant  -1.07*** -1.20*** -0.58*** -0.61***  -1.40*** -1.50*** -0.86*** -0.97*** 
  (0.13) (0.07) (0.06) (0.04)  (0.13) (0.14) (0.09) (0.09) 
 
m1  -1.76* -2.13** -2.06** -2.72***  -1.56 -1.83* -2.01** -2.48** 
m2  -1.87* -1.25 -1.94* -0.75  -1.27 -0.77 -1.77* -0.48  
N  275 265 275 265  163 157 163 157 
1 – RSS/TSS 0.51 0.56 0.64 0.72  0.54 0.53 0.53 0.54 
 
 
 
 
* denotes significance at the 90% level, ** at the 95% level, and *** at the 99% level (two-tailed test). Results for one-step 
estimation are obtained using DPD98 for GAUSS. Heteroscedasticity adjusted asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. M1 
and m2 are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as 
N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. 1 – RSS/TSS: 1 – residual sum of squares/total sum of squares. Yq20s/Yq40s: 
ln(Q20/40/0.2) unadjusted approach (regressions without outliers). Yq20c/Yq40c: ln(Q20/40/0.2) adjusted approach (regressions 
without outliers).  
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Table 18: Exchange rate regimes and macroeconomic variables 
total effect (Growth equation) 
 
Levy-Yeyati/Sturzenegger 2002   Reinhart/Rogoff 2003, coarse classification 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6) (7) (8) 
      
Dep. Var. yp20o yp40o yp20o  yp40o   yp20o yp40o yp20o yp40o  
all/ols all/fe dev/ols dev/fe   all/ols all/ols dev/ols dev/ols  
   
Crawling peg -1.40 -3.74* -1.11 -3.29 Limited flexibility 1.69 0.60 1.25 0.21  
(1.53) (1.79) (1.88) (2.57)   (1.03) (0.79) (1.01) (0.74)  
 
Dirty float  1.72 1.00 1.90 -0.53 Managed floating 2.52 1.33 1.74 1.04  
(1.79) (2.03) (2.19) (2.94)   (1.72) (1.16) (1.61) (1.54)   
Flexible  0.43 -0.34 0.73 -0.78 Freely floating 1.11 0.71    
  (1.47) (1.50) (1.74) (1.84)   (1.97) (1.28)    
 
Freely falling 2.81 1.32 1.64 0.28  
        (2.62) (2.26) (2.81) (2.63) 
 
M2/GDP  -0.01 0.12 -0.03 0.07   0.04 0.05*** 0.02 0.04 
(0.04) (0.11) (0.06) (0.15)   (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) 
 
Budget   0.36** 0.40* 0.39** -0.27   0.19 -0.06 0.32* 0.01 
Surplus  (0.10) (0.22) (0.17) (0.50)   (0.17) (0.10) (0.18) (0.12) 
 
Secondary -0.35 -1.65 0.06 3.11   -0.02 -0.38 0.43 0.05 
Education (0.69) (1.67) (1.69) (4.30)   (0.70) (0.53) (1.47) (0.98) 
 
Adjusted Gini 0.14 0.88*** 0.11 0.96**   0.17 0.15 0.13 0.13 
Coefficient (0.14) (0.25) (0.17) (0.41)   (0.13) (0.10) (0.14) (0.11) 
 
Ln(1+inflation) -4.72 11.31 -4.32 -4.48   -2.55 -1.59 -0.03 1.51 
  (5.08) (10.62) (6.13) (18.20)   (6.88) (5.37) (7.78) (6.42) 
 
EAP  0.11  3.05    1.81 1.96 0.75 1.89 
  (3.05)  (2.27)    (2.71) (1.93) (2.20) (1.99) 
 
ECA        -7.47 -5.93*** 
        (2.29) (1.48) 
 
LAC  -4.27  -1.39    -3.28 -3.06 -4.24** -3.33* 
  (3.64)  (2.20)    (3.30) (2.34) (2.00) (1.96) 
 
MNA  -3.18  0.37    -2.72 -1.54 -2.55 -0.98 
  (3.43)  (2.86)    (3.29) (1.77) (2.20) (1.44) 
 
SA  2.04  5.04**    1.96 0.89 1.32 1.04 
  (1.88)  (2.18)    (1.93) (1.36) (2.59) (1.90) 
 
SSA  -2.51      0.91 0.20   
  (2.48)      (2.65) (1.65) 
 
Constant  0.85 -35.44***-1.13 -46.11**   -6.58 -6.20 -2.98 -4.86 
  (4.71) (9.23) (5.85) (15.83)   (4.73) (3.73) (6.08) (4.94) 
 
Breusch-Pagan  0.49  0.14    
Hausmann  28.58***  17.90** 
F-test  1.97** 4.52*** 1.47 2.60*   62.03*** 87.05*** 1.84* 3.69***  
R – squared 0.26 0.67 0.28 0.70   0.24 0.35 0.24 0.31 
N  72 72 52 55   94 93 63 62 
   
* denotes significance at the 90% level, ** at the 95% level, and *** at the 99% level (two-sided alternative). Heteroscedasticity 
adjusted standard errors in parentheses. F-test indicate the F-statistic for the test on the overall significance of the regression. 
Ramsey Reset test for omitted variables is only passed in equation 6, when powers of the right-hand side variables are 
considered (and not passed in all other OLS regressions). Breusch-Pagan is a Lagrange-multiplier test for the random effects 
model, distributed as chi-squared under the null of no random effects. Hausmann is a test on fixed or random effects estimation, 
distributed as chi-squared under the null of no difference. yp20o: average annual growth rate of the mean income of the first 
quintile share (regressions without outliers). yq40o: average annual growth rate of the mean income of the second quintile share 
(regressions without outliers). ols: results for pooled OLS estimation, fe: results for fixed effects estimation. all: all countries. dev: 
developing countries. 
 148
Table 18: continued 
 
Reinhart/Rogoff 2003, 4-way classification  
 
(9) (10) (11) (12) 
       
Dep. Var. yp20o yp40o yp20o yp40o 
all/ols all/ols dev/ols dev/ols 
 
Limited flexibility 1.65 0.62 1.20 0.20 
  (1.00) (0.78) (1.02) (0.74) 
 
Managed floating 2.56 1.20 1.59 0.92 
  (1.58) (1.13) (1.61) (1.57) 
 
Freely floating 0.87 1.19 -1.30 0.93 
  (1.50) (1.24) (2.57) (2.53) 
 
M2/GDP  0.04 0.05** 0.02 0.03 
  (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) 
 
Budget Surplus 0.19 -0.05 0.34* 0.005 
  (0.16) (0.09) (0.18) (0.12) 
 
Adjusted Gini 0.17 0.15 0.12 0.13 
Coefficient (0.13) (0.10) (0.14) (0.12) 
 
Ln(1+inflation) -0.82 -1.33 2.17 -0.09 
  (4.49) (3.49) (5.81) (5.10) 
 
EAP  1.91 1.91 -0.17 1.99 
  (2.68) (1.94) (2.18) (2.08) 
 
ECA  -7.56*** -5.94***   
  (2.28) (1.52) 
 
LAC  -3.15 -3.04 -5.07** -3.35 
  (3.26) (2.43) (1.96) (2.07) 
 
MNA  -2.57 -1.55 -3.43 -0.92 
  (3.22) (1.77) (2.28) (1.62) 
 
SA  2.15 -0.80 0.50 1.10 
  (1.92) (1.35) (2.73) (2.09) 
 
SSA  1.53 0.26   
  (2.55) (1.64) 
  
Constant  -6.97 -5.90* -2.11 -4.77 
(4.79) (3.46) (6.18) (5.03) 
 
F-test  63.60*** 92.46*** 2.08** 3.69*** 
R2  0.16 0.35 0.25 0.31 
N  95 93 63 62 
 
 
* denotes significance at the 90% level, ** at the 95% level, and *** at the 99% level (two-sided alternative). Heteroscedasticity 
adjusted standard errors in parentheses. Ramsey Reset test for omitted variables is only passed in equations 10, when powers 
of right-hand side variables are considered (and not passed in all other OLS regressions). yp20o: average annual growth rate of 
the mean income of the first quintile share (regressions without outliers). yp40o: average annual growth rate of the mean income 
of the second quintile share (regressions without outliers). ols: results for pooled OLS estimation. all: all countries. dev: 
developing countries. 
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Table 19: Exchange rate regimes and macroeconomic variables 
total effect (System GMM estimation) 
 
Reinhart/Rogoff 2003: coarse classification 
 
All Countries     Developing Countries 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Dep. Var. Yp20s Yp20c Yp40s Yp40c  Yp20s Yp20c Yp40s Yp40c   
    
Limited flexibility 0.074 0.077 0.068 0.060  0.145 0.134 0.145** 0.122* 
  (0.077) (0.077) (0.060) (0.059)  (0.091) (0.094) (0.071) (0.074) 
 
Managed floating 0.044 -0.021 -0.005 -0.049  0.116 0.058 0.073 0.010 
  (0.103) (0.099) (0.086) (0.085)  (0.116) (0.118) (0.103) (0.107) 
 
Freely floating 0.010 -0.007 -0.026 -0.006  0.203** 0.096 0.052 -0.014 
  (0.101) (0.096) (0.073) (0.069)  (0.094) (0.096) (0.079) (0.088) 
 
Freely falling 0.154 0.062 0.116 -0.049  0.222* 0.114 0.187* -0.101 
  (0.121) (0.128) (0.099) (0.102)  (0.125) (0.136) (0.102) (0.109) 
 
Civil liberties -0.02 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04*  -0.02 -0.03 -0.05 -0.05* 
  (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
 
Secondary 0.09* 0.14*** 0.13*** 0.14***  0.19 0.13 0.16 0.14 
Education (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)  (0.13) (0.14) (0.12) (0.12) 
 
Government  -0.014** -0.01** -0.012** -0.013**  -0.018** -0.024*** -0.018** -0.021** 
Consumption (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)  (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) 
 
Life  0.05***  0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05***  0.04*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 
Expectancy (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
  
Ln(1+inflation) -0.15 -0.04 -0.13 -0.03  -0.15 -0.03 -0.13 -0.04  
  (0.23) (0.28) (0.18) (0.21)  (0.23) (0.29) (0.17) (0.21) 
 
Terms of  0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003**  0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 
Trade  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
 
EAP  -0.94*** -0.81*** -0.94*** -0.95***  0.27 0.48* 0.25 0.33  
  (0.19) (0.19) (0.18) (0.19)  (0.27) (0.28) (0.25) (0.26) 
 
ECA  0.33** 0.44*** 0.16 0.15     
  (0.14) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12) 
 
LAC  -1.32*** -1.19*** -1.12***-1.16***  -0.10 0.10 0.06 0.11 
  (0.14) (0.14) (0.11) (0.12)  (0.32) (0.32) (0.31) (0.31) 
 
MNA  -0.61*** -0.64*** -0.64*** -0.73***  0.61** 0.59* 0.53* 0.52* 
  (0.17) (0.17) (0.14) (0.15)  (0.31) (0.32) (0.29) (0.30) 
 
SA  -1.07*** -1.05*** -1.24*** -1.27***  0.14 0.28 -0.04 0.03 
  (0.26) (0.25) (0.23) (0.23)  (0.22) (0.22) (0.20) (0.21) 
 
SSA  -1.21*** -1.31*** -1.21*** -1.31*** .     
  (0.36) (0.38) (0.36) (0.36) 
 
Constant  4.44*** 4.57*** 5.22*** 5.21***  3.44*** 3.19*** 4.06*** 3.87*** 
  (0.86) (0.88) (0.81) (0.84)  (0.74) (0.77) (0.69) (0.73) 
 
m1  -0.88 -0.92 -0.40 -0.75  -0.54 -0.21 -0.44 -0.53 
m2  0.83 -0.70 -0.04 -0.75  0.62 -0.87 1.53 -0.44  
N  215 212 215 212  127 127 127 127 
1 – RSS/TSS 0.90 0.90 0.93 0.93  0.67 0.71 0.75 0.75 
 
 
Notes: see next page 
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Table 19: continued 
 
Reinhart/Rogoff 2003, coarse classification 
 
Industrial Countries      
 
(9) (10) (11) (12) 
 
Dep. Var. Yp20s Yp20c Yp40s Yp40c        
  
Limited flexibility -0.062 0.041 -0.086 -0.076   
  (0.088) (0.090) (0.063) (0.065)   
 
Managed floating -0.022 -0.108 -0.100 -0.118   
  (0.127) (0.125) (0.082) (0.082)   
 
Freely floating -0.157 -0.144 -0.129 -0.130*   
  (0.111) (0.105) (0.081) (0.076)   
 
Civil liberties -0.01 -0.04* -0.01 -0.02    
  (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
 
Secondary 0.04 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.15***   
Education (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)   
 
Government  -0.007 -0.003 -0.005 -0.004  
Consumption (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004)   
 
Life  0.06***  0.04* 0.04*** 0.04***   
Expectancy (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)   
  
Ln(1+inflation) -1.16** -0.75** -0.58 -0.45    
  (0.46) (0.38) (0.38) (0.36)   
 
Terms of  0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002   
Trade  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)      
          
Constant  4.59*** 5.91*** 5.96*** 6.23***   
  (1.41) (1.42) (1.01) (0.97)   
 
m1  -1.19 -1.19 -1.72* -1.74*   
m2  0.16 -1.59 -1.06 -0.53    
N  83 80 83 80   
1 – RSS/TSS 0.38 0.49 0.63 0.65   
 
 
* denotes significance at the 90% level, ** at the 95% level, and *** at the 99% level (two-tailed test). Results for one-step 
estimation are obtained using DPD98 for GAUSS. Heteroscedasticity adjusted asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. M1 
and m2 are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as 
N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. 1 – RSS/TSS: 1 – residual sum of squares/total sum of squares. Yp20s/Y40s: 
logarithm of mean income of first/second quintile (unadjusted approach, regressions without outliers). Yp20c/Yp40c: logarithm of 
mean income of first/second quintile (adjusted approach, regressions without outliers).  
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Table 19: continued 
 
Reinhart/Rogoff 2003, 4-way classification 
 
All Countries     Developing Countries 
 
(13) (14) (15) (16)  (17) (18) (19) (20) 
 
Dep. Var. Yp20s Yp20c Yp40s Yp40c  Yp20s Yp20c Yp40s Yp40c 
        
Limited flexibility 0.072 0.069 0.066 0.058  0.136 0.112 0.139** 0.113* 
  (0.076) (0.074) (0.059) (0.056)  (0.089) (0.088) (0.069) (0.069) 
 
Managed floating 0.051 -0.011 0.016 -0.028  0.135 0.065 0.104 0.037 
  (0.094) (0.089) (0.078) (0.075)  (0.100) (0.100) (0.084) (0.087) 
 
Freely floating 0.076 0.034 0.047 0.010  0.210 0.133 0.111 0.052 
  (0.114) (0.105) (0.083) (0.076)  (0.171) (0.164) (0.125) (0.122) 
 
Civil liberties -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04*  -0.03 -0.04 -0.05* -0.05* 
  (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
 
Secondary 0.09* 0.15*** 0.14*** 0.15***  0.22* 0.16 0.19 0.17 
Education (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04)  (0.12) (0.13) (0.11) (0.12) 
 
Government  -0.015*** -0.015** -0.013** -0.014**  -0.019** -0.025*** -0.019** -0.022** 
Consumption (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)  (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) 
 
Life  0.05***  0.04*** 0.05*** 0.05***  0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 
Expectancy (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
  
Ln(1+inflation) 0.07 0.14 0.06 0.13  0.08 0.14 0.08 0.13  
  (0.25) (0.25) (0.19) (0.18)  (0.25) (0.27) (0.19) (0.19) 
 
Terms of  0.002* 0.003** 0.002* 0.003**  0.004*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
Trade  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
 
EAP  -0.94*** -0.80*** -0.94*** -0.94***  0.24 0.45* 0.23 0.31  
  (0.18) (0.19) (0.18) (0.19)  (0.26) (0.26) (0.24) (0.25) 
 
ECA  0.32** 0.43*** 0.15 0.13     
  (0.14) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) 
 
LAC  -1.32*** -1.19*** -1.11*** -1.16***  -0.12 0.06 0.05 0.09 
  (0.14) (0.14) (0.11) (0.12)  (0.31) (0.32) (0.30) (0.30) 
 
MNA  -0.61*** -0.64*** -0.63*** -0.72***  0.60** 0.57* 0.53* 0.50* 
  (0.16) (0.16) (0.14) (0.14)  (0.30) (0.31) (0.28) (0.29) 
 
SA  -1.07*** -1.04*** -1.24*** -1.27***  0.12 0.25 -0.05 0.01 
  (0.26) (0.25) (0.22) (0.23)  (0.21) (0.21) (0.20) (0.20) 
 
SSA  -1.17*** -1.26*** -1.19*** -1.27*** .     
  (0.36) (0.36) (0.35) (0.36) 
 
Constant  4.63*** 4.76*** 5.39*** 5.36***  3.84*** 3.57*** 4.37*** 4.16*** 
  (0.82) (0.84) (0.78) (0.81)  (0.67) (0.72) (0.66) (0.72) 
 
m1  -0.78 -0.87 -0.41 -0.63  -0.57 -0.15 -0.55 -0.42 
m2  0.78 -0.59 -0.16 -0.80  0.70 -0.79 1.48 -0.46  
N  213 210 213 210  125 125 125 125 
1 – RSS/TSS 0.90 0.90 0.93 0.93  0.65 0.69 0.73 0.74 
 
* denotes significance at the 90% level, ** at the 95% level, and *** at the 99% level (two-tailed test). Results for one-step 
estimation are obtained using DPD98 for GAUSS. Heteroscedasticity adjusted asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. M1 
and m2 are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as 
N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. 1 – RSS/TSS: 1 – residual sum of squares/total sum of squares. Yp20s/Y40s: 
logarithm of mean income of first/second quintile (unadjusted approach, regressions without outliers). Yp20c/Yp40c: logarithm of 
mean income of first/second quintile (adjusted approach, regressions without outliers).  
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Abstract 
 
This paper analyzes empirically the impact of trade policy and sector specific openness on pro-poor growth 
in a cross-country approach to answer the question, whether the poorest 20 and 20 to 40 percent benefit 
from trade openness. To capture this issue, we estimate the distribution effect of eight different openness 
indicators, six adjusted trade sector indicators (agricultural raw materials exports and imports, food exports 
and imports, manufactures exports and imports) and two tariff indicators (export duties and imports duties). 
In addition, we estimate the total effect, i.e. the distribution and growth effect, to analyze potential trade-
offs between the impact of trade liberalization on poverty via overall economic growth and distribution.  
 
To test the poverty effects, we collect an irregular and unbalanced panel of time-series cross-country data 
on the first and second quintile share in 72 countries for the period 1971 to 1999 and apply two 
econometric specifications, a growth equation and a system GMM equation. We estimate the poverty 
effects of trade policy for all countries and, separately, for developing/transitional and industrial countries 
due to considerable differences in economic structure. Finally, we estimate poverty effects of trade 
liberalization with respect to the level of the countries’ development.  
 
Combining empirical findings of the system GMM estimation for both the distribution and total effect, 
estimation results suggest the importance of sector specific trade policy for the poorest 20 and 20 to 40 
percent. First, liberalization in agricultural raw material exports is very important for the poorest 40 percent 
of low income developing countries due to both the distribution and total effect. In addition, liberalizing 
imports in agricultural raw materals is highly positively related to the mean income of the poor without 
changing the distribution. Second, trade reforms in food exports affect negatively the mean income of the 
poorest 40 percent in low income developing countries through the growth effect. However, higher food 
imports are associated with positive distribution effects, but without total effects on the poorest 20 percent 
in low income developing countries. Third, promotion of manufactures exports lead to a positive total effect 
on the poorest 40 percent in developing countries via the growth effect, while trade reforms in 
manufactures imports are never relevant. Finally, reduced export and import duties affect positively the 
mean income of the poorest 40 percent in low income developing countries, an effect primarily driven by 
the growth effect. Findings for agriculture exports, food exports, export and import duties, however, are 
only relevant if we exploit information on both the cross-country and within-country variation of the income 
of the poor in a system GMM estimator. In addition, results of the growth equation suggest positive total 
effects of agriculture imports on the poorest 20 and 20 to 40 percent in development countries driven by 
the growth effect alone.  
 
Thus, empirical findings suggest the following policy recommendations with respect to poverty-reducing 
trade reforms in low-income developing countries. While results are not always consistent between the 
growth equation and the system GMM estimation, liberalization of agricultural raw material exports and 
imports seems to be the most promising approach. On the other hand, liberalization in food markets and 
manufactures imports are not associated with poverty alleviation in low-income developing countries. 
Finally, a promotion of manufactures exports and a reduction of export and import duties seem to increase 
mean income of the poorest 40 percent in low-income developing countries only via the growth effect.   
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1. Introduction 
 
Trade policy and its integration into international markets, a topic heavily discussed in the 
literature, is assumed to be one critical element to promote economic growth and alleviate 
poverty. Nevertheless, empirical evidence of the openness - growth link is mixed and has been 
severely criticized on econometric issues (Rodriguez/Rodrik 2000). The effect of trade reforms 
on poverty, while neglected in the past, is receiving considerable attention in recent publications 
(Bannister/Thugge 2001, McCulloch/Winters/Cirera 2001, Reimer 2002, Berg/Krueger 2003, 
Goldberg/Pavcnik 2004). Methodological approaches encompass microsimulations of specific 
trade policies, macro–micro synthesis, i.e. general equilibrium simulation with post-simulation of 
effects on representative households, and cross-country studies of openness indicators (Reimer 
2002). While the cross-country approach is heavily criticized because of econometric issues, 
inappropriate indicators of openness (Rodriguez/Rodrik 2000) and the case-specific implications 
of liberalization on poverty (McCulloch/Winters/Cirera 2001), the strength of cross-section 
regressions lies in the statistical testing and generalization of the results and the possible 
coverage of dynamic aspects (Reimer 2002).  
 
In general, the effect of trade policy on absolute poverty is assumed to be mainly driven by the 
impact of openness on economic growth (Bannister/Thugge 2001, Berg/Krueger 2003). 
Nevertheless a small part of literature analyses also the question of distributional effects of trade 
policy and openness on the income of the poor in a cross-country framework (Edwards 1997, 
Gugerty/Roemer 1997, Gallup/Radelet/Warner 1999, Lundberg/Squire 2001, Dollar/Kraay 
2001a, Ghura/Leite/Tsangarides 2002, Winters/McCulloch/McKay 2002, Lopez 2003, Milanovic 
2003). In combining both approaches we extend the literature in four ways.  
 
First, we select an irregular and unbalanced panel of data on first and second quintile share in 
the most consistent way to capture the problem of incomparability of income inequality 
measures. Second, we apply two econometric specifications, a growth equation and a system 
GMM equation, to cover econometric issues, cross country variation and dynamic aspect of 
within-country change of the income of the poor. Third, we choose eight different openness 
indicators, six trade sector indicators (agricultural raw materials exports and imports, food 
exports and imports, manufactures exports and imports) and two tariff indicators (export duties 
and imports duties). The underlying hypothesis is that the poor may be affected differently by 
trade in agriculture raw materials, food and manufactures, i.e. sector specific trade policy may 
improve pro-poor growth. We test this hypothesis for all countries and in subsamples of 
developing/transitional and industrial countries to reveal important differences in the impact of 
trade policy on poverty in countries with different economic structures. Finally, we estimate both 
the distribution and total effect, i.e. the distribution and growth effect, of the trade openness 
indicators on the poorest 20 and 20 - 40 percent to analyze potential trade-offs between the 
impact of trade liberalization on poverty via overall economic growth and distribution. Thus, we 
analyze empirically the impact of trade policy and sector specific openness on pro-poor growth 
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in a cross-country approach to answer the question, whether the poorest 20 and 20 - 40 percent 
benefit from trade liberalization.     
 
This paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we present six possible channels of trade 
liberalization on poverty and empirical evidence on the distribution effect from cross - country 
studies. In section 3 we describe the data coverage and data sources used in the estimations, 
which encompasses a discussion on the measurement problem of openness indicators. While 
we debate our concept of pro-poor growth in section 4, we explain econometric specifications 
and econometric issues in section 5, followed by an interpretation of the results. Finally, we 
present major findings in the conclusion in section 6. 
 
2.  Trade policy and pro-poor growth 
 
2.1 Channels of trade liberalization on poverty 
 
Considering the theoretical and empirical literature, six channels are proposed for how trade 
policy may affect poverty (Winters 2000a/b, McCulloch/Winters/Cirera 2001, Bannister/Thugge 
2001, Berg/Krueger 2003, Agénor 2003) .  
 
Economic Growth 
 
The openness – growth link is relevant because economic growth has been to found to be a key 
element in reducing absolute poverty (Gugerty/Roemer 1997, Gallup/Radelet/Warner 1999, 
Gugerty/Timmer 1999, Dollar/Kraay 2001a, Ghura/Leite/Tsangarides 2002).  
 
Concerning economic theory, trade liberalization may foster economic growth due to a more 
efficient allocation of resources by efficiency effects on investment.219 Improved access to 
intermediate capital goods may also increase technical efficiency by technology embodied in 
capital imports (Berg/Krueger 2003, Baldwin 2003). Thus trade liberalization in manufactures 
may impact on the poor mainly through growth and productivity effects 
(McCulloch/Winters/Cirera 2001). In addition, access to larger markets may promote innovation 
by openness to new ideas or spillover effects of technologies as proposed by endogenous 
growth models (Grossman/Helpman 1991). A poverty reducing effect of trade reforms, however, 
depends critically on complementary macroeconomic and structural policies and institutions at 
the domestic level (Bannister/Thugge 2003). Institutions, however, could also be positively 
influenced by openness and thus foster growth since trade liberalization may impose discipline 
on bad government policies as corruption (Ades/Di Tella 1999). From a static point of view, 
trade restrictions could also be argued for in presence of market distortions, externalities or 
                                            
219 As long as an economy is not in the steady-state, openness also raises the growth rate due to a more efficient 
allocation of resources.  
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imperfect competition (Helpman/Krugman 1991). One possible example would be the infant 
industry argument in which protection for not-yet-competitive industries is supported. 
 
Empirical results, while indicating a positive impact of openness on growth (Sachs/Warner 1995, 
Frankel/Romer 1996, Dollar/Kraay 2001b, Baldwin 2003, Wacziarg/Welch 2003), are severely 
critisized on indicators of openness, instruments and specifications used in cross-country 
regressions (Rodriguez/Rodrik 2000, Rodrik 2000).220 In addition, cross-country studies have 
been heavily attacked by their weak theoretical foundations, data reliability and inappropriate 
econometric techniques (Srinivasan, Bhagwati 2001).  
 
Price transmission  
 
Reduction of tariffs and trade restrictions could affect the income of the poor via its effect on the 
price of tradable products demanded and supplied by the poor. Considering a tariff reduction in 
a single good, the import price would be lowered for poor consumers and producers. On the 
other side, if export duties are abolished and the good is sold to a stable world market price, 
poor producers would gain more income from exports.221 The price transmission, however, is 
heavily influenced by the competitive structure of the distribution sector, a working infrastructure 
and the regulation and operation of government institutions at the national, regional and local 
level (e.g. marketing organization). Thus the poor could also be hurt by trade liberalization, if 
they are protected by initial patterns of trade restrictions. In addition, the net effects on the poor 
may be ambiguous if many goods are liberalized simultaneously. Furthermore, adjustment 
effects of trade policy, i.e. switching consumption or production to other markets due to changed 
relative prices, may stimulate important indirect effects of trade liberalization depending also on 
the domain of trade.222  
 
The price effects of trade liberalization in agriculture and food are likely more important than in 
manufactures as a high part of the poor’s consumption is devoted to food expenditures 
(Goldberg/Pavcnik 2004). In addition, trade liberalization in agriculture may benefit all rural (and 
urban) poor by positive spill-overs to non-farmers.223 Even if trade liberalization in agriculture 
and food is widely accepted as important for poverty reduction, however, price effects depend 
also on internal reforms since the agriculture sector is heavily regulated in developing and 
industrial countries.224 Distorted domestic markets, however, may inhibit the possibility for the 
                                            
220 For a survey of empirical literature on the effect of openness on growth and productivity, see 
Winters/McCulloch/McKay (2002). 
221 However, fluctuating world market prices in agricultural products could significantly diminish poverty reducing effects 
of reduced tariffs (Hoekman/Michalopoulos/Schiff/Tarr 2002).  
222 For a survey of empirical literature on the transmission of border-price shocks, market creation and destruction and 
the possibility of the poor to capture opportunities of price effects of trade liberalization with respect to production and 
consumption, see Winters/McCulloch/McKay (2002). 
223 For a survey of empirical literature on spillover effects of trade liberalization in agriculture, see 
Winters/McCulloch/McKay (2002).  
224 The poverty effects of trade liberalization in agriculture and food are also dependent on the economic situation of the 
poor, i.e. whether they are net producers or net consumers of agricultural goods.  
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poor to capture liberalization-induced opportunities.225 Furthermore, poverty effects of trade 
reforms in the agriculture sector are not independent from policies in other sectors and 
countries. First, in developing countries import manufacturing tariffs exhibit strong bias against 
agriculture due to increased domestic prices of manufactures relative to agriculture products. 
Second, tariff escalation for agriculture products in industrial countries encourages trade only in 
agricultural raw materials (Winters 2001a/b, McCulloch/Winters/Cirera 2001).226 Finally, high 
export subsidies of commodities in industrial countries could constrain agriculture exports in 
developing countries (Hoekman/Michalopoulos/Schiff/Tarr 2002).  
 
Wages and employment  
 
Trade liberalization also works on the income of the poor via wage and employment effects.227 
Relying on the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, a rise in the relative price of exportable goods 
intensively produced by unskilled labour would increase wages of unskilled labour and thus 
reduce poverty if the poor are mainly unskilled workers (Bannister/Thugge 2001). The Stolper-
Samuelson argument would be especially important with respect to agricultural liberalization in 
developing countries since the majority of the labour force is employed in farming and so less-
skilled workers in rural areas would likely benefit the most (Winters 2001a/b, 
McCulloch/Winters/Cirera 2001).  
 
On the other side, lower trade restrictions may also reduce the demand for unskilled labour 
because unskilled labour may not be the most intensively used factor in producing tradable 
goods and trade liberalization may be associated with introduction of higher-level technology 
requiring more skilled labour (Agénor 2003, Goldberg/Pavcnik 2004).228 This situation could be 
relevant for manufacturing liberalization in developing countries when the production in 
manufacturing is intensive in skilled labour. 229 Finally, the predictions of the Stolper-Samuelson 
theorem are also criticized by its restrictive and unrealistic assumptions as perfect labour 
mobility and perfectly competitive goods and factor markets (Bannister/Thugge 2001, Winters 
2000b).  
                                            
225 Important reform areas are e.g. the structure of land ownership within society, social norms and institutions at the 
local level, centralized agricultural marketing organizations and markets for credits and insurance to the poor 
(McCulloch/Winters/Cirera 2001).     
226Tariff escalation discourages foreign processing activities since the import tariff increases with more processed 
agriculture goods (McCulloch/Winters/Cirera 2001).  
227 Additional proposals of liberalization-induced labour market effects on poverty are changed in compliance with 
minimum wages, increase of informal sector and positive or negative effects on child labour (Goldberg/Pavcnik 2004).  
228 The effect could be especially damaging for the poor, if imperfect credit markets prevent the ability of the unskilled 
workers to finance the accumulation of human capital (Agénor 2003).  
229 Concerning wage inequality effects of trade liberalization in developing countries, additional theoretical explanations 
have been proposed. First, a higher skill premium is explained by increased globalisation of production, i.e. the shift of 
skill-intensive intermediate goods production to developing countries raises the demand for skilled labour force. Second, 
openness may promote technology progress which may increase the demand for skilled employees, i.e. a skill-biased 
technological change. Third, trade liberalization may lead to a “quality” upgrading of firms or products which may 
increase demand for skilled workers relative to unskilled labour. Finally, trade liberalization could increase wage 
inequality by extending the informal sector if wages in the informal sector are lower. Wage inequality, however, is only 
one part of the distribution effect of trade liberalization on income or consumption of the poor (Cornia 2002, 
Goldberg/Pavcnik 2004).    
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While in the Stolper-Samuelson theorem total labour supply is assumed to be fixed, one could 
also imagine the opposite, i.e. a perfectly elastic supply of labour. In this case, increased prices 
of exportable goods due to trade liberalization would result in a surge in employment (not in 
wages), which could largely improve the situation of the poor with no alternative sources of 
income. In reality a mixture of both extremes may be realistic dependent on the possible 
segmentation of the labour market due to skills, gender and location (Winters 2001a/b, 
McCulloch/Winters/Cirera 2001).230 In addition, initial patterns of protection and disappearance 
of whole markets due to trade reforms can significantly influence the way the poor are affected 
by trade liberalization (Bannister/Thugge 2001). Finally, employment and wage effects on the 
poor hinge also on the flexibility of the labour market, the overall reform package and the 
importance of the sectors being liberalized. The proportion of the manufacturing industry of a 
country’s GDP varies considerably in developing countries (McCulloch/Winters/Cirera 2001).231  
 
Taxes and government spending 
 
Trade reforms may also cause falling revenues restraining government spending on social 
expenditures (health, education, social security) and public investment.232 As trade taxes in 
some developing countries cover up to 50 percent of the total government revenue, reduction of 
trade tariffs could lead to severe budget constraints. This effect may be especially relevant for 
liberalization in manufactures since manufacturing tariffs cover close to 70 percent of tariff 
revenues for developing countries in 1995 (Hertel, Martin 1999). In general, however, the effect 
of trade liberalization on government revenue is far from certain depending on the reforms 
implemented, the initial economic situation, the effect of lower tariffs on the trade volume and 
the changes in the taxation system. In addition, lower government revenues do not necessarily 
translate into reduced social programs if trade reform is properly managed (Bannister/Thugge 
2001, McCulloch/Winters/Cirera 2001).233 Furthermore, the final poverty effect depends critically 
on the initial structure of the social spending programs and how the poor are affected by new 
taxes. Therefore, social expenditures often benefit disproportionately the upper-income 
households in developing countries (Dollar/Kraay 2001a, McCulloch/Winters/Cirera 2001, 
Baldacci/de Mello/Inchauste 2002, Agénor 2002, Davoodi/Tiongson/Asawanuchit 2003).234  
 
Volatility and external shocks 
 
In general, trade liberalization leads to a deeper integration into world markets, which could 
increase the volatility of the terms of trade or the output fluctuation. Theoretically, the openness  
                                            
230 Considering the poor in developing countries, the elasticity of labour supply in rural and urban informal sectors is 
typically high. Thus adjustments to trade reforms will likely affect the poor mainly by changes in employment.  
231 On a survey of the empirical literature of the trade liberalization effects on wage, employment and wage inequality, 
see Winters/McCulloch/McKay (2002).  
232Curtailing government expenditures may also lead to increased poverty via cuts in real wages and layoffs of 
employees in the public sector (Agénor 2002).  
233 On a survey of the empirical literature covering trade liberlization effects on government revenue and poverty effects 
of falling tariff revenues, see Winters/McCulloch/McKay (2002). 
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– volatility link is argued for due to a specialization effect of trade liberalization, which may 
increase the proneness to sector-specific shocks. In addition, higher exposure to external 
shocks can also aggravate the overall level of risk (McCulloch/Winters/Cirera 2001).235 The poor 
may be vulnerable to external shocks and macroeconomic volatility (Glewwe/Hall 1998, 
Breen/Garcia-Peñalosa 1999). First, the variability of the poor’s income could be increased due 
to dependence on more flexible world market prices. Second, increased precautionary savings 
caused by higher uncertainty about future income may raise poverty due to reduced growth. In 
addition, credit market effects, i.e. higher incidence of credit rationing or increased risk premium 
and borrowing rates for private firms, may negatively affect the poor via fallen labour demand 
(Agénor 2002). The effect of external shocks and the dependence on world market prices, 
however, is crucially influenced by the institutions (e.g. distribution networks and government 
regulations) transmitting the shocks and prices throughout the economy to the poor. In addition, 
the net poverty effect depends on the possibility of the poor to cope with unanticipated shocks. 
So trade liberalization could also entail improved business opportunities for the poor, which may 
offset higher levels of risk (McCulloch/Winters/Cirera 2001).236  
 
Short-term adjustment 
 
While trade liberalization may benefit an economy in the long run, the shock of trade reform 
could nevertheless lead to a period of adverse adjustment effects on poverty. The poor may be 
affected by a changed employment situation and the speed of the adjustment process in rigid 
labour markets. Increased poverty due to short term effects of trade reforms may also depend 
on the initial level of protection in specific sectors, the way firms can react to higher competitive 
pressure, the size of the external shock, and the initial level of assets available for the 
households to smooth the consumption during transitional unemployment. In addition, possible 
economics of scale and learning-by-doing effects of trade openness are more relevant for 
countries already producing high-technology goods. Thus temporary adverse effects on growth 
and poverty may be possible in an adjustment period of economies exporting initially low-
technology goods or (agriculture) raw materials (Winters 2001a/b, McCulloch/Winters/Cirera 
2001, Winters/McCulloch/McKay 2002, Agénor 2003).     
 
2.2  Empirical evidence 
 
Analytically, the impact of trade openness on the income of the poor can be discerned in the 
growth effect and the distribution effect.237 Concerning the distribution effect of trade policy, 
recent cross-country studies provide only mixed results depending also on the limited availability 
                                                                                                                                                 
234 Cuts in social spending may nevertheless lead to reduced poverty if social expenditures are better targeted to the 
poor (Agénor 2002).  
235 Concerning the empirical evidence, however, results for both terms of trade and output volatility due to trade 
liberalization are not consistent (McCulloch/Winters/Cirera 2001, Winters/McCulloch/McKay 2002).  
236 For a survey of the empirical literature on the effect of trade liberalization on the vulnerability of the poor via portfolio 
choice of households, variability of existing income sources or prices and poverty traps, see Winters/McCulloch/McKay 
2002).  
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of inequality and poverty data in the past years. Edwards (1997) tests the impact of average 
tariffs on the change of the Gini coefficient with a positive coefficient indicating increased 
inequality for countries with trade distortions. On the other side, trade reforms seem not to 
significantly affect changes in income distribution. Gugerty/Roemer (1997) use data on the 
poorest 20 and 40 percent from the Deininger/Squire dataset for 26 developing countries. The 
distribution effect of openness measured by the Sachs-Warner Index is statistically insignificant 
in several specifications. A similar result is reached by Gallup/Radelet/Warner (1999), which 
regress the growth rate of the first quintile share on openness measured by the Sachs-Warner 
Index and additional variables in a cross–section study with 54 countries. Lundberg/Squire 
(2001) examine joint determinants of growth and inequality in a model of simultaneous 
equations using adjusted Gini coefficients as inequality indicator. Statistical tests reveal a trade-
off between growth and distribution for openness measured by the Sachs–Warner index, i.e. a 
10 percent increase of the openness indicator (increasing the proportion of time in a given 
period in which the Sachs-Warner criteria are fulfilled) improves the growth rate by 10 percent 
and increases inequality by 1 percent.  
 
Spilimbergo/Londoño/Székely (1999) collect panel data on Gini coefficients and factor 
endowments over the period 1965 to 1992 to regress the trade volume corrected for factor 
endowments and other variables on the inequality measure. While the openness index reduces 
inequality in capital-abundant countries, inequality is increased in skill–abundant countries. 
Using a panel of Gini coefficients, Barro (2000) tests the effect of a filtered trade volume 
measure on inequality with significant positive association. Anderson/White (2001), however, 
find no impact of the Sachs-Warner index on the poorest 20 and 40 percent, while growth 
regressions of quintile incomes on openness and additional variables result in positive 
coefficients of the Sachs-Warner index except in the top quintile. Dollar/Kraay (2001a) collect 
the most comprehensive dataset based on four sources. However, no systematic correlation 
between six openness indicators (trade volume, adjusted trade volume, Sachs-Warner index, 
collected import taxes to total import ratio, dummy for WTO membership and dummy for capital 
controls) and the share of income of the poorest 20 percent is found. Relying on the dataset and 
econometric specification of Dollar/Kraay (2001a) Ghura/Leite/Tsangarides (2002) extend the 
Dollar/Kraay (2001a) approach to account for model uncertainty issues using a Bayesian-type 
robust estimation. Again, trade openness measured as trade volume and collected import taxes 
to total import ratio remains statistically insignificant. Lopez (2003) uses as openness measure 
the volume of trade adjusted by country size (area, population), whether a country is landlocked 
or oil exporter. Using the unadjusted Dollar/Kraay (2001a) dataset inequality measures, 
averages of non-overlapping five year periods from 1960 to 2000 are constructed. Trade 
openness is found to increase inequality and growth resulting in a trade-off of both effects on 
poverty. While in the short run trade openness seems to worsen poverty, the net long-run 
growth elasticity of poverty with respect to trade openness is negative. In addition, Milanovic 
(2003) finds evidence that the effect of trade volume and foreign direct investment on the poor is 
                                                                                                                                                 
237 See section 4.  
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dependent on the country’s average income level, i.e. in poor countries the rich benefit from 
openness, but this effect is reversed in richer countries. Kraay (2003) tests the direct impact of 
the trade volume on the Gini index and four poverty measures (headcount, poverty gap, 
squared poverty gap and Watts index) on a sample of developing countries. Estimated 
coefficients, however, are never statistically significant. Finally, Agénor (2003) examines the 
effect of globalization on poverty in regressing the poverty gap on the ratio of import duties to 
total import, the ratio of foreign direct investment to GDP and a ‘composite’ index of 
globalization. Empirical results indicate an inverted U-shape relationship between globalization 
and poverty, i.e. beyond a threshold of the globalization index integration in the world market 
seems to help the poor.  
 
To summarize our discussion on poverty effects of trade liberalization, empirical results suggest 
an ambiguous effect of openness on pro-poor growth. In addition, poverty effects of openness 
may depend on a possible trade-off between a growth effect and a distribution effect. Finally, 
the impact of trade liberalization on the poor may differ with respect to the country’s level of 
development. Thus we conclude from this section, that we have to test these hypotheses for the 
20 and 20 to 40 percent poorest.     
 
3.   Data  
 
3.1 Indicators of trade policy and openness  
 
In our research the question of the effect of openness on pro-poor growth is restricted to trade 
openness and policy in contrast to broader concepts of openness concerning increased labour 
or capital mobility. Notwithstanding this restriction, measuring trade openness is heavily debated 
in the literature. Broadly, two different approaches to trade openness are discerned: outcome-
based and policy-based measures.  
 
First, trade liberalization can be measured with respect to the trade outcome (e.g. the trade 
dependency ratio, i.e. the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP). Thus trade openness would 
measure the importance of trade on poverty looking only indirectly at the possible reasons and 
policies responsible for changed trade volumes. As the trade volume is also dependent on other 
factors (e.g. economic development, geography, factor endowments) also adjusted trade 
openness indicators are applied by taking residuals of a regression of the trade volume on 
structural characteristics. Methodological shortcomings of this procedure, however, concern the 
atheoretic or ad hoc nature of the adjustment process and the possible weak correlation 
between trade distortions and unexplained variation in the trade dependency ratio (Pritchett 
1996, Spilimbergo/Londoño/Székely 1999, Berg/Krueger 2003).  
 
Second, focusing more on trade reform openness can also be measured by trade policy under 
direct control of the government. Examples for the second category are tariff averages, i.e. the 
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simple/trade-weighted average of tariff levels, or the coverage of quantitative restrictions. 
(Pritchett 1996, Spilimbergo/Londoño/Székely 1999, Rodriguez/Rodrik 1999, 
McCulloch/Winters/Cirera 2001). Policy measures, however, are criticized with respect to 
aggregation, quantification and implementation problems (Berg/Krueger 2003). Considering the 
relationship between both approaches countries may be open with respect to the trade 
dependency ratio, but nevertheless impose high tariff rates. So various indicators of openness 
are not necessarily correlated with each other and may measure different aspects of trade 
policy with opposite effects (Pritchett 1996, Harrison 1996, Spilimbergo/Londoño/Székely 1999). 
Thus it is important to specify clearly what is assumed to be measured by the openness 
indicator (McCulloch/Winters/Cirera 2001). In addition, it seems necessary to test different 
measures of trade liberalization to gain a more comprehensive insight into the effects of trade 
openness on pro-poor growth (Edwards 1997).  
 
In our approach we, first, extend the recent literature on the impact of trade liberalization on 
poverty in testing the effect of trade liberalization in the primary and secondary sector.238 The 
underlying hypothesis is that the poor may benefit differently from trade in specific sectors or 
commodities, i.e. targeted trade policy may be necessary to achieve higher pro-poor growth. 
Thus we choose six outcome measures, i.e. agricultural raw materials exports to GDP, 
agricultural raw material imports to GDP, food exports to GDP, food imports to GDP, 
manufactures exports to GDP and manufactures imports to GDP.239 The six outcome measures 
were formed by three basic variables, i.e. a trade structure measure (e.g. food exports to 
merchandise exports) is multiplied by total merchandise exports and divided by GDP in current 
US dollars (table 3). Subsequently, the outcome variables, e.g. food exports to GDP, are 
regressed on area, population and an oil exporter dummy to control for structural determinants 
of trade (table 4).240 The estimated residuals from the regressions form our six openness 
indicators. Thus we assume that all differences in trade sectors, which do not depend on the 
size of the country, population and difference between countries due to oil exports, are trade 
policy driven and measure policy openness. Second, we also test two more trade policy 
oriented measures, i.e. export duties to total exports, and import duties to total imports.241 Due 
to data limitations our sample covers the period 1980 to 1999 for the trade sector openness 
indicators and the period 1971 to 1999 for the duties variables.    
                                            
238 We also thought of measuring the impact of trade in services especially for developing countries (Whalley 2003). 
Data of total and decomposed indicators of trade in services, however, are based mainly on balance of payments 
statistics and are flawed by severe inconsistencies (World Development Indicators 2001). Thus we restricted our 
research on trade in the primary and secondary sector.  
239 The six openness indicators capture only in a very crude way the trade with respect to poverty. More specific 
outcome-based measures for trade in goods produced or consumed by the poor would be more convincing. Cross–
country data on exports and imports, however, are not filtered with respect to its relevance for the poor. On the other 
side, trade in products not directly relevant for the poor may also affect the income of the poor via the wage and 
employment channel and trade in different products may be relevant for the poor in different countries.   
240 We also tested other adjustment procedures including ln(Y) and ln(Y)2 in the regression. While the correlation matrix 
of residuals (our openness indicators) differs, the results of the estimation regressions with respect to pro-poor growth 
do not change considerably. In addition, including mean income in the adjustment regression is not necessarily 
convincing. For a discussion of different adjustment methodologies, see Pritchett (1996), Harrison (1996), 
Frankel/Romer (1996),  Spilimbergo/Londoño/Székely (1999), Rodriguez/Rodrik (2000). 
241 We also tried other openness measures: the trade dependency ratio and an adjusted version (using area, population 
and an oil exporter dummy for the adjustment), and an price distortion index (Dollar 1992). In our sample, however, they 
turned out to be insignificant.  
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To have a look on the relationship between the openness measures, we present a correlation 
matrix of all eight indicators (table 5). While one would expect a negative correlation between 
the policy and outcome measures as higher duties should prevent trade flows, food exports and 
imports are significantly positive correlated with imports duties (and exports duties in one case). 
The correlations are significantly negative only in three cases (agriculture imports and exports 
duties, manufactures exports and exports duties, and manufactures exports and import duties). 
The correlations between the outcome measures, however, are mostly positive and thus in the 
assumed direction.  
 
Finally, if we interpret higher adjusted trade sector openness indicators as measures for less 
restricted or more open trade policy, regional disaggregation reveals important differences in 
trade sector openness between the regions (table 7). While trade is relatively open in East Asia 
and the Pacific in all sectors and with respect to duties on trade, the food sector seems to be 
especially protected in Eastern Europe and Industrial countries. In addition, trade in agriculture 
and manufactures is heavily restricted in Latin America and the Caribbean. While exports for all 
sectors are more restricted than imports in Middle East and North Africa due to the outcome 
variables, the duties variables, however, indicate the opposite result. Finally, trade in 
manufactures imports is the most regulated in South Asia, whereas trade in the food sector 
seems to be the most open in Sub-Saharan Africa. Concerning export and import duties, South 
Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa are the regions which rely the most on revenues from trade taxes.  
 
3.2 Data on income inequality measures and additional macroeconomic variables 
 
Empirical tests on the impact of trade policy on pro-poor growth are limited by data availability of 
income inequality. In addition, incomparability of inequality data can cause severe problems in 
cross-section analysis (Atkinson/Brandolini 2001). Due to different concepts used in income 
distribution surveys across time and space cross-section analysis of pro-poor growth using first 
and second quintile share of income has to be applied with caution. Data on income inequality 
may vary in various aspects, e.g. in income concept (income, expenditure), tax treatment, 
reference unit (household/family/household equivalent/person) or coverage (age/area/popu-
lation). Concerning the income definition, expenditure should be preferred to income for 
developing countries for reasons of practical measurement, especially for rural (poor) 
households (Deaton 1997, Atkinson 1993). In addition, data on income distribution can be 
based on different sources (national household surveys, income tax records, social 
security/labour market agency records).242 Thus comparability of data on first and second 
quintile share of income has to be handled with care. While data on quintile shares of income 
cannot be restricted to completely comparable samples due to limited data availability, samples 
                                            
242
see for further details UNU/WIDERUNDP World Income Inequality Database, Version 1.0, 12 September 2000, 
User guide; Atkinson/Brandolini (2001).  
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should only be used with observations as fully consistent as possible (Atkinson/Brandolini 
2001).  
 
Our data on the first and second quintile share of income (and the Gini coefficient) are based on 
four sources: the UNU/WIDER-UNDP World Income Inequality Database, Version 1.0, 12 
September 2000, the Global Poverty Monitoring described in Chen and Ravallion (1997, 
2000)243 and the World Development Indicators 2002 Table 2.8 (see table 1). The observations 
are chosen by a successive selection procedure with restriction criteria motivated by the 
problems outlined above. For the UNU/WIDER database (2000), we first restrict the sample to 
data based on surveys covering all area, all population, all age and fulfilling the 1 OKIN quality 
rating.244 Second, as we are interested in pro-poor growth, only countries with at least two 
spaced observations are selected. To cover medium-to-long run growth and measurement 
errors due to fluctuations we draw the first available observation and every following with at 
least three years distance to the preceding. Only in three cases have we allowed for a two year 
distance within a spell for pragmatic reasons.245 In addition, the income concept and income 
recipients (reference unit) have to be identical for each spell.246  
 
The Global Poverty Monitoring data set is based on nationally representative surveys. All 
measures of household living standards are normalized by household size. The distribution and 
empirical Lorenz curves are household-size weighted. The income shares are estimated from 
primary data sources using parameterized Lorenz curves with flexible functional forms 
(Chen/Ravallion 1997). We have selected the sample on data of first and second quintile share 
of income due to the restriction criteria outlined above. In addition, actual data are drawn from 
the World Development Indicators 2002 Table 2.8 using the same methodology for low- and 
middle- income countries as used by the Global Poverty Monitoring data set.247 This selection 
procedure has resulted in 371 observations in total, 231 for developing, 27 for transitional and 
113 for industrial countries. Finally, data on openness indicators have to be available, reducing 
the total sample further to 266 observations for 72 countries (166, 15, 85 for developing, 
transitional and industrial countries, respectively) in the period 1971 to 1999 (table 1).   
 
In our regressions we use, first, the same income concept and reference unit for each spell, i.e. 
we do not construct all possible spells between the observations in each country.248 In addition, 
we select in some cases two observations per country per year, exchanging the observations 
between the spells (table 1). Second, in adjusting the income inequality measures to form all 
                                            
243
The Global Poverty Monitoring is available under www.worldbank.org/research/povmon/index.htm and continually 
updated.  
244 Reliable income or expenditure data referring to the entire (national) population, not affected by apparent 
inconsistencies (UNU/WIDER – UNDP World income inequality database, Version 1.0, 12 September 2000, Users 
guide). 
245 Bulgaria 1991 – 93, Guatemala 1987 – 89, Kenya 1992 – 94 
246 One can further strengthen the selection criteria by also requiring the same type of survey for each spell to control for 
differences in survey design not captured by the same income definition and reference unit. Due to data availability, 
however, we omitted this idea.  
247 For description of estimation methods see World Development Indicators 2002 Table 2.8. 
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possible spells in each country we regress the first/second quintile share and the Gini coefficient 
on dummy variables for different income definitions and regional dummies.249 The adjusted 
first/second quintile share and Gini coefficient are then calculated by subtracting the estimated 
coefficients of the alternative income dummies from the unadjusted measures to form a sample 
of inequality measures corresponding to the distribution of household expenditure (table 2).250 In 
general, the number of observations per country varies significantly from 2 (almost all Sub-
Saharan Africa and Eastern Europe countries) to 8 (e.g. Finland). 
 
Mean income of the poorest is measured as the share of income earned by the poorest first and 
second quintile times mean income, divided by 0.2. Data on mean income are based on the 
PPP-adjusted real income per capita (constant 1996 US dollars using the chain index) reported 
in the Penn World Tables Version 6.1 (Heston/Summers/Aten 2002, Heston/Summers 1991). 
Though the mean income from national accounts may differ from mean level of household 
income (expenditure) due to measurement errors, income definition or underestimation of 
income (consumption) in developing countries caused by nonparticipating rich, we use per 
capita GDP.251  
 
Looking at summary statistics (adjusted) first/second quintile, (adjusted) mean income of the 
first/second quintile, growth rates of the first/second quintile, and growth rate of the mean 
income of the first/second quintile vary considerably in the different regions (table 7). Thus the 
growth rate of the first quintile in Eastern Europe is on average highly negative (-5.36 percent). 
Second, we emphasize the differences between changes in distribution and overall economic 
growth. We have a low positive growth rate of the first quintile share in East Asia and Pacific 
(0.39 percent), but a high positive growth rate for the mean income of the first quintile (+4.83 
percent). Thus this positive effect stems mainly from the positive growth rate of real GDP per 
capita (+4.44).  
 
Data sources and definitions of additional macroeconomic variables are presented in table 3. As 
we confront missing values and outliers the number of observations vary for each variable and 
                                                                                                                                                 
248 The length of time between two observations with the same income concept within a country ranges from 2 to 14 
years with a median of 4 years in our sample. 
249 We prefer to use regional dummy variables in the adjustment regressions since we have only 371 observations and 
eight different income definitions which are not equally distributed among regions. While category family and equivalized 
are only relevant for industrial countries, category income (unknown tax treatment) and net income are only present in 
three out of five regions in developing countries. If we omit regional dummy variables, the coefficients of these income 
definitions may falsely capture also regional differences in inequality. Since we only subtract the estimated coefficients 
of the income definitions from the unadjusted income inequality measures, regional differences in inequality are not 
consumed away by this adjustment procedure. To check this issue further, we also run adjustment regressions without 
regional dummy variables. If we compare correlations of the two adjusted first/second quintile shares and Gini 
coefficients with its unadjusted version, the correlation coefficients for the adjustment process with regional dummy 
variables are always closer to one confirming our approach.  
250 Subtracting the estimated coefficients of the alternative income dummies from the unadjusted measures means that 
we calculate the adjusted measures by subtracting the alternative income dummies multiplied by their coefficients from 
the unadjusted first/second quintile and Gini coefficients. On critic of this adjustment procedure, see Atkinson/Brandolini 
2001. 
251 One pragmatic reason is that the UNU/WIDER-UNDP Database does not indicate the mean level of household 
income for each household survey. For a discussion of applying this procedure in pro-poor growth regressions, see 
Eastwood/Lipton (2001), Dollar/Kraay (2001a). For a further discussion of discrepancies between national accounts and 
household survey measures of living standards, see Ravallion 2001a). 
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restrict the size of the sample due to the econometric specification (table 6). In addition, not all 
additional macroeconomic variables are used in all specifications due to insignificant 
coefficients.  
 
The variables overall budget surplus to GDP and government consumption to GDP are 
controlled for. Their use is motivated by the impact of trade reform on the poor via public sector 
financing. Budget deficit is expected at least to not have negative coefficients as better public 
finances should not decrease pro-poor growth. The impact of government consumption, 
however, is ambiguous as benefits of public sector do not necessarily support the poorest part 
of an economy more than other income groups.252 In addition, government size can also 
negatively impact the income of the poor due to distortions of private decisions and its proxy for 
bad governance (Barro/Sala-i-Martin 1995). Unfortunately, we could not test the impact of 
health and education expenditures to GDP on pro-poor growth due to lacking data availability 
for our sample.253 Human capital may play a crucial role for the income of the poor, thus we use 
the average years of secondary schooling in the total population aged 25 and over as proxy for 
investment in education with expected positive coefficients.254 We also include life expectancy 
as a proxy for investment in health with expected positive effect.  
 
The rate of inflation is used to cover macroeconomic uncertainty effects and to control for 
inflationary financial effects on pro-poor growth. Low levels of inflation are expected to stimulate 
or at least not hinder pro-poor growth, while high or crisis levels of inflation should impact 
negatively on pro-poor growth. Furthermore, we use terms-of-trade to capture external 
environmental effects with expected positive impact (Barro/Sala-i-Martin 1995, 
Ghura/Leite/Tsangarides 2002).255 We also controll for financial development measured by M2 
to GDP ratio with expected positive coefficient. A positive impact of financial sector development 
on the poor may be reasoned by better access to credit and improved risk sharing 
(Ghura/Leite/Tsangarides 2002).  
 
Furthermore, the initial value of the adjusted Gini coefficient is added to cover the impact of 
initial inequality on the growth of the mean income of the poor with expected positive coefficient. 
Adding the initial inequality in the growth equation can be justified by testing the hypothesis of 
inequality convergence. A positive coefficient for the initial Gini coefficient would confirm the 
convergence of inequality (Ravallion 2000). Finally, civil liberties are used to test institutional 
                                            
252 In developing countries social expenditures often benefit more the middle class and the rich (Dollar, Kraay 2001a, 
Davoodi, Tiongson, Asawanuchit 2003). 
253 Davoodi/Tiongson/Asawanuchit (2003) collected data on education and health expenditures for 81 countries for the 
period 1960 to 2000. Even if the dataset was accessible (which is not the case), it would be inconvenient for our 
purposes as only less than half of the countries are present in our sample.  
254 We also experimented with three other education indicators (average years of schooling in total population aged 25 
and over, average years of primary schooling in total population aged 25 and over, and percentage of “secondary 
school attained” in total population aged 25 and over). While results remained similar, secondary education turned out to 
be the most relevant indicator.  
255 Terms of trade growth reflects external shocks from world market orientation. The sign of the coefficient, however, 
may be indifferent as a positive terms of trade growth can improve the income of the poor representing for example an 
increase in the relative price of agricultural commodities (benefiting the rural poor) or a fall in the price for imported 
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effects on the poor. The index is measured on a scale from one to seven with one indicating the 
most liberal state. Thus the coefficient should be negative, if less civil liberties result in anti - 
poor growth and policies.256  
 
4. Pro-poor growth 
 
Analytically, the impact of openness on the income of the poor can be distinguished in the 
growth and the distribution effect 257:  
 
∂ Yp20/40it
 / ∂  Opjit   = ∂ln(Yit)/∂ Opjit + [∂Y
q20/40
it/∂ ln(Yit)*∂ln(Yit)/∂Opjit + ∂ Y
q20/40
it
 / ∂  Opjit]   
= ρj       + [(α1- 1) * ρj   + γj] (1)  
 
with  
 
Yp20/40it :  mean income of the 20 percent/20 - 40 percent poorest defined as 
 ln(Q20/40it*Yit/0.2) 
Yq20/40it :  Y
p20/40
it – ln(Yit) = ln(Q
20/40
it *Yit/0.2) – ln(Yit) = ln(Q
20/40
it) + ln(Yit) – ln 0.2 – ln (Yit) 
=   ln(Q20/40it/0.2)  
Q20/40it:  first/second quintile share of income  
Yit:  real per capita income  
Opjit:  openness indicators with j = 1, ... , 8 
ρj:  (equiproportionate) growth effect of openness indicator on mean income 
(∂ ln(Yit)/∂ Opjit) 
(α1- 1): distribution effect of mean income (∂ Y
q20/40
it/∂ ln(Yit)) 
γj: distribution effect of openness indicator (∂ Y
q20/40
it
 /∂ Opjit) 
 
The (equiproportionate) growth effect (the first term on the right hand side of the equation) 
measures the effect of the openness indicator on mean income (ρj). The distribution effect 
(second term in brackets) measures the impact of the openness indicator on the first/second 
quintile share in two parts, the difference between α1 and one times the growth effect and the 
direct effect γj of the openness indicator Opjit on the first and second quintile share. Thus the 
income of the poor could be affected directly and indirectly through growth by openness. In 
                                                                                                                                                 
consumption goods (benefiting the urban poor). Otherwise, positive terms of trade growth can also decrease the income 
of the poor by adverse supply-side effects due to the shift in relative prices. 
256 To cover the omitted variable issue we also controlled for other additional macroeconomic variables, i.e. we used the 
impact of institutions measured by political rights and macroeconomic uncertainty captured by output volatility. Test 
statistics, however, indicate no significant impact of these covariates in our regressions. 
257 There is considerable ongoing discussion on the appropriate definition and measurement of pro-poor growth. While 
none of the measures proposed has so far set an international accepted standard, both the growth effect and the 
distribution effect have been identified as most critical for reduction in absolute poverty (Kakwani/Pernia 2000, 
Anderson/White 2001, Bourguignon 2001, Eastwood/Lipton 2001, Chen/Ravallion 2001, Kakwani/Son/Khandker 2003, 
Klasen 2003, Ravallion 2003). 
 168
addition, possible trade-offs of the openness indicator affecting economic growth and the 
first/second quintile share in opposite directions can be analyzed.258  
 
A natural benchmark for pro-poor growth would be equipropotionate growth with α1 = 1 and γj = 
0, i.e. no distribution effects (equation (1): ∂ Yp20/40it
 / ∂  Opjit = ρj). Thus pro-poor growth could be 
defined by a distribution effect: 
 
ρj  + [(α1- 1) * ρj +γj] > ρj  i.e.  γj > 0  for α1 = 1   (2) 
  
One drawback of defining pro-poor growth only by equation (2) is the fact, that a situation with a 
negative growth effect (ρj < 0) would also be labelled as pro-poor if γj > 0. In this case the 
openness indicator would affect the growth rate negatively (ρj < 0), but this effect would be 
diminished by a positive effect on the first/second quintile share, if γj > - (α1- 1) * ρj (as ρj is 
assumed to be negative the direct distribution effect of the openness indicator γj must be greater 
than the distribution effect via growth if α1 > 1). To cover this issue, pro-poor growth could be 
defined by a total effect assuming ∂ Yp20/40it
 / ∂  Opjit > 0:   
 
ρj+ [(α1 - 1) * ρj + γj] > 0  i.e.  γj > - ρj  for α1 = 1   (3) 
 
This condition would require a positive impact of a total effect, adding the growth and 
distribution effect. A positive impact of the openess indicator on first/second quintile share has 
to more than offset the negative effect of the openness indicator through growth. On the other 
hand, a growth situation would be also labelled pro-poor, if the positive growth effect of an 
openness indicator exceeds its negative distribution effect. 
 
In our approach we choose equation (2) and equation (3) as our pro-poor growth conditions, to 
cover both the distribution effect and the total effect of openness indicators on the poorest 20 
and 20 – 40 percent. We also profit from the fact that the coefficient α1-1, while often different 
from zero, is almost always insignificant in our regressions. Thus, assuming no indirect 
distribution effect via the mean income (α1= 1), pro-poor growth is defined in equation (2) by a 
positive distribution effect (γj > 0). In equation (3) pro-poor growth is achieved if the total effect 
of the distribution effect and growth effect is positive (γj + ρj > 0). By estimating both equations, 
possible trade-offs between the distribution effect and growth effect can be analyzed. If 
estimations for the distribution effect are positive (γj > 0), but the coefficients for the total effect 
are zero (γj + ρj = 0), we can conclude that the growth effect of the openness indicator on the 
income of the poor has to be negative (ρj < 0). If estimations for the distribution effect are 
negative (γj < 0) and the total effect is zero (γj + ρj = 0), the growth effect of the openness 
indicator on the income of the poor has to be positive (ρj > 0).    
 
                                            
258 In the discussion of our concept of pro-poor growth we abstract from the inclusion of an interaction term to simplify 
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5.   Econometric specifications and estimation 
  
 
5.1   Econometric specifications 
 
To measure the impact of openness indicators on pro-poor growth we choose two different 
econometric methodologies, a system generalized method of moments estimation for a level 
and first-differenced equation and a growth equation using pooled OLS, random or fixed effects 
estimation. 259 
  
5.1.1   System GMM Estimation: level and first differenced equation 
 
To estimate the distribution effect we formulate the following ad hoc equation in levels, i.e. we 
regress the mean income of the 20/20 to 40 per cent poorest on the mean income, trade 
openness indicators, and variants of additional variables.   
 
Yp20/40it
 = α0 + α1ln(Yit) + βkXkit + γjOpjit  +  μit + εit      (4) 
 
with 
 
Yp20/40it :  mean income of the 20 percent/20 to 40 percent poorest defined as 
 ln(Q20/40it *Yit/0.2) 
Q20/40it:  first/second quintile share of income 
Yit:  real per capita income  
i:  cross-section units (split or not split countries)  
t:  year of observation 
μit + εit:  composite error term including unobserved country effects  
Xkit:  additional variables with k = 1, ... ,n  
Opjit:  trade openness indicators with j = 1, ... , 8 
 
To present more clearly the distribution effect we subtract Yit from both sides: 
260 
 
Yq20/40it
 = α0 + (α1-1)ln(Yit) + βkXkit + γjOpjit  + μit + εit     (5)  
 
with 
 
Yq20/40it: logarithm of first/second quintile share divided by 0.2 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
the analysis. 
259 In the discussion of our concept of pro-poor growth we abstract from the inclusion of an interaction term to simplify 
the analysis. 
260 Yq20/40it  = Yp20/40it  ln(Yit) = ln(Q20/40it*Yit/0.2)  ln(Yit) = ln(Q20/40it) + ln(Yit)  ln 0.2  ln (Yit) = ln(Q20/40it /0.2) 
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However, to include information on within-country variation and to cover econometric issues 
discussed in the next section we apply a system GMM estimator, i.e. we estimate the level 
equation (5) and its first difference (6) as a system with the restriction of having the same 
coefficients α1-1, βk and γj 
 
Yq20/40i,t+z
 - Yq20/40it
 = (α1-1)[ln(Yi,t+z) – ln(Yit)]+ βk[Xki,t+z - Xkit]+ γj[Opji,t+z - Opjit] +  [εit+z  - εit] (6)  
 
z: distance of years between two observations of a spell with identical income definition or 
 distance of years between observations within a country 
 
To handle the incomparability problem of inequality data we choose two different routes. First, 
we split the countries requiring the same income definition within each subgroup (e.g. Côte 
d’Ivoire 1: 1985/88, Côte d’Ivoire 2: 1988/95) and using only the unadjusted income definition. 
While the number of cross-section units is now increased, the number of oberservations for the 
level equation is decreased as the first observation per cross-section unit is omitted due to the 
first-differenced procedure. The advantage of this procedure is that the first-differenced 
equations are now formed only by observations with the same income definition per country. On 
the other hand, the first/second quintile shares in the level equations are not directly 
comparable. Therefore, second, we do not split the countries and form first-differenced 
equations for all observations per country using the adjusted first/second quintile share of 
income. In this case we omit one of the two observations for the same year in one country (e.g. 
Côte d’Ivoire 1988/1) and an observation with only one year difference within a country 
(Netherlands 1983) (see table 1).261 While in this case income definitions in the first-differenced 
and level equation are comparable, the adjustment procedure may influence the estimated 
coefficients (Atkinson, Brandolini 2001). One general drawback of the system GMM estimation 
in our context, however, is the fact that we are confronted with irregular panel data, i.e. z ranges 
from 2 to 14 in both approaches. In the system GMM estimation, however, z is assumed to be 
identical in the first-differenced equation.  
 
The results of the system GMM estimation can be interpreted as a mixture of the level and first-
differenced equation, i.e. pooled cross-section regression of the impact of the openness 
indicators on the level of first/second quintile at certain country-year observations (5) and the 
impact of the change of the openness indicators on the change of the first/second quintile share 
(6) between the observations within a country. Combining (5) and (6) in the system GMM 
estimation, the coefficients of the openness indicators (γj) and the additional regressors (βk) 
capture the distribution effect. Thus relying on (2) a significant γj, βk > 0 indicate pro-poor growth 
(positive distribution effect), while γj, βk < 0 could be labelled as anti-poor growth on average.
262 
                                            
261 We compare the values of the adjusted first and second quintile of both per country year observations (e.g. 
Venezuela 1987/1, 1987/2) with the values before (Venezuela 1981) and after (Venezuela 1993) the country year 
observations to decide whether we omit the first or second observation as ordered in table 1. If one of the adjusted 
observation varies considerably with respect to the other observations, we omit this observation.   
262  This interpretation would apply equivalently to α1 – 1. As α1 – 1, however, is almost never significant, we present 
only results for the system GMM estimation of equations (5) and (6) omitting ln(Yit).  
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Interpreting the system GMM approach as a level equation e.g. a one percentage points 
increase in the openness indicators would change the first/second quintile share by γj*100 
percent. 
 
Finally, to estimate the total effect we regress the mean income of the poorest 20 and 20 to 40 
percent on the openness indicators and variants of additional regressors taking as level 
equation in the system GMM methodology variants of the following equation: 263  
 
Yp20/40it
 = α0 + (βk+ρk)Xkit + (γj+ ρj)Opjit  +  μit + εit      (7) 
 
Taking into account (3) a significant (βk+ρk) > 0, (γj+ ρj) > 0 indicates pro-poor growth (positive 
total effect), while (βk+ρk) < 0, (γj+ ρj) < 0 would indicate anti-poor growth on average. Trade-offs 
between the distribution effect and growth effect are present, if estimations for the distribution 
effect (γj) and the total effect (γj + ρj ) differ in sign.  
 
5.1.2   Growth equation: pooled OLS, fixed effects or random effects estimation 
  
To measure also within-country variation, to cover the problem of an irregular panel in the first-
differenced equation and the incomparability issue of income inequality measures, we also use 
a growth equation forming the dependent variable exclusively from spells with identical 
definitions of inequality income measures and divide the growth rates of each spell by the 
distance of years to calculate (regular) annual averages. Thus we regress the annual average 
growth rate of the mean income of the 20 and 20 - 40 per cent poorest on the annual average 
growth rate of mean income and initial values for the openness indicators and additional 
macroeconomic variables.  
  
yp20/40it
  = α0 + α1yit + βkXkit + γjOpjit +  uit       (8) 
 
with 
 
yp20/40it: average annual rate of growth of the mean income of the 20/20 to 40 per cent 
poorest defined as 100/z*[ln(Q20/40i,t+z*Yi,t+z/0.2) – ln(Q
20/40
it*Yit/0.2)] 
z: distance of years between two observations of a spell with identical income 
definition 
yit:  average annual rate of growth of the mean income defined as 
  100/z*[ln(Yi,t+z) – ln(Yit)] 
Xkit:  additional variables with k = 1, ... ,n; only initial values (at beginning of spell)  
Opjit:  openness indicators with j = 1, ..., 8; only initial values (at beginning of spell) 
uit  error term of unknown form  
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We subtract yit from both sides in (8) to derive the distribution effect more clearly: 
 
yq20/40it
  = α0 + (α1-1)yit + βkXkit + γjOpjit +  εit      (9)  
 
with 
 
yq20/40it: average annual rate of growth of the first and second quintile share defined as 
100/z* [ln(Q20/40i,t+z) – ln(Q
20/40
it)]
 264 
 
Again γj > 0 or βk > 0 indicate pro-poor growth (positive distribution effect) with respect to (2), 
i.e. a one percentage point increase of the openness indicators or the additional variables would 
increase the average annual growth rate of the first/second quintile share by γj and βk 
percentage points, respectively.265   
 
Finally, we also estimate the total effect in using variants of the following equation:266 
 
yp20, 40it
  = α0  + (βk+ρk)Xkit +(γj+ ρj)Opjit +  uit      (10) 
 
With respect to (3) a significant (βk+ρk) > 0, (γj+ ρj) > 0 indicate pro-poor growth (positive total 
effect), while (βk+ρk) < 0, (γj+ρj) < 0 would indicate anti-poor growth on the average. Again, 
trade-offs between the distribution effect and growth effect are indicated, if estimations for the 
distribution effect (γj) and the total effect (γj + ρj ) differ significantly in the sign of the coefficients.  
 
5.2 Econometric issues 
 
In estimating variants of equations (5), (6), (9), several econometric issues have to be 
mentioned.267  First, if we estimate the level equation (5) alone by pooled OLS, coefficients 
would be biased and inconsistent due to unobserved heterogeneity correlated with regressors 
(Dollar/Kraay 2001a, Eastwood/Lipton 2001, Chen/Ravallion 1997). Fixed-effect or first-
difference estimation in a panel data framework would be standard remedies to the unobserved 
heterogeneity issue. However, within-country variation of income distribution may be too limited 
compared to the greater variability of first and second quintile shares across countries 
(Dollar/Kraay 2001a). Thus we apply a system GMM estimator using both information on the 
levels (cross country variation) and first-difference (within country variation) of income 
distribution data (Arellano/Bover 1995, Blundell/Bond 1998). Estimating the growth equation (9) 
                                                                                                                                                 
263 In this approach we assume that α1-1 equals zero. 
264 yq20/40it
 = yp/20/40it – yit  =  100/z* ([ln(Q
20/40
i,t+z *Yi,t+z/0.2) – ln(Q
20/40
it *Yit/0.2)] - [ln(Yi,t+z) – ln(Yit)]) 
=  100/z* ([ln(Q20/40i,t+z) + ln(Yi,t+z) – ln 0.2 - ln(Q
20/40
it) - ln (Yit) + ln (0.2) 
- ln(Yi,t+z)  + ln(Yit)]) 
=  100/z* [ln(Q20/40i,t+z) – ln(Q
20/40
it)] 
 
265 This interpretation would apply equivalently to α1 – 1. As α1 – 1, however, is almost ever insignificant, we present only 
results for the growth equation (9) omitting yit. 
266 In this approach we assume that α1 equals one. 
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by pooled OLS, the estimated coefficients might also be biased and inconsistent due to 
unobserved country-specific effects in εit. We use both a Hausmann test for fixed and random 
effects and a Breusch Pagan Lagrange multiplier test for random effects to cover this issue. If 
we can not reject the null hypothesis in both tests pooled OLS is the appropriate method. 
Otherwise, we present results for random effects (the Breusch Pagan test is rejected, but not 
the Hausmann test) or fixed effects model (the Hausmann test is rejected).     
 
Second, even if time-invariant country-specific effects can probably be dismissed, omitted 
variable bias might be an issue due to variables whose values change over time. In addition, as 
the econometric specification is not based on a comprehensive theoretical framework, but more 
founded in ad hoc considerations and plausible reasoning, model uncertainty problems might 
arise (Ghura/Leite/Tsangarides 2002).268 Thus excluded variables might be correlated with the 
regressors leading to biased estimates.  
 
Third, measurement error in dependent and independent variables could generate biases in the 
estimated coefficients. While measurement error in the data on first/second quintile might be 
more severe due to flawed inequality data, measurement error in the dependent variable only 
causes only biases in case of systematic correlation with regressors (Wooldridge 2000).269 
Measurement error in explanatory variables, however, may lead to inconsistent estimates. 
Varying definitions and accuracy in data collection, for example, cause measurement errors 
especially present in data on developing countries.270 
 
Fourth, in estimating level and first difference equations (5), (6) or the growth equation (9) 
simultaneity might be an issue.271 In case of reverse causation estimations would be biased and 
inconsistent. The impact of the (growth rate of) first/second quintile income on explanatory 
variables (X, Op), however, is controversially discussed. While, on the one hand, endogeneity is 
denied due to pragmatic reasons (Dollar/Kraay 2001a), reverse causation may be argued for 
because of major policy and institutional changes in developing countries and political economy 
reasons (Lundberg/Squire 2001). We do not instrument for X and Op in the system GMM 
estimations due to limited data availability and plausibility.272 Finally, only initial values for each 
                                                                                                                                                 
267 The discussion in this section is also relevant for regressions on the total effect (equations 7 and 10). 
268 The problems of omitted variables and model uncertainty are connected by the exclusion of significant explaining 
regressors which might be correlated with the selected regressors. But while the omitted variable issue points to the 
inconsistent estimation of the selected parameters, the problem of model uncertainty focuses on the misspecification of 
the general model and the problem in explaining pro-poor growth by a single ad hoc model. On the problem of model 
uncertainty in cross country growth regressions, see Temple (1999). On the issue of model uncertainty in pro-poor 
growth regressions with macroeconomic policy variables, see Ghura/ Leite/ Tsangarides (2002). 
269 As yp20/40 is formed by y, i.e. the dependent variable would be systematically related to an explanatory variable in 
regressions with y, a biased coefficient of y might be expected. However, remembering yq20/40 in equation (5), this is 
equal to stating that the growth rate of the first/second quintile must be correlated with the growth rate of mean income. 
As the data on first/second quintile and mean income stem from different sources, this can not be assumed in advance 
(Dollar/Kraay 2001a). On the issue of biased estimates in case of identical data sources, see Chen/Ravallion (1997).  
270 On the measurement error problem in cross-section growth regressions and on the flawed data in the Penn World 
Table, see Temple (1999). 
271 On the problem of simultaneous examination of inequality and growth and their joint determinants, see 
Lundberg/Squire (2001). 
272 One could use lagged values of X and D as instruments. However, as our sample is often restricted to only two 
observations per country, we would have to drop all these countries from the regression.  
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spell are used for the regressors X and Op to avoid endogeneity due to explanatory variables in 
the growth equation.273  
 
A significant impact of the (growth rate of the) mean income of the poor on the (growth rate of 
the) mean income might be possible.274 Considering equations (5), (6), and (9), reverse 
causation thus means impact of the (growth rate of) first/second quintile share on the (growth 
rate of the) mean income.275 Using only a level equation (5) contemporaneous reverse 
causation will cause inconsistent OLS estimation, while lagged reverse causation would justify 
OLS estimation assuming serial independence. Thus considering the growth equation (9), 
pooled OLS estimation is unbiased and consistent if lagged reversed causation can be 
assumed with serial independence (Eastwood/Lipton 2001). Concerning the system GMM 
estimation, reverse causation is covered in using instruments for mean income. In the level 
equation (5), we instrument for mean income using accumulated growth in mean income over 
three years prior to time t (e.g. Brazil 1967 to 1970 for 1970). In the first difference equation (7), 
we instrument for growth in mean income using the level of mean income at the beginning of the 
period, and accumulated growth in the three years prior to time t (Dollar/Kraay 2001a, 
Ghura/Leite/Tsangarides).276 A Sargan test on overidentifying restrictions is used to test for 
validity of extra instruments (Arrelano/Bond 1991, Bond/Blundell 1998). As the coefficient for 
(the growth rate of the) mean income is 1 in most of the cases, however, we present only results 
omitting (the growth rate of the) mean income. 
  
Assuming lagged reverse causation of yq20/40 on y in the growth equation (9), serial correlation in 
the error term within countries and over time remains to be discussed. In static models, 
autocorrelation in the error term leads to incorrect standard errors and t-ratios but not to 
inconsistent estimates in OLS estimation. Serial correlation in models with lagged endogenous 
variables, however, would result in inconsistent estimates. Given a serially correlated error term 
the structure of the variance-covariance matrix for equation (9) would be block diagonal with a 
separate block for each country. Thus off-diagonal elements would only be non-zero within 
these blocks (Chen/Ravallion 1997 As different surveys are used within almost each block, the 
error term is assumed to be serially independent. Considering the system GMM estimator, the 
assumption of no serial correlation of the error term εit in the level equation (5) is essential for 
consistency (Bond/Blundell 1998). Thus tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation 
of the first-differenced residuals εit+z  - εit of equation (6) are reported. If disturbances εit are not 
serially correlated, first order serial correlation in first differenced residuals εit+z  - εit have to be 
                                            
273 On this solution, see Lundberg/Squire (2001). On the empirical application of this method to deal with the 
endogeneity issue in cross-section growth regressions, see Barro/Sala-i-Martin (1995). But even in this solution 
endogeneity might remain a problem, see Temple (1999). 
274 Biased estimates might also be possible due to joint causation (Timmer 1997, Eastwood/Lipton 2001).  
275 The effect of initial income inequality on subsequent growth has been often empirically examined. The evidence, 
however, is mixed with negative (Perotti 1996, Alesina/Rodrik 1994), positive (Forbes 2000, Li/Zou 1998) and indifferent 
effect of initial income inequality on future growth (Deininger/Squire 1998b). In addition, a negative effect only for 
countries with mean income below $ 2000 (in constant 1985 purchasing power) is found (Barro 2000). 
276Example: given the first difference equation Brazil 1960 – 1970 we use the mean income of 1960 and the 
accumulated growth of mean income between 1957 and 1960 as instruments for the first difference of mean income 
1960 - 1970. 
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significant negative (m1), and second order serial correlation in the first differenced residuals 
insignificant (m2) (Arrelano/Bond 1991, Bond/Blundell 1998).  
 
5.3  Estimation strategy and results 
 
To measure the impact of trade policy on pro- poor growth, we estimate separately the impact of 
the eight openness indicators on the first and second quintile share for all, developing and 
industrial countries applying the system GMM estimator and the growth equation. We test this 
set of equations in specifications with regional dummy variables and with additional 
macroeconomic variables. To analyze potential trade-offs between this distribution effect and 
the growth effect we additionally test the total effect of the eight openness indicators on the 
mean income of the 20 and 20 to 40 percent poorest adding macroeconomic variables. Due to 
our fundamentally empirical approach, we execute different robustness checks to confirm the 
results, i.e. we test results only without outliers, with and without mean income, and adjusted 
and not adjusted inequality income measures in the system GMM estimations.277 Finally, we 
test also for the effect of an interaction term with mean income for all eight openness indicators 
in all and developing countries.  
 
To present a general overview of our results, we indicate matrices of significant coefficients of 
openness indicators in table 16 to 22.278 In the rows we indicate the different specifications 
applied. The eight columns denote the eight different openness indicators we test in each 
specification. In table 22 we present results for the distribution and total effect of the openness 
indicators with interaction term. In row 1 we see findings regressing the first quintile on regional 
dummies and the eight openness indicators using the unadjusted approach in the system GMM 
estimation. Coefficients for agriculture exports and food imports seem to be highly statistically 
significant (table 22).    
 
5.3.1   Openness indicators and pro-poor growth: distribution effect 
 
Relying on this overview we emphasize that openness indicators have no distribution effect on 
the growth rate of the poorest 20 and 20 to 40 percent in all, developing or industrial countries 
(table 16, 17). In the system GMM estimation we find weak positive effect of manufactures 
exports on the first quintile for all, and less robust for developing countries (table 18, 19).  
 
First, we regress the first and second quintile on the eight openness indicators and regional 
dummy variables to control for cultural, historical and economical differences of income 
inequality in the seven regions (Cornia 2002). In the system GMM approach estimations confirm 
                                            
277 We indentify outliers from graphical analysis and descriptive statistics without a strict rule (table 6). Due to a varying 
number of observations of the samples used in regressions for developing, and industrial countries, and in the growth 
equation and system GMM estimation, the number of outliers differ in these regressions for dependent and independent 
variables. 
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the hypothesis of important inequality difference between regions as almost all coefficients for 
regional dummy variables differ to a high significance level from the region omitted, i.e. 
industrial countries in all countries and Eastern Europe and Central Asia in developing countries 
(table 8). This result is in line with the regional difference of the mean of the (adjusted) first and 
second quintile (table 7). Concerning openness indicators, only manufactures exports and 
import duties are weakly significantly positive (table 8 equatons 1, 2, and 5).279  Failed tests on 
first order serial correlations, however, do not confirm the findings and emphasize the weakness 
of the results.280  
 
Considering the empirical literature (Romer/Romer 1998, Easterly/Fisher 2001, Eastwood/Lipton 
2001, Ghura/Leite/Tsangarides 2002), macroeconomic variables are found to be relevant with 
respect to pro-poor growth. Thus we additionally control for budget deficit to GDP, financial 
development (money and quasi money to GDP), secondary education (average years of 
secondary schooling in total population aged 25 and over), inflation and initial Gini coefficient in 
the growth equation.281 The eight openness indicators, however, remain insignificant in the 
growth equation approach. In the system GMM estimation, we substitute budget deficit by 
government consumption due to its proven relevance in this estimation methodology 
(Ghura/Leite/Tsangarides 2002). While the Gini coefficient is found to be highly significant in a 
similar approach (Ghura/Leite/Tsangarides 2002), regressing the first quintile share on the Gini 
coefficient in a level/first-difference equation seems to us tautological as a change in  inequality 
in the first and second quintile share is only explained by change in overall inequality, i.e. no 
new informations on the determinants of inequality are added in this specification. Thus we omit 
the Gini coefficient in the system GMM estimations.  
 
Considering the openness indicators, manufactures exports affect positively the first quintile 
share for all countries and the first and second quintile share for industrial countries (table 9 
equations 1 to 6). Furthermore, agriculture exports and food exports impact negatively on the 
first quintile share in industrial countries, a result not confirmed in either the adjusted or 
unadjusted approach (table 9, equations 7 to 12). In addition, secondary education is amazingly 
negative (-0.12) to a one percent significance level on the first quintile share for industrial 
countries (table 9, equations 7 and 9). Specification tests on first-order serial correlation, 
however, are not passed in all regressions presented. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
278 Results for industrial countries in the growth equation are not presented since coefficients are either insignificant or 
the size of the sample is under 30 observations.  
279 Coefficients, heteroscedasticity adjusted asymptotic standard errors and tests on first-order and second-order serial 
correlation are based on the one-step estimator. While the one-step estimator is asymptotically inefficient relative to the 
two-step estimator, asymptotic inference based on the one-step estimator is supposed to be more reliable indicated by 
simulations (Blundell/Bond 1998, see also Bond/Hoeffler/Temple 2001). 
280 In addition, table 8 equation 4 is only significant in the adjusted income approach, while table 8 equation 5 is only 
significant in the unadjusted approach.   
281 Adding initial inequality in the growth equation can be motivated by testing the hypothesis of inequality convergence 
even if usually the same inequality measure, i.e. Gini coefficient or first quintile share, is used on both sides of the 
equation (Ravallion 2000). A positive coefficient for the initial Gini coefficient would confirm the convergence of 
inequality. 
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Putting the eight openness indicators separately as exogenous regressors on the right hand 
side in both the growth equation and system GMM estimation, empirical findings suggest only 
weak evidence on a distributional effect of trade policy on the poorest 20 and 20 - 40 percent. 
Thus we provisionally conclude that either there is only small distributional effect of trade on the 
poor or our model is not correctly specified and thus does not correctly describe the real 
economic situation.   
 
5.3.2 Openness indicators, interaction term and pro-poor growth: distribution effect 
 
To capture the issue posed in the last section, we next introduce an interaction term for all eight  
openness indicators using the mean income. Including openness indicators alone may be 
criticized by the fact that the effect of trade on the first and second quintile depends also on the 
level of the country’s development. Relying on the Stolper-Samuelson effect, a theoretical 
explanation could be based on the reasoning that increased openness could tend to benefit low-
skilled workers in poorer countries due to a boost for low-skill-intensive industries, while low-
skilled workers in richer countries could lose income due to increased foreign competition and 
cheaper imported low-skill-intensive products. Thus more openness could increase inequality in 
countries relatively highly endowed in human and physical capital, while inequality may 
decrease in countries relatively highly endowed in unskilled labour. As we have no information 
on the skill composition in the first and second quintile share, we use the income level of the 
country as interaction term with our openness indicators to capture in a very crude way the 
countries’ relative abundance in skilled labour (Barro 2000, Ravallion 2001b, Dollar/Kraay 
2001a, Milanovic 2003).  
 
Thus one may expect the following effects with respect to our openness indicators. First, the 
positive coefficients of liberalization in agriculture and food should decrease with respect to an 
increase in the income level of the country if the majority of the labour force is employed in the 
agriculture and food sector in low-income countries. Second, trade reforms in manufactures 
imports should lead to positive effects on the unskilled labour, decreasing with rising income 
levels. However, distribution effects may also be negative in low-income developing countries, if 
liberalization in manufactures is associated with a skilled-biased technological change 
(Goldberg/Pavcnik 2004). Finally, the effect of export and import duties should increase with 
rising income level. We test these hypotheses also for developing countries alone since the 
level of income and the economic structure of developing countries may differ significantly with 
respect to abundancy in labour and capital in our sample (table 7).  
 
We first estimate the effect of the openness indicators on the first and second quintile share 
adding regional dummy variables. Considering the growth equation, the effect of agriculture 
exports on the annual average rate of growth of the second quintile share for all and developing 
countries surges with respect to an increasing initial mean income (table 10 equations 1 and 
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2).282 Looking at the result for developing countries, agriculture exports affect negatively the 
growth rate of the second quintile share for mean income below 4150, but impact positively in 
countries with an income level higher than 4150 (table 10 equation 2).283 Thus the negative 
effect of agriculture exports on annual average rate of growth of the poorest 20 to 40 percent 
worsens with lower economic development. This result, however, is in contrast to the 
explanation proposed above. In addition, as the median in this sample is 3890 for the mean 
income, within-country distribution is aggravated in more than 50 percent of the countries by 
agriculture exports.  Finally, also manufactures imports affect significantly the growth rate of the 
first quintile share in developing countries, i.e. manufactures imports are negative for very low 
income countries, but this effect decreases with rising economic development and becomes 
positive above a value of 3720 for the mean income (table 10 equation 3).  
 
If we add regional dummy variables to the openness indicators with interaction term in the 
system GMM estimation, only agriculture exports are significant for the first and second quintile 
in all countries using the adjusted approach (table 11 equations 2, 4). In addition, agriculture 
exports and food imports are significant in developing countries (table 11 equations 5 to 12). A 
positive effect on very low income countries decreases with rising economic development and 
turns negative at some level of mean income. Agriculture exports are positive for the first 
quintile share in developing countries below a value around 5100 for the mean income, which 
means that higher agriculture exports increase the first quintile in more than 90 percent of the 
developing countries in our sample (table 11 equation 5). Food imports impact positively on the 
first quintile share in developing countries below a value of 4100 for the mean income, i.e. 
higher food imports decrease the first quintile in more than 50 percent of the developing 
countries in our sample (table 11 equation 9). However, regressions on the effect of openness 
indicators almost never pass specification tests on first-order serial correlation.  
 
One important result is that empirical findings suggest no distribution effect of agriculture 
imports, food exports, manufactures exports, and import and exports duties in both the growth 
equation and system GMM estimation if we add an interaction term in specifications without 
macroceonomic variables (table 16, 17 21, 22). A second important result is an opposite effect 
of agriculture exports if we compare the findings in the growth equation with the system GMM 
estimations (table 16, 17, 21, 22). While the positive effect of agriculture exports at very low 
income levels decreases with surging economic development for the second quintile share in 
developing countries, the effect of the initial agriculture exports on subsequent growth rate of 
the second quintile share is negative at low income levels (compare table 11 equations 7, 8 with 
table 10 equations 2).  
 
To reveal the systematic differences of the estimation methodologies, we, first, estimate a 
sample used in the growth equation in a system GMM approach. As we need two observations 
                                            
282 Results are robust to the inclusion of annual average rate of growth of the mean income on the right hand side of the 
regression. 
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with growth rates per country, i.e. three observations for the first and second quintile share, to 
apply the system GMM estimator, we omitted all countries with only two observations. 
Estimated results for the system GMM estimations are a mixture of the growth equation and the 
first difference of the growth equation. Second, we also test effects of the level and first 
differenced equations of a system GMM estimation separately in OLS. Estimated coefficients for 
system GMM estimation are here a mixture of a level equation and the first difference of the 
level equation. Thus the difference between the system GMM estimations and the growth 
estimations stems apparently from the fact that we regress the level of the first/second quintile 
on the level of openness indicators in the system GMM estimation, while we regress the growth 
rate on the level of the openness indicators in the growth equation.  
 
Again, we control for budget deficit to GDP, financial development, secondary schooling, 
inflation and initial inequality in the growth equation. Batteries of regressions, however, could 
not confirm any significance of one of the eight openness indicators (table 16, 17).284 
Concerning the system GMM estimation, we control for secondary education, government 
consumption and inflation as additional macroeconomic variables. Looking at the overview, only 
import duties are relevant in all countries, but the coefficients of agriculture exports become 
insignificant compared to regressions without macroeconomic variables (table 21).  
 
Considering the results for developing countries (table 22), the effect of agriculture exports on 
the first and second quintile share is highly significant and increased with respect to regressions 
excluding macroeconomic variables (compare table 12 equations 1 to 4 with table 11 equations 
5 to 8). Thus a higher positive effect on very low income countries decreases more sharply with 
rising economic development. Taking the regression for the first quintile share in developing 
countries, the turning point to a negative impact is at a value around 5200 for the mean income 
(Costa Rica 1989), while in the regression without macroeconomic values the turning point is at 
a value around 5050 (compare table 12 equation 1, 2 with table 11 equation 5). In addition, 
significant results are confirmed by passed specification tests on first-order serial correlation in 
the unadjusted approach (table 12 equations 1 and 3). 
 
While coefficients of food imports for the second quintile become insignificant in developing 
countries in specifications with macroeconomic variables (table 22), the effect of food imports on 
the first quintile in developing countries is analogue to the result controlling only for regional 
dummy variables (compare table 12 equation 5 and 6 with table 11 equations 9 and 10). The 
findings are confirmed by passed specification test on first-order serial correlation in the 
unadjusted approach (compare table 12 equation 5 with table 11 equation 9).  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
283 The level of initial mean income is calculated  by  –5.00 + 0.60 * ln(Y) = 0.  
284 We test the eight openness indicators for all, developing and industrial countries without outliers and with/without the 
growth rate of mean income.  
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Finally, agriculture imports affect the first quintile in developing countries and import duties the 
first quintile in all countries at low significance levels. Even if specification tests on first-order 
serial correlation are passed, the results are not robust using the unadjusted or adjusted income 
inequality measure approach (table 12 equations 5 and 8). Thus we emphasize the weakness of 
the findings for agriculture imports and import duties, as the coefficients for additional 
macroeconomic variables are either insignificant or, in case of a negative coefficient for 
secondary education (table 12 equation 7), in the opposite direction to estimations in the 
literature (Ghura, Leite, Tsangarides 2002) and are very singular with respect to robustness 
checks and tests in other specifications (table 21 and 22). Concerning additional 
macroeconomic variables, coefficients are almost never significant. Only in regressions on 
agriculture exports, secondary education and government consumption affect positively the 
second quintile share in developing countries (table 12 equation 3 and 4).285 
 
Including mean income as interaction term for all eight openness indicators seems to describe 
more detailed the economic situation. In the system GMM estimations agriculture exports and 
food imports impact positively at very low income levels in developing countries, but this effect is 
diminished and becomes negative above a certain threshold. Empirical findings for agriculture 
imports and import duties, however, do not allow a clear conclusion. Finally, food exports, 
manufactures exports and export duties are found to be insignificant in both the growth equation 
and system GMM estimations using an interaction term (table 16, 17, 21, 22).  
 
5.3.3 Openness indicators and pro – poor growth: total effect  
 
Taking into account trade-offs between the distribution effect and the growth effect of openness 
on the income of the poor, we also test for the impact of our eight openness indicators on the 
mean income of the 20 and 20 - 40 percent poorest, i.e. the total effect. We choose to measure 
the total effect and derive possible trade–offs between the distribution and growth effect, 
because our panel is highly irregular and unbalanced and tests on the growth effect of the 
openness indicators are limited by data availability and could better be answered in samples 
without restrictions on income inequality data.   
 
Controlling for budget deficit, financial development, secondary education, inflation and initial 
inequality, only agriculture imports are relevant in the growth equation (table 16, 17), i.e. 
agriculture imports impact significantly positive on the mean income of the second quintile in all 
countries and the first and second quintile in developing countries (table 13 equations 1 to 3).286 
Thus the positive effect of agriculture imports on the income of the poorest 20 and 20 to 40 
percent works only through the growth effect, as we do not find any distribution effect (table 16 
                                            
285 While the positive coefficient of secondary education is in line with empirical findings for the first quintile share, the 
very low but positive effect of government consumption is not present in the adjusted approach and not confirmed in the 
literature (Ghura/Leite/Tsangarides 2002). 
286 We also tested initial per capita income as convergence term in total effects regressions of the growth equation. 
However, we omit inital per capita income, since its coefficient was never statistically significant 
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and 17).287 In addition, the adjusted initial Gini coefficient is positive at a highly significant way 
(between 0.34 and 0.45), i.e. higher initial inequality would lead to a higher growth rate for the 
mean income of the poorest 20 and 20 to 40 percent.288 
 
The picture changes considerably if we add secondary education, government consumption, 
inflation and, additionally, civil liberties, life expectancy and terms-of-trade in the system GMM 
approach. Relying on our overview, agriculture imports, food exports, manufactures export, 
export and import duties are now significant openness indicators with respect to the total effect 
(table 18 to 20). Agriculture imports impact highly significantly positive on the mean income of 
poorest 20 and 20 - 40 percent in all and developing countries (table 14 equations 1 to 8). 
Interpreting the system GMM estimation as level equation, a one percentage point rise in 
agriculture imports would increase the mean income of the first and second quintile between 20 
and 26 percent. As the estimated residuals for agriculture imports vary only between -1.11 and 
+1.67 in our sample without outliers (table 6), however, a 0.1 percentage point rise of agriculture 
imports by trade reforms would be a more realistic perspective. This positive effect, however, is 
only present in regressions on the mean income of the poor and thus results from the growth 
effect alone (table 18 and 19). 
 
Food exports affect negatively the mean income of the first and second quintile in all countries, 
the mean income of the poorest 20 percent in developing countries (table 14 equations 9 to 16) 
and the mean income of the first and second quintile in industrial countries using the unadjusted 
approach (table 14 equations 31 to 34). A one percentage point increase in food exports would 
diminish the mean income of the poorest 20 and 20 to 40 percent between 2 and 3 percent. The 
negative effect, however, is only present in regressions on the mean income of the poor and 
thus results from the growth effect alone (table 18 and 19).  
 
Manufactures exports affect highly significantly positive the mean income of the first and  
second quintile in all and developing countries (table 14 equations 17 to 24) and the mean 
income of the first quintile in industrial countries applying the unadjusted approach (table 14 
equation 35). Interpreting the system GMM estimation as level equation, a one percentage point 
rise in manufactures exports would increase the mean income of the first and second quintile 
between 1.1 to 2.1 percent in all and developing countries. As either only the total effect is 
significant or the total effect is more than doubled with respect to the distribution effect (table 18 
and 19), manufacture exports work mainly through the growth effect on the income of the poor 
                                            
287 Concerning the result for the growth of the mean income of the first quintile (table 13 equation 2), we have to correct 
this statement, as we do find a positive coefficient (+2.20) to a 5 percent significance level in the random effects model 
for the growth of the first quintile. Thus part of the high positive value seems to stem from a distribution effect. The 
Hausmann specification test, however, is rejected to a 5 percent significance level, thus a fixed effects model has to be 
applied. The coefficient of agriculture imports is positive (+4.42), but insignificant in the fixed effects model.   
288 In regressions for the growth rate of the mean of the second quintile, around 70 percent of the positive effect of the 
initial Gini coefficient stem from a positive distribution effect on the growth rate of the second quintile, confirming the 
hypothesis of inequality convergence (Ravallion 2000). We do not present the results for the distribution effect due to 
insignificant openness indicators. The positive total effects of initial inequality are not directly comparable to Forbes 
(2001), since we do not apply a first-difference methodology (GMM) to estimate our growth equation, we use a different 
set of additional regressors, and our Gini coefficient is adjusted in a more accurate way.   
 182
in all and developing countries. This conclusion, however, can not be drawn for industrial 
countries as the small positive coefficient for the mean income of the first quintile is similar to 
the distribution effect (compare table 14 equation 35 to table 9 equations 3)   
 
Export duties affect negatively the mean income of the poorest 20 percent in all and developing 
countries, and, amazingly, affect positively the mean income of the second quintile in industrial 
countries (table 14 equations 25 to 30). A one percentage point surge in export duties would 
decrease the mean income of the first quintile by 3 percent in all and developing countries, but 
increase the mean income of the poorest 20 - 40 percent by 11 percent in industrial countries. 
The positive coefficient should not be overinterpreted as coefficients are significant only to a ten 
percent level. In addition, the values for export duties vary only between 0 and 1.12 in industrial 
countries with a mean of 0.10 (table 7) and more than 70 percent of the observations have a 
value of zero. Thus the positive coefficient is only due to few observations with positive exports 
duties. Finally, import duties impact negatively on the mean income of the first quintile in 
industrial countries (table 14 equations 37 and 38). A one percentage points rise in import duties 
would diminish the mean income of the poorest 20 percent between 1.8 and 2.4 percent. This 
negative effect, however, results mainly from the distribution effect (table 9 equations 13 and 
14).  
 
Most additional macroeconomic variables impact on the income of the poor in the way 
expected. In all and developing countries higher secondary education, life expectancy and 
terms of trade increase the income of the poor, while raised government consumption and less 
civil liberties diminish the income of the poor (table 14 equations 1 to 28).289 In addition, 
coefficients for additional macroeconomic variables are almost always statistically significant. 
Only the coefficient of inflation is amazingly positive, but almost never significant in developing 
and all countries. A one year rise of average years of secondary schooling would increase the 
mean income of the first and second quintile between 22 and 33 percent in developing 
countries. As the mean of average years of secondary education is at 1.21 years and the 
minimum and maximum values for developing countries are 0.12 and 3.52 years, respectively, a 
one year change in secondary schooling would be a very ambitious policy objective. A more 
realistic interpretation is a change of 0.1 in average years of secondary schooling that would 
increase the mean income of the first and second quintile between 2 and 3 percent. In addition, 
a one year increase in life expectancy would raise the mean income of the first and second 
quintile between 2 to 6 percent in all and developing countries. Finally, a one unit rise of civil 
liberties measured in a scale from one to seven with one indicating the most favorable state 
would diminish the mean income for the first and second quintile between 5 to 8 percent. While 
results for industrial countries point in the same direction, the coefficient of inflation is highly 
negative, terms of trade equals zero and only few coefficients are significant (table 14 equations 
29 to 38). In addition, secondary education is only significant for income of the first quintile using 
                                            
289 The variable government consumption may be seen as a proxy for nonproductive public expenditures, political 
corruption or bad governance (Barro/Sala-i-Martin 1995). 
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the adjusted approach in industrial countries (table 15 equation 31, 32, 35, 36, 37, 38). Results 
on the total effect in general, however, have the shortcoming that tests on first order serial 
correlation are never passed.  
 
5.3.4 Openness indicators, interaction term and pro–poor growth: total effect 
 
Controlling for an interaction term, budget deficit, financial development, secondary education,  
inflation and initial inequality in the growth equation, we find no significant effects in the growth 
equation (table 16, 17). Concerning the system GMM estimation, we add secondary education, 
government consumption, inflation, civil liberties, life expectancy and terms of trade to the 
interaction term of our eight openness indicators. An important finding is that the set of 
significant openness indicators has changed with respect to the distribution effect. First, 
agriculture exports now affect also the mean income of the poorest 20 and 20 - 40 percent in all 
countries. Second, food exports, export and import duties impact significantly on the mean 
income of first and second quintile in all and developing countries. Finally, food imports become 
irrelevant with respect to the total effect, i.e. the distribution effect of food imports is completely 
absorbed by an opposite growth effect (table 21 and 22). 
 
The coefficients of agriculture exports are significant in all and developing countries with 
expected effect, i.e. a positive effect on very low income countries decreases with rising 
economic development and turns negative at some level of mean income (table 15 equations 1 
to 8).290 Agriculture exports are positive for the first quintile share in developing countries in the 
unadjusted approach below a value around 6000 for the mean income, which means that higher 
agriculture exports would increase the first quintile in more than 70 percent of the developing 
countries in our sample (table 15 equation 5). The total effect of agriculture exports is 
dependent on the growth effect alone in all countries as we find no distribution effect (table 21). 
In developing countries, however, the significant distribution effect is raised by the growth effect 
(table 22). Thus there is no trade-off between the distribution and growth effect, but both work in 
the same direction.   
 
Food exports, however, affect the mean income of the first and second quintile in the opposite 
direction. A negative effect at low levels of economic development diminishes and becomes 
positive with rising mean income in all and developing countries (table 15 equations 9 to 16). 
Food exports are positive for the income of the first quintile in developing countries in the 
unadjusted approach above a value around 5300 for the mean income (table 15 equation 13). In 
developing countries this effect is steeper than in all countries as a higher negative effect on 
very low income countries increases more sharply with rising economic development. The total 
                                            
290 Exceptions are regressions on the mean income of the first quintile in the adjusted approach (table 15 equations 2 
and 6). 
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effect of food exports, however, is only driven by the growth effect as we do not find significant 
distribution effects for food exports (table 21 and 22).291  
 
Concerning  export and import duties, a negative impact at low levels of economic development 
diminishes and becomes positive with rising mean income in all and developing countries (table 
15 equations 17 to 32), i.e. increased exports and import duties worsen the mean income of the 
poorest in low to middle income countries, while they are positive for the poor in high income 
countries. Exports duties are negative for the income of the poorest 20 percent in developing 
countries in the adjusted approach below a value around 5750 for the mean income (table 15 
equation 22). Increased import duties, however, already affect positively the income of the first 
quintile at a value around 2100 for the mean income (table 15 equation 29 and 30). For both 
exports and import duties this effect is steeper in developing countries than in all countries as a 
higher negative effect on very low income countries increases more sharply with rising 
economic development. In addition, the growth effect is alone responsible for the impact of 
export and import duties on the mean income of the poorest 20 and 20 - 40 percent as almost 
all distribution effects are insignificant (table 21 and 22).292  
 
Finally, the impact of the additional macroeconomic variables is very similar to regressions on 
the total effect without interaction term (compare table 15 with table 14). Interpretation of the 
results on the total effect in general, however, are weakened by failed tests on first order serial 
correlation in most regressions (table 15). 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
We departed from the question whether the poorest 20 and 20 to 40 percent benefit from trade 
openness in the agriculture, food and manufactures sector or in export and import duties. To 
answer this question we regressed the first and second quintile and the mean income of the first 
and second quintile on eight different openness indicators, interaction terms and additional 
macroeconomic variables in a growth equation and an adjusted and unadjusted system GMM 
approach (table 16 to 22).  
 
Only a few openness indicators exhibit significant distribution effects on the poorest 40 percent. 
First, manufactures exports are weakly positive for the first quintile in all countries applying the 
system GMM estimator (table 18), a result mainly driven by effects in industrial countries (table 
19 , 20) and not supported in the growth equation (table 16, 17). Second, liberalizing agricultural 
                                            
291 A negative distribution effect of food exports at low levels of economic development could be explained in the context 
of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, if we assume that the food sector is the most protected sector producing intensively 
with unskilled labour and if tariffs are reduced the most in the food sector during trade reforms. Since trade liberalization 
is focused on the unskilled-labour intensive food sector, returns to unskilled labour should decrease. Thus sectoral 
protection patterns before trade liberalizations may significantly affect the impact of trade reforms (Goldberg/Pavcnik 
2004). This explanation, however, seems to be irrelevant in our context since the total effect is only driven by the growth 
effect. 
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raw exports leads to a significant positive distribution effect on the first and second quintile 
share in low-income developing countries. The positive effect decreases with rising economic 
development and becomes negative at a higher level of income, supporting the Stolper– 
Samuelson theorem (table 22). The results, however, are neither present in regressions for all 
countries (table 21), nor in the growth equation (table 16, 17).293 Finally, increased food imports 
impact positively on the first quintile share only at low income level in developing countries 
(table 22).294 However, this effect becomes negative in higher income developing countries and 
is not confirmed in regressions for all countries (table 21) and the growth equation (table 16, 
17). To summarize, only trade liberalization in agricultural raw materials exports and food 
imports leads to significant positive distribution effects in low income developing countries 
applying the system GMM approach. In addition, trade reforms in manufactures does not lead to 
any negative distribution effect in low income countries as proposed by the literature on wage 
inequality.295      
     
Considering the total effect, we find more relevance of trade reforms on the income of the 
poorest 40 percent.  First, trade liberalization in agricultural raw material imports, export duties, 
and promotion of manufactures exports lead to significant positive effects using the system 
GMM estimation, while higher food exports impact negatively on the mean income of the 
poorest 20 percent in all and developing countries (table 18, 19). Similar findings are confirmed 
for the mean income of the poorest 20 - 40 percent for agriculture imports, manufacture exports 
and food exports in all countries and agriculture imports and manufacture exports in developing 
countries (table 18, 19). Thus trade liberalization in agriculture imports, food exports, export 
duties, and promotion of manufactures exports work only through the growth effect on the 
income of the poor. In addition, these results are mainly relevant for developing countries since 
findings for industrial countries deviate in most of the cases.296 In industrial countries higher 
export duties affect positively the mean income of the second quintile share to a low significance 
level and import duties are negative for the mean income of the poorest 20 percent, a result 
mainly driven by the distribution effect (table 20). Of all these effects, however, only the positive 
total effect of trade liberalization in agriculture imports can be confirmed in the growth equation 
(table 16, 17).  
 
Second, trade liberalization in agricultural raw material exports, food exports, export duties and 
import duties affects the mean income of the 40 percent poorest if we control for an interaction 
                                                                                                                                                 
292 One exception is the effect of import duties on the first quintile for all countries using the unadjusted approach 
(compare table 15 equation 25 with table 12 equation 7). While the distribution effect would indicate a reverse impact, 
the total effect is insignificant in the unadjusted approach.   
293 The result, however, is present in regressions for all countries on the first and second quintile, if we control only for 
regional dummy variables and use the adjusted approach in the system GMM estimation (table 21). In addition, the 
result is reversed in regressions for the growth rate of the second quintile share in the growth equation controlling only 
for regional dummy variables (table 16, 17).  
294 We also find a similar result for the regression on the second quintile, if we control only for regional dummy variables 
and use the unadjusted approach (table 22). 
295 One exception is the negative impact of manufacture imports on the growth rate of the first quintile in very low 
income countries (table 17).  
296 Exceptions are the regressions for food exports on the mean income of the first and second quintile and 
manufactures exports on the mean income of the poorest 20 percent using the unadjusted approach (table 20).   
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term. Liberalizing agriculture exports leads to a significant positive total effect on the first and 
second quintile share in low income developing countries.297 The positive effect decreases with 
rising economic development and becomes negative at a higher level of income supporting the 
Stolper–Samuelson theorem (table 21, 22). While the total effect of agriculture exports is 
dependent on the growth effect alone in all countries (table 21), the significant distribution effect 
is raised by the growth effect in developing countries (table 22). Food exports, however, affect 
the mean income of the poorest 40 percent in the opposite direction, i.e. a negative effect at low 
levels of economic development diminishes and become positive with rising mean income in all 
and developing countries (table 21, 22). The total effect of food exports, however, is only driven 
by the growth effect due to insignificant distribution effects for food exports (table 21 and 22). 
Finally, export and import duties affect the mean income of the first and second quintile in the 
expected way, i.e. a negative impact at low levels of economic development diminishes and 
becomes positive with rising mean income in all and developing countries (table 21, 22). The 
growth effect is alone responsible for the impact of export and import duties on the mean 
income of the poorest 20 and 20 to 40 percent as almost all distribution effects are insignificant 
(table 21 and 22).298  
 
Combining empirical findings of the system GMM estimation for both the distribution effect and 
the total effect estimation results suggest the importance of sector specific trade policy for the 
poorest 20 and 20 to 40 percent. Accepting higher adjusted trade sector openness indicators as 
measures for less restricted or more open trade policy, the findings suggest the conclusion that 
liberalizing agricultural raw material exports is very important for the poorest 40 percent of low 
income developing countries due to both the distribution effect and the total effect (table 22). In 
addition, liberalizing imports in agricultural raw materials is highly positively related to the mean 
income of the poor without changing the distribution (table 18, 19). Thus liberalized trade in 
agricultural raw materials, i.e. hide, rubber, cork, wood, waste paper, textile fibres or crude 
animal and vegetable material, is highly positively relevant for the income of the poorest 20 and 
20 to 40 percent in (low-income) developing countries for the period 1980 to 1999. 
 
In contrast, trade reforms in food exports affect negatively the mean income of the poorest 40 
percent in low-income developing countries, a result only driven by the growth effect (table 22). 
Furthermore, higher food imports seem to have a positive distribution effect on the poorest 20 
percent in low-income developing countries, an effect which is completely offset by the growth 
effect (table 22). Concerning trade in manufactures, exports exhibits a positive total effect on the 
poorest 40 percent in developing countries via the growth effect (table 19), while trade reforms 
in manufactures imports are never relevant. Finally, reduced export and import duties affect 
positively the mean income of the poorest 40 percent in low-income developing countries, an 
effect primarily driven by the growth effect (table 22). Findings for agriculture exports, food 
                                            
297 Exceptions are regressions on the mean income of the first quintile in the adjusted approach ( table 21, 22). 
298 One exception is the effect of import duties on the first quintile for all countries using the unadjusted approach (table 
21). While the distribution effect would indicate a reverse impact, the total effect is insignificant in the unadjusted 
approach.   
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exports, export and import duties, however, are only relevant if we exploit information on both 
the cross-country and within-country variation of the income of the poor in the system GMM 
estimation. In addition, results of the growth equation suggest positive total effects of agriculture 
imports on the poorest 20 and 20 to 40 percent in development countries driven by the growth 
effect alone (table 17).  
 
Thus, empirical findings suggest the following policy recommendations with respect to poverty-
reducing trade reforms in low-income developing countries. While results are not always 
consistent between the growth equation and the system GMM estimation, liberalization of 
agricultural raw material exports and imports seems to be the most promising approach. On the 
other hand, liberalization in food markets and manufactures imports are not associated with 
poverty alleviation in low-income developing countries. Finally, a promotion of manufactures 
exports and a reduction of export and import duties seem to increase mean income of the 
poorest 40 percent in low-income developing countries only via the growth effect.  
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Table 1: Coverage of the data set 
 
 
Region   Country Observations dates  Source  No. of spells 
 
 
East Asia Pacific  China   1988, 91     UNU  1 
(EAP)     1994, 97    GPM  1 
 
   Hongkong 1981, 86, 91   UNU  2 
    
   Indonesia 1980, 84, 87, 90   UNU  3 
     1993, 96, 99   GPM, WDI 2 
 
   Korea  1976, 80, 85, 88   UNU  3 
 
   Malaysia  1976, 79, 84   UNU  2 
     1987, 92, 95   GPM  2 
 
   Philippines 1985, 88, 91   UNU  2 
     1994, 97    UNU  1 
    
   Singapore 1978, 88    UNU  1 
 
Thailand  1975, 81, 86, 90   UNU  3 
1992, 98    UNU  1 
 
    
Eastern Europe and  Bulgaria  1991, 93    UNU  1 
Central Asia   
(ECA)   Hungary  1982, 87    UNU  1 
     1989, 93    GPM  1 
    
   Latvia  1995, 98    GPM  1 
 
   Poland  1985, 90, 93   UNU  2 
 
   Romania  1989, 92    UNU  1 
    
   Russia  1994, 98    GPM  1 
 
 
Latin America and  Brazil  1980, 86    UNU  1  
Caribbean (LAC)    1988, 93, 96   GPM  2 
 
   Chile  1989, 92    UNU  1 
    
   Colombia  1971, 78, 88   UNU  2 
     1988, 91, 95   UNU  2  
 
   Costa Rica 1981, 86, 89   UNU  2 
     1993, 96    GPM  1 
    
   Dominican 1989, 96    GPM  1  
   Republic 
 
   Ecuador  1988, 95    GPM  1 
    
   El Salvador 1989, 95, 98   GPM, WDI 2 
    
Guatemala 1987, 89    UNU  1 
    
   Honduras 1989, 92, 96   GPM  2 
    
   Jamaica  1988, 91    UNU  1 
     1991, 96    UNU  1 
    
   Mexico  1984, 89    UNU  1 
     1989, 95, 98   GPM, WDI 2 
 
   Panama  1979, 89    UNU  1 
     1991, 95    GPM  1 
 
Paraguay  1995, 98    GPM, WDI 1 
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Table 1: continued 
 
Peru  1986, 94    UNU  1 
 
   Trinidad & 1976, 81    UNU  1 
   Tobago  1988, 92    GPM  1 
 
   Venezuela 1971, 81, 87   UNU  2 
     1987, 93, 96   GPM  2 
 
 
 
Middle East and   Algeria  1988, 95    GPM  1 
North Africa (MNA) 
   Egypt  1991, 95    UNU  1 
 
   Jordan  1980, 87, 91   UNU  2 
     1991, 97    UNU  1 
 
   Morocco  1984, 91    UNU  1 
     1991, 99    UNU  1 
 
Tunisia  1985, 90, 95   GPM, WDI 2 
    
   Turkey  1987, 94    GPM  1 
 
   Yemen  1992, 98    GPM, WDI 1 
 
 
 
South Asia (SA)  Bangladesh 1973, 77, 81, 86   UNU  3 
     1988, 91, 95   GPM  2 
 
   India  1977, 83, 86, 89, 92  UNU  4 
1994, 97    UNU  1 
 
   Pakistan  1979, 85, 88   UNU   2 
     1991, 96    UNU  1 
 
   Sri Lanka  1979, 87    UNU  1 
     1990, 95    UNU  1 
 
 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) Côte d’Ivoire 1985, 88    UNU  1 
     1988, 95    UNU  1 
 
   Ethiopia  1981, 95    GPM  1 
    
   Ghana  1987, 92    GPM  1 
     1992, 97    UNU  1  
  
   Guinea  1991, 94    UNU  1  
       
   Kenya  1992, 94    UNU  1 
 
   Lesotho  1986, 93    GPM  1 
 
   Madagascar 1980, 93, 99   GPM, WDI 2  
 
   Mali  1989, 94    GPM  1 
 
Mauritius  1986, 91    UNU  1 
 
   Nigeria  1985, 97    GPM  1 
 
Senegal  1991, 95    UNU  1 
 
   Zambia  1993, 96    UNU  1 
 
 
Industrial Countries (IND) Australia  1976, 79    UNU  1 
     1981, 85, 89   UNU  2 
     1995, 98    UNU  1 
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Table 1: continued 
 
 
   Belgium  1979, 85, 88, 92   UNU  3 
    
   Canada  1973, 77, 81, 84, 87  UNU  4 
     1987, 91    UNU  1 
 
   Denmark  1981, 87, 92   UNU  2 
     1992, 95    UNU  1 
    
Finland  1978, 81, 84   UNU  2 
     1987, 91    UNU  1 
1991, 94, 97   UNU  2 
    
   France  1979, 84    UNU  1 
 
   Germany  1973, 78, 81, 84   UNU  3 
    
   Greece  1981, 88    UNU  1  
  
   Ireland  1980, 87    UNU  1 
 
Italia  1978, 81, 84, 87, 91  UNU  4 
 
Japan  1977, 80    UNU  1 
 
Netherlands 1975, 79, 82   UNU  2 
  1983, 87, 91   UNU  2 
 
Norway  1976, 79, 84, 91   UNU  3 
 
New Zealand 1973, 77, 80, 83, 86, 89  UNU  5 
 
Portugal  1980, 90    UNU  1 
 
Spain  1981, 91    UNU  1 
 
   Sweden  1975, 81, 87, 92   UNU  3 
    
   United Kingdom 1971, 74, 77, 80, 84, 88, 91  UNU  6 
       
   USA  1974, 77, 80, 83, 86, 89  UNU  5 
 
 
   No. of countries No. of observations     No. of spells 
   
Total   72  266      165 
 
UNU:  UNU/WIDER-UNDP World Income Inequality Database 
GPM:  Global Poverty Monitoring  
WDI:  World Development Indicators 
 
Note:  
 
Pooled OLS estimation:  As all observations within each line have the same income/reference unit, spells are formed only within 
each line (e.g. Panama 1979, 89, 91, 95 results in two spells: 1979 – 89, 91 - 95). Thus two observations for the same year in 
one country ( e.g. Jordan 1991) indicate different income/reference unit definitions (e.g. Jordan 91: net expenditure, person/ 
expenditure, household per capita).  
 
System GMM estimation:  
 
If the countries are split by the same income definition (e.g. Côte d’Ivoire 1 1985, 88; Côte d’Ivoire 2: 1988, 95; i.e the number of 
cross-section units increases), first-differenced equations are formed only within each line. (First-differenced equations for 
Morocco 1991 – 99, Ghana 1992 – 97, Guinea 1991 – 94, Madagascar 1993 – 99, Mali 1989 - 94, Zambia 1993 – 1996 and 
level equations for Morocco 1999, Ghana 1997, Guinea 1994, Madagascar 1999, Mali 1994, and Zambia 1996 could not be 
formed as the openness indicators are not available for the end period, a problem not present in the growth equation where we 
use only the initial values).  
 
If the countries are not split by the same income definition, first-differenced equations are formed by all observations per country 
using the adjusted first/second quintile share. In this case we omit one of the two observations for the same year in one country 
(Canada 1987/1, Côte d’Ivoire 88/1, Colombia 88/1, Denmark 92/2, Finland 91/2, Jamaica 91/1, Jordan 91/2, Mexico 89/1, 
Morocco 91/1, Venezuela 87/2) and if the time length between observations in one country is only one year (Netherlands 1983). 
The number behind the year indicates whether we omit the first or second observation as ordered in the table.  
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Table 2: Adjustment regressions for first/second quintile income shares 
and Gini coefficients 
 
 
Dep. Var.  First quintile  Second quintile Gini 
   share of income  share of income coefficient 
      
 
(1)   (2)   (3) 
 
 
Income (unknown tax   -0.0149***  -0.0127***  5.71***  
treatment) (0.0043)  (0.0049)  (1.90) 
 
Income, net  0.0046   0.0046   -1.81 
   (0.0036)  (0.0040)  (1.52) 
 
Income, gross  -0.0071**  -0.0008   1.32 
   (0.0046)  (0.0035)  (1.36) 
 
Family   -0.0036   -0.0014   0.60 
   (0.0023)  (0.0031)  (0.82) 
 
Person   0.0119***  0.0185***  -6.62*** 
   (0.0026)  (0.0033)  (1.20) 
 
Household per capita 0.0108***  0.0159***  -5.43*** 
   (0.0032)  (0.0041)  (1.51) 
 
Equivalized  0.0265***  0.008***  -5.61*** 
   (0.0033)  (0.0029)  (0.96) 
 
EAP   -0.0045**  -0.0248***  8.85*** 
   (0.0022)  (0.0029)  (0.97) 
 
ECA   0.0196***  0.001   -1.00  
  (0.005)   (0.0051)  (1.96) 
 
LAC   -0.0272***  -0.0519***  18.86*** 
  (0.0024)  (0.0032)  (1.09) 
 
MNA   -0.0117***  -0.0328***  12.00*** 
  (0.0036)  (0.0043)  (1.67) 
 
SA   0.0081***  -0.0128***  4.65*** 
   (0.0027)  (0.0032)  (1.25) 
 
SSA   -0.0199***  -0.0407***  16.00***  
   (0.0042)  (0.0055)  (2.14) 
 
Constant  0.0662***  0.123***  33.03*** 
   (0.0033)  (0.0036)  (1.34) 
 
N   371   371   371   
R-Squared  0.6647   0.6716   0.6997  
 
 
 
 
Note: This table reports the results of pooled OLS Regression for the indicated inequality measures on the indicated 
variables. * denotes significance at the 90% level, ** at the 95% level, and *** at the 99% level (two-sided alternative). 
Heteroscedasticity adjusted standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 3: Data Sources 
 
Variable  Source    Comments     
 
Share of Income: UNU/WIDER-UNDP World Income  for selection procedure see 
First/Second Quintile Inequality Database, Version 1.0  section 3 
(12 September 2000), Global Poverty  
Monitoring, World Bank (Chen, 
Ravallion 2000), World Development  
Indicators (2002)      
 
Real GDP Per Capita Penn World Tables   Constant 1996 US dollars using the 
Version 6.1 (October 2002)  Chain index  
 
Gini coefficient:  UNU/WIDER-UNDP World Income  for selection procedure see share of  
 Inequality Database, Version 1.0  income quintile 
(12 September 2000), Global Poverty  
Monitoring, World Bank (Chen, 
Ravallion 2000), World Development  
Indicators (2002)      
   
          
Import duties  World Development Indicators (2001) Import duties (% of imports) 
(GB.TAX.IMPT.BM.ZS) All levies collected on goods at the 
point of entry into the country.  
 
Export duties  World Development Indicators (2001) Export duties (% of exports) 
(GB.TAX.EXPT.BX.ZS) All levies collected on goods at the 
point of export. 
 
Agriculture imports World Development Indicators (2001) Agricultural raw materials imports  
(TM.VAL.AGRI.ZS.UN)   (% of merchandise imports) 
Agricultural raw materials comprise 
SITC section 2 (crude materials 
except fuels) excluding division 22 (oil 
seeds, oil nuts, oil kernels), 27 (crude 
fertilizers and minerals excluding coal, 
petroleum, and precious stones), and 
28 (metalliferous ores and scrap).  
 
Agriculture exports World Development Indicators (2001) Agricultural raw materials exports 
(TX.VAL.AGRI.ZS.UN)   (% of merchandise exports) 
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Table 3: continued 
 
Food imports  World Development Indicators (2001) Food imports     
   (TM.VAL.FOOD.ZS.UN)  (% of merchandise imports) 
Food comprises the commodities in 
the SITC sections 0 (food, live 
animals), 1 (beverage, tobacco), 22 
(oil seeds, oil nuts, oil kernels), and 4 
(animal and vegetable oils and fats). 
 
Food exports  World Development Indicators (2001) Food exports     
   (TX.VAL.FOOD.ZS.UN)  (% of merchandise exports) 
 
Manufactures imports World Development Indicators (2001) Manufactures imports 
(TM.VAL.MANF.ZS.UN)  (% of merchandise imports)  
Manufactures comprise commodities 
in SITC sections 5 (chemicals), 6 
(basic manufactures), 7 (machinery 
and transport equipment) and 8 
(miscellaneous manufactured goods), 
excluding division 68 (non-ferrous 
metals) 
 
Manufactures exports World Development Indicators (2001) Manufactures exports    
   (TX.VAL.MANF.ZS.UN)   (% of merchandise exports)   
     
GDP    World Development Indicators (2001) GDP in current US dollars 
   (NY.GDP.MKTP.CD)    
 
Oil exporter World Development Indicators (2001) Dummy variable equals one if 
(TX.VAL.FUEL.ZS.UN)    fuel exports (% of merchandise   
exports) greater than 30  
         
Government   Penn World Tables, Version 6.1  Constant 1996 US dollars 
Consumption  (October 2002)      
   
Ln(1+inflation/100) World Development Indicators (2001) Inflation, GDP deflator (annual %) 
   (NY.GDP.DEFL.KD.ZG) 
 for missing values:  
(FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG) Inflation, consumer prices (Laspeyres) 
(annual %) (Germany 73, 78, 81, 84; 
Ethiopia 81; Poland 90)  
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    Table 3: continued 
 
Secondary Education  Barro and Lee (2000)   Average years of secondary 
schooling  in total population aged 25 
and over 
Due to limited data availability for 
secondary education values are 
linearily interpolated between the 
years prior and after the observation. 
 
M2 to GDP  Word Development Indicators (2001) Money and quasi money (M2) 
   (FM.LBL.MOMY.GD.ZS)  to GDP 
 
Overall Budget   World DeveIopment Indicators (2001) Overall Budget, including grants 
Surplus (+)/  (GB.BAL.OVRL.GD.ZS) 
Deficit (-) to GDP          
        for missing values: 
Easterly, Sewadeh (2002): Global  Data on overall budget/deficit    
Development Network Growth from IMF Government Financial  
Database, World Bank Statistics (Germany 1973, 78, 81, 84; 
Tunisia 1990; Latvia 1995) 
 
Life expectancy  World development indicators (2001) life expectancy at birth, total (years) 
(SP.DYN.LE00.IN) Values calcutated by linear 
interpolation for Guatemala 1989, 
India 1994, Kenya 1994  
 
for missing value: 
   World Population Prospects: The  Jordan 1980 
   2002 Revision Population Database 
 
Terms  of  Trade Easterly, Sedaweh (2002): Global Terms of Trade (goods and   
   Development Network Growth  services, 1995 = 100)  
   Database, World Bank 
 
Civil Liberties  Freedom House   Measured on a scale for 1 to 7. 
(1 indicates the most liberal 
country) 
 
Area   Statistical Yearbook (Germany)  km2 
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Table 4: Adjustment regressions for openness indicators 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Agriculture  Agriculture Food exports Food imports  
  exports to  imports to  to GDP  to GDP    
  GDP  GDP 
 
 
ln(area)  0.19*  -0.24***  0.26  -0.60*** 
   (0.10)  (0.05)  (0.23)  (0.12) 
       
ln(population)  -0.37***  0.14***  -1.60***  -0.38*** 
   (0.10)  (0.05)  (0.31)  (0.14) 
    
Oil exporter  -0.97***  -0.02  -3.39***  0.65 
   (0.24)  (0.10)  (0.75)  (0.54) 
 
Constant  2.56***  2.35***  17.97*** 14.74*** 
  (0.82)  (0.41)  (1.93)  (1.22) 
 
N   210  208  210  208 
R - Squared  0.09  0.26  0.24  0.33 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Manufactures  Manufactures 
exports to imports to GDP 
   GDP 
 
 
ln(area)  -5.28***  -4.17*** 
   (1.48)  (1.37) 
 
ln(population)  2.59**  -0.47 
   (1.06)  (0.93) 
    
Oil exporter  -6.67***  -1.93 
   (1.55)  (1.68) 
 
Constant  54.72  76.79 
   (11.24)  (10.81) 
 
N   210  208 
R-Squared  0.30  0.34 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: This table reports the results of pooled OLS regression for sector specific exports and imports. The measure of 
trade openness is constructed by the residuals of the regressions. * denotes significance at the 90% level, ** at the 95% 
level, and *** at the 99% level (two-sided alternative). Heteroscedasticity adjusted standard errors in parentheses. 
 
As we have some double observations per country per year (see table 1), the adjustment process may be biased. We 
checked for differences, but could not confirm any significant problem due to counting several observations of the 
openness indicators twice.  
 
 
 
 
 
 201
Table 5: Correlation matrix for adjusted openness 
indicators  
 
 
      
 
     Imdu Exdu Agim Agex Foim Foex Maim Maex 
 
 
Imports duties   1  
 
 
Exports duties   0.141 1 
    (0.036) 
 
Agriculture Imports  -0.105 -0.193 1 
    (0.178) (0.012) 
 
Agriculture Exports  -0.071 0.105 0.041 1 
    (0.363) (0.176) (0.554)   
 
Food imports   0.182 -0.046 0.264 0.021 1 
    (0.019) (0.557) (0) (0.765) 
 
Food exports   0.265    0.229 -0.094 0.194 0.051 1 
    (0) (0.003) (0.179) (0.005) (0.463) 
 
Manufactures imports  -0.076 -0.124 0.524 0.312 0.434 0.036 1 
    (0.329) (0.111) (0) (0) (0) (0.217) 
 
Manufactures exports  -0.301 -0.209 0.625 0.226 0.205 -0.114 0.831 1 
    (0) (0.006) (0) (0.001) (0.003) (0.10) (0)    
 
 
Note: P–values of each correlation coefficient in parentheses. Correlation matrix is presented only for all available 
observations, i.e. some observations are counted twice (see table 1). Thus correlation matrix for openness indicators 
may differ for the growth equation as only initial values are used. Imdu/Exdu: Import/Export duties. Agim/Agex: 
Agriculture imports/exports. Foim/Foex: Food imports/exports. Maim/Maex: Manufactures imports/exports.  
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Table 6: Descriptive Statistics  
 
 
Variable  Observ. Mean  Std. Dev. Min.  Max. 
 
Q20   266  0.061  0.021  0.019  0.116 
Adjusted Q20  266  0.058  0.018  0.015  0.113 
 
Q40   266  0.108  0.024  0.050  0.156 
Adjusted Q40  266  0.101  0.025  0.039  0.153 
 
Income Q20  266  2689  2457  175  11266 
Adjusted Income Q20 266  2658  2437  102  8501 
 
Income Q40  266  4946  4424  287  15194  
Adjusted Income Q40 266  4754  4424  245  14863  
 
Real GDP per capita 266  8535  6767  528  26279 
 
Growth Q20  165  0.17  4.71  -17.45  25.26 
Growth Q40  165  -0.02  2.94  -9.05  18.50 
 
Growth income Q20 165  1.81  5.64  -23.83  26.45  
Growth income Q40 165  1.61  4.03  -15.42  16.85 
 
Growth real GDP 165  1.64  2.64  -9.35  9.42 
per capita 
 
Agriculture exports 210  0  1.71  -2.57  11.19 
Agriculture imports 208  0  0.56  -1.11  3.02 
 
Food exports  210  0  4.51  -7.21  24.59 
Food imports  208  0  2.30  -3.62  11.35 
 
Manufactures exports 210  0  12.59  -20.48  68.48 
Manufactures imports 208  0  11.68  -20.03  77.94 
 
Export duties  224  1.56  4.79  0  46.04 
Import duties  223  9.09  9.33  0  50.84 
 
Adjusted Gini    266  41.35  9.33  23.06  64.36 
 
Gov. Consumption  266  17.95  9.82  3.40  69.11 
Budget surplus  229  -3.43  4.00  -15.18  8.22  
 
Secondary Education 240  1.82  1.12  0.12  5.09 
Life expectancy  266  67.59  8.26  41.96  78.63 
 
M2 to GDP  213  38.87  21.09  4.91  132.48  
ln(1 + inflation/100) 266  0.16  0.30  -0.05  3.04 
 
Terms of Trade  254  102.51  19.72  50.78  262.37  
Civil liberties  260  3.11  1.74  1  7 
 
 
Note: Descriptive statistics are presented for all available observations, i.e. some observations are counted twice (see table 1). 
Thus summary statistics for openness indicators (residuals) and additional macroeconomic variables differ for the growth 
equation as only initial values are used (table 1). Q20/40: first, second quintile share. Adjusted Q20/40: adjusted first, second 
quintile share. Income Q20/40: mean income of first, second quintile share (Q20/40 * mean income/0.2). Adjusted income 
Q20/40: mean income of adjusted first, second quintile share. Growth Q20/40: average annual growth rate of first, second 
quintile share using only spells with identical income inequality measures (table 1). Growth income Q20/40: average annual 
growth rate of mean income of first, second quintile share using only spells with identical income inequality measures.      
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Table 7: Descriptive Statistics - Regions 
 
Variable   EAP ECA LAC MNA SA SSA IND 
 
Q20    0.059 0.085 0.037 0.066 0.081 0.058 0.068 
Adjusted Q20   0.060 0.080 0.037 0.056 0.076 0.047 0.067 
 
Q40    0.102 0.133 0.079 0.107 0.122 0.100 0.126 
Adjusted Q40   0.096 0.120 0.071 0.092 0.112 0.084 0.123 
 
Income Q20   1612 3085 1023 1305 652 536 5782 
Adjusted Income Q20  1699 2889 1024 1107 605 433 5761 
 
Income Q40   2820 4754 2201 2126 975 949 10788 
Adjusted Income Q40  2728 4274 1986 1817 887 793 10609  
 
Real GDP per capita  5579 7156 5504 4017 1602 1832 17218 
 
Growth Q20   0.39 -5.36 0.03 1.05 -0.46 0.36299 -0.19 
Growth Q40   0.05 -2.68 0.33 0.72 -0.52 0.78 -0.40   
 
Growth Income Q20  4.83 -7.31 0.75 1.32 2.69 -0.05 1.69 
Growth Income Q40  4.49 -4.63 1.05 0.99 2.64 0.48 1.48 
Growth real GDP p.cap.  4.44 -1.95 0.72 0.27 3.16 -0.39 1.88 
 
Agriculture exports  1.31 0.36 -0.70 -0.97 0.06 0.16 0.05 
Agriculture imports  0.50 0.10 -0.30 0.48 -0.52 -0.10 -0.01 
 
Food exports   1.18 -2.06 1.25 -1.04 -0.16 3.76 -1.82 
Food imports   0.27 -0.88 -0.75 3.11 -0.06 1.74 -0.86 
 
Manufactures exports  11.24 1.22 -5.62 -1.72 -9.61 -3.65 2.92 
Manufactures imports  12.11 -2.47 -2.88 2.01 -7.41 0.90 -2.19 
 
Export duties   1.33 0.61 1.64 0.19 4.83 6.83 0.10 
Imports duties   7.69 5.17 10.25 15.45 23.40 20.53 2.25 
 
Adjusted Gini    42.77 33.85 52.20 44.32 36.92 48.70 32.91 
 
Government Consumption 16.45 20.97 18.97 29.29 20.29 19.71 13.49  
Budget surplus   -1.16 -3.40 -1.99 -4.24 -5.68 -1.77 -4.57  
 
Secondary Education  1.50 1.41 1.26 1.24 0.91 0.64 2.94 
Life expectancy   66.94 69.22 69.10 65.79 58.17 51.98 74.69 
 
M2 to GDP   50.16 33.43 27.22 62.36 31.72 25.94 48.92 
Ln(1+inflation)   0.09 0.46 0.29 0.13 0.10 0.12 0.07 
 
Terms of Trade   102.53 99.34 102.23 107.69 104.46 111.97 93.13 
Civil liberties   4.53 3.69 2.79 4.85 4.22 4.96 1.33   
 
Note: Descriptive statistics are presented for all available observations, i.e. some observations are counted twice (see table 1). 
Thus summary statistics for openness indicators (residuals) and additional macroeconomic variables differ in the growth 
equation as only initial values are used (table 1). Q20/40: first, second quintile share. Adjusted Q20/40: adjusted first, second 
quintile share. Income Q20/40: mean income of first, second quintile share (Q20/40 * mean income/0.2). Adjusted Income 
Q20/40: mean income of adjusted first, second quintile share. Growth Q20/40: average annual growth rate of first, second 
quintile share using only spells with identical income inequality measures (table 1). Growth income Q20/40: average annual 
growth rate of mean income of first, second quintile share using only spells with identical income inequality measures. 
                                            
299 We present mean for growth Q20 and growth income Q20 in SSA without Guinea 1991 – 94, Kenya 1992 – 94, and Senegal 
1991 – 95 and mean for growth Q40 and growth income Q40 in SSA without Kenya 1992 – 94. We omit these observations in 
regressions of the growth equation due to their incredible high growth rates, which may result from measurement errors.   
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Table 8: Openness indicators and regional dummy variables 
distribution effect (System GMM estimation) 
 
 
Dep. Var.  Yq20s  Yq20c Yq20s  Yq20c    Yq20s  Yq20c 
  all all dev dev    dev dev  
   
(1) (2) (3) (4)    (5) (6)   
 
 
Manufacture 0.004* 0.005** 0.004 0.005*  Import  0.005* 0.004  
Exports  (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)  duties  (0.003) (0.003) 
             
    
EAP  -0.06 -0.08 -0.42*** -0.41***    -0.34* -0.22  
  (0.09) (0.08) (0.10) (0.09)    (0.19) (0.26)  
  
ECA  0.36*** 0.33***     
  (0.08) (0.06)   
 
LAC  -0.56*** -0.55*** -0.92*** -0.89***   -0.81***  -0.69***  
(0.09)  (0.07)  (0.09) (0.08)    (0.18) (0.25)  
 
MNA  0.03 -0.13* -0.33*** -0.47***    -0.23 -0.31 
(0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09)    (0.18) (0.26) 
 
SA  0.32*** 0.24*** -0.04 -0.10    -0.09 -0.02  
(0.07) (0.05)  (0.07) (0.07)    (0.18) (0.25)  
 
SSA  -0.25*** -0.44***  -0.61***-0.78***   -0.48** -0.65** 
(0.07) (0.07)  (0.08) (0.09)    (0.22) (0.30)  
 
Constant -1.13*** -1.15***  -0.78***-0.81***   -0.95***  -1.03***  
  (0.05) (0.03) (0.06) (0.06)    (0.17) (0.25) 
  
m1  -1.42 -1.20 -1.42 -1.47    -1.57 -1.95* 
m2  1.45 1.35 0.99 1.33    -0.94 1.61 
N  181 181 124 127    121 119 
1 – RSS/TSS 0.60 0.65 0.66 0.66    0.58 0.52 
 
 
 
* denotes significance at the 90% level, ** at the 95% level, and *** at the 99% level. Results for one–step estimation 
are obtained using DPD98 for GAUSS. Heteroscedasticity adjusted asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. m1 and 
m2 are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed 
as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. 1 – RSS/TSS: 1 – residual sum of squares/total sum of squares. Yq20s: 
ln(Q20/0.2) unadjusted approach (regressions without outliers). Yq20c: ln(Q20/0.2) adjusted approach (regressions without 
outliers). all: all countries, dev: developing countries. 
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Table 9: Openness indicators, regional dummies and  
macroeconomic variables - distribution effect 
(System GMM estimation) 
 
 
Dep. Var.  Yq20s Yq20c Yq20s Yq20c Yq40s Yq40c   Yq20s  Yq20c 
  all all indu indu indu indu   indu indu 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)   (7)  (8)   
 
 
Manufacture 0.007***0.006** 0.010***0.007***0.004** 0.003**  Agriculture 0.004 0.035**   
Exports  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)    exports (0.025) (0.018) 
 
Secondary -0.05 0.01 -0.12*** -0.02 -0.03 -0.01   -0.11*** -0.02 
Education (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)   (0.03) (0.03)  
  
Government -0.001 -0.002 -0.007 0.001 0 0.001   -0.003 0.004  
Consumption (0.004) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)   (0.006) (0.004) 
 
Ln(1+inflation) 0.05 0.15 0.04 0.11 0.20 0.26   -0.43 -0.32 
(0.18) (0.14) (0.41) (0.37) (0.27) (0.29)   (0.48) (0.42) 
 
EAP  -0.15 -0.06        
  (0.10) (0.09)     
 
ECA  0.39*** 0.44***   
  (0.08) (0.08) 
 
LAC  -0.60*** -0.52***     
(0.11) (0.10)     
 
MNA  -0.09 -0.14     
(0.14) (0.15)     
 
SA  0.24** 0.28***     
(0.09) (0.08)     
 
SSA  -0.43*** -0.55***    
(0.12) (0.13)     
 
Constant -0.97*** -1.17***-0.70*** -1.09***  -0.42*** -0.53***  -0.72*** -1.10***   
  (0.15) (0.13) (0.14) (0.13) (0.07)   (0.07)   (0.14) (0.13) 
 
m1  -1.36 -1.01 0.06 0.83 -1.11 0.23   0.33 0.89 
m2  1.49 1.61 1.51 0.23 -0.47 1.16   0.87 0.61 
N  161 161 57 54 57 54   57 54 
1 – RSS/TSS 0.59 0.66 0.28 0.11 0.15 0.12   0.15 0.07 
 
 
* denotes significance at the 90% level, ** at the 95% level, and *** at the 99% level. Results for one–step estimation 
are obtained using DPD98 for GAUSS. Heteroscedasticity adjusted asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. m1 and 
m2 are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed 
as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. 1 – RSS/TSS: 1 – residual sum of squares/ total sum of squares. 
Yq20/40s: ln(Q20/40/0.2) unadjusted approach (regressions without outliers). Yq20/40c: ln(Q20/40/0.2) adjusted approach 
(regressions without outliers). all: all countries. indu: industrial countries. 
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Table 9: continued 
 
 
Dep. Var.  Yq20s  Yq20c Yq40s Yq40c    Yq20s Yq20c    
  Indu indu Indu indu    indu indu    
 
(9) (10) (11) (12)    (13) (14)  
 
Food Exports -0.023** -0.007 -0.011** -0.007  Import duties -0.030***-0.016** 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.006) (0.006)    (0.010) (0.007) 
 
Secondary  -0.12*** -0.02 -0.03 -0.005    -0.08*** 0.003 
Education (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02)    (0.03) (0.02) 
 
Government -0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003    -0.001 0.004 
Consumption (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)    (0.005) (0.004) 
 
Ln(1 + inflation) -0.53 -0.24 -0.05 0.06    0.20 0.22 
(0.50) (0.41) (0.29) (0.31)    (0.51) (0.37) 
 
Constant -0.75*** -1.12***  -0.44*** -0.54***   -0.79*** -1.16*** 
  (0.14) (0.14) (0.08) (0.07)    (0.13) (0.09)  
 
m1  -0.07 0.72 -1.29 -0.25    -1.22 -1.02 
m2  0.46 0.60 -0.40 1.76*    0.26 -0.10 
N  57 54 57 54    84 80 
1 – RSS/TSS 0.27 0.04 0.16 0.09    0.25 0.10 
  
 
 
* denotes significance at the 90% level, ** at the 95% level, and *** at the 99% level. Results for one–step estimation 
are obtained using DPD98 for GAUSS. Heteroscedasticity adjusted asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. m1 and 
m2 are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed 
as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. 1 – RSS/TSS: 1 – residual sum of squares/ total sum of squares. 
Yq20/40s: ln(Q20/40/0.2) unadjusted approach. Yq20/40c: ln(Q20/40/0.2) adjusted approach. all: all countries. indu: industrial 
countries. 
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Table 10: Openness indicators, interaction term and regional 
dummy variables – distribution effect (Growth equation) 
 
 
 
Dep. Var.   yq40   yq40     yq20    
   all  dev     dev   
   re  re     ols   
 
(1)  (2)     (3)  
 
Agriculture   -3.36**  -5.00**  Manufactures  -0.74* 
Exports   (1.47)  (2.32)  imports   (0.42)  
  
Agriculture   0.38**  0.60**  Manufactures  0.09* 
Exports * Y  (0.17)  (0.29)  imports * Y  (0.05) 
 
EAP   0.85  1.93     2.85** 
   (0.76)  (1.51)     (1.15) 
 
ECA   -1.22        
   (1.24) 
 
LAC   0.77  2.08     3.27*** 
   (0.68)  (1.45)     (0.86) 
       
MNA   0.93  2.31     2.90*** 
   (0.95)  (1.64)     (0.89) 
 
SA   0.06  1.22     1.01 
   (0.93)  (1.62)     (1.01) 
    
SSA   1.63*  2.91*     2.02 
   (0.98)  (1.66)     (1.83)  
 
Constant  -0.57  -1.74     -2.07*** 
   (0.43)  (1.32)     (0.54) 
 
 
Breusch Pagan  17.36*** 17.11***    0.44 
Wald - test  11.38  8.72  
F-test          7.91*** 
R-squared  0.10  0.11     0.10 
N   115  79     73 
 
 
 
 
 
* denotes significance at the 90% level, ** at the 95% level, and *** at the 99% level (two-sided alternative). 
Heteroscedasticity adjusted standard errors in parentheses. F-test/Wald-test indicates the F-statistic/Wald-statistic for 
the test on the overall significance of the regression. Ramsey Reset test, used to test for omitted variables in equation 3, 
is passed. Breusch-Pagan is a Lagrange multiplier test for the random effects model, distributed as chi-squared under 
the null of no random effects. yq20: average annual growth rate of the first quintile share (regressions without outliers). 
yq40: average annual growth rate of the second quintile share (regressions without outliers). ols: results for pooled OLS 
estimation. re: results for random effects estimation. all: all countries. dev: developing countries. 
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Table 11: Openness indicators, interaction term and regional 
dummy variables - distribution effect (System GMM estimation) 
 
 
Dep. Var.   Yq20s  Yq20c Yq40s Yq40c  Yq20s  Yq20c Yq40s Yq40c  
   all all all all  dev dev dev dev  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Agriculture  0.32 0.35** 0.19 0.22**  0.72*** 0.70*** 0.52*** 0.49*** 
Exports   (0.216) (0.17) (0.124) (0.09)   (0.281) (0.25) (0.15) (0.13) 
 
Agriculture  -0.04 -0.04* -0.02 -0.02**  -0.08***-0.08***-0.06***-0.06*** 
Exports * Y  (0.024) (0.02) (0.014) (0.01)   (0.032) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
 
EAP   -0.09 -0.10 -0.20*** -0.26*** -0.44*** -0.41***-0.33*** -0.33*** 
   (0.09) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05)   (0.08) (0.07) (0.04) (0.06) 
 
ECA   0.34*** 0.31*** 0.13*** 0.07* 
   (0.08) (0.08) (0.03) (0.04)  
 
LAC   -0.59*** -0.58*** -0.47*** -0.56***   -0.94***-0.91***-0.61***-0.65***  
   (0.09) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06)   (0.09) (0.08) (0.05) (0.06) 
 
MNA   0.03 -0.12 -0.14*** -0.28*** -0.32*** -0.46***-0.28*** -0.37***  
(0.08) (0.08) (0.04) (0.04)   (0.08) (0.09) (0.04) (0.05) 
 
SA   0.27*** 0.17*** 0.01 -0.08*** -0.08 -0.15** -0.12*** -0.16***  
   (0.07) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)   (0.07) (0.06) (0.02) (0.04) 
 
SSA   -0.25*** -0.48*** -0.28*** -0.45***  -0.59*** -0.08***-0.41*** -0.55***  
   (0.08) (0.09) (0.05) (0.06)  (0.08) (0.03) (0.05) (0.06) 
 
Constant  -1.12*** -1.13*** -0.48*** -0.50*** -0.77*** -0.81***-0.34*** -0.42***  
   (0.06) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.05) (0.06) (0.02) (0.03) 
 
m1   -1.62 -1.44 -2.21** -2.69***    -1.60 -1.58 -2.04** -2.76***  
m2   1.15 1.57 -1.00 2.78***  1.02 1.54 -0.92 2.46** 
N   184 183 184 183  127 129 127 129 
1 – RSS/TSS  0.59 0.65 0.65 0.70  0.66 0.67 0.63 0.62 
 
 
 
* denotes significance at the 90% level, ** at the 95% level, and *** at the 99% level. Results for one–step estimation 
are obtained using DPD98 for GAUSS. Heteroscedasticity adjusted asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. m1 and 
m2 are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed 
as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. 1 – RSS/TSS: 1 – residual sum of squares/ total sum of squares. 
Yq20/40s: ln(Q20/40/0.2) unadjusted approach (regressions without outliers). Yq20/40c: ln(Q20/40/0.2) adjusted approach 
(regressions without outliers). all: all countries. dev: developing countries. 
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Table 11: continued 
 
 
Dep. Var.   Yq20s Yq20c Yq40s Yq40c 
   dev dev dev dev  
 
 (9) (10) (11) (12)       
    
           
Food imports  0.46*** 0.44** 0.219* 0.23* 
(0.171) (0.18) (0.115) (0.14) 
 
Food imports  -0.06***-0.05** -0.027* -0.03  
*Y   (0.021) (0.02) (0.014) (0.02)  
   
EAP   -0.38*** -0.37*** -0.30*** -0.30*** 
   (0.10) (0.09) (0.06) (0.07)   
 
LAC   -0.90*** -0.89*** -0.58*** -0.63*** 
   (0.08) (0.08) (0.05) (0.06)   
 
MNA   -0.28*** -0.47*** -0.24*** -0.35*** 
   (0.10) (0.10) (0.05) (0.06)   
 
SA   -0.01 -0.01 -0.08*** -0.13*** 
   (0.07) (0.07) (0.03) (0.05)  
 
SSA   -0.60*** -0.82*** -0.41*** -0.53*** 
   (0.15) (0.15) (0.09) (0.09)   
 
Constant  -0.83*** -0.85*** -0.38*** -0.45*** 
   (0.06) (0.06) (0.03) (0.04)   
  
m1   -1.53 -1.47 -1.91* -2.54** 
m2   1.01 1.03 -0.78 2.19** 
N   124 128 124 128 
1 – RSS/TSS  0.65 0.65 0.61 0.59 
 
 
 
* denotes significance at the 90% level, ** at the 95% level, and *** at the 99% level. Results for one–step estimation 
are obtained using DPD98 for GAUSS. Heteroscedasticity adjusted asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. m1 and 
m2 are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed 
as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. 1 – RSS/TSS: 1 – residual sum of squares/ total sum of squares. 
Yq20/40s: ln(Q20/40/0.2) unadjusted approach (regressions without outliers). Yq20/40c: ln(Q20/40/0.2) adjusted approach 
(regressions without outliers). dev: developing countries. 
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Table 12: Openness indicators, interaction term and 
macroeconomic variables - distribution effect 
(System GMM estimation) 
 
  
Dep. Var.  Yq20s  Yq20c  Yq40s  Yq40c    Yq20s Yq20c   
  dev dev dev dev    dev dev   
  
  (1) (2) (3) (4)    (5) (6)    
        
        
Agriculture 1.02*** 1.02** 0.75*** 0.76***  Food Imports 0.55** 0.59**  
exports  (0.34) (0.48) (0.17) (0.24)    (0.24) (0.28)  
 
Agriculture  -0.12*** -0.12** -0.09*** -0.09***  Food imports -0.06** -0.07**  
exports * Y (0.04) (0.05) (0.02) (0.03)           *Y  (0.03) (0.03)  
 
Secondary 0.10 0.09 0.08*** 0.09**    0.08 0.06   
Education (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04)    (0.07) (0.07)   
   
Government 0.005 -0.002 0.006** 0.002    0.002 -0.006   
Consumption (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)    (0.005) (0.005)    
 
Ln(1+inflation) 0.03 0.13 -0.03 0.06    0.10 0.18    
  (0.18) (0.15) (0.12) (0.09)    (0.18) (0.15) 
 
EAP  -0.59*** -0.51*** -0.37*** -0.34***    -0.50*** -0.44***   
  (0.09) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05)    (0.12) (0.10)   
         
LAC  -1.03*** -0.97*** -0.61***-0.64***   -0.99*** -0.93***   
  (0.08) (0.08) (0.05) (0.05)    (0.08) (0.09)   
 
MNA  -0.42*** -0.53*** -0.26*** -0.32***    -0.37*** -0.53***  
  (0.10) (0.11) (0.06) (0.06)    (0.13) (0.13)   
  
SA  -0.16** -0.17*** -0.12** -0.12**    0.07 -0.10    
  (0.08) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05)    (0.12) (0.10)   
 
SSA  -0.72*** -0.02*** -0.41*** -0.51***    -0.74*** -1.03***  
  (0.07) (0.09) (0.05) (0.05)    (0.23) (0.25)    
Constant -0.86*** -0.83***-0.52***-0.59***    -0.87*** -0.79***  
  (0.13) (0.13) (0.07) (0.09)    (0.14) (0.14)   
 
 
m1  -1.71* -1.60 -2.06** -2.60***    -1.69* -1.65*   
m2  1.02 1.79* -0.91 2.33**    0.96 1.67*   
N  107 109 107 109    107 110   
1 – RSS/TSS 0.68 0.69 0.63 0.64    0.66 0.67 
 
 
* denotes significance at the 90% level, ** at the 95% level, and *** at the 99% level. Results for one–step estimation 
are obtained using DPD98 for GAUSS. Heteroscedasticity adjusted asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. m1 and 
m2 are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed 
as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. 1 – RSS/TSS: 1 – residual sum of squares/ total sum of squares. 
Yq20/40s: ln(Q20/40/0.2) unadjusted approach (regressions without outliers). Yq20/40c: ln(Q20/40/0.2) adjusted approach 
(regressions without outliers). dev: developing countries. 
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Table 12: continued 
 
 
Yq20s Yq20c      Yq20s Yq20c  
dev dev     all all 
 
(5) (6)     (7) (8) 
 
Agriculture  1.04 1.37*  Import duties  0.039* 0.018   
Imports   (0.74) (0.76)     (0.02) (0.021) 
 
Agriculture  -0.12 -0.15  Import duties * Y -0.005* -0.002 
Imports * Y  (0.09) (0.09)     (0.003) (0.003) 
 
Secondary  0.08 0.07     -0.060* 0.005 
Education  (0.07) (0.07)     (0.04) (0.03) 
 
Government  0.002 -0.005     0 0 
Consumption  (0.006) (0.005)     (0.003) (0.003) 
 
Ln(1+inflation)  0.12 0.20     -0.03 0.08 
(0.18) (0.15)     (0.14) (0.15) 
 
EAP   -0.62*** -0.54***    -0.25** -0.12 
(0.10) (0.08)     (0.10) (0.09) 
 
ECA         0.40*** 0.42*** 
(0.08) (0.07) 
 
LAC   -1.07*** -1.00***    -0.66*** -0.56*** 
(0.08) (0.07)     (0.09) (0.12) 
 
MNA   -0.50*** -0.63***    -0.10 -0.19 
(0.10) (0.10)     (0.15) (0.17) 
 
SA   -0.10 -0.08     -0.04 -0.08 
(0.09) (0.07)     (0.12) (0.09) 
 
SSA   -0.71*** -0.91***    -0.28 -0.39* 
(0.10) (0.12)     (0.19) (0.20) 
 
Constant  -0.78*** -0.73***    -0.91*** -1.14*** 
(0.14) (0.14)     (0.12) (0.08) 
 
  
m1   -1.67* -1.64*     -1.89* -2.01** 
m2   1.03 1.40     -0.43 1.31 
N   106 109     184 180 
1 – RSS/TSS  0.66 0.67     0.56 0.59 
 
 
* denotes significance at the 90% level, ** at the 95% level, and *** at the 99% level. Results for one–step estimation 
are obtained using DPD98 for GAUSS. Heteroscedasticity adjusted asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. m1 and 
m2 are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed 
as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. 1 – RSS/TSS: 1 – residual sum of squares/ total sum of squares. Yq20s: 
ln(Q20/0.2) unadjusted approach (regressions without outliers). Yq20c: ln(Q20/0.2) adjusted approach (regressions without 
outliers). all: all countries. dev: developing countries. 
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Table 13: Openness indicators, interaction term and macro-
economic variables - total effect (Growth equation) 
 
Dep. Var.   yp40   yp20  yp40   
   all  dev  dev   
   re  re  re   
 
   (1)  (2)  (3)    
 
Agriculture  2.47**  4.33***  2.70*  
Imports   (1.21)  (1.64)  (1.40) 
 
      
Secondary  0.04  0.36  -0.002    
Education  (0.83)  (1.56)  (1.33)   
 
Budget   0.09  0.26  0.27    
Surplus   (0.16)  (0.26)  (0.22)    
 
Adjusted Gini  0.40***  0.34**  0.38***    
coefficient  (0.12)  (0.17)  (0.14)    
 
Ln(1+inflation)  -4.50  -3.37  -2.09    
   (5.27)  (7.02)  (5.99)    
 
M2/GDP  -0.02  -0.02  -0.003    
   (0.03)  (0.05)  (0.04)    
 
EAP   -1.48  5.21  2.25    
   (2.58)  (5.79)  (4.95)    
 
ECA   -3.48       
   (4.40) 
 
LAC   -6.67**  -0.23  -2.93    
   (3.11)  (6.82)  (5.82)    
 
MNA   -6.00*  0.65  -1.68    
   (3.21)  (6.30)  (5.38)    
 
SA   2.23  10.23*  7.10    
   (2.55)  (5.62)  (4.80)    
 
SSA   -3.16  3.95  1.04    
   (3.62)  (6.67)  (5.70)    
  
Constant  -10.98** -15.17** 14.81***   
   (5.13)  (6.52)  (5.57)    
   
Breusch-Pagan  11.14*** 3.48*  9.52***    
R-squared  0.34  0.40  0.39    
N   67  50  50    
 
* denotes significance at the 90% level, ** at the 95% level, and *** at the 99% level (two-sided alternative). Heteroscedasticity 
adjusted standard errors in parentheses. F-tests/Wald-tests, i.e. tests on the overall significance of the regression, are passed in 
all equations. Breusch-Pagan is a Lagrange multiplier test for the random effects model, distributed as chi-squared under the 
null of no random effects. yq20: average annual growth rate of the mean of the first quintile share (regressions without outliers). 
yq40: average annual growth rate of the mean of the second quintile share (regressions without outliers). re: results for random 
effects estimation. all: all countries. dev: developing countries. 
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Table 14: Openness indicators and macroeconomic variables 
total effect (System GMM estimation) 
 
Dep. Var.   Yp20s  Yp20c  Yp40s Yp40c   Yp20s  Yp20c  Yp40s Yp40c 
   all all all all   dev dev dev dev 
   
   (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Agriculture  0.21*** 0.25*** 0.20*** 0.21***   0.23** 0.26** 0.23** 0.24**  
Imports   (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08)   (0.10) (0.11) (0.09) (0.11)  
  
Secondary  0.12** 0.18*** 0.17*** 0.19***   0.33*** 0.27** 0.29*** 0.28***  
Education  (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)   (0.11) (0.11) (0.09) (0.10)  
   
Government  -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01***  -0.01** -0.02*** -0.01 -0.01*  
Consumption  (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)   (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)  
   
Ln(1+inflation)  0.22 0.22 0.14 0.17   0.24 0.24 0.15 0.17  
   (0.24) (0.18) (0.15) (0.13)   (0.23) (0.19) (0.15) (0.13)  
   
Civil liberties  -0.03 -0.06* -0.05** -0.06**   -0.05 -0.07* -0.06** -0.07**  
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)   (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)  
   
Life    0.05*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04***   0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03***  
expectancy  (0.01) (0.01) (0.008) (0.01)   (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  
   
Terms of  0.008***0.007*** 0.006***0.005***   0.009***0.007*** 0.007***0.006*** 
Trade   (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)   (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  
  
EAP   -0.99*** -0.87*** -1.04*** -1.05***  -1.40*** -1.27*** -1.19*** -1.12*** 
   (0.18) (0.19) (0.16) (0.19)   (0.12) (0.13) (0.11) (0.13)  
 
ECA   0.31** 0.37** 0.09 0.04        
   (0.15) (0.15) (0.12) (0.13)        
 
LAC   -1.21*** -1.10*** -1.03*** -1.10***  -1.55*** -1.46*** -1.12*** -1.13*** 
   (0.15) (0.15) (0.12) (0.12)   (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11)  
   
MNA   -0.74*** -0.78*** -0.76*** -0.85***  -1.04*** -1.14*** -0.85*** -0.90*** 
   (0.20) (0.21) (0.17) (0.18)   (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10)  
   
SA   -0.77*** -0.83*** -1.03*** -1.15***  -1.20*** -1.23*** -1.18*** -1.22*** 
   (0.22) (0.22) (0.20) (0.19)   (0.15) (0.16) (0.15) (0.15)  
   
SSA   -1.20*** -1.42*** -1.14*** -1.32***  -1.60*** -1.83*** -1.29*** -1.41*** 
   (0.37) (0.37) (0.34) (0.34)   (0.30) (0.31) (0.28) (0.28)  
   
Constant  3.86*** 4.60*** 5.20*** 5.58***   5.10*** 5.40*** 5.82*** 6.03***  
   (0.68) (0.69) (0.62) (0.61)   (0.62) (0.65) (0.60) (0.59)  
   
m1   -1.07 -0.65 -1.06 -0.69   -1.07 -0.69 -0.98 -0.69  
m2   0.32 1.12 -1.19 1.29   0.91 1.48 -0.91 1.64  
N   155 156 155 156   101 104 101 104  
1 – RSS/TSS  0.91 0.91 0.94 0.94   0.77 0.76 0.80 0.78  
 
* denotes significance at the 90% level, ** at the 95% level, and *** at the 99% level. Results for one–step estimation are 
obtained using DPD98 for GAUSS. Heteroscedasticity adjusted asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. m1 and m2 are tests 
for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the 
null of no serial correlation. 1 – RSS/TSS: 1 – residual sum of squares/ total sum of squares. Yp20/40s: logarithm of mean income 
of 20/20 to 40 percent poorest (unadjusted approach, regressions without outliers). Yp20/40c: logarithm of mean income of 20/20 
to 40 percent poorest (adjusted approach, regressions without outliers). all: all countries. dev: developing countries. 
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Table 14: continued 
 
Dep. Var.   Yp20s  Yp20c  Yp40s Yp40c   Yp20s  Yp20c  Yp40s Yp40c 
   all all all all   dev dev dev dev 
  
   (9) (10) (11) (12)   (13) (14) (15) (16) 
 
Food   -0.03*** -0.02** -0.02** -0.02**   -0.02* -0.02* -0.02 -0.02 
Exports   (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)   (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
         
Secondary  0.08* 0.15** 0.14*** 0.16***   0.27*** 0.22** 0.26*** 0.24** 
Education  (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03)   (0.09) (0.10) (0.08) (0.10) 
 
Government  -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01** -0.01**   -0.01*** -0.02*** -0.01* -0.01** 
Consumption  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)   (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
 
Ln(1+inflation)   0.26 0.30 0.20 0.24*   0.28 0.30 0.21 0.24* 
  (0.25) (0.20) (0.16) (0.13)   (0.26) (0.21) (0.17) (0.14) 
 
Civil liberties  -0.04 -0.06* -0.05** -0.07**   -0.04 -0.06* -0.06* -0.07** 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)   (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) 
 
Life expectancy  0.06*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05***   0.05*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.04***  
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)   (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
Terms of   0.008***0.007***0.005***0.004***  0.009***0.008*** 0.007***0.006*** 
Trade   (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)   (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  
 
EAP   -0.79*** -0.68*** -0.86*** -0.87***  -1.37*** -1.23*** -1.15*** -1.09*** 
(0.20) (0.23) (0.10) (0.23)   (0.15) (0.13) (0.15) (0.14) 
 
ECA   0.49*** 0.55*** 0.25 0.20 
(0.17) (0.15) (0.15) (0.13) 
 
LAC   -1.19*** -1.12*** -1.02*** -1.11***  -1.70*** -1.64*** -1.28*** -1.30*** 
(0.16) (0.17) (0.13) (0.14)   (0.13) (0.10) (0.12) (0.08) 
 
MNA   -0.59*** -0.59*** -0.61*** -0.69***  -1.04*** -1.13*** -0.84*** -0.89*** 
(0.20) (0.20) (0.16) (0.17)   (0.12) (0.10) (0.12) (0.08) 
 
SA   -0.75*** -0.83*** -1.01*** -1.14***  -1.30*** -1.36*** -1.28*** -1.34*** 
(0.25) (0.25) (0.23) (0.22)   (0.19) (0.17) (0.18) (0.15) 
 
SSA   -0.91* -1.14** -0.88** -1.06**   -1.47*** -1.70*** -1.17*** -1.29*** 
(0.47) (0.49) (0.44) (0.45)   (0.41) (0.41) (0.39) (0.38) 
 
Constant  3.29*** 4.03*** 4.68*** 5.08***   4.39*** 4.76*** 5.17*** 5.46*** 
(0.79) (0.80) (0.74) (0.71)   (0.81) (0.81) (0.79) (0.76) 
 
m1   -0.97 -0.49 -1.19 -0.96   -1.06 -0.60 -1.13 -0.89 
m2   0.83 0.43 -0.72 1.08   0.96 0.13 0.26 0.66 
N   157 158 157 158   103 106 103 106 
1 – RSS/TSS  0.91 0.90 0.94 0.93   0.75 0.74 0.79 0.76 
 
 
* denotes significance at the 90% level, ** at the 95% level, and *** at the 99% level. Results for one–step estimation are 
obtained using DPD98 for GAUSS. Heteroscedasticity adjusted asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. m1 and m2 are tests 
for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the 
null of no serial correlation. 1 – RSS/TSS: 1 – residual sum of squares/ total sum of squares. Yp20/40s: logarithm of mean income 
of 20/20 to 40 percent poorest (unadjusted approach, regressions without outliers). Yp20/40c: logarithm of mean income of 20/20 
to 40 percent poorest (adjusted approach, regressions without outliers). all: all countries. dev: developing countries. 
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Table 14: continued 
 
 
Dep. Var.   Yp20s  Yp20c  Yp40s Yp40c   Yp20s   Yp20c  Yp40s   Yp40c 
   all all all all   dev dev dev dev 
   
   (17) (18) (19) (20)   (21) (22) (23) (24) 
 
Manufactures  0.014***0.017***0.011***0.013***   0.017***0.021***0.015***0.017*** 
Exports   (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)   (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)  
   
Secondary  0.07 0.13** 0.13*** 0.14***   0.29** 0.22* 0.26** 0.24*  
Education  (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)   (0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13)  
   
Government  -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01***  -0.01** -0.02*** -0.01* -0.01**  
Consumption  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)   (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)  
   
Ln(1+inflation)  0.16 0.16 0.12 0.14   0.09 0.08 0.05 0.06  
   (0.23) (0.17) (0.15) (0.12)   (0.23) (0.17) (0.15) (0.12)  
   
Civil liberties  -0.04 -0.07** -0.05** -0.07**   -0.06* -0.08** -0.07** -0.08**  
   (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)   (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)  
   
Life    0.04*** 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.03***   0.03*** 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.02***  
Expectancy  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)   (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  
   
Terms of   0.007***0.006***0.004*** 0.004***   0.007***0.006***0.005***0.005** 
Trade   (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)   (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  
    
EAP   -1.02*** -0.91*** -1.06*** -1.06***   -1.45*** -1.33*** -1.23***-1.17*** 
   (0.19) (0.19) (0.18) (0.19)   (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.12)  
   
ECA   0.31** 0.38*** 0.10 0.06        
(0.14) (0.14) (0.12) (0.11)       
 
LAC   -1.23*** -1.12*** -1.06*** -1.12***  -1.56*** -1.46*** -1.15*** -1.16*** 
   (0.15) (0.15) (0.12) (0.13)   (0.12) (0.10) (0.11) (0.09)  
   
MNA   -0.69*** -0.71*** -0.70*** -0.78***  -0.98*** -1.08*** -0.79*** -0.84*** 
   (0.19) (0.19) (0.16) (0.16)   (0.09) (0.11) (0.09) (0.08)  
   
SA   -0.88*** -0.92*** -1.12*** -1.21***  -1.31*** -1.31*** -1.29*** -1.30*** 
   (0.22) (0.20) (0.20) (0.19)   (0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.11)  
   
SSA   -1.33*** -1.55*** -1.23***-1.40***   -1.76*** -2.01*** -1.42***-1.54*** 
   (0.37) (0.35) (0.35) (0.34)   (0.28) (0.26) (0.27) (0.25)  
 
Constant  4.64*** 5.34*** 5.78*** 6.11***   5.95*** 6.26*** 6.54*** 6.68***  
   (0.72) (0.67) (0.62) (0.58)   (0.66) (0.64) (0.55) (0.58)  
 
m1   -0.69 -0.10 -1.30 -1.22   -0.92 -0.14 -1.30 -1.17  
m2   -0.07 0.66 -1.67 1.05   0.15 0.66 -1.01 1.04  
N   156 157 156 157   102 105 102 105  
1 – RSS/TSS  0.91 0.92 0.94 0.94   0.78 0.78 0.80 0.79   
   
* denotes significance at the 90% level, ** at the 95% level, and *** at the 99% level. Results for one–step estimation are 
obtained using DPD98 for GAUSS. Heteroscedasticity adjusted asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. m1 and m2 are tests 
for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the 
null of no serial correlation. 1 – RSS/TSS: 1 – residual sum of squares/ total sum of squares. Yp20/40s: logarithm of mean income 
of 20/20 to 40 percent poorest (unadjusted approach, regressions without outliers). Yp20/40c: logarithm of mean income of 20/20 
to 40 percent poorest (adjusted approach, regressions without outliers). all: all countries. dev: developing countries. 
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Table 14: continued 
 
 
Dep. Var.   Yp20s  Yp20c   Yp20s  Yp20c   Yp40s Yp40c 
   all all  dev dev  indu indu 
  
   (25) (26)  (27) (28)  (29) (30) 
 
Export   -0.03*** -0.03**   -0.03*** -0.03**  0.11* 0.11* 
duties   (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01)  (0.06) (0.07)     
 
Secondary  0.05 0.13***  0.08 0.04  0.10*** 0.12*** 
Education  (0.04) (0.04)  (0.17) (0.16)  (0.03) (0.03) 
 
Government  -0.01** -0.01**  -0.02* -0.03***  -0.003 -0.002 
Consumption  (0.006) (0.006)  (0.01) (0.01)  (0.004) (0.004) 
 
Ln(1+inflation)   0.16 0.29  0.23 0.36  -0.88* -0.80 
(0.25) (0.27)  (0.28) (0.31)  (0.52) (0.51) 
 
Civil liberties  -0.02 -0.07*  -0.03 -0.07*  -0.003 -0.02 
(0.03) (0.03)  (0.04) (0.04)  (0.03) (0.03) 
 
Life expectancy  0.06*** 0.05***  0.06*** 0.06***  0.04** 0.04** 
(0.01) (0.01)  (0.02) (0.02)  (0.02) (0.02) 
 
Terms of   0.004***0.003**  0.006***0.005**  0 0 
Trade   (0.002) (0.001)  (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002) 
 
EAP   -0.86*** 0.67***  -1.14*** -0.99***    
(0.21) (0.24)  (0.19) (0.18) 
 
ECA   0.30** 0.42*** 
(0.15) (0.14) 
 
LAC   -1.25*** -1.14*** -1.58*** -1.54*** 
(0.16) (0.18)  (0.12) (0.09) 
 
MNA   -0.69*** -0.68*** -1.00*** -1.13*** 
(0.19) (0.18)  (0.09) (0.09) 
 
SA   -0.91*** -0.91*** -1.12*** -1.10*** 
(0.26) (0.27)  (0.27) (0.25) 
 
SSA   -1.05* -1.18**  -1.37*** -1.60*** 
(0.58) (0.59)  (0.52) (0.53) 
 
Constant  3.85*** 4.78***  4.02*** 4.60***  5.88*** 6.16*** 
(0.81) (0.80)  (1.09) (1.01)  (1.29) (1.23) 
 
m1   -1.17 -1.15  -1.04 -0.80  -1.15 -1.51 
m2   -1.15 -0.14  -0.80 -0.08  -1.15 -0.94 
N   165 162  90 90  75 72 
1 – RSS/TSS  0.90 0.90  0.72 0.73  0.54 0.56 
 
* denotes significance at the 90% level, ** at the 95% level, and *** at the 99% level. Results for one–step estimation 
are obtained using DPD98 for GAUSS. Heteroscedasticity adjusted asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. m1 and 
m2 are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed 
as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. 1 – RSS/TSS: 1 – residual sum of squares/ total sum of squares. 
Yp20/40s: logarithm of mean income of 20/20 to 40 percent poorest (unadjusted approach, regressions without outliers). 
Yp20/40c: logarithm of mean income of 20/20 to 40 percent poorest (adjusted approach, regressions without outliers). all: 
all countries. dev: developing countries. indu: industrial countries. 
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Table 14: continued 
 
 
Dep. Var.  Yp20s  Yp20c  Yp40s Yp40c   Yp20s  Yp20c   Yp20s Yp20c 
  indu indu indu indu   indu indu  indu indu 
  
  (31) (32) (33) (34)   (35) (36)  (37) (38) 
 
 
Food exports -0.027**-0.017 0.019** -0.016 Manufactures 0.008* 0.008 Import -0.024* -0.018*  
  (0.012) (0.017) (0.010) (0.011) Exports  (0.005) (0.005) duties (0.013) (0.009) 
 
Secondary  0.01 0.10** 0.10*** 0.11***   0.01 0.10**  0.03 0.12*** 
Education (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03)   (0.04) (0.05)  (0.04) (0.04) 
 
Government -0.009* -0.002 -0.005 -0.003   -0.011**-0.005  -0.006 0 
Consumption (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)   (0.006) (0.005)  (0.005) (0.005) 
 
ln(1+inflation) -0.90 -0.61 -0.74 -0.62   -0.18 -0.06  -0.60 -0.58 
  (0.68) (0.61) (0.57) (0.55)   (0.47) (0.49)  (0.66) (0.59) 
 
Civil liberties -0.03 -0.07 -0.05 -0.06*   0.02 -0.04  0.01 -0.05 
  (0.06) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03)   (0.06) (0.05)  (0.07) (0.05) 
  
Life   0.06 0.04 0.05* 0.04   0.08* 0.06  0.04** 0.03 
expectancy (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)   (0.04) (0.04)  (0.02) (0.02) 
 
Terms of 0.003  0.003 0 0   0.004 0.003  0 0  
Trade  (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)   (0.003) (0.004)  (0.002) (0.002) 
 
Constant 4.08 4.86* 5.55*** 5.93***   2.68 4.01  5.36*** 6.48*** 
  (2.70) (2.53) (2.05) (2.05)   (3.02) (3.04)  (1.66) (1.34) 
 
m1  1.07 1.33 -1.26 -1.23   1.21 1.55  -0.89 -0.89 
m2  -0.27 -0.71 -1.12 0.61   -0.03 -1.01  -0.77 -1.57 
N  54 52 54 52   54 52  76 73 
1 – RSS/TSS 0.45 0.45 0.61 0.61   0.42 0.46  0.28 0.38 
 
 
* denotes significance at the 90% level, ** at the 95% level, and *** at the 99% level. Results for one–step estimation are 
obtained using DPD98 for GAUSS. Heteroscedasticity adjusted asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. m1 and m2 are tests 
for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the 
null of no serial correlation. 1 – RSS/TSS: 1 – residual sum of squares/ total sum of squares. Yp20/40s: logarithm of mean income 
of 20/20 to 40 percent poorest (unadjusted approach, regressions without outliers). Yp20/40c: logarithm of mean income of 20/20 
to 40 percent poorest (adjusted approach, regressions without outliers). indu: industrial countries.  
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Table 15: Openness indicators, interaction term and 
macroeconomic variables - total effect  
(System GMM estimation) 
 
 
Dep. Var.   Yp20s  Yp20c  Yp40s Yp40c  Yp20s  Yp20c  Yp40s Yp40c 
   all all all all  dev dev dev dev 
   
   (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Agriculture  0.75** 0.64 0.60*** 0.51*  1.32** 1.22 1.09** 0.99*  
Exports   (0.30) (0.44) (0.23) (0.29)  (0.57) (0.76) (0.49) (0.58) 
 
Agriculture  -0.08** -0.07 -0.07*** -0.06*  -0.15** -0.14 -0.13** -0.11* 
Exports * y  (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03)  (0.07) (0.09) (0.06) (0.07)   
 
Secondary  0.10* 0.17*** 0.16*** 0.18***  0.37*** 0.31*** 0.34*** 0.32*** 
Education  (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)  (0.10) (0.12) (0.10) (0.11) 
 
Government  -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.01*** -0.01***  -0.01*** -0.02*** -0.01** -0.01*** 
Consumption  (0.004) (0.004) (0.04) (0.004)  (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
 
Ln(1+inflation)  0.25 0.28 0.20 0.23*  0.21 0.24 0.15 0.19 
   (0.25) (0.20) (0.16) (0.13)  (0.26) (0.21) (0.17) (0.14) 
 
Civil liberties  -0.03 -0.06** -0.05** -0.06**  -0.05* -0.07** -0.06** -0.07** 
   (0.21) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
 
Life    0.06*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.04***  0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.03*** 
expectancy  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
Terms of    0.007*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.004***  0.008*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.005***  
Trade   (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
 
 
EAP   -0.87*** -0.77*** -0.93*** -0.96***  -1.40*** -1.29*** -1.18*** -1.14*** 
   (0.20) (0.22) (0.19) (0.22)  (0.15) (0.13) (0.15) (0.15) 
 
ECA   0.45*** 0.53*** 0.22* 0.17 
   (0.15) (0.15) (0.13) (0.12) 
 
LAC   -1.19*** -1.10*** -1.02*** -1.11***  -1.65*** -1.59*** -1.23*** -1.26*** 
   (0.16) (0.17) (0.12) (0.14)  (0.13) (0.11) (0.12) (0.09) 
  
MNA   -0.49*** -0.51** -0.54*** -0.65***  -0.90*** -1.00*** -0.72*** -0.78*** 
   (0.19) (0.21) (0.16) (0.17)  (0.12) (0.10) (0.12) (0.09) 
 
SA   -0.69*** -0.82*** -0.97*** -1.15***  -1.22*** -1.33*** -1.21*** -1.31*** 
   (0.24) (0.27) (0.22) (0.43)  (0.16) (0.18) (0.17) (0.16) 
 
SSA   -0.93** -1.15** -0.90** -1.11***  -1.46*** -1.71*** -1.17*** -1.32*** 
   (0.43) (0.48) (0.41) (0.43)  (0.33) (0.36) (0.32) (0.33) 
 
Constant   3.35*** 4.19*** 4.73*** 5.28***  4.69*** 5.20*** 5.44*** 5.87*** 
   (0.70) (0.81) (0.68) (0.71)  (0.64) (0.78) (0.69) (0.73) 
 
 
m1   -0.67 -0.15 -1.07 -0.84  -0.88 -0.23 -0.91 -0.66 
m2   0.88 1.13 -1.43 1.06  0.94 1.20 -0.91 0.71 
N   156 156 156 156  102 104 102 104 
1 – RSS/TSS  0.90 0.90 0.93 0.93  0.77 0.74 0.80 0.77 
 
 
 
* denotes significance at the 90% level, ** at the 95% level, and *** at the 99% level. Results for one–step estimation are 
obtained using DPD98 for GAUSS. Heteroscedasticity adjusted asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. m1 and m2 are tests 
for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the 
null of no serial correlation. 1 – RSS/TSS: 1 – residual sum of squares/ total sum of squares. Yp20/40s: logarithm of mean income 
of 20/20 to 40 percent poorest (unadjusted approach, regressions without outliers). Yp20/40c: logarithm of mean income of 20/20 
to 40 percent poorest (adjusted approach, regressions without outliers). all: all countries. dev: developing countries. 
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Table 15: continued 
 
 
Dep. Var.   Yp20s  Yp20c  Yp40s Yp40c   Yp20s  Yp20c  Yp40s Yp40c 
   all all all  all   dev dev dev dev 
  
  (9) (10) (11) (12)   (13) (14) (15) (16) 
 
Food   -0.16* -0.19** -0.17** -0.18**   -0.44*** -0.40*** -0.43*** -0.42*** 
Exports    (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)   (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) 
  
Food    0.015 0.020** 0.017* 0.018**   0.052*** 0.047*** 0.050*** 0.049***  
Exports * Y  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)   (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
Secondary  0.08* 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.16**   0.31*** 0.26** 0.29*** 0.27** 
Education  (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)   (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11)  
 
Government  -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01** -0.01**   -0.01** -0.02*** -0.01 -0.01* 
Consumption  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)   (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
 
Ln(1+inflation)  0.25 0.30 0.20 0.24*   0.26 0.28 0.19 0.21 
   (0.26) (0.20) (0.16) (0.14)   (0.25) (0.21) (0.16) (0.14) 
 
Civil liberties  -0.03 -0.06* -0.04* -0.06**   -0.04 -0.05 -0.05* -0.06** 
   (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03)   (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) 
 
Life expectancy  0.06*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05***   0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 
   (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)   (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
Terms of    0.008*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.005***   0.010*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.007***  
Trade   (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)   (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
 
 
EAP   -0.83*** -0.73*** -0.91*** -0.91***   -1.37*** -1.24*** -1.15*** -1.09*** 
   (0.20) (0.23) (0.20) (0.23)   (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) 
 
ECA   0.44*** 0.49*** 0.19 0.15 
   (0.16) (0.15) (0.14) (0.13) 
 
LAC   -1.22*** -1.15*** -1.05*** -1.13***   -1.64*** -1.59*** -1.22*** -1.24*** 
   (0.16) (0.18) (0.13) (0.14)   (0.09) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) 
 
MNA   -0.65*** -0.66*** -0.68*** -0.76***   -1.01*** -1.10*** -0.81*** -0.85*** 
   (0.19) (0.20) (0.16) (0.16)   (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.06) 
 
SA   -0.82*** -0.91*** -1.10*** -1.20***   -1.38*** -1.41*** -1.36*** -1.39*** 
   (0.24) (0.24) (0.22) (0.21)   (0.16) (0.15) (0.15) (0.13) 
 
SSA   -0.95** -1.18** -0.93** -1.10***   -1.53*** -1.75*** -1.22*** -1.33*** 
   (0.45) (0.46) (0.42) (0.42)   (0.32) (0.34) (0.31) (0.31) 
 
Constant   3.30*** 3.99*** 4.68*** 5.05***   4.58*** 4.87*** 5.36*** 5.57*** 
   (0.79) (0.78) (0.72) (0.68)   (0.77) (0.78) (0.74) (0.71) 
 
 
m1   -0.98 -0.54 -1.22 -1.02   -1.05 -0.62 -1.14 -0.92 
m2   0.70 0.08 -1.05 0.78   0.96 -0.29 0.57 0.43 
N   157 158 157 158   103 106 103 106 
1 – RSS/TSS  0.91 0.91 0.94 0.94   0.78 0.76 0.82 0.79 
 
 
 
* denotes significance at the 90% level, ** at the 95% level, and *** at the 99% level. Results for one–step estimation are 
obtained using DPD98 for GAUSS. Heteroscedasticity adjusted asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. m1 and m2 are tests 
for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the 
null of no serial correlation. 1 – RSS/TSS: 1 – residual sum of squares/ total sum of squares. Yp20/40s: logarithm of mean income 
of 20/20 to 40 percent poorest (unadjusted approach, regressions without outliers). Yp20/40c: logarithm of mean income of 20/20 
to 40 percent poorest (adjusted approach, regressions without outliers). all: all countries. dev: developing countries. 
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Table 15: continued 
 
 
Dep. Var.   Yp20s  Yp20c  Yp40s Yp40c   Yp20s  Yp20c  Yp40s Yp40c 
   all all all all   dev dev dev dev 
   
 (17) (18) (19) (20)   (21) (22) (23) (24) 
 
Export    -0.51*** -0.41** -0.45*** -0.38**   -0.79*** -0.58* -0.68*** -0.52** 
Duties   (0.19) (0.21) (0.16) (0.18)   (0.26) (0.30) (0.21) (0.25) 
 
Export   0.058** 0.046* 0.053***  0.044**   0.093***  0.067* 0.081***  0.062**  
Duties * Y  (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)   (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) 
 
Secondary  0.05 0.13*** 0.12*** 0.14***   0.05 0.03 0.08 0.07 
Education  (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)   (0.15) (0.16) (0.13) (0.14)  
 
Government  -0.01** -0.02** -0.01** -0.01***   -0.03** -0.04*** -0.03* -0.03*** 
Consumption  (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)   (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
Ln(1+inflation)  0.13 0.27 0.06 0.20   0.20 0.34 0.12 0.26 
   (0.23) (0.26) (0.16) (0.17)   (0.26) (0.29) (0.19) (0.19) 
 
Civil liberties  -0.01 -0.06* -0.02 -0.05*   -0.02 -0.06* -0.03 -0.06* 
   (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)   (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) 
 
Life expectancy  0.05*** 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.04***   0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 
   (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)   (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
Terms of    0.004***   0.003** 0.004** 0.002*   0.007*** 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.005***  
Trade   (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)   (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
 
 
EAP   -0.92*** -0.71*** -0.91*** -0.88***   -1.15*** -1.01*** -0.93*** -0.86*** 
   (0.21) (0.24) (0.20) (0.22)   (0.17) (0.18) (0.15) (0.16) 
 
ECA   0.25* 0.39*** 0.08 0.06 
   (0.14) (0.14) (0.11) (0.11) 
 
LAC   -1.29*** -1.17*** -1.06*** -1.16***   -1.57*** -1.54*** -1.16*** -1.20*** 
   (0.16) (0.18) (0.13) (0.14)   (0.11) (0.14) (0.09) (0.10) 
 
MNA   -0.76*** -0.72*** -0.75*** -0.82***   -1.05*** -1.16*** -0.87*** -0.91*** 
   (0.18) (0.17) (0.14) (0.14)   (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.05) 
 
SA   -0.93*** -0.91*** -1.11*** -1.16***   -1.03*** -1.05*** -0.98*** -0.99*** 
   (0.26) (0.26) (0.22) (0.23)   (0.26) (0.25) (0.24) (0.22) 
 
SSA   -1.22** -1.30** -1.10*** -1.22**   -1.58*** -1.75*** -1.26*** -1.33*** 
   (0.58) (0.58) (0.50) (0.50)   (0.50) (0.51) (0.43) (0.44)  
 
Constant   4.27*** 5.12*** 5.03*** 5.59***   4.56*** 5.04*** 4.80*** 5.24*** 
   (0.79) (0.77) (0.74) (0.73)   (0.98) (0.95) (0.92) (0.92)  
 
 
m1   -1.16 -1.12 -1.65* -1.80*   -1.10 -0.91 -1.48 -1.30 
m2   -1.53 -0.65 -1.52 -0.88   -1.31 -0.67 -0.92 -0.62  
N   165 162 165 162   90 90 90 90 
1 – RSS/TSS  0.90 0.90 0.93 0.93   0.75 0.75 0.79 0.80 
 
 
 
* denotes significance at the 90% level, ** at the 95% level, and *** at the 99% level. Results for one–step estimation are 
obtained using DPD98 for GAUSS. Heteroscedasticity adjusted asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. m1 and m2 are tests 
for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the 
null of no serial correlation. 1 – RSS/TSS: 1 – residual sum of squares/ total sum of squares. Yp20/40s: logarithm of mean income 
of 20/20 to 40 percent poorest (unadjusted approach, regressions without outliers). Yp20/40c: logarithm of mean income of 20/20 
to 40 percent poorest (adjusted approach, regressions without outliers). all: all countries. dev: developing countries. 
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Table 15: continued 
 
 
Dep. Var.   Yp20s  Yp20c  Yp40s Yp40c   Yp20s  Yp20c  Yp40s Yp40c 
   all all all all   dev dev dev dev 
   
(25) (26) (27) (28)   (29) (30) (31) (32) 
 
Import   -0.06 -0.08* -0.10** -0.09**   -0.13** -0.13** -0.14** -0.13**  
duties   (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)   (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05)  
 
Import   0.007 0.010* 0.012** 0.012**   0.017** 0.017** 0.018*** 0.017**  
duties * Y   (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)   (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) 
 
Secondary  0.06 0.13*** 0.12*** 0.13***   0.19 0.12 0.15 0.10 
Education  (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04)   (0.15) (0.15) (0.13) (0.13) 
 
Government  -0.01* -0.01* -0.01 -0.01   -0.01 -0.03** -0.01 -0.03** 
Consumption  (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)   (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  
  
Ln(1+inflation)  -0.04 0.16 -0.11 0.09   0.01 0.23 -0.06 0.15 
   (0.20) (0.48) (0.14) (0.15)   (0.19) (0.25) (0.15) (0.16) 
 
Civil liberties  -0.01 -0.05 -0.03 -0.04*   -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 
   (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)   (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
 
Life expectancy  0.05*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04***   0.04* 0.04** 0.04** 0.04*** 
   (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)   (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
   
Terms of    0.004*** 0.003** 0.004*** 0.003**   0.005*** 0.005** 0.006*** 0.005***  
Trade   (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)   (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
 
 
EAP   -0.99*** -0.80*** -0.96*** -0.94***   -1.17*** -0.99*** -0.90*** -0.81*** 
(0.20) (0.22) (0.18) (0.20)   (0.19) (0.17) (0.16) (0.15) 
 
ECA   0.20 0.29** -0.007 -0.04      
   (0.13) (0.13) (0.10) (0.10) 
 
LAC   -1.27*** -1.22*** -1.06*** -1.19***   -1.47*** -1.46*** -1.06*** -1.12*** 
   (0.13) (0.17) (0.10) (0.12)   (0.10) (0.12) (0.09) (0.09) 
 
MNA   -0.77*** -0.80*** -0.79*** -0.89***   -1.00*** -1.15*** -0.81*** -0.90*** 
   (0.18) (0.18) (0.14) (0.14)   (0.14) (0.14) (0.12) (0.10) 
 
SA   -1.06*** -0.94*** -1.10*** -1.11***   -1.20*** -1.06*** -1.00*** -0.92*** 
   (0.33) (0.32) (0.28) (0.30)   (0.29) (0.29) (0.26) (0.27) 
 
SSA   -1.25*** -1.33*** -1.18*** -1.29***   -1.48*** -1.58*** -1.17*** -1.21*** 
   (0.42) (0.40) (0.36) (0.35)   (0.33) (0.31) (0.28) (0.27) 
 
Constant   4.51*** 5.10*** 5.43*** 5.67***   5.28*** 5.22*** 5.47*** 5.37*** 
   (0.80) (0.82) (0.70) (0.77)   (1.17) (1.13) (1.03) (1.03) 
 
 
m1   -1.01 -1.20 -1.09 -1.85*   -0.82 -0.77 -0.82 -1.24 
m2   -0.81 -0.43 -1.47 -1.16   -0.56 -0.74 -0.77 -1.13 
N   170 167 170 167   94 94 94 94 
1 – RSS/TSS  0.90 0.90 0.93 0.94   0.73 0.75 0.80 0.80 
 
 
 
* denotes significance at the 90% level, ** at the 95% level, and *** at the 99% level. Results for one–step estimation are 
obtained using DPD98 for GAUSS. Heteroscedasticity adjusted asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. m1 and m2 are tests 
for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the 
null of no serial correlation. 1 – RSS/TSS: 1 – residual sum of squares/ total sum of squares. Yp20/40s: logarithm of mean income 
of 20/20 to 40 percent poorest (unadjusted approach, regressions without outliers). Yp20/40c: logarithm of mean income of 20/20 
to 40 percent poorest (adjusted approach, regressions without outliers). all: all countries. dev: developing countries. 
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Table 16: First/Second Quintile and Openness Indicators 
All countries (Growth equation) 
 
I. Openness Indicators 
 
  Agex Agim Foex Foim Maex Maim Exdu Imdu 
 
1) Distribution effect 
 
yq20 = regional dummies   - - - - - - - - 
 
yq40 = regional dummies   - - - - - - - - 
 
yq20 = regional dummies  - - - - - - - - 
+ macroeconomic variables     
 
yq40 = regional dummies  - - - - - - - - 
+ macroeconomic variables     
 
2) Total effect 
 
yp20 = regional dummies  - - - - - - - - 
+ macroeconomic variables   
      
yp40 = regional dummies  - 2.47** - - - - - - 
+ macroeconomic variables       
 
II. Openness Indicators and interaction term 
 
Agex Agim Foex Foim Maex Maim Exdu Imdu 
     Yagex Yagim Yfoex Yfoim Ymaex Ymaim Yexdu Yimdu 
 
1) Distribution effect 
 
yq20 = regional  dummies  - - - - - - - - 
              
yq40 = regional  dummies  -3.36** - - - - - - - 
    0.38**      
            
yq20 = regional dummies  - - - - - - - - 
macroeconomic variables  
 
yq40 = regional dummies  - - - - - - - - 
macroeconomic variables  
 
2) Total effect 
 
yp20 = regional dummies  - - - - - - - - 
macroeconomic variables      
 
yp40 = regional dummies  - - - - - - - - 
macroeconomic variables 
 
Note: Under the rubric specifications we denote the different basic equations which are tested with eight different combinations 
of the openness indicators. E.g. yq20 = regional dummies means that the growth rate of the first quintile share is regressed on 
regional dummy variables and eight different combinations. In the matrix we indicate coefficients of significant openness 
indicators. * denotes signficance at 90 % level, ** at the 95 % level, and *** at the 99 % level (two-sided alternative). yq20/40: 
regressions without outliers for growth rate of first/second quintile. yp20/40: regressions without outliers for growth rate of mean 
income of first/second quintile. Agex/Agim: Agriculture exports/imports. Foex/Foim: Food exports/imports. Maex/Maim: 
Manufactures exports/imports. Exdu/Imdu: Export/Import duties. Yagex/Yagim: Agriculture exports/imports * ln(Y). Yfoex/Yfoim: 
Food exports/imports * ln(Y). Ymaex/Ymaim: Manufactures exports/imports * ln(Y). Yexdu/Yimdu: Export/Import duties * ln(Y).  
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Table 17: First/Second Quintile and Openness Indicators 
Developing countries (Growth equation) 
 
I. Openness Indicators 
 
  Agex Agim Foex Foim Maex Maim Exdu Imdu 
 
1) Distribution effect 
 
yq20 = regional dummies   - - - - - - - - 
 
yq40 = regional dummies   - - - - - - - - 
 
yq20 = regional dummies  - - - - - - - - 
+ macroeconomic variables     
 
yq40 = regional dummies  - - - - - - - - 
+ macroeconomic variables     
 
2) Total effect 
 
yp20 = regional dummies  - 4.33*** - - - - - - 
+ macroeconomic variables   
      
yp40 = regional dummies  - 2.70* - - - - - - 
+ macroeconomic variables       
 
II. Openness Indicators and interaction term 
 
Agex Agim Foex Foim Maex Maim Exdu Imdu 
     Yagex Yagim Yfoex Yfoim Ymaex Ymaim Yexdu  Yimdu 
 
1) Distribution effect 
 
yq20 = regional  dummies  - - - - - -0.74* - - 
         0.09* 
yq40 = regional  dummies  -5.00** - - - - - - - 
      0.60**      
     
yq20 = regional dummies  - - - - - - - - 
+ macroeconomic variables  
 
yq40 = regional dummies  - - - - - - - - 
+ macroeconomic variables  
 
2) Total effect 
 
yp20 = regional dummies  - - - - - - - -  
+ macroeconomic variables     
       
yp40 = regional dummies  - - - - - - - - 
+ macroeconomic variables     
 
Note: Under the rubric specifications we denote the different basic equations which are tested with eight different combinations 
of the openness indicators. E.g. yq20 = regional dummies means that the growth rate of the first quintile share is regressed on 
regional dummy variables and eight different combinations. In the matrix we indicate coefficients of significant openness 
indicators. * denotes signficance at 90 % level, ** at the 95 % level, and *** at the 99 % level (two-sided alternative). yq20/40: 
regressions without outliers for growth rate of first/second quintile. yp20/40: regressions without outliers for growth rate of mean 
income of first/second quintile. Agex/Agim: Agriculture exports/imports. Foex/Foim: Food exports/imports. Maex/Maim: 
Manufactures exports/imports. Exdu/Imdu: Export/Import duties. Yagex/Yagim: Agriculture exports/imports * ln(Y). Yfoex/Yfoim: 
Food exports/imports * ln(Y). Ymaex/Ymaim: Manufactures exports/imports * ln(Y). Yexdu/Yimdu: Export/Import duties * ln(Y). 
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Table 18: First/Second Quintile and Openness Indicators 
All countries (System GMM estimation)  
 
Openness indicators:  Agex Agim Foex Foim Maex Maim Exdu Imdu 
     
1) Distribution effect 
   
Specifications:  
 
Yq20s = regional   - - - - 0.004* - - - 
dummies      
 
Yq20c = regional  - - - - 0.005** - - - 
dummies           
           
Yq40s = regional   - - - - - - - - 
dummies      
 
Yq40c = regional  - - - - - - - - 
dummies  
 
Yq20s = regional dummies - - - - 0.007*** - - - 
+ macroeconomic variables  
 
Yq20c = regional dummies - - - - 0.006** - - - 
+ macroeconomic variables 
    
Yq40s = regional dummies - - - - -  - - - 
+ macroeconomic variables  
 
Yq40c = regional dummies - - - - - - - - 
+ macroeconomic variables 
 
2) Total effect 
 
Yp20s = regional  - 0.21*** -0.03*** - 0.014*** - -0.03*** - 
dummies + macro-     
economic variables  
     
Yp20c = regional  - 0.25*** -0.02** - 0.017*** - -0.03** - 
dummies + macro-          
economic variables         
    
Yp40s = regional  - 0.20*** -0.02** - 0.011*** - - - 
dummies + macro-      
economic variables  
     
Yp40c = regional  - 0.21*** -0.02** - 0.013*** - - - 
dummies + macro-          
economic variables  
 
 
Note: Under the rubric specifications we denote the different basic equations which are tested with openness indicators. E.g. 
Yq20 = regional dummies means that the first quintile share is regressed on regional dummy variables and eight different 
combinations. In the matrix we indicate coefficients of significant openness indicators. * denotes signficance at 90 % level, ** at 
the 95 % level, and *** at the 99 % level (two-sided alternative). Yq20/40s: ln(Q20/40/0.2) unadjusted approach. Yq20/40c: ln(Q20/40/0.2) 
adjusted approach. Yp20/40s: logarithm of mean income of the 20/20 to 40 percent poorest (unadjusted approach). Yp20/40c: 
logarithm of mean income of 20/20 to 40 percent poorest (adjusted approach). All regressions without outliers.  Agex/Agim: 
Agriculture exports/imports. Foex/Foim: Food exports/imports. Maex/Maim: Manufactures exports/imports. Exdu/Imdu: 
Export/Import duties.  
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Table 19: First/Second Quintile and Openness Indicators  
Developing countries (System GMM estimation)  
 
Openness indicators:  Agex Agim Foex Foim Maex Maim Exdu Imdu  
 
1) Distribution effect 
 
Specifications:  
  
Yq20s = regional   - - - - - - - 0.005* 
dummies      
 
Yq20c = regional  - - - - 0.005* - - - 
dummies           
           
Yq40s = regional   - - - - - - - - 
dummies      
 
Yq40c = regional  - - - - - - - - 
dummies  
 
Yq20s = regional dummies  - - - - -  - - - 
+ macroeconomic variables  
 
Yq20c = regional dummies  - - - - - - - - 
+ macroeconomic variables 
    
Yq40s = regional dummies - - - - -  - - - 
+ macroeconomic variables  
 
Yq40c = regional dummies - - - - - - - - 
+ macroeconomic variables 
 
2) Total effect 
 
Yp20s = regional  - 0.23** -0.02* - 0.017*** - -0.03*** - 
dummies + macro- 
economic variables  
     
Yp20c = regional  - 0.26** -0.02* - 0.021*** - -0.03** - 
dummies + macro-          
economic variables         
    
Yp40s = regional  - 0.23** - - 0.015***  - - - 
dummies + macro-      
economic variables  
     
Yp40c = regional  - 0.24** - - 0.017*** - - - 
dummies + macro-          
economic variables  
 
Note: Under the rubric specifications we denote the different basic equations which are tested with openness indicators. E.g. 
Yq20 = regional dummies means that the first quintile share is regressed on regional dummy variables and eight different 
combinations. In the matrix we indicate coefficients of significant openness indicators. * denotes signficance at 90 % level, ** at 
the 95 % level, and *** at the 99 % level (two-sided alternative). Yq20/40s: ln(Q20/40/0.2) unadjusted approach. Yq20/40c: ln(Q20/40/0.2) 
adjusted approach. Yp20/40s: logarithm of mean income of the 20/20 to 40 percent poorest (unadjusted approach). Yp20/40c: 
logarithm of mean income of 20/20 to 40 percent poorest (adjusted approach). All regressions without outliers.  Agex/Agim: 
Agriculture exports/imports. Foex/Foim: Food exports/imports. Maex/Maim: Manufactures exports/imports. Exdu/Imdu: 
Export/Import duties.  
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Table 20: First/Second Quintile and Openness Indicators  
Industrial countries (System GMM estimation)  
 
Openness indicators:  Agex Agim Foex Foim Maex Maim Exdu Imdu  
 
1) Distribution effect 
 
Specifications:  
  
Yq20s = macro-   - - -0.023**- 0.010*** - - -0.030*** 
economic variables  
 
Yq20c = macro-   0.035** - - - 0.007*** - -0.016** 
economic variables 
    
Yq40s = macro-   - - -0.011**- 0.004*** - - -  
economic variables  
 
Yq40c = macro-   - - - - 0.003** - - -  
economic variables 
 
2) Total effect 
 
Yp20s = macro-   - - -0.027**- 0.008*  - - -0.024* 
economic variables  
     
Yp20c = macro-    - - - - - - - -0.018* 
economic variables         
    
Yp40s = macro-   - - -0.019**- - - 0.11* - 
economic variables  
     
Yp40c = macro-    - - - - - - 0.11* - 
economic variables  
 
 
 
Note: Under the rubric specifications we denote the different basic equations which are tested with openness indicators. E.g. 
Yq20 = regional dummies means that the first quintile share is regressed on regional dummy variables and eight different 
combinations. In the matrix we indicate coefficients of significant openness indicators. * denotes signficance at 90 % level, ** at 
the 95 % level, and *** at the 99 % level (two-sided alternative). Yq20/40s: ln(Q20/40/0.2) unadjusted approach. Yq20/40c: ln(Q20/40/0.2) 
adjusted approach. Yp20/40s: logarithm of mean income of the 20/20 to 40 percent poorest (unadjusted approach). Yp20/40c: 
logarithm of mean income of 20/20 to 40 percent poorest (adjusted approach). All regressions without outliers.  Agex/Agim: 
Agriculture exports/imports. Foex/Foim: Food exports/imports. Maex/Maim: Manufactures exports/imports. Exdu/Imdu: 
Export/Import duties.  
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Table 21: First/Second Quintile and Openness Indicators plus 
Interactions term - All countries (System GMM estimation)  
 
Openness indicators:  Agex Agim Foex Foim Maex Maim Exdu Imdu  
    Yagex Yagim Yfoex Yfoim Ymaex Ymaim Yexdu Yimdu  
1) Distribution effect 
 
Specifications:  
  
Yq20s = regional   - - - - - - - - 
dummies      
 
Yq20c = regional  0.35** - - - - - - - 
dummies   -0.04        
           
Yq40s = regional   - - - - - - - - 
dummies      
 
Yq40c = regional  0.22** - - - - - - - 
dummies   -0.02** 
 
Yq20s = regional dummies  - - - - -  - - 0.039* 
+ macroeconomic variables        -0.005* 
 
Yq20c = regional dummies - - - - - - - - 
+ macroeconomic variables 
    
Yq40s = regional dummies - - - - -  - - - 
+ macroeconomic variables  
 
Yq40c = regional dummies - - - - - - - - 
+ macroeconomic variables 
 
2) Total effect 
 
Yp20s = regional  0.75** - -0.16* - -  - -0.51*** - 
dummies + macro-  -0.08**  0.15    0.058**  
economic variables  
     
Yp20c = regional  - - -0.19** - -  - -0.41** -0.08* 
dummies + macro-     0.02**    0.046* 0.010* 
economic variables         
    
Yp40s = regional  0.60*** - -0.17** - -  - -0.45*** -0.10** 
dummies + macro-  -0.07*** 0.017*    0.053*** 0.012** 
economic variables  
     
Yp40c = regional  0.51* - -0.18** -   - -0.38** -0.09** 
dummies + macro-   -0.06*  0.018**    0.044** 0.012**  
economic variables  
 
Note: Under the rubric specifications we denote the different basic equations which are tested with openness indicators. E.g. 
Yq20 = regional dummies means that the first quintile share is regressed on regional dummy variables and eight different 
combinations. In the matrix we indicate coefficients of significant openness indicators. * denotes signficance at 90 % level, ** at 
the 95 % level, and *** at the 99 % level (two-sided alternative). Yq20/40s: ln(Q20/40/0.2) unadjusted approach. Yq20/40c: ln(Q20/40/0.2) 
adjusted approach. Yp20/40s: logarithm of mean income of the 20/20 to 40 percent poorest (unadjusted approach). Yp20/40c: 
logarithm of mean income of 20/20 to 40 percent poorest (adjusted approach). All regressions without outliers.  Agex/Agim: 
Agriculture exports/imports. Foex/Foim: Food exports/imports. Maex/Maim: Manufactures exports/imports. Exdu/Imdu: 
Export/Import duties. Yagex/Yagim: Agriculture exports/imports * ln(Y). Yfoex/Yfoim: Food exports/imports * ln(Y). 
Ymaex/Ymaim: Manufactures exports/imports * ln(Y). Yexdu/Yimdu: Export/Import duties * ln(Y). 
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Table 22: First/Second Quintile and Openness Indicators plus 
Interactions term - Developing countries (System GMM estimation) 
 
Openness indicators:  Agex Agim Foex Foim Maex Maim Exdu Imdu  
Yagex Yagim Yfoex Yfoim Ymaex Ymaim Yexdu Yimdu  
1) Distribution effect 
 
Specifications:  
  
Yq20s = regional   0.72*** - - 0.46*** - - - - 
dummies   -0.08***  -0.06*** 
 
Yq20c = regional  0.70*** - - 0.44** - - - - 
dummies   -0.08***  -0.05**     
           
Yq40s = regional   0.51*** - - 0.22* - - - - 
dummies   -0.06***  -0.03* 
 
Yq40c = regional  0.49*** - - 0.23* - - - - 
dummies   -0.06***  -0.03 
 
Yq20s = regional  1.02*** - - 0.55** -  - - -  
dummies + macro-  -0.12***  -0.06**     
economic variables  
 
Yq20c = regional  1.02** 1.37* - 0.59** - - - - 
dummies + macro-  -0.12** -0.15*  -0.07**    
economic variables 
    
Yq40s = regional  0.75*** - - - -  - - - 
dummies + macro-  -0.09*** 
economic variables  
 
Yq40c = regional  0.76*** - - - - - - - 
dummies + macro-  -0.09***      
economic variables 
 
2) Total effect 
 
Yp20s = regional  1.32** - -0.44*** - -  - -0.79*** -0.13** 
dummies + macro-  -0.15**  0.052***   0.093***  0.017**  
economic variables  
     
Yp20c = regional  - - -0.40*** - -  - -0.58* -0.13** 
dummies + macro-     0.047***   0.067*  0.017** 
economic variables         
    
Yp40s = regional  1.09**  - -0.43*** - -  - -0.68*** -0.14** 
dummies + macro-  -0.13**  0.050***   0.081***  0.018*** 
economic variables  
     
Yp40c = regional  0.99* - -0.42*** -   - -0.52** -0.13** 
dummies + macro-   -0.11*  0.049***   0.062** 0.017**  
economic variables  
 
 
Note: see table 21.  
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General conclusion 
 
In our empirical research we have analyzed the effects of external indebtedness, exchange rate 
regimes and trade policy on pro-poor growth. To cover these issues, we have estimated the 
distribution effect and the total effect, i.e. the distribution and growth effect, on the 20 and 20 to 
40 percent poorest in an irregular and unbalanced panel of time-series cross-section 
observations. Concerning the econometric methodology, we have applied a growth equation 
estimating pooled OLS, random or fixed effects models and a system GMM estimator. 
 
Empirical findings for debt indicators do not indicate an optimal level of external debt with 
respect to pro-poor growth. On the other hand, higher external debt is associated with negative 
effects on the level of the income of the poorest 40 percent without exhibiting significant effects 
on the growth rates. If we abstract from political economy and bad governance issues, a 
cautious interpretation would be that debt relief may affect the poor positively. However, debt 
relief seems not to be a sufficient policy instrument for increased growth rates of the income of 
the poorest 40 percent.  
 
Empirical results for exchange rate regimes differ considerably with respect to exchange rate 
regimes classifications, developing and industrial countries, and econometric specifications. 
Even if the empirical findings are only weakly robust, we emphasize the positive effects of 
intermediate regimes on the poorest 40 percent in developing countries for the Reinhart/Rogoff 
(2003) classification.  
 
Finally, liberalization of agricultural raw material exports is very important for the poorest 40 
percent of low-income developing countries due to both the distribution and total effect. In 
addition, liberalization in agricultural imports is highly positively related to the mean income of 
the poor without changing the distribution. On the other hand, liberalization in food markets and 
manufactures imports are not associated with poverty alleviation in low-income developing 
countries. Finally, a promotion of manufactures exports and reductions of export and import 
duties seem to increase the mean income of the poorest 40 percent in low-income developing 
countries only via the growth effect. 
 
One problem of the empirical findings, however, is the fact that coefficients of our policy 
variables vary considerably due to robustness analyses and different econometric 
specifications. In addition, we often find weak or no statistically significant effects of our policy 
variables. Thus, to interpret these inconsistent results with respect to poverty reduction, we 
conclude the research with some notes on our empirical approach.  
 
Estimating poverty effects of policy indicators is a difficult task due to the limited data availability 
of poverty measures. We have used unadjusted and adjusted first and second quintile share of 
income as basis for our pro-poor indicators. While this approach is in the tradition of quintile 
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cross-country regressions, the average income of the poorest 20 and 20 to 40 percent  
measures poverty only in an aggregate way concealing changes of the economic situation for 
different social groups (Klasen 2003). In addition, data quality of household surveys may be 
weak for the lowest quintiles in developing countries due to reporting errors and sample biases 
(Eastwood/Lipton 2001, Winters/McCulloch/McKay 2002, Goldberg/Pavcnik 2004).300 
Furthermore, our sample is very irregular with respect to the frequency of country-specific 
observations due to limited availability of income inequality data, which may influence the 
empirical results (Eastwood/Lipton 2001). 
 
In addition, the cross-country approach has been criticized by its weakness for our purpose. 
First, standard linear specifications in cross-country regressions may incorrectly simplify 
complex relationships between growth and poverty (Bourguignon 2002). Second, estimating 
only ad hoc regressions may have something unsatisfactory due to the absence of a solid 
theoretical framework (Srinivasan/Bhagwati 2001). Finally, cross-country regressions may 
generalize in estimating isolated effects only on average, which may completely offset 
contradictory poverty effects of policy indicators in different countries (Ravallion 2001, 
Bourguignon 2002).  
 
To conclude, interpretation of statistically insignificant poverty effects of our policy indicators 
should be cautious, since empirical findings may be different at the country level. Thus micro-
economic analysis of distributional changes and poverty effects in case studies may help to 
understand specific country experiences and may reveal further insights in the impact of our 
policy indicators on pro-poor growth.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
300 Measurements of the first and second quintile may be biased due to underreporting of the rich in household surveys 
in developing countries (Eastwood/Lipton 2001). 
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